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ABSTRACT 
 
WONDERFULLY AND FEARFULLY MADE 
Hans Urs von Balthasar on the Metaphysical Significance of the Wonder of a Child and the 
Fruitfulness of Human Sexual Difference 
 
Angus David Ingvar Reid 
 
Hans Urs von Balthasar promotes a concrete metaphysics whereby humans disclose the reality of 
being as a whole within their lives. Being’s superabundant mystery is encountered and manifested in 
the beauty, goodness and truth of human interactions. This receives its fullest articulation in 
interpersonal love wherein created being shines most brightly as a loving gift of participation in 
divine being. For Balthasar, the human capacity to grasp and share being as whole, and so the task of 
metaphysics, rests in childlike wonder at being’s radiant beauty. Against perspectives that laud the 
autonomous adult self, I develop this aspect of Balthasar’s vision to defend the abiding significance 
of the child-parent relationship and human sexual difference. In this, however, I also critique 
Balthasar’s views on the latter. I claim his univocal identification of the female with receptivity and 
the male with activity contravenes his metaphysics. Working critically within Balthasar’s thought, I 
extend what is implicit therein: the relationships between mother, father and child, and male and 
female humanity primordially and paradigmatically communicate created being's fruitful openness 
to, and difference from, divine being. I maintain these relationships carry a mantle at once 
fundamental, fragile and full of promise. They inscribe in human nature a predilection for gratuitous 
wonder at being's beauty. I argue the male-female difference and child-parent relationship serve as 
co-principles of being’s beauty. As such, they underpin the metaphysical expression of human 
fruitfulness which cannot, however, be limited to procreation and family, but is communicated in 
the richness of human creativity. Nevertheless, whenever these constitutive relationships are 
threatened so too is beauty and, therefore, being’s goodness and truth, and the human vocation to 
love to the fullest. Here metaphysics receives its concrete measure of truthfulness in its ability to 
celebrate, safeguard and pass on the wonder of a child. 
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Introduction 
Jesus…said, ‘Truly I tell you, unless you change and become like children, you will never 
enter the kingdom of heaven….’1  
Jesus celebrates children and the attitude of being  like a child.2 Hans Urs von Balthasar takes this as 
a basic anthropological principle. To be childlike is the ‘original form, the Alpha’ out of which every 
human receives what is needful for living towards their final form, ‘the Omega.’3 Balthasar locates 
the significance of this beyond the merely human since he holds human beings disclose the nature of 
being itself. What it means to be human (anthropology) and the question of being (metaphysics) 
entwine in what Balthasar calls ‘meta-anthropology’.4 From this perspective, metaphysics is no mere 
abstract intellectual pursuit but basic to being human. It concerns how each person encounters and 
expresses being’s reality in their concrete lives. In Balthasar’s eyes, the weight Jesus attributes to 
children and childlikeness is, therefore, crucial to the question: why is there something rather than 
nothing? This is quintessentially a child’s question whose manner of asking bears the seed of its 
response and comes fully to itself on the wings of a child’s wonder. Childlike wonder is the hidden 
yet ubiquitous way of journeying into being’s inexhaustible mystery. Significantly, for Balthasar, the 
interplay of childlike wonder and ontological mystery does not just emerge once a child is sufficiently 
aware to ponder existence. Rather, the original form of each child’s self-consciousness is fashioned 
out of wonder insofar as every child is awoken to self-conscious freedom by others.  
The meta-anthropological import of childlikeness, therefore, is tied to the human relationships that 
are concrete conditions of possibility for each child’s self-conscious existence. If the marvel of being 
is disclosed decisively, albeit embryonically, in the wonder of a child – both in a child’s wondrous 
existence and its awe-filled experience of being – then this redounds upon sexual difference and the 
child-parent relationship. And, indeed, Balthasar treats as metaphysically significant the events of 
conception, pregnancy, birth and a child’s awakening to self-consciousness through its parents’ love. 
He assigns equal importance to the sexual and personal fruitfulness of human sexual difference. This 
metaphysical framework means human procreation is not merely biological. Neither are the 
germinal experiences of childhood, parental nurture and the interpersonal exchanges of love simply 
emotional or psychological. Nor are questions of sexual difference and the parent-child relationship 
just social, legal and cultural issues. While these perspectives are vital, they assume things about 
 
1 Matthew, 18:2-3 (NRSV). Cf., Mark, 10:14-16; Luke, 18:16-17. 
2 For other related passages, see Matthew, 18:10, 19:14, 21:16, 18:10; Luke, 2:46-47, 10:21; John, 1:13, 18; 
3:3, 5. 
3 UBC, 15. 
4 MW, 114. 
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humanity and being. What Balthasar insists upon, however, is that these metaphysical and 
anthropological presuppositions, to avoid lifeless abstraction, cannot be separated from the child-
parent relationship and sexual difference. Similarly, these relationships are impacted by how being 
and humanity are conceived of and judged to fit together.  
1. Issue at Hand: Metaphysics and Sexual Difference 
It is Balthasar’s advocacy of the metaphysical significance of these constitutive human relationships 
that is the focus of this thesis. I expound and defend Balthasar’s integral association of metaphysics 
with the child-parent relationship and human sexual difference. Yet, I show how this vision 
challenges Balthasar’s own problematic account of male and female humanity. Let me expand. 
In working critically within Balthasar’s metaphysical framework, it is noteworthy that Balthasar does 
not systematically present his metaphysical schema in one place. Rather, it underpins and is 
developed throughout his vast oeuvre. This is important to highlight because part of the present task 
involves offering an interpretation of Balthasar’s metaphysics.  
To offer an outline of the key elements of the latter pertinent to this thesis, Balthasar grounds his 
account of metaphysics as meta-anthropology in a traditional catholic Christian theological 
understanding of being and human nature, a tradition he develops. This interweaves several 
components. First, created being is not mere factual existence but a superabundant actuality that 
accounts for everything’s existence whose fullness actively shows itself in, beyond, but never 
without the concrete reality of actual beings. Balthasar employs the idiom of Martin Heidegger’s 
ontological difference between Being (das Sein) and beings (das Seiende).5 He adapts this, however, 
to Thomas Aquinas’ real distinction between existence, understood as the actuality of being (esse), 
and essence (essentia).6 Each being (ens) is a complex whole comprised of a dynamic tension 
between esse, the act whereby anything exists at all, and its essence, the act that constitutes what a 
particular being is.7 
 
5 Martin Heidegger, The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, trans. Albert Hofstadter (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1982), 318. 
6 John F. Wippel summarises the medieval debate regarding the real distinction. See “Essence and Existence in 
Later Medieval Philosophy,” in Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy, ed. Norman Kretzmann et 
al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 385-410. 
7 Echoing Balthasar, I use Aquinas’ terminology of esse for being as pure actuality. I consider this coterminous 
with esse commune; that is, esse considered in general wherein all beings participate for existence. In the 
English translation of Balthasar’s work this is rendered by the capitalised ‘Being’ for creation, whereas 
‘Absolute Being’ concerns God. I understand actus essendi as concerning esse as participated by beings as the 
source of their essence’s actuality. ‘A being’ and ‘beings’ concern subsistent entities comprised of esse and 
essence. This matches the singular ens and plural entia in Thomist terms. When I employ ‘being’, ‘being itself’, 
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Secondly, this distinction rests on the theological doctrine of creatio ex nihilo where created being is 
a gift of God’s diffusive love. Each being exists by receiving esse, and so its essential nature, as a gift 
of participation in the superabundant act of divine being (ipsum esse subsistens). As I explore below, 
Balthasar subscribes to an analogical notion of being (analogia entis) where the unity-in-difference 
between divine and created being expresses itself, in finite terms, as the dynamic between esse and 
essence. 
Thirdly, Balthasar follows Aquinas and Aristotle in affirming that humanity’s embodied spiritual 
nature has ‘the capacity to view the world as a whole, indeed Being as a whole’;8 is ‘quodammodo 
omnia’ (in some manner, all things); and, ‘convenire cum omni ente' (meant to fit in with all being).9 
Each human, by reflecting being within themselves in spiritual terms, encapsulates being's 
transcendence which underpins human self-conscious freedom.10 This informs the meta-
anthropological task which ‘takes man in his freedom as the key to understanding being – without, 
however, slipping into an anthropological reduction.’11 This relationship means that ’human 
structures are able to illuminate the meaning of being in itself….’12  
While Balthasar clearly engages in abstract reflection, the foregoing aspects combine in his 
metaphysics’ characteristically concrete focus.  Early in his thought Balthasar states, ‘these first 
principles cannot be abstract propositions, since it is precisely not on the basis of abstraction that we 
arrive at them: they must be concrete and immediate encounters, not only with the laws of Being, 
but with Being itself.’13 As will become apparent, the concrete is not identical to the particularity of 
an individual being existing in a specific circumstance in contradistinction to universal notions of 
essence or form. Rather, Balthasar attests to the intrinsic relationship between the universal and 
particular in actual beings open to esse. 
 
or similar, unless indicated, I mean finite being in its complex dynamic between esse and essence considered in 
general. In Aquinas’ idiom this is ens commune. For further explanation, see John F. Wippel, The Metaphysical 
Thought of Thomas Aquinas: From Finite Being to Uncreated Being (Washington, DC: Catholic University of 
America Press, 2000), 120-137. 
8 GL5, 615. Cf., ST, 1a.76.5 ad.4.  
9 De Veritate, 1.1; cf., Aristotle, De Anima, trans. R.D. Hicks (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1907), 
431b21. 
10 E, 39. See also ExT3, 17-18. Cf., Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on the Book of Causes, trans. Vincent A. 
Guagliardo et al. (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America, 1996), 98-102. 
11 Martin Bieler, “Future of the Philosophy of Being,” Communio: International Catholic Review 26, (1999): 472. 
12 DST, 259.   
13 Hans Urs von Balthasar, “On the Task of Catholic Philosophy in Our Time,” Communio: International Catholic 
Review 20, (1993): 150.   
13 
 
Balthasar deepens this. Being manifests itself concretely according to the so-called transcendental 
aspects of beauty, goodness and truth.14 Against modern transcendentalism, Balthasar treats these 
not simply as aspects of human cognition. They are distinctions inherent to esse as it subsists in 
actual beings and are fully disclosed in spiritual nature. What further characterises Balthasar’s 
thought is how this transcendental realism is rooted in and expressed as love. The transcendentals 
are key moments of love's self-giving and receiving reciprocity understood as being’s very meaning. 
Within this scheme, Balthasar allots primacy to beauty. Beauty’s importance is evident throughout 
Balthasar’s work, most conspicuously in his trilogy whose order places beauty first. As Balthasar 
reflects, this is 'a primal decision which includes all later ones for the person whose life is based on 
response and decision….’15 Beauty comes first as the gratuitous showing of esse’s superabundant 
mystery in the inexhaustible concrete reality of the forms, or, in Balthasar’s idiom, Gestalten, of 
actual beings.16 Gestalt is pivotal in Balthasar’s metaphysical thought.17 It captures how any being 
appears as a concrete whole according to a distinct pattern which manifests the intelligibility and 
ever-greater mystery of their essential and existential reality. Within Gestalt’s self-transcending 
dynamic, the beauty of being’s ever-greater mystery and openness to the divine appears concretely, 
inviting further discovery proper to the good and true.  
Matching beauty’s primacy is wonder at ‘the miracle of being.’18 Wonder is not purely subjective. It 
is the whole subject’s response to being’s objective appearance as worthy of wonder.19 In this, 
humans are, for Balthasar, contemplatively receptive to actual beings in their irreducible difference 
and actively engaged with them, judging and interpreting each being against being's ever-greater 
reality. This involves an aesthetic judgement engaging not just the imagination, the will or the 
intellect but the entire person, and applies to every act of human cognition.20 Metaphysics is, 
therefore, for Balthasar, a discipline that begins, abides and ends in wonder at being’s beauty. Here 
he adapts Plato, Aristotle, Augustine, Aquinas, Heidegger, amongst others.21 Such wonder invites us 
 
14 MW, 115-116. 
15 GL1, 17. 
16 Unless stated otherwise, I use form and Gestalt interchangeably. 
17 GL5, 339-407. D.C. Schindler states ‘Gestalt is, for Balthasar, the fundamental form of being and the ultimate 
vessel of meaning.’ DST, 166. 
18 GL5, 613. 
19 GL1, 17. 
20 Cf. GL1, 164, 174, 179, 234, and, especially, 241-257. 
21 GL1, 24, 71. Cf., Plato, “Theaetetus,” trans. M. J. Levett and Myles Burnyeat, in Complete Works, ed. John M. 
Cooper (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1997), 155d; Metaphysics, I.2.982b9; Thomas Aquinas, Commentary 
on the Metaphysics, trans. John P. Rowan (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1961), 1.3. On the significance of wonder, 
see Michael Funk Deckard and Péter Losonczi, eds. Philosophy Begins in Wonder: An Introduction to Early 
Modern Philosophy, Theology and Science (Cambridge: James Clarke, 2011); and, Mary-Jane Rubenstein, 
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to the marvel of the ‘First Thing: to what is apparently the most obvious, the most unquestioned of 
all things: sheer existence.’22 We must not presuppose being is fully understood. We are to 
interrogate it repeatedly; or better, let being interrogate us. Balthasar here sees metaphysics as 
charged with a commission to stand against the forgetfulness of being and beings.23 Positively, this 
translates into the human calling to champion wonder and be ‘guardians’ and ‘shepherds’ of being.24  
For classical and medieval thinkers, however, metaphysics is patently an occupation of a mature 
mind. As Charles Taylor argues, this becomes fateful for how metaphysics is challenged in Western 
thought. The philosophy and social practices of modernity claim to dispense with metaphysics and 
its attendant wonder as make-believe. Against such childish ways is extolled the adult rational mind 
that deals with empirically verifiable reality and the ethical behaviour of self-directing individuals.25 
These modern perspectives have in turn been challenged as humanly imposed fictions. In their stead 
is proposed an immanent shaping of a world that liberates human creativity, giving rise to a 
profusion of different views of reality – so-called post-modernism. This is the culmination of 
modernity's narrative of maturation against a childish religious worldview. In this rejection of 
metaphysics, whether modern or postmodern, lies a dismissal of childlikeness and a child’s 
dependence on others. 
By contrast, as noted above, Balthasar defends childlike wonder. He attributes metaphysical priority 
to how each child awakens as a self-conscious spirit in wholehearted wonder at being’s beauty 
mediated by sexual fruitfulness and parental love. This primordial event echoes Balthasar’s primal 
decision to begin with beauty. It is a decision both bestowed and taken since a child’s own decision 
for beauty is enabled by the parents’ welcoming love. A child’s dependence, therefore, is not 
opposed to, but constitutes, the freedom that springs from the human capacity for wonder. This 
animates all intellectual endeavour and free action, of the wise and unwise alike.26 Insofar as 
everyone has been born a child and remains fundamentally a child, a metaphysics rooted in wonder 
belongs to everyone. This fleshes out Balthasar’s metaphysical take on Jesus’ injunction to celebrate 
 
Strange Wonder: The Closure of Metaphysics and the Opening of Awe (Chichester: Columbia University Press, 
2008). 
22 E, 45. 
23 GL5, 655. Balthasar draws on Heidegger’s notion of Seinsvergessenheit. Cf. Martin Heidegger, “The Onto-
Theo-Logical Constitution of Metaphysics,” in Identity and Difference, trans. Joan Stambaugh (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2002), 50-72. 
24 GL5, 656. 
25 Charles Taylor, “What is Secularity?” in Transcending Boundaries in Philosophy and Theology, ed. Kevin 
Vanhoozer and Martin Warner (Hampshire: Ashgate, 2007), 57; and, A Secular Age (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2007), 572-575; 587-589. 
26 TL1, 8. 
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childlikeness. Metaphysics should ‘raise the banner’ for childhood.27 Christ lauds childhood as ‘a 
paradigm of existence.’28 This is vital to an adult maturity based not on ‘self-glorying autonomy’ but 
‘humble service.29 Metaphysics thus conceived lauds attitudes self-evident to the child: ‘self-
reception from another and thanksgiving for the gift of existence…, yet without dispensing us of the 
burden of responsibility (which we retain as mature adults).’30 Childlikeness is, therefore, not simply 
metaphorical.31 It is of catholic significance: to be childlike is indispensable for unveiling being’s 
meaning, as are the relationships upon which each child relies for its being and freedom. 
This brings us to the place of sexual difference in Balthasar’s thought. To clarify, my focus is limited 
to human sexual difference as the concrete condition for a child’s coming to being and its awakening 
in wonder to self-conscious freedom. In this, I do not mean to suggest that sexual difference is only 
about children. Sexual difference is no univocal reality understood one way according to a fixed 
pattern. I recognise it to be a multivalent reality encompassing a complex set of distinctions 
between, and interpretations of, biology, bodily differences, psychology, sexuality, reproductive 
capacity and social/cultural roles at the least. As Rowan Williams suggests, in critical engagement 
with Balthasar, even if we grant that sexual difference is a ‘peculiarly focal case’ of functional 
difference vis-à-vis reproduction this should not exclude other levels of difference that concern, say, 
the body or sexual desire.32 Williams also queries whether this functional, reproductive focus of 
sexual difference ‘so overrides differences between diverse male and diverse female subjects as to 
allow us to assume a basic and defining polarity.’33 While I agree on the importance of protecting the 
wealth of differences that converge on and complexify sexual difference, I question the implication 
that reproduction is merely functional or that a basic polarity need override other differences. 
Rather, with Balthasar, I affirm that the advent of a new child reveals something unique about the 
metaphysical significance of sexual difference’s fruitfulness that is basic to protecting the fruitful 
difference at being's core. 
The ambiguity of the question of sexual difference is apparent in contemporary Western culture. I 
examine some of these issues in chapter three insofar as they concern this thesis’ metaphysical 
focus, especially how sexual difference is variously understood as a function of human essence or 
 
27 Hans Urs von Balthasar, “The Presence of the Child,” Communio: International Catholic Review 29, (2002): 
796. 
28 Ibid., 796. 
29 EXT5, 214. Cf., GL1, 179. 
30 ExT5, 214. 
31 ExT5, 216. 
32 Rowan Williams, “Balthasar and the Trinity,” in The Cambridge Companion to Hans Urs von Balthasar, ed. 
Edward T. Oakes and David Moss (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 46.  
33 Ibid., 46.  
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construct. It is here that we also meet the problematic aspect of Balthasar vision. Balthasar’s 
metaphysical thought, as outlined above, supports a perspective where both essence and construct 
are located in the overarching perspective of being’s fruitful superabundance. Balthasar espouses a 
dramatic notion of human nature as receptive to and actively expressive of being that depends on 
and creatively transforms human essence. The latter cannot be limited to a fixed essence if it is to do 
justice to the wonder of being. Indeed, Balthasar insists a metaphysical account of sexual difference 
goes beyond even integrating the biological, socially-constructed and essential into a creative self-
defining dramatic notion of human nature. It must reach into being itself. 
Despite this, however, Balthasar promotes an essentialist perspective when he identifies maleness 
with activity and femaleness with receptivity. The implications are far-reaching not least because 
Balthasar's views have been influential on the Catholic Church which, Balthasar asserts, alone 
protects the significance of human sexual difference.34 Indeed, Balthasar’s thought has been accused 
of supporting a politically-motivated enforcement of narrow gender roles within the Church and 
beyond.35 More broadly, his views on sexual difference feed accusations he fails to recognize ‘the 
liaisons between social power and knowledge.’36 The disjunction between his views of sexual 
difference and metaphysics is jolting given the latter’s depth. As Lucy Gardner and David Moss ask, 
‘[i]s all this to founder on Balthasar’s account of sexual difference?’37  
I take up this question’s challenge. As Williams articulates it, Balthasar’s account of sexual 
difference, ‘tantalizingly both opens up revolutionary perspectives and intimates some very firm and 
traditional closures….’ To address this, Williams urges ‘more than an enlightened outrage at a 
rhetoric of sexual differentiation apparently in thrall to unexamined patriarchy....’ A response should 
be made from Balthasar’s ‘own rhetoric’ of ‘the extraordinary affirmation of simultaneous and 
reciprocal difference that his account of…the relation of God to creation insists upon....’38 In this 
spirit, I examine Balthasar’s views on sexual difference from within his metaphysics. Nuancing 
Williams’ comment on patriarchy, however, I wish to validate some of the outrage Balthasar’s views 
garner.39 A response of outrage need not be solely attributed to unthinking accusations of patriarchy 
but can arise from delving into being itself. This allows us to probe critically a ‘central unclarity’ in 
 
34 NE, 195. 
35 Cf., Fergus Kerr, Twentieth-Century Catholic Theologians: From Neoscholasticism to Nuptial Mysticism 
(Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2007), 121-144. 
36 Oliver Davies, ”Von Balthasar and the Problem of Being,” New Blackfriars 79, (1998): 15. 
37  Lucy Gardner and David Moss, “Something like Time; Something like the Sexes – An Essay in Reception,” in 
Balthasar at the End of Modernity, ed. Lucy Gardner et al. (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1999), 100. 
38 Rowan Williams, “Afterword: Making Differences,” in Gardner et al., Balthasar at the End of Modernity, 177. 
39 Cf., Linn Marie Tonstad, God and Difference: The Trinity, Sexuality and the Transformation of Finitude 
(London: Routledge, 2016), 28, 54n.66.  
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Balthasar’s thought about sexual difference.40 To hold fast to Balthasar’s metaphysics, however, 
means such probing should proceed carefully to ensure that any clarity sought derives from a notion 
of being which holds together clarity and mystery, unity and difference, wonder and daily existence 
in contrast to a clarity that reduces the concrete to abstraction. The hope is to distinguish when the 
‘tantalizing’ in Balthasar’s thought about sexual difference serves the wonder attendant upon 
being's beauty; and, when it accompanies a problematic avowal of ambiguity pitted against the 
concrete. 
2. Thesis Statement 
Against this backdrop, I offer an apologetic defence of the metaphysical value Balthasar allots to the 
wonder-filled attitude of being childlike. I argue this requires a concomitant affirmation of the 
metaphysical significance of human sexual difference as the fruitful unity-in-difference whose fruit is 
a child awoken to self-conscious freedom as spirit through others’ love. Balthasar does not fully or 
consistently develop this connection. As an apologia that is critical, I challenge Balthasar’s rendition 
of human sexual difference, particularly how he identifies the female with receptivity and the male 
with activity. I argue this contravenes his metaphysical commitments. This criticism, however, serves 
my apologetic aim to defend the importance of the constitutive human relationships for a 
concretely-focused metaphysics.  
I maintain the relationships of child-parent, mother-father, and female-male play this role as specific 
anthropological relationships that constitute and communicate the form of humanity’s embodied 
spiritual nature in its openness to being as a whole. They represent concrete differences that in their 
shared fruitfulness generatively enact and disclose the differences that comprise finite being’s 
analogical reality. More specifically, I hold that the male-female difference and the child-parent 
relationship serve this purpose as co-principles of being’s beauty. They are crucial to warding off the 
evisceration of humanity’s capacity for wonder at being. They provide the concretely human context 
wherein being’s beauty, goodness and truth are safeguarded, handed on and fulfilled in the fruitful 
reciprocity of interpersonal love as being's meaning. 
I delineate this status of the constitutive human relationships as primordial, paradigmatic, yet non-
exclusive. They are primordial and paradigmatic because they impact every human person by virtue 
of their being born to sexual difference and awoken to self-consciousness by parental others. Each 
person is, as a child, shaped by how male and female jointly yet differently enact the fruitfulness of 
being’s beauty, goodness and truth. This is not, however, to limit the most metaphysically significant 
 
40 Williams, “Afterword: Making Differences,” 177. 
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human act of creativity to having and raising children. Rather, I claim these constitutive human 
relationships are also non-exclusive. They unveil the fruitful pattern of the metaphysical nature of 
human creativity. These relationships do not exclude but give birth to, underscore and are the 
concrete metaphysical measure and wellspring of the myriad ways humans enact being’s fruitfulness 
beyond reproduction and family. 
3. Theology, Philosophy and Metaphysics 
Given this study’s metaphysical focus, let me clarify how I employ a notion of metaphysics 
understood from a philosophical perspective informed by Christian theology. This echoes Balthasar’s 
perspective. Metaphysics can, however, be interpreted differently. D Stephen Long suggests five 
possibilities:  
First, metaphysics is a philosophical invective used against an imprecise use of language, which 
speaks of being or beings for which there can be neither verification nor falsification 
(metaphysics 1). Second, metaphysics is a totalizing discourse that presents Being as origin, 
cause, and goal and thinks everything within its structure (metaphysics 2). Third, metaphysics is 
the inevitable opening of a sign that exceeds its context (metaphysics 3). Fourth, metaphysics is 
the beyond that interrupts immanence ‘in the middle’ (metaphysics 4). Fifth, metaphysics is a 
beyond that secures the presence of any sign such that the sign is unnecessary. It is an objective, 
universal validation where a sign corresponds to a reality such that the reality could be known 
without the sign. In fact, the reality secures the sign and not vice versa (metaphysics 5). 
(Metaphysics 5 is the ‘cartoon Platonism’ post-metaphysical philosophy critiques and which can 
still be found in some post-Tridentine Catholic versions of the ‘analogia entis.’ Metaphysics 3 
and 4 are also versions of the ‘analogia entis.’)41  
Balthasar’s metaphysics combines the third and fourth definitions. He sits critically to the fifth 
definition, reflecting his dissatisfaction with Neo-Scholasticism. He implicitly disagrees with the first 
model which amounts to a metaphysical nominalism. As Fergus Kerr notes, this pits Balthasar against 
‘the standard conceptions of metaphysics in Anglo-American [analytical] philosophy.’42 Balthasar 
also challenges the rejection of metaphysics articulated in the second definition as associated with a 
post-metaphysical continental philosophy. 
 
41 D. Stephen Long, Speaking of God: Theology, Language and Truth (Cambridge: Eerdmans, 2009), 9-10. For 
‘cartoon Platonism,’ see William Desmond, “Neither Servility nor Sovereignty,” in Theology and the Political: 
The New Debate, ed. Creston Davis, John Milbank, and Slavoj Žižek (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2005), 
155.  
42 Fergus Kerr, “Balthasar and metaphysics,” in Oakes and Moss, Companion to Hans Urs von Balthasar, 224. 
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Rather Balthasar’s metaphysics encompasses an immanent sense of reality opening to the 
transcendent, and a transcendence unveiling itself in immanent reality while remaining 
transcendent. This bespeaks philosophy and theology’s inseparability. Without philosophy, theology 
suffers. Either it relies on ‘a few dry, abstract concepts, or else, totally neglecting the philosophical 
foundations, it will improvise a rough-and-ready philosophical foundation for itself and will tend to 
draw support from ideologically-colored material which it has not thought through.’43  To be ‘a 
serious theologian’, Balthasar says, one must be a philosopher immersed ‘in the mysterious 
structures of creaturely being....'44 This does not collapse theology into philosophy. Rather, Balthasar 
resists a premature foreclosure of what can be said about created being via a fideistic leap into 
theology. He also cautions against the opposite reduction of reality to human reason, however 
construed. Rather theology and philosophy aim differently but inseparably at the one reality of 
being.45  
Beyond the merely philosophical, however, theology provides a perspective on being based on God's 
free disclosure which enriches philosophical metaphysics. Indeed, regarding the question of being, 
Balthasar proposes a distinctive third option between a pure philosophy based on reason alone and 
a pure theology rooted in faith and revelation. Instead, reason is illumined by and moves within the 
light of faith wherein ‘the light of Being can itself shine much brighter and deeper....’46 It is this third 
approach that I adopt. While, therefore, a philosophical metaphysics is indispensable, theological 
reality deepens and transforms metaphysics.47 This third integrated approach matches Balthasar’s 
prioritization of beauty which 'forgetfully' crosses the boundaries of philosophy and theology – 
beauty appears 'to be so transcendent in itself that it glide[s] with perfect continuity from the 
natural into the supernatural world.’48 That said, Balthasar is adamant that Christianity is ‘the 
guardian of that metaphysical wonderment which is the point of origin for philosophy and the 
continuation of which is the basis of its further existence.’49 Such vital wonder is underwritten by 
God ‘who is pre-eminently the guardian and the shepherd’ of the miracle of being.50 
 
43 TL1, xiv.  
44 TL1, 8. 
45 Cf., GL1, 143; TL2, 159.  
46 GL1, 159n.9.  
47 GL1, 144-145. 
48 GL1, 34. Cf., John Milbank’s distinction between Romantic and Classical Orthodoxy. The former opposes the 
objective pure reason of the latter, instead stressing how reason too participates in the divine as gift and 
cannot stand apart from faith and aesthetic judgement. See “The New Divide: Romantic Versus Classical 
Orthodoxy,” Modern Theology 26, (2010): 26-38. 
49 GL5, 646. 
50 GL5, 636.  
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The foregoing dovetails with the discipline of fundamental theology which is concerned with the 
possibility of doing theology itself. As Balthasar says, it asks how God’s revelation is perceived, 
received and enacted.51 Fundamental theology seeks to ensure that the truths of Christianity speak 
as a vital unity to the whole of human experience, including reason's quest. Without this the living 
kernel of dogmatic theology is not accessed and remains detached from the life of the intellect. Here 
theology will, as D.C. Schindler says, ‘collapse into mere history, fideism, biblical positivism, 
moralism, or a program of social justice and political action….’52 This echoes Balthasar’s criticism of 
an apologetics that piles up reasons for accepting Christian faith to force a clumsy assent.53 Against 
these, philosophy and theology must continually return to transformative concrete encounters open 
to being's beauty. This insists that knowledge of truth cannot be gained by ‘turning away from that 
which is concretely finite (a movement which seems so natural!), but in turning towards the 
phenomenal existent (conversio ad phantasma) as the only place where the mystery of being will 
shine forth for him who exists bodily and spiritually.’54 Against, therefore, the claim that Balthasar 
proffers grace at the expense of nature – making nature a ‘vacuole for grace’55 – his concern for 
fundamental theology affirms Aquinas’ insistence that nature is presupposed, healed and fulfilled by 
grace.56 Nature is not abandoned but is where grace’s transformation is encountered and enacted. 
Indeed, Adrian Walker identifies Balthasar’s metaphysics as especially suited for the task of 
retrieving nature amid a cultural undermining of the ‘distinction between the artificial and the 
natural, the made and the born….’57 
The different approaches to metaphysics reflected above represents how its subject matter, being, is 
variously conceived. As mentioned, Balthasar’s metaphysics rest on the analogia entis. He is 
influenced here by Thomist thought, particularly Erich Przywara.58 I examine this more fully in the 
 
51 GL1, 125. Cf., GL1, 9, on the inseparability of dogmatic and fundamental theology. 
52 D.C. Schindler, “Surprised By Truth: The Drama Of Reason In Fundamental Theology,” Communio: 
International Catholic Review 31, (2004): 589-590. 
53 E, 45. 
54 GL1, 146. 
55 Steven A. Long, Natura Pura: On the Recovery of Nature in the Doctrine of Grace (New York: Fordham 
University Press, 2010), 52. 
56 E, 17-18. Cf., ST, 1a.1.8, ad.2, 1a.2.2, ad.1. 
57 Adrian J. Walker, “Love Alone: Hans Urs von Balthasar as a Master of Theological Renewal,” in Love Alone is 
Credible: Hans Urs Von Balthasar as Interpreter of the Catholic Tradition, Volume 1, ed. David L. Schindler 
(Cambridge: Eerdmans, 2008), 22n.14. 
58 Hans Urs Von Balthasar, The Theology of Karl Barth: Exposition and Interpretation, trans. Edward T. Oakes 
(San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1992), 255-256. Cf., Erich Przywara, Analogia Entis: Metaphysics Original 
Structure And Universal Rhythm, trans. John R. Betz and David Bentley Hart (Cambridge: Eerdmans, 2014). 
Michael Hanby, “Creation as Aesthetic Analogy,” in The Analogy of Being: Invention of the Antichrist or 
Wisdom of God? ed. Thomas Joseph White (Cambridge: Eerdmans, 2011), 343, notes an ‘impressionistic’ unity 
 
21 
 
first chapter. Here, however, I offer some background to an analogical notion of being to emphasize 
that Balthasar’s conception of being represents only one interpretation.59 This can be contrasted to 
other notions of being that do not, however, allot the same degree of significance to beauty or the 
concretely human, least of all the wonder of a child and sexual difference. 
The analogia entis, as Balthasar employs it, encompasses several distinct yet intersecting 
differences. There is, first, a transcendent or downward vertical aspect which reflects creatio ex 
nihilo and constitutes the fundamental distinction between God and creation as a matter of being. 
God's being is radically distinct from existing things as the source of everything’s being; yet, God’s 
transcendence underpins the radical nature of his immanence to all things as their source of being in 
their difference from God.60 Secondly, from a more immanent or horizontal perspective, are the 
differences which constitute created being, principally, the distinction between esse and essence 
which comprises the basic metaphysical polarity of any actual being. The horizontal analogy's 
dynamic tension between esse and essence points upward to the downward transcendent or vertical 
analogy. Thirdly, representing a more comprehensive analogia entis, is the relationship between 
these immanent and transcendent analogies. The difference between esse and essence in created 
reality is related to the difference between God and creation. This is articulated in the definition of 
analogy promulgated by the Fourth Lateran Council: ‘between Creator and creature no similitude 
can be expressed without implying a greater dissimilitude.’61  
These three aspects comprise, fourthly, a single complex pattern or form of created being which 
concretely encapsulates God’s greater dissimilarity within every similarity between God and 
creation.62 This reflects Balthasar’s sense of being's primal Gestalt which underpins the concrete 
Gestalten of created beings which shimmer with the light of the gift of God’s ever-greater being. It 
corresponds to an aesthetic notion of the analogia entis. The dissimilarity, therefore, is not sheer 
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negative absence that places God wholly outside creation over against the concrete. Rather, it is a 
dissimilarity manifest within the similarity between God and creation according to a certain 
intelligible, self-transcending pattern of being that affirms the integrity and freedom of creaturely 
becoming in openness to being as divine gift shared with all beings. In human terms, this takes on 
the concrete pattern of wonder-filled loving truthful service.  
Given the above, for Balthasar, the analogia entis patently concerns being itself. It is not merely 
about language or conceptual thought. Indeed, language and thought are inextricably bound up for 
Balthasar with being. This distinguishes him from perspectives influenced by analytical philosophy.63 
That said, the linguistic account of analogy is the immediate context where Aquinas distinguishes 
between a univocal, equivocal or analogical predication of names of God and creatures.64 Here 
analogy is located between univocity, where a term is used in the same way of God and creatures, 
and equivocity where a term is used incommensurably. Regarding the question of being, however, it 
is not simply an issue of terminology.65 Hence, as Aquinas stresses, there is an analogical likeness of 
being between God and creation.66 Here too, the language of univocity and equivocity is applicable 
where the former indicates an identity of divine and created being, and the latter an oppositional 
difference. Balthasar interprets Aquinas’ analogical understanding of being against a univocal sense 
identified particularly with Duns Scotus and William Ockham.67 For Scotus, being is not an actuality 
beyond essence as it is for Aquinas, but an abstract essential yet indeterminate concept that spans 
both infinite and finite being. Here reason’s univocal concept of being becomes an absolute beyond 
both God and creation that is isolated from concrete existing reality.68  Another distinction, not 
made explicitly by Aquinas, is the dialectical sense of being. This is a richly ambiguous term.69 In 
contemporary discussions about being, it is often used to denote a Hegelian dialectic where 
differences are subsumed into a higher dynamic unity.70  
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William Desmond provides a helpful summary of these different senses of being, contrasting them 
with a metaxological understanding of being, which is his term for an analogical sense of being.71 
If univocity stresses sameness, equivocity difference, dialectic the appropriation of 
difference within a mediated sameness, the metaxological reiterates, first a sense of 
otherness not to be included in dialectical self-mediation, second a sense of togetherness 
not reached by the equivocal, third a sense of rich ontological integrity not answered for by 
the univocal, and fourth a rich sense of ontological ambiguity not answered for either by the 
univocal, the equivocal, the dialectical [sic].72 
Analogy has, therefore, to do with affirming difference and unity. The contrast with the dialectical is 
that the latter tends to subsume difference in unity. Indeed, John Milbank, refining Desmond’s 
perspective, notes that the dialectical is problematic insofar as it affirms both a sameness treated as 
a univocal abstract unity and a difference understood as an equivocity between finite beings with no 
real mediation between them. This results in a split where we live univocally in our minds and 
equivocally in our bodies.73 These different accounts of being, however, need not be mutually 
exclusive. As Desmond argues, an analogical/metaxological understanding of being affirms the truth 
and interrelation of the univocal, equivocal and dialectical senses of being without reifying them.74  
That said, analogy always involves an element of paradox because it insists being cannot be 
univocally fixed. There are also different types of analogy.75 Indeed, as David Bentley Hart states, 
analogy can risk becoming equivocal.76 Thus, for example, Przywara’s formulation of the analogia 
entis, though influential on Balthasar, and cited by Karl Barth as the reason he did not become 
Catholic, does not represent ‘the key to Catholic doctrine incumbent on all to use.’77 Analogy is a 
middle, a between, that cannot be pinned down but requires ongoing exploration of likenesses and 
differences. This stresses the importance of continually attending to the presumptions underlying 
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any account of being. One of Balthasar’s distinctive contributions, I maintain, is that he holds the 
analogy of being finds its measure in concrete principles, particularly the unity-in-difference 
between male and female, and child and parent. 
4. Outline of Argument  
Given the foregoing, I aim to employ Balthasar’s metaphysics to argue for the singular significance of 
the child-parent relationship and human sexual difference in fruitfully communicating being's 
analogical reality as love according to the transcendental aspects of beauty, goodness and truth. To 
this end, I offer an exposition of Balthasar’s analogical account of being and its connection to the 
concretely interpersonal wherein being's unity-in-difference is encountered in wonder. Against 
concepts of the autonomous individual, I argue this metaphysical wonder reflects the abiding 
childlike, filial and interdependent character of human self-conscious freedom. Through this lens, I 
argue for the metaphysical significance of the child-parent relationship and human sexual difference. 
This puts Balthasar in opposition to many prevailing anti-metaphysical accounts of sex and gender. It 
also, however, motivates my critique of Balthasar’s understanding of sexual difference. I both 
criticise Balthasar using his metaphysical framework and offer an alternative account of sexual 
difference that accords with the latter. Finally, I show how the constitutive human relationships 
represent the concrete metaphysical conditions for the centrality of beauty to a notion of being that 
finds its fullest expression in the love shared between persons and which opens to the wonder of 
God's gift of divine being in all things. 
5. Critical Approach, Sources and Literature Review  
In pursuing this, I follow Balthasar’s metaphysical method as encapsulated in the motto to the 
Epilogue: ‘Whoever sees more of the truth is more profoundly right’ (Wer mehr Wahrheit sieht, hat 
mehr recht). Here ‘less extensive views are integrated into more comprehensive ones.’ 78 Balthasar 
distinguishes this from a Hegelian approach which asserts ‘Die Wahrheit ist die Ganze’ (the truth is 
the whole).79 This claims an absolute knowledge of being within a purely immanent reality which 
absorbs the transcendent. Such is the method of Hegelian dialectic or, as Balthasar calls it, 
‘evolution’, where ‘one breaks through to the new, while one cancels the old....’80 
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By contrast, Balthasar’s sense of seeing more enacts immanent reality’s openness to a transcendent 
ever-more which, because it can be encountered precisely in its mystery, escapes absolute 
comprehension. Balthasar here criticises a false humility that renounces an ability to see the ever-
greater whole by claiming 'less is more’81 This is problematic insofar as the accent falls on reducing 
the transcendent more to a less that is pure immanence, rather than acknowledging the more in the 
apparent less. Such a reductionism appoints itself arbitrator of knowledge’s limits thereby 
precluding beforehand the possibility of any transcendence shining from within concrete reality. 
Balthasar judges such an approach has ‘got beyond love.’82 By contrast, he affirms a method of 
integration of parts into an ever-greater whole; a whole that is, however, a matter of freely 
bestowed divine gift that both exceeds and answers human nature's capacity for grace and evokes 
wonder.83  
To illustrate the implications of this for the present discussion, I refer to the disagreement between 
Karen Kilby and D.C. Schindler. Kilby accuses Balthasar of claiming access to an overall perspective 
on reality which places him in a God-like position.84 In this, however, she undersells how Balthasar 
affirms the mystery of the whole that appears in the depth of the part which is itself an integral 
whole – just as an ecosystem is a whole that includes, say, an ash tree as a part which is also a 
whole-in-itself. Schindler, with justification, questions Kilby’s appraisal of Balthasar’s metaphysics.85 
It is notable, however, that Schindler is silent about Kilby’s concerns over Balthasar’s portrayal of 
sexual difference. Indeed, Schindler fails to acknowledge that Kilby here engages with the substance 
of Balthasar’s thought despite his claims to the contrary. Also, while Schindler is a sympathetic 
interpreter of Balthasar’s metaphysics, he does not directly engage Balthasar’s understanding of 
human sexual difference. Furthermore, as I examine in chapter three, in Schindler’s own 
metaphysical treatment of sexual difference he articulates a view congruent with Balthasar’s 
metaphysics, yet, I argue, implicitly critical of Balthasar’s views on sexual difference.  
This latter claim accords with Schindler’s own suggestion in his response to Kilby that it is 
‘indispensable’ for ‘Catholic (and catholic) thinkers' to critique Balthasar in light of a vision of the 
whole: where his perspective is limited, reductionist, exaggerated or oversimplified ‘one does a 
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service to his thought to make whatever shortcomings it betrays known.’86 Whatever the merits of 
Schindler’s critique of Kilby, he does her concern for catholic truth a disservice. It is insufficient, 
however, simply to highlight the shortcomings in Balthasar’s thought. A more adequate account of 
the whole and its parts must be attempted. In this thesis, this means proffering an alternative to 
Balthasar’s view of sexual difference. Pace Kilby, my criticism is that Balthasar fails to offer a 
sufficient account of the whole by focusing reductively on a part. 
To employ Balthasar’s method here means searching out being as it appears in the self-exceeding 
concrete whole of the essential and existential reality of human being. This pursues a knowing of 
things that simultaneously encompasses, first, their interiority, essential intelligibility and meaning; 
and, secondly, existential uniqueness and actuality – ‘the common "whatness" and 
incomprehensible, irreducible "thisness" characterizing the actual world of elementary 
experience….’87 In short, this involves a phenomenological approach (how the essence and existence 
of things appear to human consciousness which is only ever consciousness of things that appear); 
and, a metaphysical or analogical way of knowing (the human encounter with (created) being in and 
through actual beings).88 As Michael Hanby says, ‘in the dynamic interplay between essence and 
existence there is...a certain infinity within the being of the creature itself, that is 
phenomenologically and analogically visible, as it were, and that opens of its inner necessity into the 
gift of esse and the dependence of creature upon the gratuity of the Creator.’89 
Indeed, this engagement with the essence and existence of things rests on a basic judgement about 
how things fit together vis-à-vis the beautiful whole of being.90 This echoes Balthasar’s emphasis on 
the importance of an aesthetic–like judgement rooted in childlike wonder. It depends, moreover, on 
convictions about how humans know things, and so epistemology; and, also, the importance of 
language, speech, text and interpretation, and so hermeneutics. Indeed, it extends to include ethical 
consideration, community, society, artistic creativity and worship. Also significant are the 
importance of interpersonal relationships, and, indeed, sexual difference and the child-parent 
 
86 Ibid., 83-84.  
87 Hanby, “Aesthetic,” 369-370. 
88 For an assessment of Balthasar’s appropriation of phenomenology via an emphasis on gift, see Larry Chapp, 
“The Primal Experience of Being in the Thought of Hans Urs von Balthasar: A Response to Theodore Kepes Jr.,” 
Philosophy and Theology 20, (2008): 291-305. Schindler, DST, 363n.48, stresses how for Balthasar there is no 
opposition between phenomenology and metaphysics. His metaphysics concerns the phenomenon of how 
being appears. 
89 Hanby, “Aesthetic,” 376. 
90 Cf., John Milbank and Catherine Pickstock, Truth in Aquinas (London: Routledge, 2001), 43: Since being can 
be interpreted variously, ‘the judgement we make of it (Christian, Heideggerian, or otherwise), is adopted as, 
for us, the most compelling, the most manifest, the most intense.’ 
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relationship, and, therefore, the significance accorded to adulthood and childhood. The key for 
Balthasar is that these all pertain to being’s appearing. This method of engaging the whole, 
therefore, reflects the form and content of Balthasar’s metaphysics. I attempt to show the credibility 
of the latter in its workings, doing so as an adult seeking to be faithful to childlike wonder at being.  
For primary textual sources, I principally employ sections of the English translation of the sixteen 
volumes of Balthasar’s trilogy, encompassing seven volumes of The Glory of the Lord, five volumes of 
the Theo-Drama, three volumes of Theo-Logic, and the single volume Epilogue. The trilogy 
represents Balthasar’s ‘fundamental project’, and the ‘goal’ of his life.91 He called it the ‘heart’ of his 
thought.92 The trilogy offers a sustained, maturing and deepening reflection on, inter alia, 
Balthasar’s metaphysics. Here it is important to highlight that TL1 is the earliest part of the trilogy to 
be written despite featuring as the thirteenth volume.93 It therefore represents an earlier moment in 
Balthasar’s thought. This is significant because TL1 contains Balthasar’s most sustained reflections on 
questions of philosophical metaphysics, only parts of which he develops subsequently. Hence, this 
aspect of his work has needed to be developed by later thinkers in a speculative key (see below).  
More particularly, I engage those sections of the trilogy that relate to Balthasar’s metaphysics, the 
child-parent relationship and sexual difference. Regarding his metaphysics, this includes, as 
indicated, TL1 which offers a metaphysical, epistemological and phenomenological study of the truth 
of created being and its openness to God. Balthasar also develops his metaphysis in GL1, where he 
enumerates his central conception of Gestalt; GL4 and GL5 where he engages the Western tradition 
of metaphysics and articulates his analogical account of being; TD2 and TD3 which details his 
metaphysical account of human freedom based on a dramatic understanding of being; and, E where 
Balthasar further treats the analogia entis, the transcendentals and human self-consciousness’ 
relationship to being.  
I supplement these with texts where Balthasar examines the child-parent relationship. This is central 
to the final section of GL5 where Balthasar presents the analogy of being according a fourfold 
difference which includes the mother-child relationship. The metaphysical value of a child’s wonder 
informs the last book he wrote, UBC. He also explores this theme in LAC; MW where Balthasar offers 
periodical summary reflections on his work; TL2; and essays in ExT3 and ExT5, particularly the essay 
MTG.  
 
91 MW, 94. 
92 MW, 111. 
93 DST, 9.  
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I place interpretative weight on UBC which has been considered Balthasar’s legacy.94 We can 
compare this to Aquinas’ statement, made at the end of his life, about his massive output: ‘to me it 
seems like straw’ (Mihi videtur ut palea). Josef Pieper and Phillip Rosemann suggest this is key to 
understanding Aquinas’ work, particularly the Summa Theologica. Pieper argues the latter’s 
unfinished status is deliberate, not a function of Aquinas’ untimely death. The Summa is a fragment 
pointing beyond itself.95 Rosemann labels this a ‘“negative systematicity”’ which involves ‘not a 
system but a system: a system…deeply aware of its own inadequacy.’96 I am proposing that UBC 
similarly offers a key to interpreting Balthasar’s enterprise, that is, with a child’s wonder-filled 
attitude. A crucial difference from the foregoing interpretation of Aquinas is that Balthasar offers in 
UBC not a system crossed out, but a fruitful fragment which manifests the inexhaustible whole. This 
echoes the title of Balthasar’s monograph, The Whole in the Fragment.97  Thus, Balthasar offers his 
work as a fragment where being’s ever-greater mystery appears and is grasped through childlike 
wonder.  
Regarding Balthasar statements on sexual difference, I use key sections in TD2 and TD3, where he 
explores sexual difference as a central anthropological polarity. I examine other references Balthasar 
makes to sexual difference elsewhere in the trilogy. I supplement these with essays on sexual 
difference from ExT5, NE and from Balthasar’s wider corpus.  
The commentators on Balthasar with whom I engage are grouped according to their focus on his 
metaphysics or human sexual difference. Thus, firstly, this study's metaphysical focus is contiguous 
with recent scholarship that demonstrates the richness of Balthasar’s contribution to philosophical 
metaphysics. This work distils and critically develops Balthasar’s metaphysics, exploring its relation 
to his theology and anthropology.  It seeks to offer correctives to mis-readings of Balthasar’s work 
and places him in dialogue with Thomist thought.98 I do not offer a comprehensive account of 
Balthasar’s philosophical metaphysics, relying instead on others. Nevertheless, I seek to contribute 
to the speculative development of Balthasar’s metaphysics given the importance he assigns to the 
constitutive human relationships. 
 
94 Peter Henrici, “Hans Urs von Balthasar: A Sketch of His Life,” in Hans Urs von Balthasar: His Life and Work, 
ed. David L. Schindler (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1991), 42. 
95 Josef Pieper, The Silence of St. Thomas: Three Essays, trans. J. Murray SJ and D. O’Connor (New York: 
Panteon, 1957), 88-89. 
96 Philipp W. Rosemann, Omne Agens Agit Sibi Simile: A ‘Repetition’ of Scholastic Metaphysics (Leuven: Leuven 
University Press, 1998), 225. 
97 The English version, Hans Urs von Balthasar, A Theological Anthropology, trans. Franz Benzinger (New York: 
Sheed & Ward, 1963), obscures the original German: Das Ganze im Fragment: Aspekte der Geschichtstheologie 
(Köln: Benziger, 1963). 
98 Cf.  Walker, “Love Alone”, 20n.12.  
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In English, the most significant works on Balthasar’s philosophical thought are those by D.C. 
Schindler, Nicholas Healy and Cyril O’Regan.99 In other languages, the key works are by Juan Manuel 
Sara, Eliecer Pérez Haro, Mario Saint-Pierre, Pascal Ide, and Georges de Schrijver.100 Other works are 
included in the bibliography. I particularly draw on D.C. Schindler’s interpretation of Balthasar given 
his focus on the transcendentals and the child-mother encounter. It is noteworthy that explorations 
of Balthasar’s metaphysical philosophy have not dealt comprehensively with his views on human 
sexual difference. I seek to address this lacuna. 
Secondly, I consider commentators who treat Balthasar’s understanding of sexual difference. Those 
who are principally critical include Karen Kilby, Tina Beattie and Linn Tonstad.101 Other authors, 
included in the bibliography, have engaged with Balthasar’s understanding of sexual difference, 
ranging from the critical to the appreciative. Particularly important is an essay by Lucy Gardner and 
David Moss who consider how Balthasar’s views on sexual difference relate to his theological 
application of the analogy of being and the Trinity, although they only briefly consider his wider 
metaphysics.102 Also, a monograph by Michele Schumacher defends Balthasar’s understanding of 
sexual difference based on a Trinitarian anthropology in dialogue with Aquinas and Adrienne von 
Speyr. 103 Though Schumacher recognises the importance of metaphysics in adding coherence to 
Balthasar’s theological imagery, she does not offer sustained engagement with this. While my 
criticism coincides somewhat with feminist critiques of Balthasar’s view of sexual difference, it 
differs by being based on his metaphysics. I argue that where they clash, priority be given to 
Balthasar’s metaphysics. 
  
 
99 DST; Nicholas J. Healy, The Eschatology of Hans Urs von Balthasar: Being as Communion (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2005); Cyril O’Regan, The Anatomy of Misremembering: Von Balthasar’s Response to 
Philosophical Modernity. Volume 1: Hegel (New York: Crossroad, 2014). O’Regan is writing a second volume 
dealing with Balthasar’s engagement with Heidegger.  
100 Juan Manuel Sara, Forma y Amor. Un estudio metafisco sobre la triologia de Hans Urs von Balthasar (Rome: 
Privatdruck, 2000); Eliecer Pérez Haro, El misterio del ser: Una mediación entre filosofí y teología en Hans Urs 
von Balthasar (Barcelona: Santanreu Editor, 1994); Mario Saint-Pierre, Beauté, bonté, verité chez Hans Urs von 
Balthasar (Quebec: Laval University Press, 1998); Pascal Ide, Être et mystère: La philsophie de Hans Urs von 
Balthasar (Brussels: Culture et Vérité, 1995); Georges de Schrijver, Le merveilleux accord de l'homme et de 
Dieu: étude de l'analogie de l'être chez Hans Urs von Balthasar (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1983). 
101 Kilby, Balthasar; Tonstad, God and Difference; Tina Beattie, New Catholic Feminism: Theology and Theory 
(London: Routledge, 2006); “Sex, Death and Melodrama: A Feminist Critique of Hans Urs von Balthasar,” The 
Way 44, (2005): 160-176; and,  “A Man and Three Women—Hans, Adrienne, Mary and Luce,” New Blackfriars 
79, (1998): 97-105. 
102 Gardner and Moss, “Something like the Sexes”. See also, Lucy Gardner and David Moss, “Difference – The 
Immaculate Concept?" The Laws of Sexual Difference in the Theology of Hans Urs von Balthasar,’ Modern 
Theology, 14 (1998): 377-401. 
103 Michele M. Schumacher, A Trinitarian Anthropology: Adrienne von Speyr and Hans Urs von Balthasar in 
Dialogue with Thomas Aquinas (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2014). 
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6. Chapter Outlines 
The main section of this discussion considers Balthasar’s metaphysics by circling around the focal 
point of the significance of a child’s wonder. The first two chapters give an exposition of key aspects 
of Balthasar’s metaphysics which serves as a framework for what then follows. The subsequent two 
chapters take on a more critical tone regarding Balthasar’s interpretation of sexual difference and 
further develop the insights of Balthasar’s metaphysical vision given the significance of the 
constitutive human relationships.  
Thus, in chapter one, I assess Balthasar’s understanding of metaphysics as beginning in wonder. I 
give an exposition of his analogical notion of being, focusing on how he characterises finite being 
according to a fourfold difference comprised of, first, the mother-child difference; secondly, how 
esse is distinct from beings; thirdly, the inverse difference between beings and esse; and, finally, the 
God-creation difference. This denotes the intrinsic relationship between the interpersonal, the 
metaphysical and the theological that undergirds Balthasar’s concrete metaphysics where esse 
depends on beings, particularly human being, for its subsistence according to a pattern of letting be 
characteristic of love. This chapter furnishes the basic metaphysical perspective I employ critically in 
subsequent chapters. 
In chapter two, I consider the central significance of Balthasar’s account of the childlike and filial 
shape of human self-conscious freedom against modern and postmodern hostility towards 
childlikeness. I focus on how Balthasar’s understanding that a child awakens to self-consciousness in 
wonder through parental love paradigmatically informs how human self-consciousness freely 
encounters and communicates the wonder of being via responses of the heart. The heart, for 
Balthasar, is the concrete core of the whole human person in their attunement to being. It 
encompasses a single complex act of the intellect, will, imagination, and senses. I show, moreover, 
how the heart is childlike and filial in its openness to being and beings. Accordingly, I consider how 
the acceptance or rejection of this is determinative for how human beings mediate being in their 
freedom as embodied spirits open to God's gift of divine being.  
Chapter three employs the previous chapters' insights to explore the metaphysical significance 
Balthasar gives to human sexual difference. I approach the latter through the lens of its distinctive 
fruit: a child’s born and awoken to self-consciousness. I set this against the backdrop of the legacy of 
Aristotelian metaphysics and contemporary debates over sexual difference and gender-identity. I 
argue that while the fruitfulness of human interpersonal love cannot be reduced to the fruitfulness 
of sexual reproduction, neither can it be divorced from it. While in the previous chapters I examine 
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how Balthasar knits together the metaphysical, the interpersonal, the childlike and filial, in this 
chapter I examine how these converge on an indispensable anthropological gateway: namely, the 
constitutive human relationships of child-parent, mother-father, female-male. The chapter includes 
a sustained critique of Balthasar’s reductive account of sexual difference as outlined above. I show 
how this falls foul of Balthasar’s metaphysical commitments. I also offer a revised account of sexual 
difference that is more faithful to the latter by affirming an asymmetrical reciprocity between male 
and female where they share a co-primacy in mediating being’s fruitfulness.  
In chapter four, I examine how the constitutive human relationships relate to being’s transcendental 
aspects of beauty, goodness, and truth. I examine how the logic of Balthasar’s thought means that 
the causality of the transcendentals encompasses a transcendental fruitfulness that analogically 
matches the pattern of fruitfulness disclosed decisively in a child’s awakening to self-consciousness 
through its parents' love. I identify how Balthasar’s understanding of metaphysics and anthropology 
converges on beauty's primacy and how sexual difference and the child-parent relationship are co-
principles of being’s beauty. They safeguard the overarching unity of the transcendentals as 
interrelated aspects of love. I revisit the previous chapter's findings in this light, expanding my 
critique of Balthasar’s view of sexual difference and my alternative speculative account. 
Although Balthasar’s metaphysical vision means that questions of ontology, aesthetics, ethics and 
truth are inseparable, I limit myself to his notion of created being, finite spirit, the constitutive 
human relationships and their relation to the transcendentals. This study's findings, however, extend 
to ethical and cultural concerns raised by sexual difference, gender-identity, reproduction, and 
childhood. Accordingly, in the conclusion I consider some implications vis-à-vis safeguarding the 
wonder of a child in an increasingly technological age. 
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Chapter One 
The Wonder of Being 
Metaphysics, for Balthasar, is fundamentally concerned with the question: ‘why is there anything in 
the first place?’1  This is distinct from, but vital for, the question ‘what are the nature and structure 
of being and beings?’ These ‘why’ and ‘what’ questions about being are inseparable. They are a 
particular sort of question that invites a specific response. They do not hinge primarily on rational 
speculation and judgement about realities abstracted or separated from the material world, but on 
the wholehearted human encounter with being as it appears in the intractable reality of beings. 
Balthasar assigns great importance to the first ‘why’ question. It is a question that is both an 
exclamation and a step on a journey into being itself. It carries the seeds of its response. This cannot 
simply be a determinate and fixed answer. It is a more-than-simply-determinate question which 
arises from and articulates wonder at anything existing. For Balthasar, the more determinate ‘what’ 
question about being and beings must be approached via this ‘why’ regarding anything's wondrous 
existence. For the human subject, this aligns with the personal questions of ‘Who am I?’ and ‘Why 
do I exist?’ Again, the answer lies embedded in the wonder and perplexity of each person’s lived 
response.  
In this chapter, I expound how Balthasar draws these fundamental questions and responses together 
into an account of created being and the significance of interpersonal relationships to the latter. I 
focus on how this reflects Balthasar’s analogical notion of being where created being is inscribed 
with a dynamic relationship between unity and difference. Balthasar presents created being as 
encompassing a tension between, in Heidegger’s terms, being and beings (the Ontological 
Difference), yet interpreted along the lines of Aquinas’ real distinction between esse and essence (or 
ens).2 For Balthasar, the manifestation of the actuality of esse in the concrete reality of actual beings 
is characterised by a reciprocal self-transcending ‘letting be’ that expresses being's inherent excess. 
This opens to and participates in divine esse and manifests the freedom of God’s self-giving being as 
love within finite being’s difference from God. Taken together, this represents created being’s primal 
Gestalt – the ‘primal phenomenon’ of being.3  
Within the creaturely realm, being’s primal Gestalt is fully disclosed in and as the primal form of 
humanity’s embodied spiritual nature and actions. Indeed, being’s primal form comes fully to light 
 
1 GL5, 613. Cf., Martin Heidegger, “What is Metaphysics?” in Pathmarks ed. W. McNeil (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1998), 96. 
2 GL5, 446-447. 
3 GL1, 19-20. 
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from within itself as spirit.4 Balthasar identifies the first occasion of metaphysical wonder at being’s 
primal Gestalt with each child’s awakening to self-consciousness and so to being itself through its 
mother’s concrete love. This is the primal instance of Balthasar’s distinctive vision of how 
metaphysics and anthropology interpenetrate according to created being’s ‘fourfold difference’.5 
This represents what several commentators judge to be the centrepiece of Balthasar’s metaphysical 
thought. The fourfold is comprised of the difference between mother and child; beings and Being 
(esse); Being (esse) and beings; and, God and creation. It straddles theological, ontological, 
interpersonal and anthropological categories.  
In what follows, I treat each aspect of the fourfold difference as set out in GL5, offering thereby a 
detailed commentary on the metaphysical presuppositions of the primal Gestalt of an analogical 
notion of being as Balthasar understands it. This underpins the subsequent chapters’ treatment of 
Balthasar’s metaphysical view of the child-parent relationship, human sexual difference and the 
transcendental aspects of beauty, goodness and truth. To this end, I consider, first, how, for 
Balthasar, metaphysics begins in wonder. I then examine the fourfold difference. Finally, I treat 
Balthasar’s conviction that the latter is characterised by the dynamic reciprocity of self-giving love or 
mutual ‘letting be’ between being and beings, and draw out the implications this has for the 
metaphysical significance of interpersonal relationships. 
1. Wonder 
In the final section of his critical engagement with medieval and modern Western metaphysics in 
GL4 and GL5, Balthasar’s articulates his unified metaphysical vision.6 The preface is entitled the 
‘Miracle of Being.’7 This reflects, first, what Balthasar considers, along with Heidegger, to be the 
authentic metaphysical question, ‘Why is there anything and not simply nothing?’8 Secondly, 
 
4 GL1, 22. 
5 GL5, 613. I follow D.C Schindler, Nicholas Healy, and Fergus Kerr’s preference for ‘difference’ rather than 
‘distinction’ in the English translation of Balthasar’s work. ‘Difference’ stresses how finite being encompasses 
four irreducible but inseparable aspects in a complex whole. See DST, 31; Healy, Eschatology of Hans Urs von 
Balthasar, 61; and, Kerr, “Balthasar and metaphysics,” 235. 
6 The German original encompasses two volumes with the same title emphasising the unity of Balthasar’s 
critical appropriation of medieval and modern metaphysical thought. See Hans Urs von Balthasar, Herrlichkeit: 
Eine theologische Ästhetik, Band III/1: Im Raum der Metaphysik 2. Teil: Neuzeit (Einsiedeln: Johannes Verlag, 
1975) 
7 GL5, 613. 
8 For Balthasar’s engagement with Heidegger, see GL5, 429-450. While he lauds Heidegger’s attempts to 
reclaim the difference between being and beings, Balthasar holds that Heidegger ultimately makes the 
nothingness of (created) being an absolute, undermining genuine wonder. Balthasar thus gives only qualified 
assent to Heidegger’s critique of ‘onto-theology’, the charge that Western metaphysics undermines the 
difference between being and beings because God is made both the highest being and the source of being. See 
Martin Heidegger, “Introduction to ‘What is Metaphysics?’,” in McNeil, Pathmarks, 277-290; Identity and 
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Balthasar links this ‘astonishing’ question to the importance of wonder (Verwunderung). He 
identifies the metaphysical task with the guardianship of the wonder being evokes as manifested 
within actual beings.9 Echoing Heidegger, Balthasar affirms wonder as the beginning of thought and 
its ‘permanent element'.  Against Heidegger, such wonder is not just characterised by how humanity 
can 'wonder at Being in its own distinction from Being, but also that Being as such...“causes 
wonder”, behaving as something...striking and worthy of wonder….'10 Such primal and abiding 
wonder at being is a fundamental aesthetic experience weaved into the fabric of thought. Balthasar 
thus foregrounds the human encounter with being's beauty, or more fully, glory.  
Balthasar contrasts wonder with ‘admiration’ (Bewunderung).11 Admiration becomes problematic 
insofar as it attends a sense of being wholly identified with the order of nature based on a scientific 
rational worldview. This is not wonder at there being anything but ‘an admiration that everything 
appears so wonderfully and “beautifully” ordered within the necessity of Being.'12  It relies on an 
abstract identification of being and meaning in human thought – a univocal notion of being.  
Balthasar’s concern is, however, that this can be attractive as a total explanation. It is not self-
evident but relies on a wilful ‘titanic’ leap of faith that imposes this univocal identity. As Balthasar 
states, this gets ‘the phenomenon wrong.’13 The problem is that it forecloses genuine wonder at 
being. Moreover, individual instances of beauty are sacrificed to the beauty of an abstract notion of 
the harmony of a necessary universal process or a Hegelian-type harmony-in-and-beyond-
disharmony. Indeed, where this necessity is in turn questioned everything becomes a product of 
chance which, echoing Heidegger, opens the finite to the seeming terror and indifference of the 
infinite. Balthasar, however, insists the spirit’s ecstatic relationship to being should not be finally 
identified with such dread. This becomes absolute only when being is wilfully conceived as 
ultimately empty necessity and nihilistically inimical to finite beings.14 
In contrast, an authentic metaphysical sense of wonder concerns an encounter with being’s actuality 
that cannot be reduced to a necessary order, the totality of all beings or sheer nothingness. This 
wonder is not principally about an encounter with the unexpected within the realm of existing 
 
Difference, trans. Joan Stambaugh (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002), 42-75. Cf., TL2, 134-135n.10; 
D.C. Schindler, “Hans Urs von Balthasar, Metaphysics, and the Problem of Onto-Theology,” Analecta 
Hermeneutica, 1, (2009): 109-113. 
9 GL5, 656. 
10 GL5, 614-615. Cf. Martin Heidegger, What is Philosophy?, trans. Jean T. Wilde and William Kulback (New 
Haven: College and University Press, 1958), para. 46-48. 
11 GL5, 613. 
12 GL5, 613-614. 
13 GL5, 614. 
14 GL1, 158-159. 
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beings. As Schindler clarifies, the latter merely involves an ontic wonder; ‘the arrival of an 
unanticipated person or thing within the horizon of a person’s particular field of attention or 
concern. Metaphysical wonder, however, is possible only where the horizon of being itself is not 
closed but is constituted so as to include a “more”: in other words, to include a difference.’15 
Metaphysical wonder thus arises from an irreducible difference inherent to being's self-exceeding 
character. Within this framework, difference is affirmed as wholly positive. More concretely, wonder 
is not correlated simply to being, which risks abstraction or emptiness, but also to beings. Ontic 
differences between beings mediate ontological differences inherent to being, and vice versa. Both 
combine to cause metaphysical wonder. As we shall see, Balthasar is concerned not simply with 
difference between beings, considered in the abstract. He focuses on a special category of ontic 
differences: those which obtain between humans and what they disclose about being. This accounts 
for why Balthasar begins his consideration of the fourfold difference with a person’s experience of 
their existence. He links wonder at being to the origin of interpersonal subjectivity itself.  
2. Fourfold Difference as the Primal Gestalt of Created Being 
In his account of being’s fourfold difference, Balthasar progressively unfolds different relationships 
that comprise a single complex concrete whole. Together they comprise the phenomenon of being’s 
primal Gestalt which is the source of being’s authentic beauty that causes wonder.16 In what follows, 
I consider each of the differences of the fourfold in turn and then reflect on its implications for the 
relationship between being and humans. 
2.1. First difference: mother and child 
The first difference rests on the first self-consciousness encounter of a child with its mother wherein 
the child awakens as embodied spirit open to being. This is, for Balthasar, the actual beginning of the 
metaphysical wonder for each person. It is ‘arguably the most fundamental insight in Balthasar’s 
philosophy, an insight that affects everything else.’17 Indeed, this insistence on the historical 
provenance of the beginning of a person’s self-consciousness is, for Schindler, ‘one of Balthasar’s 
most fundamental contributions in philosophy…. [W]e can hardly avoid speaking of a “paradigm 
shift”….’18  
 
15 DST, 32.  
16 GL5, 615 
17 DST, 37.  
18 DST, 99. Cf., Kerr, “Balthasar and metaphysics,” 237, offers a more measured assessment: ‘Balthasar’s 
signalling of the importance of the mother-child relationship is certainly illuminating and deserves further 
reflection….’ 
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The first difference focuses on the interpersonal difference and unity between a child and its 
mother. Though the child-mother relationship is an ontic, anthropological and biological difference, 
Balthasar’s chief concern is its metaphysical significance. Indeed, it contains incipiently each of the 
differences comprising being’s fourfold difference. Here Balthasar compares the metaphysical 
question – ‘Why anything?’ – to a person’s self-questioning about their existence in the world – 
‘Why do I exist?’ These converge on how a person is conceived, born and awoken as embodied spirit 
such that any person’s existence is astonishing beyond measure and cannot be exhaustively 
explained by causes within the world. Balthasar comments how little ‘the enigma of reproduction – 
not only of organic natural creatures but above all of man, who is Spirit – has concerned 
philosophers.’19 Expanding he says, 
[f]rom the infinite prodigality of an act of generation – prodigality in the male as well as the 
female organism resulting in a ‘chance hit’ – a ‘new’ being is created which, reflecting upon 
its personal ego, cannot interpret itself in any way as a product of chance; for it possesses in 
fact the capacity to view the world as a whole, indeed Being as a whole, from its 
unrepeatable perspective and thus to effect a unification of what it sees….20  
The birth of a new self-reflective spirit who can reflect meaningfully on existence and the world as a 
whole is irreducible to mere chance. Neither is it a matter of sheer necessity for not only does the 
world continue to exist whether or not a person exists, but no person is simply reducible to their 
source. They stand apart as something unique and gratuitous.21 This is expressed in each person’s 
spiritual capacity to question their contingent existence against the seeming necessity of the world’s 
being and its order. While such self-reflection is characteristic of an adult self-consciousness, 
Balthasar asks how this capacity for self-conscious encounter with being arises.  
Balthasar identifies this beginning with an event of encounter that takes place between a child and 
mother. This is the primary difference of the fourfold difference because here each person receives 
their capacity for metaphysical reality. Balthasar states,  
[the child’s] ‘I’ awakens in the experience of a ‘Thou’: in its mother’s smile through which it 
learns that it is contained, affirmed and loved in a relationship which is incomprehensively 
encompassing, already actual, sheltering and nourishing. The body which it snuggles into, 
…is a kiss of love in which it can take shelter because it has been sheltered there a priori. The 
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awakening of its consciousness is a late occurrence, in comparison with this basic mystery of 
unfathomable depth. It finally sees only what always has been, and can therefore only 
confirm it. A light which has been perpetually asleep awakens at some point in to an alert 
and self-knowing light. But it awakens at the love of the Thou, as it has always slept in the 
womb and on the bosom of the Thou. The experience of being granted entrance into a 
sheltering and encompassing world is one which for all incipient, developing and mature 
consciousness cannot be superseded. Therefore it is right that the child should glimpse the 
Absolute, ‘God’…, first in its mother, its parents, and that only in a second and third stage 
does it have to learn to distinguish the love of God from the love which it has experienced in 
this way.22 
This passage incorporates several important aspects of Balthasar’s metaphysical thought. I 
summarise them here and treat them more fully in subsequent chapters. First, this event marks the 
historical genesis of a child’s self-consciousness. This is ‘both historical and a genuine beginning, 
namely, the fundamental experience of the child. As historical, it is relative, but as fundamental 
and…paradigmatic, it is…in a certain sense absolute.’23 Though the child’s self-consciousness needs 
to develop, this encounter is sui generis as the child’s awakens for the first time as a self-conscious 
embodied spirit open to being as a whole. This is an awakening of a pre-existent but dormant light: 
the intellectual light latent within the child’s nature as spirit; and, the light of being in which the 
human spirit participates. 
Secondly, this awakening depends on the encounter with the prior reality of another existing person 
and, by extension, the prior actuality of other beings, being itself, God, and spiritual nature’s intrinsic 
openness to these. Ontologically speaking, therefore, the already actual has priority vis-à-vis the 
child’s new being and self-consciousness. Self-consciousness is constituted and shaped by an 
encounter with a Thou. This establishes, moreover, from the outset, the thoroughly dialogical and 
reciprocal nature of human self-consciousness. It represents an alternative account of self-
consciousness to the fully formed standalone self-consciousness assumed by modern philosophy. 
Thirdly, the encounter is a concrete one. The child awakens through its sense-based encounter with 
the Gestalt of the mother’s love wherein it encounters the mother herself. Most comprehensively, 
what appears is the ever-greater mystery of the mother’s essential mystery as embodied spirit and 
her openness to being, other beings, and God. This is, therefore, an encounter with being’s beauty 
 
22 GL5, 616. 
23 DST, 38.  
38 
 
as disclosed in the concrete gift of personal love – an epiphany to which the child has no choice but 
to assent where this underpins every subsequent self-conscious act.  
These three aspects emphasise how, in the encounter with its mother, the child attains the self- 
awareness of its difference from her only in relationship to her. This denotes a fourth element. The 
child’s awakening occurs within an a priori relationship of love which Balthasar notes is ‘a basic 
mystery of unfathomable depth.’ Their relationship is already actual and incomprehensively 
encompassing. It is characterised by both a unity-in-difference, namely, the pre-existent relationship 
of love between them, and a difference-in-unity which affirms their irreducibly distinct identities. 
Into this pre-existing relationship of love the child awakens to self-consciousness. Balthasar refers to 
this as the ‘experience of being granted entrance.’ He also speaks of it as ‘being admitted’, ‘being 
permitted to be’, or a ‘letting be.’24 Balthasar adds, 
there can be nothing more beyond the love which wakens me and shelters me, and which 
greets me in the smiling face of my mother. Many things can interfere: incomprehensible 
departure, not being understood, pain, death. But all that is only an interpolation. Perhaps it 
will appear infinite, perhaps interrupted by lightning recollections of the origin: but I have 
been given a measure for all that is called distance and distinction. However excluded I may 
be, I remain primally someone who has been permitted entry.25 
This underpins the fundamentally affirmative and positive nature of the encounter as foundational 
for human self-consciousness per se, wherein difference is affirmed. The child’s difference from its 
mother is entirely positive and not a function of loss. The paradigmatic nature of this encounter for 
each person stretches beyond the immediate relationship between mother and child to reality itself. 
This reflects an all-pervasive sense of being-permitted-to-be. Balthasar associates this with a child’s 
capacity for play which he gives a metaphysical gloss. 
[The child] gives itself to play because the experience of being admitted is the very first thing 
which it knows in the realm of Being. It is, in so far as it is allowed to take part as an object of 
love. Existence is both glorious and a matter of course. Everything, without exception, which 
is to follow later and will inevitably be added to this experience must remain an unfolding of 
it. There is no “gravity of life” which would fundamentally surpass this beginning. There is no 
“taking over control” of existence which might go further than this first experience of 
miracle and play. There is no encounter – with a friend or an enemy or with a [sic] myriad 
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passers-by – which could add anything to the encounter with the first-comprehended smile 
of the mother….26 
This affirms how the overriding positive nature of the unity-in-difference that characterises the 
encounter between mother and child has its roots in ontological reality. It is the ‘most primitive 
experience of Being.’27 It is a primordial experience characterised by ‘primal and overpowering 
wonder.’28 Hence, starting with the child-mother relationship in a metaphysical account of the 
character of finite being is no arbitrary choice. It is the condition of possibility and measure for every 
interaction with being. This, in turn, has implications for how a person relates to contradiction, 
negativity, loss, suffering and evil. How these are met will vary according to whether they are seen 
against the a priori positive structure of self-consciousness as a matter of ontological reality. As we 
will see, Balthasar puts this primordial and paradigmatic sense of being-permitted-to-be, with its 
positive sense of unity-in-difference, to ontological and theological use when he explores the 
second, third and fourth differences of the fourfold difference. These are ‘only the ever greater 
extension of the same thing which is already present in the first act of self-consciousness of the 
awakening child. This first act, journey towards transcendence, immediately touches the final 
end….’29 What is crucial to recognise at this point is how the positive nature of the interpersonal 
difference between mother and child opens into the properly metaphysical dimension since it 
concerns the relationship between finite spirit and finite being for each person. This concretely and 
anthropologically glosses how metaphysics, even a rejection of metaphysics, presupposes a 
relationship between spirit and being.30 As Balthasar expands: 
 there occurs an opening within me as Spirit to the light-space of Being, which is in no way 
directed to the Being of the world as a whole: if in the first aspect my spirit ‘nihilates’ with 
respect to the Being of the world into which I find myself to be thrown and constrained, 
then in the second aspect the Being of the world ‘nihilates’ within the opening of my spirit, 
which can attribute to the Being of the world no necessity within itself which would excel 
our wonder at its existence: both are related to each other, but they do not coincide.31  
This language needs unpacking. The existence of a self-conscious person is not simply accidental or 
something which can be regulated. But neither can the individual self-conscious person be identical 
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to the actuality of being nor the necessity of the world. The child’s finite spirit transcends the being 
of the world because it can spiritually reflect the whole in itself; but this same being transcends 
finite spirit from within spirit as its cause and so has ontological priority. There is, therefore, an 
asymmetrical relationship of mutual transcending where ‘Being transcends the spirit within the 
spirit’s transcending of Being.’32 It is a mutual transcending where neither spirit nor being are 
reduced to each other, something which Balthasar seeks to communicate with the word ‘nihilates.’33 
By linking this ontological asymmetrical reciprocity between spirit and being to the interpersonal 
asymmetrical reciprocity between mother and child, Balthasar underlines how the former (spirit-
being) is mediated by the latter (mother-child) which opens to the former. Hence, the mother-child 
encounter needs to be understood not only on a phenomenological level whereby consciousness is 
always related to the object of consciousness which appears to it, but also on a metaphysical level 
where what appears to and constitutes self-consciousness is being as a whole in another particular 
being. Priority is given to the metaphysical because it is the concrete encounter with being that 
constitutes the relationship between consciousness and being from the first. 
Balthasar goes on to explore this in the subsequent differences of the fourfold difference, employing 
Thomist thought particularly to offer an account of being’s structure. As Schindler notes, Balthasar’s 
beginning, however, can be distinguished from more abstract Thomist approaches which presume a 
fully formed human self-consciousness. Balthasar stresses how openness to being itself, which 
underpins any philosophy concerned with metaphysics, ‘does not occur in the first place through the 
process of abstraction, nor even through the separation of Being from all limiting differences 
(separatio)…but rather initially in the inexhaustible fullness of the child’s joyful awakening in love.’34 
The upshot is that the beginning of metaphysics is inherently interpersonal whereby each person’s 
self-conscious relation to being is constituted dramatically in the encounter of a child with the love 
of its mother. This is crucial to recall as Balthasar goes onto consider being's structure, so revealed. If 
the intrinsic relationship of the first difference to the other three is lost Balthasar’s understanding of 
the primal Gestalt of created being risks ossifying.35  
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2.2. Second difference: the difference of Being from beings 
Having considered the interpersonal beginning to metaphysics, Balthasar turns to the nature of 
being so disclosed. Each person’s awakening to self-consciousness is accompanied by a dawning 
realisation that they are one among all other beings that exist. Self-consciousness opens onto the 
vista of being’s transcendence. Here ‘all existents partake in Being, yet…never exhaust it nor even, as 
it were, “broach” it.’36 Being cannot be equated with any particular being or the sum total of beings. 
Even if we imagine this totality ‘to be quantitatively and qualitatively as extended and as perfect’ as 
possible it still does not equate with the primal wonder of the encounter with being in the first 
place.’37 This heralds the ‘unsurpassable abundance of Being’.38  
Here Balthasar adopts Aquinas’ sense of being’s actuality as esse: the perfect, complete and simple 
act, ‘the actuality of actuality,’ which brings about the existence of individual beings (ens).39 Hence, 
for Balthasar and Aquinas alike, esse comes first in the order of finite reality. Esse is most universal 
and perfect as the source of all other perfections. Esse transcends not only individual beings but the 
realm of essential categories altogether. To refer to esse as act relies on the Aristotelean distinction 
between act (energeia) and potency (dunamis), where something that is in potency can only be 
moved to act through something already in act. Whereas for Aristotle substantial form or essence is 
the highest actuality, Aquinas holds that essence is in potency as to the act of being (esse).40 Hence, 
esse is that pure act which actualises the essence of each individual being. 
To further explicate this, Balthasar, like Aquinas, employs the Platonic notion of participation.41 Thus, 
any finite essence can be said to participate in esse, where esse does not belong to anything that 
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exists by virtue of its essence. No ens is the source of its esse. What it is does not entail that it is. The 
notion of participation also explicates how esse cannot be identified with the totality of existing 
beings. Rather, all individual beings participate in esse which nevertheless transcends every being 
which participates in it. Again Balthasar refers to this as esse’s act of self-transcending or ‘nihilating’: 
‘Being [esse], in which a world totality participates, possesses its own mode of “nihilating”, that is an 
indissoluble identity with respect to every participation within it….’42 The superabundant actuality of 
esse in which all beings participate accords with the primitive experience of wonder at there being 
anything at all. Esse has a mode of transcendence which goes beyond the beauty of the totality of 
everything that exists. This is the glorious beauty of esse or actus essendi which radiates in the latter. 
As Balthasar notes, Aquinas ‘attributes to the actus essendi its own bonum-pulchrum in which the 
individual essentiae and the world which is constituted by them only participate.’43 
This second difference emphasises how the interpersonal encounter of the first, and the awakening 
to self-consciousness it effects, are mediated by the prior actuality of esse which is the immediate 
source of the existence of the child, the mother, their relationship and, by extension, all other beings 
that exist. There can be no interpersonal encounter without esse. Balthasar stresses, however, that 
this superabundance of esse is not separate from the essences of the beings that participate in esse, 
and, with reference to humans, without the concrete interpersonal encounter between mother and 
child. To ignore this risks an abstract notion of esse and a diminution of each being’s essential reality. 
Accordingly, Balthasar affirms the converse relationship, namely, the difference of beings from esse 
as the third difference in his metaphysical scheme.  
Before considering this, however, Balthasar notes how this movement to the third difference in not 
wilful but occurs as a dramatic unfolding of the encounter with being in the awakened self-
consciousness of the person in their spirit’s intrinsic relation to being. As with the child’s sense-
based encounter with the Gestalt of its mother’s smile, this self-conscious encounter occurs 
simultaneously on the level of the spirit’s relation to the whole of being, and the sensory encounter 
with other entia that participate in esse. As Balthasar says, 
if my spirit is conformed to this act of Being in which it participates and also performs the act 
of thinking (intellectus agens) in the light of this superessential…act of Being in order to 
grasp what is essential, then it understands at the same time that it is not the act of Being 
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which has the responsibility of bringing essences into existence from itself, just as it is not 
my intellectus agens (without the conversio ad phantasma) which constructs the real world; 
not only ‘concepts without intuition are empty,’ but the ‘idea’ or the ‘light’ or the 
‘abundance’ of Being remain so too.44  
Here the dual aspect of human self-consciousness that encompasses the intellect and the return to 
the imagination’s sensible images (phantasma) corresponds to being's dual structure wherein esse 
depends on essences in their difference from and dependence on esse. From this perspective, 
wonder relates not just to esse but also the beings that participate in esse. In this dual wonder at 
beings and esse dawns the realisation that esse cannot be attained apart from concrete beings.45  
2.3. Third difference: the difference of beings from Being 
The third difference reflects how the act of being (esse or actus essendi), in its superabundant 
actuality, depends on entia for its concrete actuality. This extends, moreover, to a dependence on 
the actions and interrelations that arise from each being’s essential nature which participates in 
esse. 
This third difference is not tautologous to the second between beings and Being (esse).46 Rather, it 
highlights the co-dependency and asymmetry of esse and beings (ens). Balthasar thus distinguishes 
Aquinas’ metaphysics from that of, particularly, Heidegger and Hegel, who affirm being’s 
dependence on beings yet reduce one to the other. In the early Heidegger, beings are sacrificed to 
being's absolute nothingness; in the late Heidegger, being’s nothingness depends on beings to the 
extent that it becomes essentialised.47 For Hegel, being is at first an empty concept that depends on 
beings to come to full realisation, yet dialectically subsumes them into spiritual being as a whole, 
understood in abstract, essentialist albeit dynamic terms.48 For Balthasar, it is critical to recognise 
that for Aquinas esse cannot be reduced to but transcends all individual beings as the 
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superabundant source of their existence. Equally, individual beings in their essential nature cannot 
be reduced to but transcend esse as allowing esse to be actualised in actual beings. 
Balthasar reiterates how, in contrast to the later Heidegger, esse cannot have responsibility for 
essences because it depends on them to come to subsistence as a particular being. Moreover, 
[t]he indifferentia of the abundance which is characteristic of the Being of the existent 
fundamentally contradicts any form of planning, located within Being, in order to actualise 
itself in substance through a specific ascending sequence of stages of essential forms, which 
contain it first as ‘vessels’ and then (as Heidegger says) finally shepherd it. For the ‘plans’ lie 
in the entity, not in Being, however true it may be that there are no entities which do not 
participate in Being.49 
The superabundant fullness of esse coupled with its simultaneous dependence on essences means 
esse cannot be responsible for essence qua essence; nor, the plans or teloi which inhere the 
individual essence of each being; nor, the wider order which each being and its intrinsic telos is a 
part. This raises several important aspects of Balthasar’s understanding of the real 
distinction/ontological difference.  
First, there is the central notion of the non-subsistence of esse which accounts for its dependence on 
essences.50 Balthasar treats a statement by Aquinas as axiomatic: ‘Being [esse] denotes something 
complete and simple, yet non-subsistent.’51 In GL4, referring to Aquinas, Balthasar elaborates:  
because esse does not subsist, it cannot even be said to release natures from itself as its 
“possibilities”; it is only in them that it comes to “standing” and subsistence.... Thus esse…is 
at once both total fullness and total nothingness: fullness, because it is the most noble, the 
first and most proper effect of God, because ‘through being [esse] God causes all things’ and 
‘being [esse] is prior and more interior than all other effects’. But being [esse] is also 
nothingness since it does not exist as such, for ‘just as one cannot say that running runs’, but 
rather that ‘the runner runs’, so ‘one cannot say that existence exists’.52 
This passage shows how the non-subsistence of esse requires a fourth difference between God and 
creation where God is the cause of finite esse. We will consider this shortly. For present purposes, 
 
49 GL5, 619-620. 
50 On the non-subsistence of esse in Aquinas see, Gustav Siewerth, Philosophizing with Gustav Siewerth – Das 
Sein als Gleichnis Gottes: Being as Likeness of God, trans. Andrzej Wiercinski (Konstanz: Gustav Siewerth 
Gesellschaft, 2005); Ulrich, Homo Abyssus, 28-30; cf., TL2, 183.  
51 De Potentia, 1.1.  
52 GL4, 401-404. 
45 
 
Balthasar interprets Aquinas as not only affirming the transcendent fullness of esse as the source of 
everything that exists (second difference), but also its nothingness by virtue of esse’s dependency on 
essence (third difference).  
Secondly, esse's non-subsistence underpins the irreducible ontological dignity of the essences of 
beings. Essences are required by esse for esse to come into subsistence in actual beings and the 
distinctive activities which flow from their essential natures. Hence, while essences do not exist prior 
to or without esse, there is nonetheless a sense in which they, or rather the whole being to which 
they belong, are paradoxically prior to esse as the latter only attains subsistence in beings according 
to their essential natures. I explore this more fully in the fourth difference. 
Thirdly, given the presupposition of esse’s non-subsistence and dependence on essence, and 
essence’s concomitant dependence on esse, and their mutual irreducibility, a preliminary case can 
be made for the relationship between esse and entia being one of mutual dependence. Balthasar 
refers to this as a polar relationship. In TL1, he elaborates 
[n]ot only does the ‘real distinction’ between essence and esse-existence…pervade every 
last fibre of all finite being, but…each pole can be accounted for only and strictly in terms of 
the other. The existence of such polarities gives finite being the consistency, vitality, and 
dignity that elevate it beyond mere facticity and make it the object of an unquenchable 
interest, indeed, of a reverent, astonished wonderment. For the more deeply the knower 
delves into these structures, the more they unveil themselves to him and, at the same time, 
withdraw behind the veil of their mystery.53  
This polar relationship refers to a reciprocity between esse and essence that coheres in the dynamic 
reality of an actually existing entity or ens. Balthasar calls this a ‘double dependence,’ a ‘mutual 
conditionedness,’ and a ‘conditioned, mutually dependent freedom.’54 The notion of a polar 
relationship when applied to created being, therefore, refers to a relationship of irreducible yet 
correlated terms. This is distinguished from an extrinsic dualism where terms are not mutually 
dependent on each other. It is, moreover, distinct but inseparable from the theological polarity that 
constitutes finite being, namely, between God and creation (fourth difference). The notion of 
polarity is a crucial concept for Balthasar, one he borrows from Przywara.55 He applies it not only to 
the relationship between existence/esse and essence, or God and creation, but also to other 
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metaphysical terms (for example, act and potency, essence and appearance, subject and object) and 
human nature, such as the polarities between the soul and body, male and female, and the 
individual and the community.56 The nature of the polarity differs in each instance, however, and so 
cannot be univocally applied, but must be analogically related to the basic polarities that constitute 
finite being.  
Regarding created being, the polar relationship between esse and essence is not simply reciprocal 
but asymmetrical where each pole offers to the other that which constitutes them in themselves.57 
Such asymmetry concerns the difference in how esse and essence causally relate to each other. Each 
term is a cause and effect of the other, but in different ways, and as part of a single unified whole or 
Gestalt.58 Thus, while esse has absolute ontological priority insofar as it accounts for the existence of 
anything, essence and action/operation have relative priority vis-à-vis esse for only in them does 
esse come to expression as an actual ens. This mutual priority ensures their abiding distinctiveness. 
Put differently, this asymmetrical reciprocity denotes the real nature of the relationship between 
esse and essence, as opposed to a merely conceptual relation.  
It is important to clarify that, for Balthasar, the notions of essence and existence are themselves 
complex. Balthasar’s interpretation of the real distinction thus affirms an intersection between two 
different polarities, namely, between an essential and an existential polarity where each is 
characterised by a tension and movement between immanence and transcendence.59 Any ens is a 
concrete whole comprised of the intersection between these two polarities. Thus, existence refers, 
immanently, to the particularity and irreplaceable uniqueness of a being in its historical existence 
(existentia). In transcendent terms, esse is the inexhaustible source of all being which brings and 
sustains all things in existence. This transcendent-immanent dynamic can be summarised as 
‘existence-in-beyond-essence.’60  
Similarly, essence refers, immanently, to the intelligible form, nature, interiority, and unity 
instantiated in particular beings (echoing the Aristotelian morphe). This sense of essence 
incorporates, moreover, a being’s intrinsic final end or telos (entelecheia) whereby it fulfils its nature 
 
56 TD2, 335-393 
57 For a discussion of ‘asymmetrical reciprocity’ in Balthasar, see DST, 126. 
58 Cf., David L. Schindler, “Agere Sequitur Esse: What Does It Mean? A Reply To Father Austriaco,” Communio: 
International Catholic Review 32, (2005): 809-810. Schindler charts this asymmetry vis-à-vis matter and form. 
Cf., Thomas Aquinas, Being and Essence: A Translation and Interpretation, trans. Joseph Bobik (Notre Dame: 
University of Notre Dame, 1965), para 16-18. 
59 For what follows, see TL1, 35-71; 131-205; and E, 43-57. Cf. DST, 28-95; and Healy, The Eschatology of Hans 
Urs von Balthasar, 19-90. 
60 Przywara, Analogia Entis, 478. Cf., DST, 84-88. 
47 
 
through its characteristic actions. Both the internal telos of each entity and the interactions between 
beings already suggests an immanent transcendence within material reality. Conversely, essence can 
be understood, in transcendent terms, to refer to the universal truth of the nature (echoing the 
Platonic eidos) that any being of a certain kind shares with all other beings of the same kind without 
being fully exhausted by them. This includes, moreover, any such nature’s place within the 
intelligible whole that makes up the order and telos of all that exists. This dynamic within the 
essential polarity can be encapsulated as ‘essence-in-beyond-existence.’61 For Balthasar, the 
intersection of these polarities constitutes the concrete ‘constellation’ or Gestalt of any being.62 This 
holds true, however, only if these polarities are not absolutized, but seen to open beyond 
themselves to God (fourth difference). 
Fourthly, and finally, at this stage Balthasar is presenting the non-subsistence of esse as a 
fundamental premise for understanding the relationship between esse and essence/ens. His concern 
is to account for their interdependence without referring immediately to a divine source in a way 
that elides the difference between God and creation. This reflects how the esse-ens relationship is 
not self-evident but can be interpreted differently. Balthasar here proceeds negatively by critiquing 
different interpretations of the real distinction as, either, sheer necessity (where essences are simply 
the self-explication of an ultimately essentialised esse as per Hegel or alternatively esse is identified 
with a nothingness beyond essences to which the latter are reduced as per early Heidegger); or, 
sheer freedom of choice (where esse, as it were, decides to expresses itself in essences, and so 
adopts characteristics of willed choice which, however, does not belong to esse qua esse, but is 
rather indicative of an actual being with a spiritual nature which esse cannot be as per late 
Heidegger). The problem is that, via a hidden choice, these views threaten to reduce being to the 
order of necessity and/or nothingness thereby undermining the wonder at there being anything at 
all and the diversity of essential forms. As Balthasar says, here the glory or beauty of being is lost. 
Either it is reduced to ‘the beauty of the order that prevails within the world (the totality of which 
then becomes ‘explicated’ Being),’ or, ‘it is submerged in the necessity of an ineluctable self-
explication of Being, governed by no ultimate form of freedom, in order simply to be itself.’ 63 In 
either case, ‘the primal phenomenon is not treated appropriately, and not even the most soaring 
metaphysical towers can conceal this….’64 
 
61 Przywara, Analogia Entis, 124; 160-191. Cf., DST, 82-84. 
62 TL1, 193. 
63 GL5, 621-622. 
64 GL5, 622. 
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By contrast, Balthasar argues that being’s primal phenomenon encompasses both the manifestation 
of the essence of things in their outward appearances and actions, and how this manifestation is 
dependent on and yet distinct from esse. Esse makes this manifestation possible by bringing all that 
exists into being as their transcendent source, even as esse depends on the dynamic expression of 
essences for subsistence. Thus,  
the ‘ground’ of a living entity – be it a plant, animal, or person – is always ‘more’ than what 
is projected on to the phenomenal surface, and this mysterious More can also be read in a 
mysterious manner from that surface, most supremely in the free spiritual being which, in 
expressing itself, retains the sovereign capacity (mendaciously) to conceal itself all the while. 
Any yet this is not at all sufficient to characterise the incomprehensible ‘freedom’ of Being 
itself, which plays indifferently over all things and is bound to nothing, and on the grounds of 
which the elevated, sublime (transcendental) radiance of glory is justified, that radiance 
which streams intangibly through everything which is.65 
Hence, Balthasar’s negative critique has the positive aim of offering a counterview of the 
relationship between esse and essence as characterised by a sense of freedom contemporaneous 
with mutual interdependence. Echoing the loving relationship between mother and child, but now 
on a fully ontological platform, this mutual freedom-in-dependency between esse and essence 
entails a reciprocal ‘letting be’. Here ‘just as being does not mould everything which is to itself, but 
lets it be, in the same way all that is must correspondingly allow being to dwell in its 
imperturbability, in order that its light should rise over all.’66  Hence, finite esse, as non-subsistent, 
‘lets’ all things be in their participation in its pure actuality and fullness through their distinctive 
essences; similarly, each essence exhibits a different 'letting be' regarding esse where, though the 
latter achieves subsistence in each being, esse is not reduced to beings but abides in its freedom 
beyond all entia. The unity of finite being, therefore, entails a double ‘letting be’ between esse and 
essence within the overarching context of their relationship in actual beings. Neither esse nor 
essence can account for each other or their mutual dependency whereby finite being is utterly 
contingent and in no way absolute. 
Balthasar stresses, however, how this mutual letting be must itself interpreted and affirmed in a 
decisive choice: either nihilistically where esse's letting be is a sheer nothingness devoid of fullness 
whereby it collapses back into the totality of the world understood as endless becoming; or, as 
 
65 GL5, 622. 
66 GL5, 622. 
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pointing beyond esse and essence to a transcendent single source – which opens the third difference 
to the fourth difference between God and creation. Here ‘God is the sole sufficient ground for both 
Being and the existent in its possession of form [Gestalt].'67 This means that the ens of which both 
esse and essence are constituent metaphysical parts is a whole that is greater than the sum of its 
parts, since neither can account for the unity of the whole. Yet this whole beyond them is only 
manifested in their dynamic unity-in-difference. As Healy notes, the ‘“more” of which Balthasar 
speaks is an inner fruitfulness resident within the ontological difference as a whole. Inasmuch as this 
“more” is richer even than the difference itself, our wonder is directed beyond the reality of the 
world.’68  
2.4. Fourth difference – God and creation 
Given the above, the polarity between esse and essence is not absolute and self-grounding. Rather, 
its contingent, mutually-conditioned dynamic opens to a source beyond itself which cannot be 
deduced by necessity but only wondered at in the reality of anything existing at all. This heralds the 
fourth difference that characterises finite being, namely, between God and creation.  
It is worth noting that when Balthasar locates the source of esse and ens in God, he is not positing a 
deus ex machina. He hints at this risk whenever the God-creation relationship is based on necessity 
not freedom: ‘gingerly, almost against our will, we must posit the fourth opening of distinction: 
beyond the still conditioned, mutually dependent freedom of the existent with regard to Being and 
the freedom of Being to shine unconstrainedly as a light within the existent ….’69 Like Aquinas in the 
Summa Theologica, Balthasar delineates how God must be understood ontologically as the cause of 
finite being given its contingency and pattern of self-transcending mutual dependency.70 What, 
therefore, must God be like if God is the source of esse and each being’s essential reality? And, how 
does this impact the nature of finite being? 
2.4.1. God as self-subsisting esse  
To answer the first of these questions, if God is understood as cause, this is meant sui generis. This is 
because God is cause of both finite esse in its freedom, actuality, fullness and non-subsistence; and, 
the inexhaustible dignity, intelligible coherence, and relative necessity of beings with their essential 
 
67 GL5, 624. 
68 Healy, Eschatology, 68. 
69 GL5, 636. 
70 Cf., Te Velde, God, 91-92n.24, 74-75, 177. 
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natures, actions and mode of causality, all of which are contingent as to their existence. 
Consequently, 
the grounding in God of this Being which does not depend upon any necessity, points to an 
ultimate freedom which neither Being (as non-subsistent) could have, nor the existent entity 
(since it always finds itself already constituted in its own essentiality). And so on the one 
hand, the freedom of non-subsisting Being can be secured in its ‘glory’ in the face of all that 
exists only if its grounded in a subsisting freedom of absolute Being, which is God, and so, on 
the other hand, the dignity of an essential form evades being threatened by the 
encompassing act of Being and thus being swallowed up and devoured as an invalid ‘stage of 
Being’ only if its valid contour can be referred back to a sovereign and absolute imagination 
or power of creation.71  
In comparing finite being and God’s infinite being, Balthasar articulates a central aspect of the 
traditional Catholic notion of the analogy of being. He is employing an analogical and Neo-platonic 
perspective which in Thomist terms is tantamount to an analogy of attribution.72 This can be 
understood in a variety of ways.73 Balthasar here implicitly proposes a so-called analogy of intrinsic 
attribution. This relates to perfections in creatures, such as being or goodness. While such 
perfections refer primarily to God, nevertheless God causes these perfections to exist in creatures 
and so they refer to something intrinsic in creatures, albeit derived, that are attributed to the 
creature because it has its source in God.74 These perfections are, moreover, pre-eminent in God 
because, as the absolutely free cause of created being, God is beyond the complexity, dependency 
and contingency that characterises finite being. Balthasar thus analogically extrapolates from the 
transcendent orientation of the unity-in-difference of finite esse and finite essence in beings towards 
their divine ground wherein the freedom and actuality of esse and the intelligibility and dignity of 
essence coincide in a pre-eminent and wholly positive way.75 There is here an immanent upward and 
self-transcending orientation to this aspect of the analogy. Given there can be no necessary link 
 
71 GL5, 625.  
72 Cf., TD3, 221n52. 
73 The analogy of attribution (also known as analogy pros hen, or, ad aliquid unum, that is, an order towards 
one) is where two (or many) things are related to a third term (or one thing is related another). The example 
used by Aristotle and Aquinas is that of health, which is used differently, but not unrelatedly, when used of 
man, urine and medicine. The latter two are healthy in an analogous sense as a sign and cause of health in 
man. Cf., ST, 1a.13.5. This is extrinsic attribution insofar as urine and medicine are not in themselves healthy. 
There is scholarly debate as to whether, with suitable qualification, an analogy of attribution safeguards the 
dissimilarity between God and creation. See Betz, introduction to Analogia Entis, 39n.111 and 73n.202. 
74 Cf., De Veritate, 21.4. 
75 Cf., De Potentia, 7.5 ‘The idea of negation is always based on an affirmation….’ 
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between how these occur in finite being and God’s infinite being, however, this means excluding the 
elements of esse and essence that characterise their contingent finitude, namely, non-subsistence 
regarding esse and existence regarding essence.76  
Accordingly, for Balthasar, God, ontologically-speaking, is the preeminent and infinite instance of 
esse and essence in their unity – a pure actuality which is not dependent on anything to exist or 
subsist.77 God is the absolute freedom of self-subsisting esse – what Aquinas refers to as esse ipsum 
per se subsistens – which is always fully actualised in its essence, and the free and responsible 
creative source of all essences.78 Balthasar here indicates the ontological minimum regarding God 
being’s given that finite being cannot be accounted for by necessity or random chance if the 
freedom of finite esse and entia is to be affirmed. God is, therefore, ‘an unconditioned freedom…an 
actus purus, which is posited in the first instance only in order to preserve the light of openness 
between Being and the existent as a free and unconstrained light so that the individual entity is not 
submerged within the exigencies of a process of explication and Being does not lose its freedom in 
the same “Odyssey” of its cosmic evolution towards itself.’79 
2.4.2. The ontological difference as the site of God’s freedom  
Understanding what the divine source of finite being must be like, namely, characterised by an 
infinite freedom in no way dependent on finite being, impacts how the dynamic and self-
transcending relationship between finite esse and finite beings is understood and enacted. Rather 
than the dynamic oscillation of their polar relationship being reduced to nothingness or made into 
an absolute mathematical necessity, it is the site of the manifestation of the absolute freedom and 
creative power of divine being. Here ‘each “pole”, has to seek and find its “salvation” in the other 
pole: Being arrives at itself as subsistent only within the entity and the entity arrives at its actuality 
(and thus at the possibility of its self-generation and perfectio) only within its participation in 
Being.’80 In other words, the divine freedom manifests itself within finite being in its very difference 
from God and, therefore, in finite being’s dynamic capacity for self-transcendence in the unity-in-
 
76 Cf., the triplex via of Dionysius the Areopagite which Aquinas follows. See ST, 1a.12.12. This starts with the 
positive relationship established by God in creation. Secondly, God is distinguished by way of negation so 
everything that characterises creation as effect – namely, its contingent finite reality – is removed. Thirdly, all 
that is positive in the effect is in the cause pre-eminently. Aquinas clarifies that the most perfect of all things is 
existence itself. ST, 1a.4.2. Cf., Michael B. Ewbank, “Diverse Orderings of Dionysius's Triplex via by St. Thomas 
Aquinas,” Mediaeval Studies 52, (1990): 82-109. 
77 TL2, 134n.10. Cf., GL1, 244-245. 
78 ST, 1a.13.11. 
79 GL5, 635-636.  
80 GL5, 625.  
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difference between esse and essence/ens. Only in light of divine freedom does the latter become the 
‘authentic “site of glory in metaphysics” in its deepest affirmation of Being.’81  
This further specifies both a ‘horizontal’ and ‘vertical’ polarity within finite being. We noted above 
how the ‘horizontal’ relationship between esse and essence points upwards beyond each of its parts 
as a dynamic concrete whole. This is each being’s constitutive relationship to God. It depends, 
however, on a prior downward movement of transcendence whereby God’s esse is immanent to 
each being as the source of its essential nature’s existence. The downward movement of divine 
transcendence thereby underpins the upward self-transcending dynamic oscillation of the horizontal 
esse-essence relationship. Balthasar labels this the ‘transcending immanence’ of worldly reality and 
the ‘transcendence immanencing’ of God which constitutes and shines within the latter.82 
Both the ‘horizontal’ esse-essence difference and the ‘vertical’ God-creation difference and their 
respective rhythms and intersection are integral to the analogy of being and so crucial to 
understanding the determinate reality of anything that exists. Indeed, they are themselves related in 
analogical terms. This represents a more comprehensive form of the analogy of being. In articulating 
this Balthasar is influenced by Przywara’s notion of the analogy of being and his interpretation of the 
Fourth Lateran Council’s edict: ‘between Creator and creature no similitude can be expressed 
without implying a greater dissimilitude.’83 Balthasar affirms how Przywara defends the abiding 
dissimilarity between God and creation. Thus, ‘[b]etween the divine and the created natures there is 
an essential abyss. It cannot be circumvented.’84 However, nuancing Przywara’s emphasis on the 
ever-greater dissimilarity in similarity, Balthasar stresses how this dissimilarity always shows itself 
concretely in the similarity.85 This echoes how created being is itself the site of the glory of divine 
 
81 GL5, 625. Cf., GL5, 636. 
82 TL2, 84. Cf., GL2, 294, where Balthasar refers to an ‘upwards-tending’ and ‘downwards-tending’ analogy; 
and, TL2, 171-218, where he distinguishes these as analogical and katalogical, respectively.  
83 Denzinger, Enchiridion, 269 (§806). Przywara translates this as ‘one cannot note any similarity between 
Creator and creature, however great, without being compelled to note an ever-greater dissimilarity between 
them.’ Betz, introduction to Analogia Entis, 73n.201, comments that some manuscripts do not include 
‘however great’ while noting Przywara’s preference to include it. Balthasar also notes this. See TL2, 95n.16, 
and TD3, 220n.51. 
84 TD3, 220. Cf., TD 3, 525. 
85 Przywara consistently states that the ever-greater dissimilarity between God and creature obtains within 
every similarity between them, however great. See Analogia Entis, 374. Balthasar’s judges, however, that 
Przywara’s stresses the dissimilarity ‘to the point of exaggeration.’ TD3, 220. Cf., TD3, 220n.51; and TL2, 
95n.16. Betz, introduction to Analogia Entis, 113n.312, labels the tension between Przywara and Balthasar as 
that of the apophatic and kataphatic, respectively. This, however, should not obscure how Przywara’s 
insistence on greater dissimilarity arises from treating the immanent analogy principally as the essential 
polarity of essence-in-and-beyond-existence in which divine and created essences are incommensurable. He 
treats the existential polarity, i.e., existence-in-and-beyond-essence, less comprehensively and principally in 
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freedom.86 As he states, ‘[e]ach basic property of Being points beyond its philosophical to its 
theological aspect….in such a way that in the similitudo the major dissimilitudo would be clear….But 
this major dissimilitudo would have to be continually revealed within the similitude….'87  
Understanding the relationship of the dissimilarity between God and creation within the similarity 
represents Balthasar’s adaptation of another aspect of the traditional understanding of the analogy 
of being, namely, the analogy of proportionality which qualifies the analogy of attribution 
mentioned above. Here two things in relationship are proportionally like two other things in 
relationship based upon a comparison of the two different proportions between each pair. This 
stresses the greater dissimilarity between the things being compared since they are only like each 
other according to this relationship of proportionality. There is no shared proportion between them. 
For God and creation, this affirms a relationship of proportionality between the unity-in-difference 
between essence and esse in created being and the identity of essence and esse in the divine.88 This 
cannot mean that God’s being is attained abstractly by essentialising in univocal terms the actuality 
of created esse along the lines of essence understood within creation.89 Rather, the analogy rests on 
two wholly different relationships of being where one (divine being) is the origin of the other 
(created being) but in no way dependent on it. As Balthasar says, ‘[t]he ontological difference 
[between being and beings]...originates both from nonsubsistent and from subsistent (divine) being; 
in that sense, it reveals both a similitudo (insofar as the multiplicity of creatures is one in esse) and a 
maior dissimilitudo, insofar as nondivine being necessarily cleaves in two and stands over against the 
divine identity in the form of a nonidentity.’90 Balthasar emphasises, however, the importance of 
directing the analogy of proportionality back to the similitude wherein it is unveiled. The 
‘proportionality between God and the creature does not affect the fact that the creature owes its 
entire being (both essence and existence) to God, by analogia attributionis.’91 Indeed, this indicates 
 
terms of facticity not esse’s superabundance. Balthasar’s focus on the intimacy between God and creation as 
rooted in esse differs markedly.  
86 Cf., TL2, 273. 
87 E, 89.  
88 TD3, 221n52. Cf., GL4, 409: ‘the creature itself is essentially a proportio between esse and essentia, so that 
its proportion in relation to God becomes ‘the proportion of a proportion’, what Thomas calls proportionalitas, 
a suspension of a suspension.’ 
89 E, 92: The ‘attribution of such an identity to God would remain a failed attempted to think in the direction of 
God….’ Cf., TL2, 134n.10 and GL1, 244-245.  
90 TL2, 183. On how the ontological difference originates both from nonsubsistent created esse and from 
subsistent divine esse, see the next section. 
91 TD3, 221n52.  Cf., Schrijver, Le Merveilleux Accord, 52-57: affirms how Balthasar employs the analogy of 
intrinsic attribution within an analogy of proportionality. Here Balthasar distinguishes himself from Przywara. 
E.g., TL2., 95n.16, where he critiques Przywara’s understanding that the ever-greater dissimilarity bursts open 
every similarity of the creature to God. Balthasar, however, is closer to Przywara than he realises. The latter 
attributes to human activity the pattern of God’s ever-greater dissimilarity within every similarity. This 
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a second descending analogy of attribution wherein the ever-greater difference between God and 
creation is revealed immanently in created reality.  
The concern underlying this comprehensive form of the analogy of being, as one of God’s ontological 
priority and the greater dissimilarity between God and creation unveiled within their relationship, is 
to be vigilant about collapsing the difference between God and creation/humanity, and undermining 
their respective freedom and integrity. This seeks to ensure not only that God is always affirmed as 
God, but to articulate what this means for how the analogy manifests itself in intra-creaturely terms 
as the dynamic relationship between essence and existence/esse that points to God who is beyond 
all as the source of all, and, therefore, in all. This reinforces how the three aspects of the analogy of 
being mentioned above, namely, the horizontal, the upward vertical relationship (as an ascending 
analogy of attribution) and the downward vertical relationship of dissimilarity within similarity (as an 
analogy of proportionality manifested in a descending analogy of attribution) cohere in a fourth 
aspect. They together constitute the single complex yet concrete primal Gestalt of created being. As 
Balthasar says: ‘through the greater dissimilarity of the finite and the infinite existent, the positive 
aspect of the analogia entis appears, which makes of the finite the shadow, trace, likeness and 
image of the Infinite.’92 The dissimilarity between God and creation, therefore, cannot be a sheer 
negative absence that places God wholly outside creation. Rather, it is manifested within the 
similarity between God and creation according to an intelligible pattern of being and action that 
affirms the integrity of creaturely becoming within its creaturely limits and ontological difference 
from God. God, who is in no way dependent on created being, fully and freely acts in every 
creature’s activity as the source of creaturely being, activity and freedom. For the creature this 
means its own activity is a matter of openness to the act of divine being.93  
  
 
‘establishes a new “attributive” analogy…, but one that proceeds not, as in the first moment, from below to 
above, but rather from above to below.’ This new attributive analogical is manifest as a ‘realm of service.’  
Analogia Entis, 235. 
92 GL5, 627.  
93 For the non-competitiveness between divine and created causality, see Jacob Schmutz, “The Medieval 
Doctrine of Causality and the Theology of Pure Nature (13th to 17th Centuries),” in Surnaturel: A Controversy at 
the Heart of Twentieth Century Thomistic Thought, ed. Serge-Thomas Bonino (Ave Maria: Sapientia Press, 
2009), 205-211. Cf., Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles: Book Three: Providence, trans. Vernon J. Bourke 
(New York: Hanover House, 1956), III.70. 
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2.4.3. The doctrine of creation and esse as gift of divine love 
To specify further this comprehensive analogical interaction of freedoms intrinsic to the relationship 
between finite and infinite being, Balthasar employs a notion central to his metaphysics: gift.94 Here 
the boundary between a philosophical and theological metaphysics becomes increasingly porous as 
the metaphysics of gift is explicitly rooted in the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo. This doctrine associates 
a metaphysical notion of gift with the act of creation where God is the giver of esse to each being. 
Finite esse is the ‘most extravagant gift’ to each being of participation in the divine esse.95  
Balthasar explains the gift-aspect of finite esse by locating the superabundance of esse’s actuality 
first in God. Divine esse is characterised as self-subsisting esse since the divine nature is always 
already fully actualised: ‘Nothing is richer and fuller than Being in its incomprehensibly glorious and 
absolute victory over nothingness...and yet this fullness can unfold absolutely only once: in God.’96 
Precisely because the divine esse is absolutely free self-subsisting superabundant actuality which 
lacks nothing and depends on nothing outside itself, God gives esse freely without being required to 
do so to actualise the divine essence. The divine esse, as fully subsisting actuality, is entirely self-
communicating and so characterised as pure diffusive freedom that does not hold on to itself.  
Finite esse, then, simply is divine esse wholly and freely given away as a gift of God’s self-giving esse 
thereby bringing non-divine being into existence through the gift of participation in the gift of divine 
esse.97 The rich abundance of created esse is, therefore, an entirely selfless fullness that is also a 
pure potency that brings all into being. It is a pure selfless diffusion which does not hold onto itself.98 
Balthasar associates this pure gift of esse with love, that is, with love understood ontologically as the 
selfless, diffusive unlimited freedom of not-holding-on-to-itself at the heart of esse’s 
superabundance actuality. This ontological sense of love, moreover, finds its source in God. For if 
God ‘creates the world without constraint and imparts to it, with its unconstraining 
unconstrainedness, something of the manner of His freedom and sovereign power of gift, and if this 
bestowing freedom deserves no name but love: then from what other ground could God “be” than 
“from” love?’99 
 
94 For gift’s metaphysical importance, see, Henri de Lubac, The Mystery of the Supernatural, trans. Rosemary 
Sheed (New York: Crossroad Publishing Company, 1998), 76-77; and, Milbank, The Suspended Middle, 53. Cf., 
Antonio López, Gift and the Unity of Being (Cambridge: James Clark, 2014). 
95 GL4, 404. 
96 GL5, 625-626. 
97 GL5, 626. 
98 GL5, 627. 
99 GL5, 636. 
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Before pursuing further Balthasar’s ontological rendering of love, more can be said about the 
doctrine of creation as a divine bestowal of esse. To the notion that finite esse is divine gift, the 
doctrine of creation adds the elements of, first, the personal freedom of the divine giver, and so 
emphasises the wholly gratuitous nature of the gift of esse which makes it a matter of love rather 
than necessity; and, secondly, the intellectual/spiritual creative depths of the same divine giver 
which accounts for the distinctive essential realities that are brought into existence by virtue of the 
gift of esse. Accordingly, the giving of esse as gift is now understood to be the result of the personal 
and spiritual freedom of the self-giving love of God which is one with the freedom of God’s self-
subsisting esse.100 In doing so, God bestows the divine esse as personal gift whereby finite beings are 
brought into existence in their infinite difference from God according to God’s creative power and 
imagination which is the creative source of their essential natures. Both essence and esse come from 
the same ‘personal and free depths of self-giving absolute Being’.101 
This affirms God’s transcendence as the creator of both finite esse and finite essence, and yet 
precisely because this transcendence relates to each creature’s esse and essential wholeness, it also 
affirms God’s intimacy to each created being as the source of their esse.  Hence,  
God is the wholly other only as the non-aliud, the not-other (Nicolas of Cusa): as He who 
covers all finite entities with the one mantle of his indivisible Being in so far as they are able 
to participate in his reality at an infinite remove – as “entities”, which are not Him, but which 
owe their possibility to his power, and their wealth to his creative freedom.102  
God as absolute freedom and creative self-giving absolute being is ‘wholly other’ as the source of the 
esse and essence of finite creatures. The latter, moreover, are other to God in their finitude through 
their participation in the gift of God’s esse without which they cannot exist. But God’s freedom as 
wholly other is also not-other precisely because creaturely esse is the divine esse bestowed and 
participated in as gift. God’s wholly other freedom, therefore, is not a freedom that is wholly beyond 
creation simpliciter, but rather a freedom whose otherness beyond creation allows God to be 
uniquely immanent to creation as the source of its actuality. Creation, therefore, manifests God’s 
self-giving within the freedom-in-dependency at the heart of finite being, and the self-transcending 
nature of this mutuality.  
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3. Non-Subsistence of Finite Esse and Dignity of Finite Essence 
Seeing finite esse as the personal gift of divine esse allows us to revisit more comprehensively 
Balthasar’s understanding of finite esse as non-subsistent and the dignity of finite essences.  
Given the above, finite esse is non-subsistent because it is pure gift, that is, the gift of participation 
in the gift of divine esse. Finite esse is, however, non-subsistent in two ways. First, the non-
subsistence of finite esse is what distinguishes it from God’s esse since the latter is identical to God’s 
essence as self-subsisting esse. The divine act of creation out of nothing is the bestowal of divine 
esse as a free personal gift of participation. This is a personal decision to share that which God 
always already is – self-subsisting esse. This decision is not out of character but accords with how the 
divine esse in its fullness does not hold on to itself and expressive of God’s nature as absolute, free 
and personal self-subsisting esse. Hence, God creates by bestowing his divine esse as gift, yet, 
precisely as gift, created esse is non-subsistent and so different from the esse identical to God’s 
essence. As Balthasar says, the distinction between divine esse and created esse ‘is only the 
oscillation between the giver and the gift, whereby gift signifies the being given (and being received) 
of the giver. Nothing substantial and subsistent, therefore, but the radiant fullness of God's Being 
[esse] in the condition of its being given to the finite recipient.’103 What is given as finite esse, 
therefore, is God’s esse received by finite essences as the gift they themselves are. This primary 
sense of finite esse’s non-subsistence constitutes the second way esse is non-subsistent, namely, 
finite esse’s dependency on created essences for subsistence even while created essences depend 
on the gift of esse for the actuality of their existence as instantiated by actual beings.104 This 
underpins how neither created essence nor created esse is absolute, since they both depend on each 
other in different ways where their mutual dependency points to and comes from God.  
We can further specify the nature of finite esse’s causal relationship to essence. As Walker notes, 
esse can be seen as a ‘quasi- or supra-formal cause’ of essence.105 This reflects, first, that esse does 
not simply bestow the actuality of existence on essential forms from the outside, as per an external 
efficient cause, but does so as each essence’s actuality even as esse depends on the resultant entity 
for its subsistence. Secondly, the actuality which esse bestows is characterised by a pattern, namely, 
the utterly selfless gift-like diffusion of not-holding-on-to-oneself. The pattern of finite esse reflects 
how esse ‘never had any “self” to diffuse in the first place, but is always already “selfless,” viz. non-
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104 Cf., GL4, 374; and, TL2, 182. 
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subsistent.’106 This aligns with, but is distinct from, the pattern of being's primal Gestalt as it appears 
in the Gestalten of actual beings since this Gestalt also encompasses each being’s essence.  
Accordingly, esse, does not exist-in-itself, but only in essences and so subsists either as created 
beings or divine being where non-subsistent created esse is a participation in the self-subsisting 
divine esse. It is the dual non-subsistence of finite esse as divine gift that underpins, for Balthasar, 
being’s analogous nature. There is no standalone univocal pure esse. There is either infinite divine 
esse which is subsistent because identical to fully actualised divine essence; or, finite created esse 
which subsists only in a plurality of created essences and, therefore, as instantiated in actual beings. 
This emphasises how the free gift of God’s esse aims ‘at the necessary plurality and manifoldness of 
created essences, since nonsubsistent being could not attain to subsistence in one essence without 
being God….’107 The difference between divine and created being, therefore, is between free self-
subsisting esse and utterly contingent non-subsisting esse subsisting in contingent essences. Esse 
considered apart from God or created essences is non-subsistent and so nothing-in-itself. Or, rather, 
in terms borrowed from Ferdinand Ulrich, it is the ‘pure mediation’ between God and creation.108 
This pure mediation of esse and its dependence on essence is, moreover, what allows the positive 
difference between God (as the identity of esse and essence) and finite being (as comprised of the 
contingent relationship and difference between esse and essence) to be affirmed in their very 
intimacy.109 The radical nearness of God to creation reflects how, as Walker states, ‘esse creatum 
would have been God’s being, except that it is always already given away as the “pure mediation” 
(Ferdinand Ulrich) of God’s self-communication – and so is one with its Archetype only within this 
radical “given awayness,”….’110 Thus, created being is closest to God when it acknowledges its 
difference from God as the source of created esse and essence in their unity-in-difference. It is in 
affirming their difference from God that humans paradoxically encounter and articulate being as 
divine gift where, as I examine later, this is especially apparent in how a new child is welcomed. 
 
106 Walker, “Love Alone,” 31-32n.29. 
107 TL2, 182. 
108 Ulrich, Homo Abyssus, 17, 23-24. Cf., DST, 53n71; Healy, Eschatology of Hans Urs von Balthasar, 45-53. This 
is based on Aquinas: ‘there can be no medium between created and uncreated.’ De Veritate, 8.17. 
109 This is echoed by Milbank and Pickstock, Truth in Aquinas, 43, for whom the ontological difference simply is 
the creator/created difference where ‘each creature is internally constituted out of nothing as that difference.’ 
Cf., Te Velde, God, 146n.49, who argues that for Aquinas creation participates in a 'similitude' of divine being 
to avoid pantheism. John Milbank, Beyond Secular Order: The Representation of Being and the Representation 
of the People (Chichester: Wiley Blackwell, 2013), 100-102n.196, argues this undermines the intimacy between 
God and creation. Balthasar’s position supports Milbank. His distinction between created non-subsistent esse 
and divine subsistent esse affirms the (mediated) immediacy of the relationship between the divine and 
created. Cf., GL4, 374. 
110 Walker, “Love Alone,” 24-25n.19. 
59 
 
Turning to reconsider finite essences, finite esse’s non-subsistence simultaneously underpins and yet 
also presumes the dignity and irreducible depth of created essences in their difference from esse. As 
we have seen, created esse depends on the essences for its subsistence in actual beings and is only 
expressed through their activity. The non-subsistent yet unlimited actuality of esse here requires a 
similarly inexhaustible depth to each being’s essence within the latter’s determined limits. The non-
subsistence of esse as divine gift means that the superabundant glory of the fullness of esse is not 
held onto but bestowed upon each being and shines from within the inexhaustible depths of the 
essences of finite beings as manifested in the beauty of the Gestalten of their outward 
appearance.111 This depth of determinate essence is not a fixed essentialism complete-in-itself, but 
rather more-than-determinate, something which is expressed in the rich fruitfulness of each being’s 
appearance and actions as it participates in and communicates the divine gift of esse.112 Each 
creature, therefore, fulfils its essential nature beyond itself through its interactions with other beings 
whereby all participate in esse’s trans-essentiality. As Balthasar says, this means essence is 
dramatic.113 In light of the fourth difference, this essential drama is, at its core, about sharing esse 
freely as divine gift. The glory of esse shining through the beauty of the super-determinate essential 
reality of individual beings is, therefore, attendant upon esse as divine gift and how beings 
participate in, appropriate and dramatically share esse as gift in their natures and interactions.114 As I 
examine in chapter three, a dramatic understanding of human essence as participating in esse as 
divine gift allows us to consider the fruit of human activity to discover more about human essence. 
There I take the fruit of a child as the prism through which to examine what is disclosed about the 
essential reality of sexual difference as it fruitfully communicates esse as divine gift within the self-
transcending dramatic form of human nature. 
The depth and dignity of the essences of actual beings in their dramatic enactment of esse reiterates 
the fact that created essences do not simply emerge from esse. They cannot be accounted for as the 
self-explication of created esse but point to God as their ultimate source. The reason for the 
essential reality of beings is, therefore, entirely positive. As Balthasar says, echoing Aquinas: 
[a]llowing natures to participate in reality – God's most proper prerogative – is not to be 
understood as the disintegration or diminution (on the part of the creature) of God's being 
and unicity…and the essences of things must not appear as simply the fragmentation of 
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reality, in a negative sense, but must be seen positively as posited and determined by God's 
omnipotent freedom and therefore are grounded in the unique love of God.115 
Balthasar thus strongly affirms the dignity of created essences as a function of the difference 
between God and finite esse, where finite essences are brought into existence by the gift of divine 
esse and determined by God’s creative freedom and grounded in God’s love. Finite esse’s 
dependence on the irreducibility and depth of finite essences for subsistence both constitutes and 
quickens the polar unity of finite being in its dynamic fruitfulness as a participation in God’s being as 
a matter of loving gift. In their very difference from finite esse, essences ‘are caught up into the 
dynamic of gift carried in esse as “dependent actualization,” so that the creature’s exercise of esse, 
its subsistence, is a “having-received-oneself-from-God-into-a-dynamic-of-self-gift.”’116 This recalls 
the first difference. The dramatic interaction between esse as non-subsistent actuality and essence 
as inexhaustible depth, which participates in esse’s selfless diffusiveness as divine gift, accounts for 
both a child’s very existence and the constituent elements of the experience of primal wonder that 
characterises the child’s first encounter with being as whole, including its own being and self-
consciousness, in its mother’s personal gift of love. 
4. Letting Be and Metaphysical Love  
We can now consider more fully Balthasar's notion of 'letting be' with which he characterises the 
child’s first self-conscious awakening to itself and to being as a whole.117 This ‘letting be’ reflects the 
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mutual interaction between non-subsistent esse and finite beings as the giving and receiving of esse 
as divine gift as instantiated in and communicated within each being’s concrete essence and activity. 
Balthasar refers to this giving and receiving of esse, or pure not-holding-onto-itself-but-letting-be, as 
the communication or word of being [esse]. This ontological communication applies to all beings in 
their participation of esse. It is distinguished from language or speech, even if the two are related. As 
Balthasar says, this is ‘a communication which points beyond all formulated and formulatable 
speech to the origin of the communication and thus also to the origin of the facility of speech of 
spiritual beings.’118 Given this, esse’s communication is a letting be that brings everything into 
existence as a matter of freedom and gift which, for humans, is encountered and communicated in 
wonder. Thus understood, concerning the first difference, 
[t]he communications of Being lies…simply enclosed in the child’s wonder at reality with the 
first opening of its eyes: in the fact that it is permitted to be in the midst of what exists. This 
condition of being permitted cannot be surpassed by any additional insight into the laws and 
necessities of the world. It emerges within the first distinction, communicates itself in the 
second to all co-existent entities and, in the third, grasps Being itself. Because no existent 
thing can be deduced by necessity from Being, but nevertheless exists in that it partakes in 
Being, and because this participation and sharing are two aspects of one and the same 
incomprehensible (because not able to be grounded within itself) oscillation, therefore the 
word of Being is itself the permission to be.119  
A child’s awakening to self-conscious existence and to being thus discloses the differences that 
constitute finite being. In elaborating this, Balthasar weaves together a set of closely related terms 
that express finite being’s polar unity as a dynamic of giving and receiving. Hence, first, concerning 
both esse and entia, he links, on the one hand, the notions of giving, fullness and actuality; and, on 
the other hand, letting be, poverty, and receptivity. Secondly, these different ways of expressing the 
mutuality intrinsic to finite being are encompassed within the notion of love understood 
ontologically which underpins the ontic interactions between finite beings. Thus, beings are engaged 
with each other through a mutual letting be, or giving and receiving, which ultimately flows from an 
ontological notion of love. This ontic expression of the ontological rhythm between esse and essence 
as love, moreover, is most fully manifest in the loving interpersonal human relationships. Ontological 
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love, which has its source in the personal gift of divine being, therefore, both undergirds and is fully 
manifested in interpersonal love. Let us consider these aspects more fully. 
4.1. The fullness and poverty of letting be 
Balthasar frames the dynamic interaction of finite esse and finite essence as a joint fullness and 
poverty that echoes God’s own gift of being.120 He states, 
God-given being is both fullness and poverty at the same time: fullness as being without 
limit, poverty modelled ultimately on God himself, because he knows no holding on to 
himself, poverty in the act of being which is given out, which as gift delivers itself without 
defence (because here too it does not hold on to itself) to the finite entities.121  
In its superabundant actuality and non-subsistence, finite esse as divine gift is simultaneously full 
and poor. Esse’s poverty is a function of its fullness as pure selfless giving which holds onto nothing 
of itself but lets beings be in their distinctiveness. This poverty is reflected, moreover, in how esse 
only subsists in and so is dependent on and receptive to the essences of actual finite beings. 
Accordingly, poverty-as-receptivity (to essence) is intrinsic to the fullness of esse’s actuality.122 This 
makes receptivity a perfection of esse.123  As Healy says: ‘[w]hile the receptivity of essence as such 
belongs to essence, not to esse, that receptivity has an analogous correspondent in esse's non-
subsistence, which it manifests, so to speak, in depending on the receptivity of essence at the 
moment it confers upon this receptivity the status of being.’124 
The fullness and poverty of esse is, moreover, echoed in the essential reality of entia wherein esse 
finds subsistence.125 Thus, on the one hand, there is a fullness to each being’s essence. In the latter’s 
receptivity to the gift of esse’s fullness, as the cause of its existence, each essence exhibits an 
interior fullness or depth. This echoes the more-than-determinate character of essences, mentioned 
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earlier, which here matches the poverty-in-fullness of esse as it subsists in individual essences. On 
the other hand, entia are limited by their essences and the actions which flow from them. Balthasar 
thus uses poverty of essences, firstly, to denote a limit whereby actual beings can never encompass 
the totality of esse’s superabundant actuality within themselves since this would reduce esse to their 
essential reality. This, however, indicates a second sense of the poverty of essence’s which echoes 
esse’s poverty-in-fullness, namely, selfless diffusive not-holding-on-it-itself.  
This second sense of the poverty of essences repeats, therefore, within the essential order, esse’s 
own fullness and actuality insofar each being communicates esse’s character as letting be. Hence, 
each finite being in its essential activity makes esse’s fullness as self-giving poverty and receptivity 
their own. This again challenges any fixed essentialism. No being exists first as a self-enclosed entity 
which then in a second extrinsic moment passes esse on.126 Rather, finite beings come into existence 
as already active in their essential natures, and as outwardly oriented to letting esse be, in their prior 
receipt of the gift of esse. Hence, each being is constituted ’by virtue of an ekstasis out of its own 
closed self, and therefore through dispossession and poverty becomes capable of salvaging in 
recognition and affirmation the infinite poverty of the fullness of being and, within it, that of the God 
who does not hold on to himself.’127 A being’s poverty, receptivity and self-emptying are, therefore, 
a function of the prior fullness of the actuality of esse as divine gift which does not hold onto itself. 
They do not denote a lack or loss vis-à-vis finite being, but a fullness and fruitfulness which is 
expressed within each being’s essential reality and activity as a generous handing on and receiving. 
This manifests itself in the fruitfulness of the shared fullness-in-poverty that is the giving and 
receiving between actual beings.  
To wed this understanding of the joint letting be of esse and essence with the earlier points 
regarding the non-subsistence of esse and the inexhaustibility of essence, this sense of finite beings 
letting esse be in their essential actions not only expresses the richness of the non-subsistent 
character of esse as gift selflessly given away. It also expresses and constitutes in ever-new ways the 
inexhaustible depths and rich interiority of finite essences, powering each being’s essential self-
expression and fulfilment through its actions. Essences, in turn, are thereby significant because they 
disclose ‘what the self-diffusion of esse “looks like” when it is “instantiated” in concrete ens as its 
subsistent supposit. For the concrete ens, which provides the “missing self” for esse’s self-diffusion, 
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is…caught up into esse’s dynamic self-diffusion, and so exists in itself only to the extent that it also 
exists outside of itself, and vice versa, in a reciprocity of ecstasy and entasy.’128 The mutual letting be 
that occurs between esse and entia thus manifests itself in how the interior depth of each bring is 
expressed outwardly in its participation in esse’s rich poverty as shared with other beings. 
In more concretely human terms, recalling the fourfold's first difference where a child is welcomed 
and permitted to be by its parents, being’s fullness and poverty as divine gift underpins, 
metaphysically, how the poverty, dependence and receptivity of childhood are not a matter of lack. 
Rather they coincide with an original fullness, freedom and self-giving at the heart of the dynamic 
reciprocal letting-be between esse and essence. Indeed, this metaphysical letting-be aligns 
primordially, in human terms, with the paradigmatic significance of being childlike in dependence on 
others' gift of esse. This matches how a child in its receptivity and poverty – as it is conceived, born 
and awoken by others in wonder – lets the fullness of esse be in a way that is a wholly positive and 
active expression of the depths of the child’s human nature in its openness to others, esse and God. 
Moreover, since this concerns the way human nature as spirit ecstatically participates in the fullness-
in-poverty of being’s own ecstatic Gestalt, its very childlike character can, metaphysically-speaking, 
never be superseded. The wonder of each child is wholly transparent to the divine gift of esse as 
enacted in human essence’s openness to God-given esse. No-one can jettison being childlike, 
therefore, without forfeiting esse’s own character as divine gift freely given away and manifested in 
the rich poverty of created essences. Where childlike wonder is rejected, so is this vision of esse's 
glorious letting be and the dignity of essences. This insight into the paradigmatic childlike character 
of being’s letting be as divine gift stresses that fully human activity is one that remains open to esse 
and hands it on with childlike wonder. Act, says Balthasar, ‘as if you yourself, your fellow-man and 
fellow-object owed your existence to a boundless grace.’129  
Beyond the human, this discloses a metaphysical vision of being whereby it is within the concrete 
interaction between beings, in their giving and receiving of each other in their shared poverty and 
wealth, that esse is received and given as divine gift and finds subsistence in the variety of different 
beings – in short, where esse is exchanged fruitfully. Such shared letting-be encompasses a 
reciprocal notion of action where the interaction between beings always involves a mutuality of 
movements of letting be in dramatic events of encounter that open beyond themselves: the 
movement of the one who ‘lets’, ‘allows’, or ‘permits’; and the movement of the one who ‘is let be’. 
The simultaneity of these movements in one act means they are reversible. The one who ‘is let be’ is 
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also one who ‘lets’, ‘allows,’ or ‘permits,’ and vice versa. There is, therefore, a co-agency in every 
such encounter where each agent’s actions are not simply consecutive but simultaneous, even if 
there is abiding asymmetry between them and the whole shared event fruitfully exceeds both 
contributions. As we shall examine later in this thesis, this sense of asymmetrical co-agency between 
beings, where subject and object are jointly active and receptive in the letting be of esse according 
to the depths of their essential natures, is crucial to how Balthasar’s metaphysics is concretely 
rooted in and affirms the fruitful mutuality of the sexes and the child-parent relationship. Here the 
fruit of a new child’s existence and wonder disclose afresh esse’s diffusiveness as a gift of divine 
love. 
4.2. Love as metaphysical reality 
As mentioned already, Balthasar understands this active giving and receiving intrinsic to being most 
comprehensively as love. As Balthasar says, 
[o]nly a philosophy of freedom and love can account for our existence, though not unless it 
also interprets the essence of finite being in terms of love. In terms of love – and not, in the 
final analysis, in terms of consciousness, or spirit, or knowledge or power, or desire, or 
usefulness. Rather, all of these must be seen as ways toward and presuppositions for the 
single fulfilling act that comes to light in a superabundant way in the sign of God. Thus, 
beyond existence in general and beyond the composition of essence, a light breaks on the 
constitution of being itself, insofar as it subsists in no other way than in the “refusal-to-cling-
to-itself”, in the emptying of itself into the finite and concrete, while finite entities in turn 
are able to receive and retain it, as it is in itself, only as that which does not hold onto itself. 
Finite beings are thus trained by it in giving themselves away in love. One’s consciousness, 
one’s self-possession and possession of being, can grow only and precisely to the extent that 
one breaks out of being in and for oneself in the act of communication, in exchange, and in 
human and cosmic sympatheia.130  
Interpreting ‘refusal-to-cling-to-itself’ or letting be of created esse as love incorporates a triple sense 
of the genitive. First, the letting be of love belongs to esse as such. Secondly, this arises from esse’s 
character as the free personal gift of participation in God’s fully actualised esse bestowed as gift. 
Thirdly, each being in its essential nature and activity lets the gift of created esse be and hands esse 
on, thereby expressing its essential participation in esse. This sense of love as letting be, therefore, 
applies simultaneously on an theological level – as characteristic of God’s fully actualised esse –, on 
 
130 LAC, 143-144. 
66 
 
an ontological level – as pertaining to the nature of created being – and on an ontic level – as  
characterising the interaction between beings and so the community of all beings wherein esse’s 
non-subsistent diffusive letting be actively subsists.  
Here we can distinguish between how various beings participate in and give subsistence to the 
selfless diffusion of esse according to their essential natures. Beyond inanimate objects, plants and 
animals, humans are uniquely placed to hand on esse as free self-conscious personal gift, that is, as a 
gift of love, because they possess the greatest level of freedom given their embodied spiritual 
nature. Such love represents an act of the whole person open to esse, other beings and God. As 
Balthasar says, ‘love means here the total human act which comprehends the totality of mind and 
body, and in particular, percipient intelligence. As metaphysical intelligence, it perceives the relation 
of the existent and Being which defies formulation and, as Christian intelligence, it perceives God’s 
free word of absolute love which utters itself as a medium within this relation.’131 Through their own 
acts of love, humans encounter and share the divine personal self-giving at the core of finite esse 
where this relationship to God’s personal giving is, conversely, always mediated via esse and so 
necessarily entails interaction with all other beings that participate in esse. Indeed, it is in 
communities of concrete persons, as an intensification of the community of all beings, that the 
letting-be of esse can be fully and concretely manifested as love. This has, moreover, a concrete 
beginning for each person, recalling the first difference between a child and its mother. It is through 
the self-giving love of its mother, which is her personal loving gift of esse as subsisting in their shared 
essential nature, that the child awakens to the gift character of its participated esse which it shares 
with all others.  
5. Conclusion 
I conclude with some observations on the connection between the interpersonal, the 
anthropological, and the ontological within Balthasar’s fourfold difference, and how this relates to 
the basic task of metaphysics as Balthasar conceives of it: to serve the wonder of being itself.  
First, the fourfold difference affirms an intrinsic link between interpersonal human relationships and 
the dynamic complex character of finite being. The ontological and interpersonal illuminate and 
mediate each other. Thus, Balthasar’s account of the analogical nature of finite being underpins and 
discloses the ontological nature of interpersonal relationships by emphasising the self-diffusive 
letting be of esse and the dignity and depth of the essential reality of beings, both personal and non-
personal. The interpersonal, by contrast, fully unveils at the heart of being the coincidence between 
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freedom and interdependence, and the giving and receiving characteristic of love. The interpersonal 
and ontological are, therefore, not extrinsically related. The interpersonal is the privileged instance 
of the dynamic between esse and entia. It concerns humans who, as embodied spirits, participate 
most fully in the letting be of esse through personal self-giving love. Humans, however, stand at a 
threshold. They can willingly act in openness to esse as free self-diffusive personal gift shared with 
others in love; or, deny the gift character of esse, splintering the intrinsic relationship between the 
personal and the ontological. 
Secondly, therefore, a willing mediation of esse as gift is not simply about personal volition, as if it 
were reducible to one or more aspects of humanity’s spiritual nature. Rather, a person shares esse 
fully with their whole spiritual embodied nature. This also includes how the letting be of esse is 
shared in concrete encounters between actual beings. The interpersonal participation in esse 
cannot, therefore, be divorced from the anthropological understanding of human nature as 
dependent on others for its self-conscious openness to being. Hence the significance Balthasar allots 
to the beginning of each child’s self-conscious existence where it awakens to its capacity to grasp 
esse in wonder through its mother’s love. This is not a function of choice, but rather moves the 
child’s whole spiritual nature in a way that allows the child to move itself, thereby underpinning its 
freedom. Accordingly, the coincidence of self-conscious freedom and interdependence for each 
person’s expression of the selfless letting-be of esse as love goes beyond a tension between the 
necessity of nature and the freedom of choice. Rather, it bespeaks a freedom borne out of loving 
dependency. The spirit's free communication of esse in love is prior to and enables any deliberate 
willed action, even if it only ever comes fully to expression in such free personal action in openness 
to esse. As Balthasar explains, ‘Love loves Being in an a priori way…. It receives it as a free gift and 
replies with free gratitude.’132 Each person enacts the letting-be which characterises both the free 
gift of esse and their nature’s spiritual freedom by ‘lending their own love, in the concretissimum of 
the encounter with their brother, that universal breadth of Being which – consciously or not, 
explicitly or not – the metaphysical act possesses and is.’133  
Thirdly, the vision articulated above is not self-evident. It reflects underlying metaphysical 
convictions about the relationship between being and spirit which impact how being is encountered, 
shaped, known and communicated. What is decisive, on Balthasar’s account, is whether finite being, 
finite self-consciousness and their relationship are characterised by loving gift and, therefore, 
whether being is actively and freely communicated as the interpersonal loving receipt and gift of 
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esse as divine gift. Given this, the measure of any metaphysics for Balthasar is how it values the 
personal. Conversely, he is concerned that without a metaphysical vision based on affirming being’s 
provenance as divine gift the human become a mere means to functional impersonal ends. Here 
personal love is reduced to cog in a ‘transcendental, biological and evolutionistic or materialistic 
process…and there is no longer any reason why it should be better that something exist rather than 
simply nothing at all. What kind of gift can [then] the other person be for me?’134 Balthasar is here 
worried about a predominately technological worldview which redefines human nature based solely 
on what humans can make of themselves and others for their own benefit.   
By contrast, Balthasar promotes a contemplative view of the human spirit's openness to being 
which, however, is fully expressed in free creative action.135 Rather than being products of and 
means towards our own fashioning, human action is to be receptive to being and other beings in 
love. Here being's analogical nature, and its fourfold pattern of difference, brings with it a service-
oriented way of being. It is characterised by a service of the whole – the whole person, community, 
society, and world – based on ‘the all-embracing openness’ of humans to esse as its subsists in 
beings.136 This reflects the basic task of metaphysics as a quintessential human vocation: 
guardianship of metaphysical wonderment.137 This is, moreover, inseparable from safeguarding 
human personhood understood as the totality of humanity’s embodied and spiritual nature 
engaging beyond itself with esse’s transcendence.138  This idea of metaphysics seeks to protect the 
freedom and gift-like character of esse, and the integrity of individual beings by living out in human 
existence the glorious indifference of esse as not-holding-onto-itself which all beings participate as 
divine gift.  
This divine orientation means, moreover, that a metaphysics which seeks to guard the inviolable 
dignity of the human person as worthy of love cannot be separate from a theological service to God. 
The latter, who has no measure, provides the measure for how each person lives out their service to 
the world and others. For Balthasar, a person, as spirit, can only give the gift of themselves fully once 
and only the ever-greater reality of God meets this human capacity to exceed itself. This is not 
simply blind faith incumbent upon an act of will. Rather the ‘gift of self is a response, to the one who 
is the ground of his being-permitted-to-be; to him who ultimately wants from man not things and 
 
134 GL5, 644.  
135 Cf., GL5, 650-651. 
136 GL5, 649. 
137 GL5, 646; 648. 
138 GL5, 655. 
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objects but his very self….’139 This gift of one’s whole self, moreover, occurs in a primordial and 
unrepeatable way in the child’s awakening to itself, being and God through the love of another 
where this once-and-for-all gift underpins human self-conscious freedom and is fully taken up in the 
love shared between persons. Where culture, philosophy and, even, theology have lost sight of the 
wonder of being and beings, Balthasar sounds a hopeful yet urgent note about ‘love’s manifestation’ 
in interpersonal relationships. Where being and concrete humanity are marginalized, such love can 
provide ‘emergency rations’ that open to God’s absolute love.140 This coincides with the importance 
of loving interpersonal relationships for living out and affirming the divinely-gifted nature of esse. 
Finally, Balthasar insists that certain human interpersonal relationships have greater epiphanic 
significance, ontologically-speaking, and are, therefore, paradigmatic vis-à-vis handing on esse as 
loving divine gift. This is reflected, first, in the primordial metaphysical importance Balthasar 
attributes to the relationship between mother and child. This, however, presumes another human 
difference, namely, human sexual difference. A key question is how these two paradigmatic human 
relationships are related. In chapter two, I examine the significance Balthasar attributes to the 
childlike heart of human self-consciousness and in chapter three I explore the connection between 
the child-parent relationship and human sexual difference. 
 
139 GL5, 654. 
140 GL5, 649. 
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Chapter Two 
The Heart’s Filial Childlikeness 
On Balthasar’s metaphysical scheme, finite being is wholly characterised by the unity-in-difference 
between being’s superabundant actuality (esse) and the essential reality of actual beings. As we 
examined in the previous chapter, Balthasar interprets this dynamically as an asymmetrical 
interdependence that opens ecstatically beyond itself. Given creatio ex nihilo, this self-transcending 
movement is judged by Balthasar to already be caught up in, exceeded, yet also the site of the prior 
gift of participation in the divine esse which calls all beings into being. Here the unity-in-difference of 
created being is unveiled to have its origin in a divine loving letting-be which is inscribed into created 
being and communicated anew in the interaction between actual beings. For Balthasar, this is 
expressed fully in the interpersonal love shared between humans for whom the encounter with the 
gift of being as manifested in actual beings is a source of wonder. Indeed, as we saw, Balthasar holds 
that the human spirit is first awoken to full self-consciousness, and, therefore, its metaphysical 
capacity to grasp the miracle of being in wonder, as a child in relationship to its mother. 
In this chapter, I explore the implications of this wonder-filled childlike provenance of human self-
conscious freedom for how humans encounter being. This acknowledges that we are the source of 
neither our being nor self-conscious freedom but receive them from others. Balthasar interprets this 
wholly positively as the gift of freedom that, in its dependency, is positively oriented to difference 
and sharing esse as gift. While each human is, therefore, an embodied spirit who participates in esse, 
their freely personal appropriation of this lies dormant until awoken from beyond through the 
concrete love of adults, typically, the child’s mother. Her personal address moves the child’s 
innermost core, precipitating its latent spiritual capacity to exceed itself in a wholly original manner, 
that is, with awareness of self and others in openness to being's fullness. This ecstatic movement 
engages all the child’s faculties in a single, complex and self-transcending whole which Balthasar 
identifies with the human heart. Indeed, the manner of the heart’s awakening imbues it with an 
abiding childlikeness that corresponds to its a priori yet gifted capacity for ontological wonder. 
In this light, two aims guide this chapter. First, I examine how this account of self-consciousness 
ascribes a singularly positive metaphysical value to the dependence of the child’s heart on its 
parents. Significantly, Balthasar applies this positive estimation not simply to childhood. To be an 
adult is to grow ever-more deeply into the truth of being a child who owes their existence and 
freedom to others as a matter of gift. Unlike children, adults can freely affirm or deny the gifted 
nature of their self-conscious freedom and their heart’s childlikeness. For Balthasar, the latter 
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cannot be abandoned without doing violence to the human capacity for wonder wherein lies the 
ontological root of freedom. Balthasar thus takes a stand against modern and postmodern 
conceptions of self-conscious freedom characterised principally by autonomy, self-actualisation and 
adult independence. The latter promotes an original antagonism towards childhood inserted into 
the fabric of human self-consciousness. 
Secondly, as a bastion against this, I show how Balthasar reaffirms the positive metaphysical 
significance of the child-parent relationship such that the human heart, and so human self-
consciousness and its freedom, are engraved with a lasting childlike filial character which keeps the 
heart open to being's divine source. Being an adult means willingly recapitulating the truth of being a 
child as one who owes their existence and self-conscious freedom to their parents and God. This 
filial gratitude underpins every other interaction that seeks willingly to enact the positive sense of 
freedom-in-dependence which marks the human spirit's openness to being in wonder. 
In what follows, first, I consider the value Balthasar attributes to childhood and the perspective of 
the child. Secondly, I give a formal account of Balthasar’s understanding of the ontological nature of 
human self-conscious freedom and the centrality of the human heart. Thirdly, I examine the 
concrete content of how a child awakens to self-consciousness through the gift of another’s love, 
typically its mother, and how this shapes the heart. Finally, I consider how the relationship between 
parents and children determines the metaphysical legacy bequeathed to each child in the form of 
the heart’s openness to being. I show thereby the importance of affirming the heart’s childlike and 
filial character for the human encounter with the wonder of being and beings, and, therefore, God. 
This also anticipates the next chapter's concern: the pivotal part played by the child-parent 
relationship and human sexual difference for the metaphysical task of safeguarding the wonder of 
being. 
1. Value and Fragility of Childhood 
Balthasar’s metaphysical approach to childhood reflects his engagement with the thought of Gustav 
Siewerth and Ferdinand Ulrich, who, like Balthasar, approach the child-parent relationship from the 
standpoint of Thomist metaphysics in dialogue with modern philosophy.1 Balthasar revisits this 
 
1 Cf.,  Gustav Siewerth, Metaphysik der Kindheit (Einsiedeln: Johannes Verlag, 1957); and, Ferdinand Ulrich, Der 
Mensch als Anfang. Zur philosophischen Anthropologie der Kindheit (Einsiedeln: Johannes Verlag, 1970). See, in 
particular, TL2, 177-178. Cf., Florian Pitschl, “’Unless you become like children’: Ferdinand Ulrich’s 
philosophical anthropology of childhood,” Communio: International Catholic Review 22, (1995): 56-64. 
Balthasar is also influenced by Charles Péguy and Georges Bernanos. See, for example, ExT5, 223-224; TD5, 
181-182. For a theological engagement, cf., John Saward, The Way of the Lamb: The Spirit of Childhood and the 
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theme in his last completed work, Unless You Become Like This Child.2 The upshot of Balthasar’s 
deepening engagement is that he affirms the unsurpassable positivity of a child’s incipient wonder 
and ‘the fragility of this originally inviolable dimension.’3  
In UBC, Balthasar reiterates how a child’s awakening to self-consciousness in wonder is 
determinative for adulthood wherein it is reclaimed afresh. This is ‘the interior turning in the 
direction of spiritual childhood; towards…”birth from the spirit” or “rebirth from above”, or, simply, 
“birth from God” (John 1:13).’4 Balthasar finds theological warrant for this, first, in Jesus’ attitude to 
the importance of children as evidenced in the Gospels. Secondly, it characterises Jesus’ relationship 
to the God he calls Father who is ever-greater than the Son.5 Indeed, Balthasar claims that Jesus 
attributes to the experience of childhood ‘a deeper and more authentic dimension of consciousness’ 
than any other philosopher, religious founder or psychological model.6 This has profound 
metaphysical implications. As Balthasar notes, Jesus assumes this as ‘something elementary, the 
condition for everything else!’7 
Balthasar pits Christ’s estimation of childhood against perspectives for which it is necessarily 
dispensable for maturity. Thus ancient Jewish, Greek and Roman views consider childhood as a ‘“not 
yet” stage’.8 In the ancient world, ‘no one was concerned with the form of the human spirit, indeed 
the form of man’s total spiritual-corporeal existence, that preceded free, moral decision-making.’9 
This echoes Jean-Yves Lacoste’s judgement that in ‘the whole metaphysical tradition of the West, 
childhood can be defined only as lack.’10 This persists in a contemporary context that values 
independence, rational autonomy and self-actualisation as ideals.11 Here childhood, along with its 
dependence on parents, needs to be outgrown.12 This can be understood differently, for example, 
as: the need to ensure the child’s inherent good develops free from external institutional 
 
End of the Age (Edinburgh: T&T Clark 1999); and, Edmund Newey, Children of God: The Child as Source of 
Theological Anthropology (Surrey: Ashgate, 2012), 190-197. 
2 This builds on treatments of this theme in ExT5, GL5, TD2, TD3, and MTG. 
3 UBC, 13. 
4 UBC, 11. 
5 Cf., UBC, 47. 
6 UBC, 28. 
7 UBC, 9. Cf., ExT5, 205.  
8 UBC, 12.  
9 UBC, 12. Cf., ExT5, 205. 
10 Jean-Yves Lacoste, Experience and the Absolute: Disputed Questions on the Humanity of Man, trans. Mark 
Raftery-Skehan (New York: Fordham University Press, 2004), 184. For a critical engagement with this tradition, 
see Gareth Matthews, The Philosophy of Childhood (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994). 
11 Cf., Taylor, A Secular Age, 575; 587-589. 
12 Some development psychology treats childhood as a distinct, positive stage. See, for example, Alison Gopnik, 
The Philosophical Baby (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux. 2009), 9. This, however, does not consider 
childlikeness a fundamental human form. 
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interference;13 psychological recapitulation of human evolution;14 cognitive development based on 
structural changes marked by age-specific stages;15 or, moral growth based on autonomous reason 
guided by educative institutions.16 These perspectives judge childhood to be devoid of abiding value 
for being fully human. Childhood’s essential dependency is a negative. For the sake of maturity, it 
must be overcome through adult reasoning, self-affirmation and self-making.17 Here, to assert 
childhood’s abiding significance undermines adult freedom by imprisoning each person in passive 
servitude to others who exercise a domineering parental-like authority. This asserts a basic 
antagonism between the self-made adult and dependent childhood. Balthasar is particularly 
concerned with ideological perspectives that advocate a positivistic and technological view of human 
nature, emphasising ‘the makability of man’, ‘self-fabrication,’ and human mastery over matter.18 
Compared to an anthropology rooted in the ‘wondrous mystery of a child’ where freedom flourishes 
in relationships of interdependence, especially those concerning a person’s origin, these 
perspectives proffer a counter-image that Balthasar equates with the Jewish mythical creature of 
the Golem.19  
Taken to an extreme, this negative view of childhood foments anti-natalism. This has precedent in 
an ancient Greek view, the so-called Wisdom of Silenus, which states ‘the best thing…is not to be 
born…; however, the next best thing…is, after being born, to die as quickly as possible.’20 It accords 
with an extreme outworking of the preference in modern philosophy for radical doubt and suspicion 
rather than wonder.21 Such anti-natalism reworks self-consciousness and its relationship to being in 
its own nihilistic image, rejecting from the outset spirit’s participation in esse as divine gift.  
 
13 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Émile or On Education, trans. Allan David Bloom (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1991). 
14 Sigmund Freud, Totem and Taboo: Some Points of Agreement between the Mental Lives of Savages and 
Neurotics, trans. James Strachey (New York: Norton, 1950), 116-187. 
15 Jean Piaget, The Child’s Construction of Quantities (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1971). 
16 Jean Piaget, The Moral Judgment of the Child (New York: Free Press, 1965). 
17 This is how Ulrich, Kindheit, 14, characterises Karl Marx’s view of childhood. 
18 UBC, 43-46.   
19 UBC, 43-44. The Golem is a being fashioned out of matter according to human designs, a trope utilised by 
Romantic writers and popular Western culture. Cf., Cathy S. Gelbin. The Golem Returns: From German 
Romantic Literature to Global Jewish Culture, 1808-2008 (Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 2010). 
20 Aristotle, Eudemus, quoted in “A Letter of Condolence to Apollonius” in Plutarch, Moralia Volume II, Loeb 
Classical Library edition, trans. F. C. Babbitt (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1928), 115B-115E. Cf., 
Arthur Schopenhauer, “Contributions to the Doctrine of the Affirmation and Negation of the Will-to-live,” in 
Selected Essays of Schopenhauer,  ed. Ernest B. Bax (London: G. Bell and Sons Ltd, 1926), 269; and, Emil M. 
Cioran, The Trouble with Being Born, trans. Richard Howard (New York: Arcade Publishing, 2012).  
21 See René Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy With Selection from the Objections and Replies, trans. 
John Cottingham (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 15. 
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By contrast, Balthasar champions ‘the distinctive consciousness of children as a value in itself.’22 This 
encompasses 
an original dimension in which everything unfolds within the bounds of the right, the true, 
the good, in a zone of hidden containment which cannot be derogated as “pre-ethical” or 
“unconscious”, as if the child’s spirit had not yet awakened or were still at the animal level – 
something it never was, not even in the mother’s womb. That zone..., on the contrary, 
reveals itself as a sphere of original wholeness and health, and it may be even said to 
contain an element of holiness, since at first the child cannot yet distinguish between 
parental and divine love.23 
This articulates Balthasar’s central insight into the importance of the child’s perspective for human 
self-consciousness.24 The original dimension encapsulates in an embryonic whole the self-
transcending gift-shape of the fourfold difference of finite being discussed in the previous chapter. 
Although Balthasar frames this here with reference to the good and the true, beauty is implicit as 
‘the original dimension’ and ‘hidden containment’ which encompasses the true and the good.25 
Balthasar correlates this, moreover, to ‘the form of man’s total spiritual-corporeal existence’. 26 As I 
explain later in this chapter, this implicitly refers to the heart as the faculty of beauty, which 
precedes, underpins and is expressed in ‘free, moral decision-making….’27  
We can distinguish Balthasar’s standpoint from idealised accounts of childhood. This is something he 
explicitly critiques.28 Christopher Denny, moreover, shows how the epigrams at the beginning of UBC 
implicitly critique a romanticised childhood. Balthasar quotes, first, Novalis (Georg Philipp Friedrich 
Freiherr von Hardenberg), ‘To be childlike: that is best of all’; and, second, Friedrich Hölderlin, ‘O 
would that I were as children are.’ These are accompanied, however, by destabilising attributions: 
‘Novalis, shortly before his death,’ and ‘Hölderlin, already demented.’29 Denny argues these ‘are 
coded attacks...upon an entire view of childhood that radiates from German idealism….’30 Although 
Novalis and Hölderlin echo Balthasar in rejecting modern denials of childhood, they absolutize 
 
22 UBC, 12. 
23 UBC, 12. 
24 Cf., Christophe Potworowski, “The attitude of the child in theology of Hans Urs von Balthasar,” Communio: 
International Catholic Review 22, (1995): 45. 
25 I examine this in chapter four. 
26 UBC, 12. 
27 UBC, 12. 
28 UBC, 15. Cf., Balthasar, Two Sisters, 145. 
29 UBC, 7. 
30 Christopher D. Denny, A Generous Symphony: Hans Urs von Balthasar’s Literary Revelations (Minneapolis: 
Fortress Press, 2016), 214. 
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childhood and remain enthralled to ‘an absolute idealism and its individualist conception of 
selfhood.’31 By contrast, Balthasar, refuses to make the child an absolute. He offers ‘a different 
anthropology of the child.... Instead, a child attains integration through interpersonal communion 
within the family, through a loving heteronomic parent who provides the gift of life.’32 
Simultaneous with the original wholeness of a child’s ontological wonder, Balthasar’s stresses its 
fragility: ‘in the human child this primal experience is shot through with an anguishing intimation of 
a deeper, more dangerous separation: the mother can be absent when needed; the child can 
experience what it would be like to be left alone….’33 Prior to UBC, while Balthasar recognises this 
threat, he emphasises that nothing can detract from the metaphysical positivity and joy of a child’s 
awakening to self-consciousness.34 While this retains priority in UBC, Balthasar also deepens the 
threat involved. Childhood ‘is fully vulnerable because the child is powerless, while those who care 
for him enjoy an all-powerful freedom….’35 This recognises an element of truth in modern 
conceptions of self-consciousness that associate an abiding childlikeness with a threat to human 
freedom. There is a fundamental asymmetry between the child and adults who raise it. The 
response, however, cannot be to reject childhood so as to liberate self-consciousness for this would 
be to carry out, in freedom’s name, the very threat against freedom’s origin, giving this rejection of 
childhood metaphysical purchase as necessary for full self-consciousness. Indeed, it implicitly 
demands that each child inflict violence against themselves and their reliance on others to be free.  
Against this Balthasar issues a caution, citing Jesus’ ‘terrible threat’, to those who do violence to 
children.36 
Any disturbance the child begins to sense…confuses and clouds over the horizon of absolute 
being and, therefore, also its bestowal of all creaturely being as a gift of God. Such a vision 
becomes troubled, too, because the child can grasp the gift of all existence only within the 
concreteness of its relationship of love with its parents within the peaceful realm of the 
familiar space it inhabits. Any violence in this realm of wholeness inflicts wounds in the child’s 
heart which for the most part will never heal…. To say this already implies how threatened 
interiorly the originally wholesome world of the child is.... The feeling of being sheltered, 
 
31 Ibid., 214. 
32 Ibid., 222-223. 
33 UBC, 31. 
34 Cf., GL5, 617; MTG, 18.   
35 UBC, 12-13. 
36 UBC, 12. 
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which can span wide distances, is nonetheless threatened from within by a fear that a life of 
love could die: this is a fear that can penetrate to the very bottom of the heart….37 
Balthasar’s wholesale affirmation of a child’s metaphysical wonder does not, therefore, ignore the 
impact of wounds inflicted during childhood. It intensifies the threat. This rests on an Augustinian 
and Thomist account of evil as the absence of the good and diminution of being.38 That the wounds 
against a child can be judged negatively presupposes an overarching positivity.39 In irreversibly 
awakening to being’s fullness, a child is potentially exposed to a metaphysical rejection and harm 
which cannot be reduced to the psychological or physiological.40 It is because a child awakens to self-
conscious freedom and being’s value through love that the absence of love or the presence of evil 
can so threaten this freedom and damage a person’s ability to encounter the concrete world around 
them. Hence Balthasar’s reference to the depth and near-incurability of wounds inflicted to a child’s 
heart which, as I examine later, is the concrete faculty whereby the whole person relates to being.41 
As Balthasar states, any damage to the heart’s a priori resonance to being can obscure the horizon of 
absolute being (God), the character of finite esse as divine gift and the dignity of the essential reality 
of beings. 
Here we can address a concern Denny, echoing Rowan Williams, raises about Balthasar’s failure to 
take seriously fallen nature in his emphasis on childhood.42 Balthasar, on the contrary, identifies the 
precise fault-line of original sin, namely, the unique relationship between a child and its parents, and 
 
37 UBC, 19-20. Italics added. 
38 For a recent defence of the Augustinian view of evil cf., David Bentley Hart, The Doors of the Sea: Where Was 
God in the Tsunami? (Cambridge: Eerdmans, 2005).  
39 Cf., John Milbank, The Future of Love: Essays in Political Theology (London; SCM, 2009), 141, who states that 
though Christianity recognises a universal tragic condition, it refuses to ‘baptise it with ontological necessity.’ 
See also, John Milbank, Being Reconciled: Ontology and Pardon (London: Routledge, 2003), 149, the tragic is 
consequent upon the Fall, and so not inevitable, but ‘contingent narrative upshot.’  
40 For a recent examination of insights drawn from development psychology and its synergy with Thomist 
metaphysics and Balthasar’s thought see, Martin Bieler, “Attachment Theory and Aquinas’s Metaphysics of 
Creation,” Analecta Hermenuetica 3, (2011): 1-25. 
41 Here Balthasar echoes Fyodor Dostoyevsky, The Brothers Karamazov, trans. C. Garnett (New York: The 
Lowell Press, 1912), 355: ‘You pass by a little child…with wrathful heart; you may not have noticed the child, 
but he has seen you, and your image, unseemly and ignoble, may remain in his defenseless heart.’ Cf., ST, 
1a.117.3, ad.2: ‘when a soul is vehemently moved to wickedness…, the countenance becomes venomous and 
hurtful, especially to children, who have a tender and most impressionable body.’ See also: ST, 2a.2ae.49.1. 
Aquinas understands this as impacting a child’s imagination in corporeal terms. This leaves open its effect on 
the spirit. Aquinas distinguishes the imaginative memory that concerns soul’s sensitive part from the habit of 
retention that pertains to the passive intellect (ST, 1a.77.8; 1a.89.6). The close relationship between the 
imagination and intellect in Aquinas (ST, Suppl.70.2) suggests a possibility of interpreting this along the same 
lines as Balthasar as impacting the child’s spiritual being. 
42 Denny, A Generous Symphony, 235. This focuses on Balthasar’s positive assessment of Myskin, the main 
protagonist in Dostoyevsky’s The Idiot, whom Balthasar sees as a childlike ‘holy fool.’ Williams, however, sees 
Myskin as avoiding tragedy and incapable of adult choices. Cf., Rowan Williams, Dostoyevsky: Language, Faith 
and Fiction (London: Continuum, 2008), 48.  
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the tendency to redefine a child’s consciousness in abstract yet deficient terms. As Balthasar says, 
most people ‘have an experience of sin in the world rather early on, and their memory of the 
concrete experience of their source goes underground. The open horizon of reality becomes filled 
with all manner of figures that are held together by the concepts “being” and “reality”, which have 
now become abstract. Such thinking and judging in the abstract serve them as a sign of autonomy 
and maturity.’43 This identifies the child-parent relationship as a crucial anthropological hinge for the 
working of salvation in the Incarnation, something Balthasar identifies with the significance of 
Mary's role and more broadly those who raise children, and the importance of the sacrament of 
baptism.44 
This diagnosis of the potential damage to a child through a lack of love makes the interpersonal 
sharing of the gift of being as love vital to the metaphysical health of children and, indeed, adults. It 
is love that distinguishes the child from the wolf’s cub.45 Moreover, because love is fundamentally 
rooted in the freedom of esse and the heart’s response to beauty, rather than mere will, it can bring 
healing through a new awakening to childlike wonder even in adulthood. That said, love can be 
deeply ambivalent because of abuses committed in its name. Here a heightened estimation of 
childhood may, when confronted with the suffering of children, justify a rejection of the view that 
being is a matter of divine love and gift. Indeed, there is a direct proportion. The greater the 
affirmation of the positive ontological significance of a child’s perspective, the greater the horror of 
any abuse and the justification for rejecting being's positive nature. This can, rightly, undergird a 
principled refusal to support a metaphysical worldview that explains such suffering as serving a 
greater harmony. It may, furthermore, wrongly, justify an anti-natalist position.46 By contrast, while 
Balthasar’s metaphysics can recognise an aspect of truth in the anti-natalist position – the rejection 
of evil – it does so on the wholly positive basis of the spirit’s a priori openness to the gift of divine 
esse. This avoids making anti-natalism’s rejection of existence, or the radical doubt of modern 
philosophy, an absolute. Instead, it meets the finality of suffering and evil through an ever-greater 
openness to the gift of being, even at the price of greater, albeit redemptive, anxiety and suffering.47 
 
43 UBC, 33. 
44 UBC, 38-40. 
45 E, 70 
46 The torture of children provokes Ivan Karamazov to reject God. See Dostoyevsky, The Brothers Karamazov, 
268-296. This rejects an intra-world harmony which encompasses suffering as part of its perfection. Cf., Hart, 
The Doors of the Sea, 39-44, 59. 
47 Cf., Hans Urs Von Balthasar, The Christian and Anxiety, trans. Dennis D. Marti and Michael J. Miller (San 
Francisco, Ignatius Press, 2000), 123-143. Balthasar affirms, with Soren Kierkegaard, the relative value of the 
anxiety that opens a person to being as an apparent void within and beyond themselves. Here esse’s 
transcendence provides no rest because it relies on beings for subsistence. Ultimately, for Balthasar, within the 
context of a fallen world, anxiety is the wonder of being’s excess as divine gift expressed as the ‘unfelt fullness 
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This is not merely to defer redemption to an idealised future where all disharmony is dialectically 
embraced in a greater harmony. Healing can arise in the present, manifesting the redemptive nature 
of being like a child.48 Furthermore, this orientation to the present means such childlikeness carries 
with it an urgent imperative towards justice based on openness to being's ever-greater wonder in 
the face of suffering. 
Indeed, confronted with suffering, Balthasar insists on the importance of affirming the excessive 
nature of being’s meaning in the midst of history in a way that heightens vulnerability to evil and 
suffering because it entails an ever-greater affirmation of the heart's openness to being's beauty, 
goodness and truth as divine gift.49 This is a refusal to close off one’s heart from suffering but rather 
to respond out of it.50 As Balthasar states, ‘this is a commitment to that which exists as a whole, no 
matter how it presents itself to the individual.’51 This commitment is inseparable from the a priori 
childlike act of the person’s heart, but now freely affirmed by an act of the whole person as they 
respond to being’s call in the particular. Rather than seeking a detachment from the particular and 
avoidance of fallen humanity in favour of an abstract idealised whole, Balthasar commends a greater 
openness to being as divine gift so as to arm ‘the spirit against this kind of abuse of detachment and 
to disarm the heart so that it becomes purely receptive – even, and precisely, to pain and 
deprivation.’52 
This adult commitment to childlike wonder mirrors the task Balthasar allots to metaphysics: 
guardianship of being.53 This is inseparable from being ‘guardians of childhood.’54 This applies to 
protecting both children and childlike vision. The decision to make this a personal mission comes to 
a head when a young person comes of age. As Balthasar says, the tenuous nature of a child’s 
‘originally inviolable dimension can…lead to definitive breaks when a young person enters the age 
when he must decide for or against evil. The “supra-moral” rightness and goodness of the original 
 
(which therefore feels like a void) of God’s Totality’. Balthasar does affirm a positive sense of anxiety bestowed 
by God which is ‘an intensification of light and of joy, a “darkness bright as day”, because it is suffering out of 
joy, anxiety out of exultation. Ibid., 147-148.  
48 Cf., TD5, 187. 
49 Cf., Milbank, Love, 144. Milbank stresses the non-resignation to loss via an ‘augmentation of the Platonic 
vision of good.’ This ‘is to refuse to cease to suffer, to become resigned to a loss. Only at the price of an 
augmentation of suffering does a complete joy and peace…shine through.’ Balthasar would agree, rooting this 
refusal in childlike wonder at being’s beauty. 
50 Cf., Hans Urs von Balthasar, “Communio—A Program,” Communio: International Catholic Review 33 (2006), 
167-168. 
51 GL4, 20.  
52 GL5, 632-33.  
53 Cf., GL5, 656. 
54 D.C. Schindler, “The Unsurpassable Significance of the Child,” Humanum: Issues in Family, Culture & Science 
(2011): 24. 
79 
 
dimension must now be affirmed with fullness of freedom.’55 Balthasar describes this according to 
stages that echo being's fourfold difference: first, as a movement away from the particular to esse’s 
transcendence; and, then, a return to the value of the particular but with a greater desire for what is 
beyond the particular.56 Child-like wonder ‘must slowly move away from its all-encompassing feeling 
and be trained in the disciplined contemplation of the Being of existents.’57 Indeed, what 
distinguishes childhood and adulthood, for Balthasar, is the notion of election (electio): ‘the election 
of a definite path, state, or vocation in life…marks the passage from the unlimited, universal 
possibility of childhood to the wise limitation imposed by the adult’s dedication to the one thing 
needful.’58 What is key is not simply choosing a path, but an ‘integration of the “supra-moral”, holy 
treasures of our original condition into the time of our maturity….’59 Such ‘an adult, who 
has…recovered at a higher level the concrete spontaneity of the child, is called by Novalis “the 
synthetic child”.’60 
Balthasar identifies the ‘essential traits’ of such a synthetic child who lives a ‘childhood in God as an 
adult.’61 First, it involves an attitude of abiding wonder at the beauty of things and that ‘all of this is’, 
and at God as ‘the ever greater one’.62 This is a person fully alive to the phenomenon of being’s 
primal Gestalt.  Secondly, such wonder engenders ‘elemental thanksgiving.’63 This is expressed 
concretely, in the first place, via gratitude to one’s parents and God as the source of the gift of being. 
Thirdly, it entails participation in the ‘intimate character of the Church as mystery’ and the readiness 
to receive the grace of the sacraments, the proclamation of the Word and the authority of the 
Church, which, more broadly, emphasise a disposition of obedience appropriate to how a person’s 
freedom is received from and shared with others and God. Fourthly, it entails an attitude of taking 
time and receiving the fullness of the gift of the present moment where ‘all of time is gathered up, 
effortlessly as it were’ and which ‘contains the memory of already having received as much as the 
hope of receiving time now’. Here every moment unveils ‘the very ground of time: as if it reposed on 
 
55 UBC, 13. 
56 Cf., Balthasar, Anxiety, 129-130.  
57 GL1, 179.  
58 ExT5, 212.  
59 UBC, 13-14. 
60 UBC, 14. In ExT5, 206, Balthasar cites Augustine’s commentary on the Psalms to the same effect: ‘”Let your 
old age be as that of a boy, and let your boyhood be as that of an old man.” [Psalm 112.2]… “In moving 
forward, let us not cease to be new or become old instead. Let us grow, rather, in our very newness.” [Psalm 
131.1]’ For Augustine, see Exposition of the Psalms 99-120, Volume 4 and Exposition of the Psalms 121-150, 
Volume 5, trans. Maria Boulding (New York: New City Press, 2004). 
61 UBC, 44. 
62 UBC, 47. 
63 UBC, 47. 
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eternity itself.’64 For Balthasar, the latter is particularly evidenced in a propensity for play and sleep: 
‘Play is possible only within time so conceived, and also the unresisting welcome we give to 
sleep….’65 
Becoming a synthetic child and integrating childlikeness with adult responsibility are flush with 
Balthasar’s entire metaphysical vision of human self-consciousness’ concrete openness to being in 
wonder. Conversely, this accentuates the tragic nature of those whose hearts have been scarred as 
children, and are unable to effect this integration. But then, in another reversal, because of the value 
Balthasar attaches to the whole of being appearing in the particular as gift, and the heart’s a priori 
receptivity to being’s fullness, this maintains the possibility of a healing of the tragic through the 
gesture of another’s heartfelt engagement wherein God’s loving gift of being is mediated anew.66 
This rekindles the metaphysical memory of the original wholeness attendant upon the child's 
awakening in wonder. Balthasar here echoes Fyodor Dostoyevsky. In The Brothers Karamozov’s 
closing chapter, the character Alyosha tells a group of children: 
[T]here is nothing higher and stronger and more wholesome and good for life in the future 
than some good memory, especially a memory of childhood, of home. People talk to you a 
great deal about your education, but some good, sacred memory, preserved from childhood, 
is perhaps the best education. If a man carries many such memories with him into life, he is 
safe to the end of his days, and if one has only one good memory left in one's heart, even 
that may sometime be the means of saving us….67 
A good childhood memory keeps a person’s heart pliable to esse as gift. It is significant, moreover, 
that, in the passage above, it is an adult telling this to children in a parental-like capacity.68 
Balthasar's perspective links such memories to the first memory of being’s primal Gestalt whereby a 
child is awoken to self-conscious existence through a concrete encounter of the heart. 69 This rests 
on the receipt of the concrete Gestalt of its mother’s love which awakens and shapes the child’s 
heart and its whole spiritual nature from beyond itself, wherein resides the capacity for memory and 
the wellspring of action, knowledge and language. As he says,  
 
64 UBC, 51. 
65 UBC, 51. 
66 This is offered most fully through the grace of baptism. See UBC, 39, 42. 
67 Dostoyevsky, Brothers Karamazov, 875-876.  
68 Cf., John Milbank, “Fictioning Things: Gift and Narrative,” Religion & Literature 37.3, (2005): 8-9, since 
‘children first learn through pictures and stories, the selection of the right stories told the right way becomes 
the most central concern….’  Milbank talks here of adults who know how ‘to qualify egoistic self-consciousness 
with a childishly active but unselfconscious participation in the real.’ Balthasar emphasises how this has its 
origins in the awakening of self-consciousness by parental love. 
69 Cf., UBC, 25. Balthasar calls this ‘a fragment of archetypical childhood.’ 
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[t]he mother’s smile is not a spoken word, yet it is understood as one because it is an 
expression of spirit. It is “word” as image, which received within the child’s heart, is 
engraved on the imagination [ein-gebildet] and, as an internal image [In-bild], is interpreted 
as referring to the imaginal structure [Gebilde] in its self-expression. Later, when the child 
learns to order similar images in accord with their objective interrelations 
[Zusammengehorigkeit], this “word” can be grasped, translated into concepts that contain 
ever more of the world. 70 
The concrete image of its mother’s loving self-expression shapes the child’s imaginative heart 
thereby underpinning every subsequent self-conscious act. To understand this further, I propose 
now to explore Balthasar’s understanding of human self-consciousness and, particularly, the 
centrality he accords the heart as the faculty of the everlasting child. 
2. Ontological Freedom of the Self-Conscious Human Person  
Balthasar explores the ontological nature of the freedom of human self-consciousness at several 
points in the trilogy and elsewhere. His thinking develops from the earliest book, TL1. Although there 
is much continuity, Balthasar’s position shifts notably regarding the relationship between self-
consciousness and being. He moves from an essentially modern philosophical perspective of 
consciousness, as a pre-existing abstract reality that is the preserve of the subject and only 
secondarily related to the empirically-encountered objects of consciousness, to a perspective that, 
while affirming an a priori relationship between finite consciousness and finite being, also holds this 
pre-existent ontological relationship as, paradoxically, awoken in the concrete encounter between 
child and parents. Balthasar affirms in the Epilogue: ‘man is open for the world in its entirety; his 
self-consciousness is indissolubly linked with his world-consciousness – so much so that he attains to 
self-consciousness only as he is addressed by and from the world.’71  
In what follows, I expand on this, delineating three distinct, mutually illuminating aspects. First, I 
offer a more formal account of the freedom of self-consciousness as rooted in each person’s 
participation in the letting be of esse via their human nature.72 This formal view, however, is always 
inflected by the concrete context of the child’s awakening by another. Secondly, I explore how this 
concrete perspective means that self-consciousness can never be reduced to an abstract isolated act 
of the subject. It is a dramatic event of encounter between the object and subject of consciousness, 
 
70 TL2, 256. 
71 E, 47-48. 
72 Affirming the concrete does not exclude an examination in the ‘abstract and ideal sphere....’ TD2, 285. 
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one which engages the whole subject according to a complex interaction of its various faculties. 
Thirdly, I relate this to Balthasar’s understanding of the heart’s attunement to being. I then consider 
further the concrete content of the child-adult encounter. 
In TD2 and TD3 Balthasar considers the relationship between a person’s self-consciousness and esse 
in light of its genesis in the encounter between child and parent. From this we can identify seven 
elements of Balthasar’s understanding of the ontological nature of human self-conscious freedom. 
2.1. Self-consciousness as ontological freedom rooted in esse 
First, in TD2, Balthasar explores the formal relationship between self-consciousness and being from 
the perspective of ‘the fundamental “cogito-sum,”’ drawing on the thought of Augustine, Aquinas 
and Descartes.73 The cogito-sum, or sense of ‘I am’, refers to the essential act of a person’s 
intellectual/spiritual nature and its participation in esse.74 While intellectual, it is more than 
intellectual as it concerns the act of the whole person. It goes beyond the intellectual awareness of 
individual items that appear to consciousness, including the awareness ‘I am thinking’. Rather, it 
concerns, in Aquinas’ terms, a habitual knowledge of self; what Balthasar refers to as active ‘self-
possession.’75 Thus, ‘“even before the soul performs some abstraction, it has a habitual (self-
possessing) knowledge where it can understand that it exists”, and this is because the soul’s essence 
is present to itself, so that it knows itself “in a certain sense through its essence, as God knows 
himself”.’76 While this intellectual self-possession is habitual as the act of the subject’s whole 
intellectual nature participating in esse, it is ontologically prior to habitual knowledge.77 Hence such 
 
73 TD2, 207. 
74 Balthasar locates the cogito-sum vis-à-vis creatio ex nihilo. Against Descartes’ cogito ergo sum (I think 
therefore I am), Balthasar affirms cogitor ergo sum (I am thought therefore I am). Cf., E, 81; TL1, 54. 
75 TD2, 208. 
76 TD2, 207-208. References to De Veritate, 10.8. 
77 At TD2, 207-208n.2, Balthasar clarifies this vis-à-vis tensions between Thomist and Augustinian traditions. 
Thus, ‘Thomas reduces actual knowledge to habitual, which is only actualized indirectly, through its powers, 
which are distinct from the soul’s essence and are referred to objects…. [For the] Augustine school…the 
reflexive character of all intellectual knowledge involves the knower possessing himself….’ Balthasar holds this 
opposition resolves in Aquinas’ notion of the intellectual nature’s participation in the divine light. Although, for 
Balthasar, this is always mediated via participation in esse. This resolution also applies to the notion of habit 
which is a participation in divine gift. Cf., John Milbank, “What Lacks is Feeling: Hume versus Kant and 
Habermas,” in Faithful Reading New Essays in Theology and Philosophy in Honour of Fergus Kerr, ed. Simon 
Oliver and Karen Kilby (London: T&T Clark, 2012), 17-19. For Balthasar, it is only because a child is awoken by 
another’s gift of being that it awakens to the gift of habitual self-knowledge.  
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self-possession is ‘not a particular accidental form of conduct (for this presupposes that the subject 
already exists), but the constitution of the subject-“substance” itself.’78  
As this suggests, the primal self-possession of the cogito–sum is, for Balthasar, inseparable from the 
possession of being itself. ‘I know not only that I exist but in the same knowledge I am open to all 
being, since in this consciousness, that I am, I have touched the farthest possible horizon, beyond 
which, evidently, there can be nothing more.’79 This is the ‘primal act of self-knowledge (which is a 
knowledge of being)’ where ‘in grasping our own being, we also grasp all being whatsoever, which 
goes beyond all particular beings. (This takes place in the soul’s innermost – and self-evident – 
presence to itself.)’80  More fully, the origin of this ontological self-possession and self-illumination 
‘comes from the very ground of Being, which we cannot “get behind” and which the questioning 
mind cannot approach, as it were, from the outside (because it is part of it)…. Spiritual being is one 
form, a highest form, of participation in Being.’81 The intellectual light whereby we know and possess 
ourselves is the light of both spirit and being. This participation in the light of esse discloses 
consciousness to itself and ‘the first principles’ of all being.82 Moreover, ‘[c]orresponding to the 
nature of being – which is both true and good – this “light”, like everything else we shall have to say 
about freedom, is an indivisibly intellectual and volitive light….’83 Here we touch on how Balthasar 
correlates self-conscious freedom to the different spiritual faculties of human nature and their 
source in being according to transcendental aspects of goodness, truth and beauty. I examine this in 
chapter four. 
My present concern, however, is the formal relationship between self-consciousness and esse. The 
simultaneity of esse and the awareness of being present-to-myself unveils, what Balthasar calls, a 
fundamental paradox between ‘the absolute incommunicability of my own being (as “I”) and the 
unlimited communicability of being as such....’84 These are not extrinsically related. Rather, ‘it is 
precisely in the experience of being “I” (and no one else) that I pass beyond all limiting knowledge of 
my nature and touch being (reality) in its uniqueness. The one, identical experience of being 
discloses two things simultaneously: the utter incommunicability (or uniqueness) and the equally 
 
78 MTG, 45. Cf., MTG, 39: ‘the human spirit [is] active all the time (intellectus semper agens), even when this 
activity makes itself known as actual knowledge (in the intellectus passibilis) only when it is addressed by the 
world.’ 
79 TD2, 208. 
80 TD2, 239. 
81 TD2, 240. 
82 TD2, 209. 
83 TD2, 211. 
84 TD2, 208. 
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total communicability of being.’85  This concurrence of the incommunicability and communicability 
of esse as it subsists as ‘I am’ constitutes, for Balthasar, the ontological basis of self-possessive 
human freedom. The latter is not primarily an act whereby the subject grasps or gains intuition into 
itself. Rather, the unique freedom of each I ‘articulates itself only in and with the universal opening 
to all being, leaving itself behind to embrace the knowledge and will of others and other things, 
particularly in shared being [Mitsein], whereby the original opening is always so great that no 
individual being…can fill it.’86 This openness establishes an ontological freedom as the basis of self-
consciousness that is prior to and underpins the acts of our distinct faculties and capacity to affirm 
or reject other beings.  
2.2. Nature and person 
Balthasar expands this ontological understanding of self-possessive freedom in light of the 
theological and philosophical distinction between being a person and an individual human. First, a 
point of clarification is needed. In Balthasar’s usage, ‘person’ applies predominantly to how 
someone receives, by virtue of a gift of supernatural grace, a unique mission from God within the 
body of Christ as a share in Christ’s mission.87 When someone ‘freely affirms and accepts 
the…mission which God, in sovereign freedom, offers him, he has the greatest possible chance of 
becoming a person, of laying hold of his own substance, of grasping that most intimate idea of his 
own self….’88 This makes a ‘theological person.’89  
Balthasar also recognises that ‘person’ can be used, if not supernaturally, then in a ‘natural’ sense 
for how spiritual nature opens beyond nature in a ‘hypercosmic’ way to the divine gift of esse.90 
Balthasar thus distinguishes ‘two forms or grades of personhood.’ In the natural case, the openness 
of spirit to esse does not of itself bestow an identity tied to a divinely-bestowed personal mission. 
Nevertheless, it points ‘to that solidarity and coresponsibility for the whole’ that arises from how 
each person ‘possesses complete human nature, [and] has access through love and understanding to 
all that is thought and felt, done and suffered by other subjects possessing the same nature….’91 This 
‘is perfected at the “supernatural” level, where human freedom…is challenged to make an ultimate 
 
85 TD2, 208. 
86 TD2, 211.   
87 TD2, 402-403, TD3, 263-282; 456-461. 
88 TD3, 263. 
89 Cf., Marc Ouellet, L’existence comme mission: L’anthropolgie théolgique de Hans Urs von Balthasar (Rome: 
Ponfitical Gregorian University, 1983). 
90 TD2, 402. 
91 TD3, 272. 
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act of faith in absolute freedom and love.’92 The latter fulfils but also presupposes the former. For 
this thesis, I am concerned with natural personhood. 
As Balthasar notes, while nature and personhood are inseparable insofar as every human person is 
an individual that belongs to a species possessing an embodied spiritual nature, person and nature 
are irreducible. Hence, the personal act of self-consciousness as open to esse is not concerned 
simply with what I am, but simultaneously with that and how I am and that I exist as a who, as a 
unique person, who by virtue of what I am, namely, embodied spirit, can know myself, others and 
being in its fullness and uniqueness. Personhood thus involves a particular way or ‘mode of being’ 
that pertains to being a spirit which is distinct yet inseparable from the spirit’s openness to being as 
a whole.93 While humans are not only persons but individuals with a common nature, their self-
possessive freedom means no-one is simply an individual alongside a ‘endlessly multipliable’ number 
of others but uniquely possesses that nature as their own – an experience which Balthasar locates 
not in essence or nature, but in a way of being, ‘in existence as such.’94  
The uniqueness of a person’s ‘I am’ is what it means for spirit to encompass esse within itself. While 
rooted in human embodied spiritual nature, a person’s unique openness to esse transcends nature, 
and so is beyond yet inseparable from nature.95 This inseparability means the trans-essential nature 
of a person is not identical with esse. As Balthasar explains: ‘no worldly entity can attain the 
coinciding of essence and reality (essentia-esse), even in the case of consciousness, because it can 
never create its own reality but must accept a reality already given to it. That is why the freest entity 
lives out its essence in itself…but is grounded not in itself, but in what is trans-essential, in Being 
absolutely....’96 The consequence is that personhood must be seen from two complementary 
perspectives: first, from the perspective of the existing nature which a person ‘“has”’ and which is 
specified by various delimiting qualities; and, secondly, from the standpoint of the mode of being of 
this very nature that is rooted in the actuality of esse itself; that is, in ‘the act of coming to possess 
 
92 TD3, 459-460. 
93 TD2, 209. 
94 TD2, 209. 
95 As Michael Hanby, No God, No Science? Theology, Cosmology, Biology (Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2013) 
305, clarifies: ‘The notion of the person…represents a certain primacy of the subject of a nature over the 
nature itself, a primacy which nevertheless protects the “the rights of nature” in its very distinction from its 
bearer.’ Cf., Hans Urs von Balthasar, Cosmic Liturgy: The Universe According to Maximus Confessor, trans. B.E. 
Daley (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1988), 211; and, “On the Concept of Person,” Communio: International 
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Oxford University Press 2006). 
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this nature’97 The uniqueness of each person, moreover, precisely because it arises from the 
uniqueness and ubiquity of esse, coincides with an openness towards all others who also uniquely 
share in esse according to the same spiritual nature. This emphasises how being a person possessed 
of spiritual nature is inseparable from other persons. 
2.3. The birth of self-consciousness 
This leads to a third formal aspect which, however, is patently coloured by the concrete. Each person 
only awakens to the personal reality of self-consciousness as an embodied spirit open to esse as a 
child dependent on its parents. The ‘little child awakens to self-consciousness through being 
addressed by the love of his mother.’98 This is an event of encounter wherein ‘the intellectual spark 
bursts into flame’ in the child’s ‘innermost core’.99 This is the ‘primal act of spiritual life’: ‘everything 
begins with the child’s being addressed by a Thou’; embedded in this ‘is the awareness that being a 
self is inseparable from owing oneself to another.’100 Schindler names this the ‘birth of 
consciousness,’ adopting a phrase from TL2.101 This means that ‘each free, human self-awareness 
enters the dance at a particular time. But it cannot enter by its own volition: it cannot waken itself to 
free self-awareness (otherwise it would have eternally to precede itself); it can only be wakened to 
free self-awareness by some other free self-awareness….’102 Although as embodied spirit the child is 
active from the moment esse attains subsistence within it, it is not fully awoken as spirit because it 
depends on receiving itself from another. 
Balthasar offers this as a concretely interpersonal rendering of Aquinas’ notion of reditio completa 
where a person grasps their unique self-consciousness, and so esse, by having gone wholly out from 
and receiving themselves back again – ‘the total taking possession of itself in the total transcending 
of itself to a “Thou” that is recognized as the other who loves.’103 Balthasar affirms against Aquinas, 
however, ‘an elementary truth of human nature: unless a child is awakened to I-consciousness 
through the instrumentality of a Thou, it cannot become a human child at all.’104 Balthasar thus 
makes the reciprocal nature of human consciousness a basic anthropological principle that 
underpins all subsequent development of self-consciousness.  
 
97 Balthasar, Maximus, 225. 
98 MTG, 15. 
99 MTG, 43. 
100 TD3, 457. 
101 DST, 110. See, TL2, 254. 
102 TD2, 388-389. 
103 MTG, 17. Cf., Aquinas, Commentary on the Book of Causes, 98-102.  
104 TD3, 175. Balthasar critiques Aquinas’ claim that Christ did not need to learn from others. See, ST, 3a.12.3. 
As Balthasar says, TD3, 175-176, ‘Thomas’s proposition is at odds with the logic of the Incarnation.’ 
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Positively, this event of birth means the child attains its sense of I am ‘by being raised up by the 
other, to the other.’105 This is an ecstatic movement which, while constituting the subject in 
themselves, occurs only through the prior invitation of the other. By its birth-like awakening, 
therefore, self-consciousness is established as inherently ecstatic and dependent for its own self-
possession on being hospitable to concrete difference. As Balthasar expands, ‘[t]his descent of the 
intellect to conscious self-possession is an act of simple fullness that can only in abstracto be 
analysed into various aspects and phases. It is not in the least possible to make it comprehensible on 
the basis of the formal “structure” of the intellect.’106 The structure of self-consciousness is not, 
therefore, imposed upon a pre-existing subjectivity which is then constrained to act within it. Rather, 
the self-conscious subject receives itself along with its concrete limits from beyond. These ‘limits 
again and again bring to fulfilment what reason is in its most profound and original form: a 
generously appropriating encounter with its other….’107  
This can be contrasted with ways of understanding consciousness that are inimical to the abiding 
value of childhood. First, Balthasar implicitly cautions against trying abstractly, along Kantian lines, to 
identify a priori limits of self-consciousness prior to its engagement with being’s concrete 
appearance.108 For Kant, it is crucial for self-conscious freedom that it is the source of its own 
autonomy and limits, and not swayed by heteronomous influences.109 This is affirmed and enacted, 
moreover, by a pure free will. The problem here is that self-consciousness relates to objects only 
extrinsically where this interaction is determined beforehand by abstract limits which are imposed 
on external objects. This precludes any intrinsic link between the freedom of self-consciousness and 
the relationships which foster a person into existence. It jettisons in advance the value of a child’s 
self-consciousness. 
Secondly, Balthasar’s view means a child does not awaken to a fully formed self-contained 
consciousness. If this were so the child would, incongruously, already possess its full self-conscious 
identity, yet in a weakened state. This raises difficulties about how the child relates to adults. In its 
utter dependence, the child’s self-conscious identity would be subsumed by theirs. It establishes an 
inverse proportionality where the more adults relate to the child, the more the child’s self-
consciousness is absorbed into theirs and the child’s distinctiveness diminished. This articulates a 
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fundamentally antagonistic relationship between adult and child consciousness. Moreover, the child 
is encouraged to reject the dependence of childhood in order to fully possess its self-conscious 
freedom.   
Thirdly, the birth of consciousness can be distinguished from a mere emergence from the child’s 
spiritual nature. As Balthasar states, ’in the mysterious birth of self-consciousness, which does not 
primarily “arise”; rather, it “awakens” to itself in the capacity to interpret an appearing image as the 
call of a Thou.’110 It is noteworthy, however, that in the earlier TL1, Balthasar does present it thus. 
‘There is nothing gentler or more continuous than this emergence of man’s spirit out of the realm of 
unconscious nature….’111 This articulates a subtle yet fundamental difference to Balthasar's later 
view. In TL1, he describes the child’s awakening to self-consciousness as the natural outworking of 
the subject's spontaneous power in the subject-object encounter. Full self-conscious freedom arises 
via the subject’s growing self-appropriation through its interaction with and sublimation of the 
objective world. The dynamism that forms the basis of the mature fully formed self-consciousness 
here already resides in a self-contained, albeit, immature and indeterminate subjectivity. Self-
consciousness does not, therefore, awake by being called to itself from beyond itself.  
In this Balthasar is close to Hegel.112 On one level, Hegel affirms an immediate relationship between 
subjectivity and being in childhood that abides into adulthood. However, the immediate relationship 
between them is formal and indeterminate. The child’s relatively empty being and indeterminate 
subjectivity must go through a self-actualising process of becoming, mediated by the concrete 
encounter between the subject and object wherein the subject both actively and receptively takes 
objects into itself and transcend them by becoming fully self-determining. This enriches being via a 
dialectical process of becoming self-conscious as the spiritual subject. Here the child’s subjective 
existence must be overcome to attain full self-conscious adult existence. Hegel’s position can only 
find abiding value in childhood insofar as it supplies the basic self-contained atom of being a subject 
as the precondition for fully autonomous adulthood as an expression of absolute Spirit in the world. 
This denies any inherent and lasting richness to the state of childhood.  Furthermore, it has no place 
for an enduring positive relationship between child and parents for the subject’s growth means 
appropriating previously non-mediated external sources of authority into its self-conscious freedom. 
That Balthasar abandons this perspective shows the influence of Ulrich. The latter affirms Hegel’s 
insight that childhood is a unity of being and nothing, while reinterpreting this along Thomist lines as 
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esse’s fullness which in poverty gives itself away in love.113 This richness-in-poverty reflects the 
enduring significance of being childlike as described in the previous chapter’s discussion of being’s 
fullness and poverty. As Balthasar says in his later thought, what the Hegelian approach lacks in its 
immediate relationship between empty being and an already fully constituted, albeit indeterminate, 
self-consciousness is an inherent sense of being’s self-exceeding fruitfulness.114  
Finally, Balthasar’s starting point also differs from a Thomist and Husserl-based phenomenological 
notion of consciousness. As Schindler notes, Balthasar shares with these perspectives that self-
consciousness does not precede but rather arises simultaneously with consciousness of the other 
which also participates in the reality of consciousness but cannot be reduced to the subject. What 
distinguishes them, however, is that whereas a Thomist or phenomenological perspective ‘tends to 
begin “abstractly” with the already mature mind, involved in the world and finding itself reflected 
back to itself therein, Balthasar begins concretely with the real beginning, the child’s coming to 
himself, which is the original experience that grounds the possibility of being always already involved 
in the world.’115 The former view prescinds from the personal origin of consciousness. The structures 
of consciousness are posited fully formed. As Schindler notes, if ‘we were to begin “in the middle,” 
like traditional approaches to consciousness...outside of the event of gift, we are forced to oppose 
mediacy and immediacy, spontaneity and receptivity, and so cannot avoid eventually falling into a 
flat, or linear, epistemology.’116 This echoes the difficulties above about how a child relates to adults 
in a way that affirms their difference and unity, avoiding violence to the child’s perspective. 
Schindler also draws a comparison between Balthasar’s notion of the birth of consciousness and 
Heidegger’s notion of being thrown [geworfen] which offers a historical account of the beginning of 
self-consciousness.117 Unlike Heidegger’s impersonal beginning, for Balthasar, this is a personal 
event which is not foremost ‘a “being thrown” but a “being welcomed,” a “being-permitted-to-
be.”’118 
2.4. Freedom rooted in ontological dependency 
The notion that self-conscious freedom is born makes its structure dependent on the prior reality 
and activity of another self-conscious person’s love through whom esse is mediated. Balthasar calls 
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this ‘ontological indebtedness.’119 This does not mean the child’s self-consciousness is created out of 
nothing. The adult ‘does not endow the “I” with subsistent being but enables it to lay hold of the 
totality of Being in which it has been given a share.’120 This event of awakening, therefore, does not 
equate with or supplant the first gift of esse at conception but intensifies the latter via another 
personal mediation of esse that actualises the child’s full capacity as embodied spirit. Now, for the 
first time, albeit in fledging fashion, the child can encompass being fully within itself which opens the 
child ecstatically to others and allows it to mediate esse freely as gift.  
Within Balthasar’s understanding of being's fourfold difference, this ontological indebtedness at the 
heart of freedom extends beyond the purely human relational world to the relation of finite being to 
God. Every ‘human being who is awakened to freedom owes his existence ultimately to an infinite 
freedom […which…] is communicative….’121 The freedom of the human person is neither self-
grounding, nor simply caused by interpersonal encounter. Though a child is first given their freedom 
by others, who mediate esse to it, this is rooted in infinite divine freedom. As Balthasar explains,  
‘[a]t this birth, in a certain sense, an umbilical cord is cut; finite freedom now exists “in 
itself” (it has an “essence”, a “nature”) and may not be defined simply in terms of relation to 
infinite freedom. On the other side, the “gift of freedom” remains a gift; …the more seriously 
finite freedom appreciates that it is a gift to itself…, the more it will be full of thanksgiving as 
it takes control of itself….122 
The reference here to an infinite communicative gift of divine freedom refers each person back to 
that which, ontologically-speaking, is communicated first, namely, divine esse. As Balthasar says, ‘at 
the most fundamental level, the dawn of self-awareness in freedom is not the realization that we are 
simply “there”, even “there with others,” it is rooted in the fact that we are “gift” and “gifted” which 
presupposes a “giving” reality.’123 This in turn establishes the pattern of being a self-dependent-on-
gift, which is one with being childlike: ‘[i]t is by embracing and keeping the gift of being, by exercising 
the privilege of being, that I am freely myself…. [I]n my cogito/sum, therefore, I never cease recalling 
these things and giving thanks….’124 While not everyone may experience this, it follows ontologically 
from their being a child of others and characterises an adult appropriation of childlikeness. 
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The communicative aspect of God’s esse is, moreover, handed over to and communicated through 
acts shared in concrete community. Hence, for Balthasar, the divine provenance of human freedom, 
and the latter's inherent dependence on others in the child’s awakening, stress the divine origin of 
humanity community. As Balthasar affirms, ‘free self-awareness experiences itself as an “I” only 
when it knows that it is addressed and treated as a “thou”...that is, when it realizes that it is 
admitted into the appropriate community.’125 That said, what ultimately decides the 
appropriateness of the human community is whether its divine provenance is acknowledged so that 
each child is welcomed not merely as one among a collection of individuals sharing the same nature, 
but as a unique person in a community wherein the child discovers their personal reality and 
purpose in openness to the divine gift of esse. 
2.5. Freedom as ontological gift given for and with others  
The ontological indebtedness that pervades the self-conscious freedom of the human person in its 
openness to esse cannot be divorced from how this freedom is not only constituted by others but 
depends on affirming others’ freedom in their participation in esse. ‘[I]t is an integral part of this 
imperishable freedom…that the soul, precisely because it possesses itself in freedom, necessarily 
respects all other beings on account of their freedom (they are true and real) and lets them be….’126 
This reiterates how each person’s freedom, their I am, includes and requires interpersonal human 
community. ‘Precisely because being-in-its totality has disclosed itself to him [the child], and he has 
experienced the gift-quality of his own nature and hence his relativity, his “response-character”…and 
so the limitation of his nature, the individual subject realizes that he is “for-himself-with-others”.’127 
The latter, however, can only be expressed through an act of free communication. This not only 
requires that the other’s freedom be freely acknowledged ‘but also the freedom to detach oneself 
from the totality of the world (and hence from the community) and encounter the latter creatively, 
out of the uniqueness of one’s own self. In this way, beings existing for themselves simultaneously 
exist for one another.’128  
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2.6. Gift implies a task 
This sense that each person’s self-conscious freedom is constituted by the gift of esse that is 
received from others and shared with and for others, means that freedom is oriented towards a 
particular task – ‘the gift implies a task.’129 Balthasar here distinguishes between two distinct but 
inseparable pillars of human freedom: first, self-possession through a person’s openness to being as 
embodied spirit, and, secondly, how this self-possession and ontological openness are freely 
exercised and shared with others. While the 
first pillar of freedom is unequivocally “given”; the second is both “given” [gegeben] and 
“laid upon us” [aufgegben]. We are given the necessity (this is our “thrown-ness”, 
Geworfenheit) of going out from ourselves in order to make decisions and prove ourselves in 
the environment of our fellow men and fellow things. The manner and degree of our “self-
realization” remain open, and it is up to man himself to decide what, ultimately, constitutes 
freedom and under what form it should be striven for.130 
Balthasar expands on this. The given-ness and self-realising task of the subject’s finite freedom are 
bestowed by an ‘infinite freedom' that each person is ‘profoundly involved with', whether willingly 
or not, and, it is in light of this infinite freedom that each person must choose their ‘own “idea”.’131 
This concerns what Balthasar calls a ‘life-form [Gestalt]’ with which a person identifies themselves. 
What is crucial is whether the life-form chosen expresses being’s primal form within concrete 
interpersonal relationships that underpin the concrete definition and freedom of each person’s self-
conscious existence. To be true, a life-form is not imposed randomly from the outside but ‘bestowed 
from within and…freely chosen…[and] uniquely personal….’ 132 
2.7. Natural desire for the vision of God 
Balthasar considers the different elements of self-consciousness enumerated above to ‘form the 
core of an ontology of finite freedom.’133 To this he adds another aspect, namely, Augustine and 
Aquinas’ understanding of the natural desire for God (desiderium natural visionis Dei), particularly as 
rearticulated by Henri de Lubac.134 This is implicit in how a spiritual being, by nature, points beyond 
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itself and nature to esse and, therefore, to God as self-subsistent esse and source of finite being. 
More explicitly, this affirms that humans are created by grace with the natural desire for grace that 
can be fulfilled, however, only by the unexpected gift of grace. Here Balthasar affirms, with de 
Lubac, that human ‘nature de facto has only one, single, supernatural end.’135 Hence, there is no 
pure self-contained nature (natura pura), only en-graced (and healed) nature or nature fallen from 
grace. As Balthasar states, ‘[m]an’s nature, actuating itself as spirit, is essentially a search, a setting-
out, for the absolute, the prototype; and in virtue of its own freedom, the spirit knows that the 
absolute can only encounter it in complete freedom.’136 It is this ontological freedom rooted in the 
desire of the whole person for God which underpins the transcendent orientation of encounters 
between humans in their mutual freedom and dependence.137 On one level, the natural desire for 
God, while it has its source from and fulfilment in God, is played out in the mutual awakening and 
indebtedness between actual persons. Nevertheless, these are truly fulfilled not in themselves, in a 
purely immanent transcendence, but beyond themselves and all things in God. These horizontal and 
vertical aspects of the human desire for God intersect. They do so, moreover, primordially in the 
child’s first self-conscious activity as free spirit awoken by its parents.  
3. Complex Nature of Human Self-Consciousness  
The previous section considered Balthasar’s treatment of the ontological nature of human self-
conscious freedom more formally. Given the genesis of each person’s self-consciousness as a child, 
however, this formal perspective is inseparable from the concrete encounter between the subject 
and object of consciousness. I examine this now by considering Balthasar’s account of the complex 
nature of human self-consciousness based on the interaction of the spiritual faculties of the intellect, 
will and heart. Though distinct, they are also interdependent and cohere into a single complex act of 
the same person who acts through them. They are, moreover, ontological because they concern 
how each person participates in esse according to their embodied spiritual nature.  
In understanding how the intellect and will interact with each other and the objects of self-
consciousness, Balthasar draws on Aristotelian and Thomist thought.138 Here, prima facie, the 
intellect relates to the being and essential reality of objects such that the object is actively taken 
intellectually into the subject where this is not merely a mental event but a real relationship that 
mediates esse. The intellect is primarily receptive. Conversely, the will relates to the being and 
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essential reality of objects such that the subject moves towards the object where this again effects a 
real relationship between them. The will here is primarily active. A crucial question within Thomist 
tradition is how the respective movements of intellect (from object to subject), and will (from 
subject to object) are related to each other given they are acts of the same person who is also 
dependent on the reality of objects in their joint participation in esse. I approach this in light of 
Balthasar's focus on the interdependence of the intellect and will as pertaining to the whole spiritual 
subject in its encounter with objects.  
As already noted, the intellect, understood as an act of the subject’s whole intellectual nature, is 
open to the light of esse beyond all beings and yet only grasps esse in the encounter with other 
beings. Balthasar calls this dual unity of the thinking subject, in terms reworked from Kant, ‘the unity 
of apperception.’139 This has a vertical and horizontal aspect. The vertical echoes the Kantian a priori 
transcendental condition of the possibility of knowledge. However, Balthasar interprets this in non-
Kantian terms as the intellect’s participation in esse. This recalls Balthasar’s view of the fundamental 
experience of the cogito/sum described above. He affirms the unity of the intellectual subject as ‘a 
definite being capable of comprehending itself and thereby also (potentially) all other beings….’140 
Also contra Kant, this a priori vertical ontological condition is inseparable from an horizontal aspect: 
its simultaneous dependence on the concrete relationship to the unity of the object’s being. This 
involves a horizontal sense of transcendence since the object is wholly distinct from the subject and 
gives itself to be known in its distinctiveness. It ensures the abstract unity of the vertical aspect of 
the intellect is rooted in the concrete unity of the horizontal that includes within it an inherent 
dependence on difference. 
The jointly vertical and horizontal dynamic of each person’s intellectual unity of apperception is 
important philosophically and cognitively. As Balthasar states in TL1, the ‘unity of consciousness in 
its immediate relation to being is what makes possible the grasping of an object as an existing 
object.’141 It is by virtue of this concrete unity of being and thinking, which is fully awoken in a child 
by its parents, that each person can recognise the ontological unity of other beings as they appear as 
objects of consciousness. In the Epilogue, Balthasar expands: 
this act of taking in the appearance of the other can only occur for me when I can gather up 
the variety of his manifold ways of appearing – voice, colors, movements – into the “unity of 
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my apperception”. I must “apperceive” the reality of the being encountering me. He is a 
reality I am thus able to recognize on the basis of my own reality.142 
This passage articulates how the ontological reality of the unity of apperception (the act of intellect 
and being) of the subject is the transcendental condition of the possibility of knowing another as a 
unified and really existing essential whole.143 While this cannot take place without the prior activity 
of the senses and imagination, Balthasar states that the unity of apperception ‘alone does full justice 
to the full concept of Gestalt. For Gestalt is more than image; it is the unity encountering the 
perceiver that is also simultaneously manifest in the experience of self (in the contemplated reality 
of the cogito/sum), so that the object encountered and the “I”…truly communicate in the all-one 
depth of reality (esse).’144 This does not occur without images but defines them as manifestations of 
an actual being. Thus, Balthasar understands how a person grasps the existential and essential unity 
of other beings as a unified whole, and thereby being as the source of this whole, as a single act of 
the person’s intellectual apperception in its participation in esse. It is thus that the subject 
‘interpret[s] forms as totalities.’145  
As already noted, however, the subject’s unity of apperception is not simply an a priori 
transcendental act of the thinking subject which imposes unity on appearing objects. Rather the 
intellectual subject’s unity also, paradoxically, depends on the prior reality of the object of any 
encounter. It is this that makes it a truly transcendent act since it requires the other as other where 
both subject and object share in the unity of esse. The thinking subject’s unity is not, therefore, 
simply something it possesses itself. The subject's unity of thinking and being is not self-contained in 
a way that must be related, in a second extrinsic act, to the object as additional content. Rather 
openness to the other is intrinsic to the subject's intellectual act of apperception by virtue of its 
participation in esse as shared by the object. As Balthasar says, there ‘is no moment when 
subjectivity monadically and self-sufficiently rests in itself. Rather, subjectivity is a matter of finding 
oneself always already engaged in the world. The unity of the ego as subject is always also the “unity 
of apperception,” which comes about in the act of synthetic judgement in the cognition of the 
object.’146 This reaffirms how the unity of apperception’s vertical openness to esse is also always a 
horizontal unity-in-others. The subject’s intellectual unity as I am, and so its capacity to apperceive 
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the ontological unity and reality of others, is dependent on the object’s invitation which in turn gives 
itself to the receptive subject.   
As Balthasar says, subject and object  
comprehend each other reciprocally, in the sense that the subject is introduced into the ever 
vaster world of the object, while the object’s appearance opens it to be surveyed and judged 
from the subject’s more comprehensive vantage point. This polarity reaches a maximum in 
the tension between the subject’s contemplative, observant posture vis-à-vis the object 
(truth as theoria), and its spontaneous, creative, normatively measuring posture vis-à-vis the 
same object (truth as poiesis).147 
The reference, in this passage, to the subject's spontaneous activity, and, earlier, to how the unity of 
apperception includes an act of synthetic judgement concerning the object, discloses how the 
intellect is not merely receptive to the transcendent unity of the object’s Gestalt but dependent on 
the subject’s outward movement towards the object. Thus, the whole subject moves towards the 
object which it apperceives as a whole. This indicates how intellectual apperception is active towards 
the object in a way analogous to the will's movement from subject to object.  
Before considering the act of will, more can be said about how the intellect relates to the prior 
appearance of the object only through the activity of the senses. As noted above, the subject’s act of 
apperception of the object is inseparable from the prior perceiving action of the senses. By 
apperceiving the object, the subject gathers and recognises the unity and reality of the other on the 
basis of all the partial ways it appears to the senses.148 In line with Balthasar’s adoption of Thomist 
and Aristotelian epistemology this in turn involves the activity of the imagination as mediating 
between the senses and intellect. Thus the intellect actively abstracts concepts and forms mental 
words in the act of understanding that draws from the images/phantasms formed in the 
imagination. At the same time the intellect, mediated by the will, turns to the actually existing object 
encountered by the senses only through mediation of the imagination.149 The reality of the object is 
in turn affirmed as participating in esse and pointing to real essences by the intellect’s act of 
judgement as mediated by the will. As Balthasar says, while ‘things that really exist want to make 
themselves known not only in images and phantasms but, more importantly, in their reality…;’ this 
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occurs insofar as the spirit, in the unity of its apperception, can grasp the real essences of beings in 
the light of esse by way of images that are themselves illumined by this same light.150 
Beyond the power of the imagination [Einbildungskfaft], but not without it, there occurs 
what can be characterised as “formation” [Bilung]: the constant, never-concluded, mutual 
process in which the recognizer ascribes to real things their valid essence behind their place 
in the world of images, while the things from their side do not simply populate the cognizing 
spirit with images but shape [aus-bilden] the spirit to itself.151 
From the above, we can see that the act of apperceiving the totality of another being as it appears in 
an image to the imagination also entails a movement from subject towards the object which shapes 
the subject. This reiterates how any act of knowledge is, for Balthasar, mediated by the will as the 
rational appetite whereby the subject goes towards the object that it perceives according to the 
senses. Indeed, the act of knowledge culminates not in an abstract concept, but the intellect’s 
turning back to the image in the imagination and so the object by way of an act of judgement which 
pertains to both an act of the intellect and will.152 Judgement, therefore, is not isolated from the 
unity of apperception, nor the act of the imagination, but occurs simultaneously with them as an act 
of self-commitment and freedom, enacted within the shared light of being.153 Moreover, Balthasar, 
like Aquinas, insists on the importance of language for the intellectual apprehension of the essential 
unity of beings, affirming in judgement their veracity as actually existing while enabling the subject 
to express and receive anew its own unity and being.154 Language is how a person self-consciously 
enacts and gives subsistence to esse in concrete encounters between the perceiving, judging, 
speaking and knowing subject, and the image-bound appearing object in their joint participation in 
esse. 
The above stresses the inseparability of the acts of the intellect and will. They are not successive acts 
of the subject but rather act jointly with respect to the object which appears and gives itself to be 
known. Balthasar here contributes to a longstanding debate about the nature of the relationship 
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between the will and the intellect in Thomist thought.155 With Aquinas, Balthasar affirms that each 
power of human nature is mediated by the other.156 Hence, the act of self-conscious freedom is 
‘both an understanding and an affirming, and while it is true that only something that has been 
understood can be affirmed, the will provides the stimulus to such understanding. Every one-sided 
attribution of freedom, whether to the area of rationality…or of the pure will…leads back to the 
subhuman, instinctual level.’157 Rather than being isolated, the movement of intellect from object to 
subject is mediated by an act of the will whereby the subject moves to the object. This occurs both 
in the movement of the subject to the object in the act of perception, and in the assent of the will in 
free judgement. Similarly, the movement of the will from subject to object is mediated by an act of 
the intellect since it is the known object which moves the will. As Schindler argues, this mutual 
mediation is what gives the act of each faculty ‘an inner resistance, and therefore a depth, within its 
own order, and what makes every union a mediated immediacy.’158 This means, however, that the 
movement of the intellect cannot simply be defined as that from object to subject, and the 
movement of the will the reverse. They each echo in their own movement the movement of the 
other. Thus, the characteristic movement of intellect whereby the object is taken to the subject also 
includes a movement of the subject to the object which appropriate to that of the will. Likewise, the 
movement of the subject to the object, which is characteristic of the will, also includes a movement 
of the object to the subject which is appropriate to that of the intellect. Indeed, to affirm their 
mutual dependency ‘we would have to take the will to be a (positive) principle of the intellect within 
the intellect’s proper order, and at the same time, in order to avoid reducing the intellect to the will, 
we would have to affirm the intellect as a (positive) principle of the will.’159 This points, therefore, to 
a reciprocal causality between them such that the intellect and will are ‘intrinsically related to each 
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other…, which means being simultaneously a positive principle of the other and dependent on the 
other….’160 However, this means that, to be acts of the same person, they must cohere in a unity 
beyond themselves within a greater whole that is distinct yet inseparable from them. Balthasar 
understands this whole as the heart. 
4. The Heart’s Joyful Attunement 
What Balthasar means by the heart, and its relationship to the other spiritual faculties of human 
nature as their concrete unity, is important to clarify because the heart is determinative for how 
humans encounter, in their self-conscious freedom, the wonder and beauty of being as manifested 
concretely in beings. The heart is a key focus for Balthasar in GL1.161 He uses it not just 
metaphorically but metaphysically for the relationship of the whole human person to being itself. He 
describes this as ‘attunement’ to being.162 As we shall see, the heart’s attunement is commensurate 
with the power of the imagination and the latter’s mediation between the senses and the intellect, 
and the will and the intellect. Attunement is not, therefore, simply identical to the receptive act of 
intellectual apperception, nor the latter’s interdependent relationship with the spontaneous act of 
will. Rather it encompasses them both in an a priori ontological openness of the whole person to 
esse. As Balthasar states, it ‘is not by means of one isolated faculty that man is open, in knowledge 
and in love, to the Thou, to things and to God: it is as a whole (through all his faculties) that man is 
attuned to total reality….’163  
Balthasar connects this to an ontological sense of ‘feeling’, ‘sensing’ or ‘experience.’164 In more 
biblical idiom, this is ‘the “heart”’ or ‘“bowels”’ and concerns ‘the seat…of man’s deepest personal 
reactions….’165 Such corporeal terminology emphasises that attunement is no abstract intellectual or 
purely volitional relationship to being. Conversely, neither is it reduced to sub-rational emotional 
states or sensory perception. It involves ‘acts that predominately belong to the whole person and 
into which the expressions of the sensitive-vegetative sphere are incorporated….’166 Hence, to the 
notion of attunement, ‘feeling’ adds an emphasis on ‘the heart of human wholeness, where all 
man’s faculties (potentiae) appear rooted in the unity of his forma substantialis, regardless of 
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whether these faculties are of a spiritual, a sensitive, or a vegetative kind.’167 Balthasar expands this 
in line with Aquinas: ‘this ontological disposition is, in the living and sentient being, an a priori 
concordance (con-sensus as cum-sentire, “to feel with,” here prior to the assentire, “to assent 
to”).’168 Such feeling with, or prior consent to, being applies, moreover, to how a person relates to 
other beings. ‘The inclination to the “thing itself” (inclination ad rem ipsam), evoked by a most 
intimate kinship with it, is characterised as a “feeling” or “sensing” – “an experiential contact” – in so 
far as the feeler is by his nature attuned to what is felt and, therefore, as-sents and con-sents to 
it….’169  
This can be further specified. The heart’s feeling, while a distinct spiritual faculty, is not isolated from 
the intellect and will but integrates them. As Balthasar says, what ‘is termed “feeling”, in 
contradistinction to intellect and will, lies neither “beside” nor “beneath” the spiritual faculties….’ 170 
Indeed, Balthasar criticises how ‘feeling is too exclusively thought of as an isolated act alongside the 
intellect and the will, and too little understood as the integration of the person’s whole life.’171 
Rather, heartfelt attunement is ‘the event by which man’s total constitution and disposition, which 
are the foundation for everything else, can be experienced in and through individual emotion 
states.’172 Furthermore, the ‘reciprocal compenetration’ of all the human faculties in the heart 
stresses how these faculties ‘are penetrated by the soul which acts and suffers through them.’173 The 
heart’s ontological consent to esse, as human nature’s ‘most interior disposition’ is, therefore, prior 
to distinct spiritual acts of the intellect and will without being separate from them.174 It integrates 
them as a concrete, rather than abstract, whole which, therefore, both transcends the intellect and 
will yet is wholly immanent to and enacted through them. Hence, the heart is neither irrational nor 
capricious, but more-than-simply-rational-and-volitional. It is not separate from acts of the intellect 
and will but ‘their foundation and very possibility.'175   
Closely related to how the heart encompasses the intellect and will is the way it is both active and 
receptive. As Balthasar says, it is ‘prior to the distinction between active and passive experience: in 
the reciprocity which is founded on openness to reality there is contained both the receptivity to 
extraneous im-pression and the ex-pressing of the self onto the extraneous. This, the fundamental 
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act of feeling (the “primal feeing”), consists of the consent (con-sensus) both to suffer extraneous 
impressions and to act upon the extraneous….’176 Such openness denotes a freedom prior to any 
deliberate act of will that is not purely passive. It is a concrete ‘event of reciprocity’ that is 
simultaneously active and receptive and located in the subject-object encounter and their joint 
mediation of esse.177 This reciprocal whole, moreover, points beyond itself to its transcendent 
source in God whereby the heart’s ontological openness embodies both humanity and being’s 
contingent openness to God.178 ‘The creature is ontologically resonant to God and for God; it is this 
in its totality and prior to any differentiation of its faculties into spiritual and sensuous, active and 
passive.’179 Significantly, therefore, Balthasar identifies the structure of the heart’s attunement as 
one of a fundamental receptivity to God and to God’s gift of esse which is, however, expressed in the 
heart’s simultaneously active and receptive relationship to being in the subject-object encounter.180  
Accordingly, the heart’s act of radically receptive attunement to being is at the same time an active 
receptivity where equal priority is accorded to, on the one hand, being’s prior active objectivity 
which is receptive to the subject’s engagement and, on the other hand, the subject’s active 
receptivity to the latter. 
The heart's radical ontological receptivity, as made manifest in a jointly active and receptive 
asymmetrical reciprocity between subject and object, underpins the ontologically positive nature of 
the human heart’s attunement to being as it appears in particular beings. This is where the heart’s 
association with the imagination and senses as well as the intellect and will is important. It 
emphasises that the fundamental receptivity of the heart’s reciprocity is rooted in the jointly sense-
based and intellectual perception of being in appearing objects which move the entirety of the 
subject according to the latter’s freedom and, therefore, anticipates and awaits the free assent of 
the will. This further develops how, as mentioned above, the heart is a distinctive third faculty of 
human spiritual nature that encompasses as a concrete whole the intellect and will, and, crucially, 
their relationship to the sensory world. As Schindler comments, because the heart’s attunement is 
both receptive and active, with priority given to the subject’s receptivity to the object's concrete 
appearance, ‘it can include the whole scope of the orders of the intellect and the will in their 
relatively opposed movements without foreshortening or reducing them.’181 The heart 
simultaneously engages the intellect and will, not ‘in a way that “pre-empts” their own distinct 
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movements and thus the integrity of their own order…. Instead, it is their “seed.”’182 This account of 
the heart’s concrete sensed-based attunement to being, as incorporating the movements of the 
intellect and will, and so the whole person, echoes the primacy Balthasar allots to being's beauty. 
The heart is, in short, the organ of beauty. As Balthasar summarises this, '[b]efore the beautiful – no, 
not really before but within the beautiful – the whole person quivers. He not only “finds” the 
beautiful moving; rather, he experiences himself as being moved and possessed by it….'183 I shall 
return to this in chapter four. 
Balthasar associates this positive sense of the heart’s a priori consent to being’s beauty as it appears 
concretely in the beauty of beings with ontological joy. Like Balthasar’s ontological rendering of 
feeling, this joy is not simply emotional or psychological. Rather, it applies foremost to the whole 
person enacting their fundamental consent to esse. ‘This ontological concordance, therefore, and 
the affirmation and joy in Being which are implied by it, lie at a much deeper level than the 
delectatio which naturally accompanies all the individual spiritual acts which are ordered to their 
proper object and which proceed from the storehouse of that primal and original consonance….’184 
Such heartfelt joy denotes a primordial ecstasy permeating each person’s self-conscious freedom in 
its participation in the ecstasy of being’s letting be. Not only is being a source of joy but this joy 
wholly characterises the self-opening reciprocity of being itself. Such joy marks the very shape of the 
heart’s reciprocal attunement to being as it appears in beings. As Schindler expands, ‘joy is…what 
characterizes the reciprocity at the root of consciousness…. [C]onsciousness is essentially joy – in its 
very structure.’185 Indeed, Balthasar’s makes this heartfelt ontological joy the measure of self-
conscious activity. This represents an ‘intra-worldly discernment of spirits’ where each encounter is 
assessed against the joy of being. This asks; ‘Does the joy of an act (or the sadness of an act) 
positively point to the joy of Being? Or, no matter how seductively an act may strongly and obviously 
be experienced as an act of joy, could it not in reality be an act that veils and clouds the joy of 
Being?’186  
5. Mother-Child Encounter 
I return now to Balthasar’s understanding of the primordial and paradigmatic instance of the heart’s 
wonder-filled joy at being's beauty, namely, the child’s awakening to self-consciousness through its 
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parents’ love. I focus, first, on the child-mother encounter and then expand this perspective to 
include both parents.  
5.1. The objectivity of the mother’s call and the receptivity of the child’s heart 
We can develop how the birth of a child’s self-consciousness involves a coincidence of freedom and 
indebtedness. Self-consciousness is not principally characterised by autonomous self-moving act, but 
a paradoxical acting by being acted upon by another. We can examine this more specifically 
according to the heart’s dynamic between receptivity and activity. It is the child’s receptivity to the 
prior activity of its mother that establishes the joint receptivity and activity that characterises its self-
conscious openness to being. Hence, a child’s consciousness, and so self-consciousness itself, is 
constituted as an event of meeting. This simultaneously encompasses the mother’s initiating 
movement and the child’s responding movement. The mother reaches down to her child who 
receives her prior objective reality, and shares in her active engagement, enabling it actively to move 
its whole self ecstatically upward to the mother who welcomes the child. Against modern 
conceptions of self-consciousness, Schindler notes, the child’s subjectivity does not appropriate the 
object ‘according to pre-established conditions of possibility, and therefore according to the 
subject’s own measure, ...[rather] the subject actively goes out “objectively” to the other on the 
strength of the other’s invitation and is actively received there.’187 This encounter establishes that 
consciousness has ‘the structure of being invited (receptively), going (spontaneously), and being 
received.’188 In this dramatic event of encounter, the child’s self-conscious freedom is entwined from 
the beginning with that of its mother’s, and its activity participates in its mother’s activity. Rather 
than threatening the child’s freedom, the mother’s engagement establishes the child’s capacity for 
free self-conscious participation in esse.  
This aligns with the heart’s attunement to being. In fact, it establishes the basic character of this 
attunement as one of childlikeness. This informs how the heart integrates and underpins the 
receptivity of the intellect, the spontaneity of the will, their mutual penetration of each other, and 
their interaction with the senses through which the person encounters the reality of the appearing 
object’s Gestalt. Hence, the prior objectivity of the mother’s loving gift does not merely actualise an 
abstract ontological receptivity in the child but evokes the first stirrings of the child’s heart, and so 
intimately shapes how the child’s heart encompasses the child’s fledging acts of intellectual 
apprehension and willing self-gift. 
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It is important, however, to stress the asymmetry of this encounter. The child is utterly dependent 
on its mother. The content of the mother’s engagement with her child, however, is not one of pure 
activity, but active receptivity. As Schindler states, without this the mother ‘would smother the child, 
and force his consciousness into the ill-fitting mould of a pure passive receptacle for the mother’s 
own self;’ instead, ‘[t]he way she gives herself, her being, is by giving the positive space of 
welcoming to the child’s being. This is why Balthasar says that the love of the mother is a creative 
call; it is a spontaneous receptivity that gives rise to a receptive spontaneity.’189 Again, the mother’s 
active receptivity is fundamentally an act of the heart. In contrast to her child, however, the mother 
is a fully conscious adult who can offer the actively receptive consent of her heart to being through 
integrated acts of her intellect and will as expressed in the language of gesture and word. Such 
maternal receptivity is not about sheer will or self-denial; nor, mere passivity. By affirming and 
expressing the heartfelt nature of her response through nurture, the mother actively welcomes her 
child’s wholehearted response, thereby enabling the first fledgling acts of the child’s intellect and 
will.  
5.2. The mother’s concrete mediation of being and the beginning of language 
The immediate relationship between being and self-consciousness (where this is, paradoxically, 
characterised by esse’s pure mediation as letting be), as expressed in the child’s self-consciousness, 
depends on the mediated character of the child-mother encounter. As Balthasar says, ‘[m]ediation 
mediates the nonmediate, and into the nonmediate.’190 This is significant because it ensures that the 
child’s self-consciousness is not simply absorbed into that of its mother or wholly extraneous to it. 
The mediated nature of their encounter concerns, particularly, how the child’s self-conscious 
awakening to the immediacy of being is occasioned by the concrete, image-based encounter with its 
mother. Schindler explains this vis-à-vis the child’s awakening: 
this original experience, which does not allow at this point any “room” for the child to take a 
“sceptical distance” (which would already presuppose a formed consciousness), is what 
enables the child to “read” the (noumenal) being of the mother – who gives her self in the 
smile and not just the physical movement of her curling lips – immediately through the 
mediation of the (phenomenal) appearance. It is not merely immediacy, which the child 
would not be able to read, or interpret, since doing so requires the movement that only the 
difference of mediation can allow. Nor is it merely mediation, which would require from the 
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child a capacity for “reflective” inference that he cannot possibly yet possess. Instead, it is a 
mediated immediacy, a presence that bears within itself an “open space.”191  
This can be contrasted with the Hegelian identification of childhood with a sheer indeterminate 
immediacy between empty being and incipient consciousness.192 For Balthasar, by contrast, there is 
from the outset a mediated sense of immediacy replete with the fullness of esse. This reflects the 
ontologically positive and joyful relationship between consciousness and being as manifested in the 
child’s awakening through the concrete appearance of its mother’s self. It also echoes the heart's 
childlike attunement to being's beauty as manifested in another’s essential reality. As Balthasar 
expands: ‘the epiphany of Being has sense only if in the appearance [Erscheinung] we grasp the 
essence that manifests itself [Ding an sich]. The infant comes to the knowledge, not of a pure 
appearance, but of his mother in herself. That does not exclude our grasping the essence only 
though the manifestation and not in itself….’193  
In awakening to itself through the mother’s concrete presence, the child's heart is given the 
ontological ability to interpret images as the concretely mediated appearance of the immediacy of 
being, that is, of how esse subsists in the essential ground of a being.  More fully, the heart’s 
interpretative capacity participates in the interpretive character of being itself, namely, the 
immediacy of esse as a pure mediation of letting be mediated by actual beings. While this is not the 
interpretation of a mature mind, nor the assent of a fully formed will, it shapes the first acts of a 
child’s intellect and will whereby it engages with other beings. 
Balthasar identifies the heart’s act of ontological interpretation with the beginning of human 
language. As examined in chapter one, this is being itself as communicative language.194 Human 
language participates in being’s own communicative letting-be and concretely arises out of the 
child’s aforementioned capacity to interpret the sensible image as the appearance of an essential 
ground which opens to being.195 Here Balthasar opposes the view that language is simply innate.196 
Rather, he ties the genesis of language to the awakening of the child’s heartfelt attunement to being 
through the concrete mediation and appearance of the immediacy of its mother’s heartfelt love 
wherein esse shines. As Balthasar notes,  
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[d]oubtless, the child is…initiated into the art of speaking by others, yet this art is preceded 
by the inner impulse to intellectual expression…that occurs in the dawning of being (in my 
own I and thus in all beings). This event is the elementary insight that I am, am, that is, in 
and thanks to being, yet am not being (but “only” one existent). I, an existent who belongs 
to being, am “given custody” of myself by a “pronouncement” [zugesprochen] of being. 
Needless to say, this pronouncement is not an audible word (the whole event occurs in the 
most profound silence).197 
Through the pronouncement of the concrete image and silent word of the mother’s love, the child is 
‘given custody’ of itself and the capacity to express itself and being through images. The childlike 
openness of the heart’s attunement to being, and the concrete dependence on others this entails, 
thus informs every subsequent encounter with and interpretation of concrete images as the basis of 
language.198 Indeed, as I consider shortly, for Balthasar, this makes love the source of language. 
5.3. Love interpreting love 
This brings us to consider how the ecstatic wholehearted response of the child to its mother’s gift of 
self is one of wholehearted love. As Balthasar says,  
[the child’s] interpretation of the mother’s smiling and of her whole gift of self is the answer, 
awakened by her, of love to love, when the “I” is addressed by the “Thou”; and precisely 
because it is understood in the very origin that the “Thou” of the mother is not the “I” of the 
child, but both centers move in the same ellipse of love, and because it is understood 
likewise in the very origin that this love is the highest good and is absolutely sufficient and 
that, a priori, nothing higher can be awaited beyond this, so that the fullness of reality is in 
principle enclosed in this “I”-“Thou” (as in paradise)...: for this reason, everything – “I” and 
“Thou” and the world – is lit up from this lightning flash of the origin with a ray so brilliant 
and whole that it also includes a disclosure of God.199 
This response of the child’s fully awakened love to the mother’s love, because it discloses the 
fullness of esse and opens to God as the source of esse, reiterates Balthasar’s ontological account of 
love. Implicit in this ‘first experience of Being on the part of the awakening human spirit’ is that 
‘Being and love are coextensive.’200 Recalling the discussion in the previous chapter, this ontological 
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notion of love concerns both the gift character of esse as pure letting be which is simultaneously a 
giving and receiving, and also how this is only fully expressed in the freedom and self-gift between 
persons. What we now see is how this is mediated to a child by its mother’s love in an event of 
intimately human asymmetrical reciprocity. 
In being awakened by its mother’s love, the child is gifted its own loving response. The child does not 
first receive the gift of awakening from its mother’s prior love and then respond in a subsequent act. 
Rather, the whole thing is a unified event: the child awakens to itself in the act of responding, and 
responds in the act of awakening. As Balthasar says: ‘Insofar as he gives himself, the child perceives: 
I give myself.’201 This is, however, a function of the mother’s gift of love. As Schindler says, this 
involves ‘a profound paradox: the child’s giving of himself, which is in fact the only thing the child 
has to give and is thus his most interior, intimate act, lies in a strict sense beyond his means. It occurs 
as a grace, not stemming from the child himself, but stemming from the mother, whose smile the 
child knows he himself did not create.'202 
We can see this more concretely as a heart-to-heart encounter wherein mother and child are both 
‘centres’ moving in the ‘same ellipse of love’ and their hearts act as concrete means of ‘love 
interpreting love’. As Balthasar says, ‘where love summons the “I” into the state where it is 
permitted to answer, the “I” is affected in the core of its being and can reply only with its totality, its 
centre, its fullness: it must collect together what is best in itself in order to respond to that 
summons. It comes into play at once as a totality.’203 This wholehearted free response of love, 
whereby the child’s entire spiritual freedom is awoken and expressed, is no less spiritual through the 
absence of prior deliberation or willing on its part. As Balthasar expands: ‘the little child does not 
“consider” whether it will reply with love or nonlove to its mother’s inviting smile, for just as the sun 
entices forth green growth, so does love awaken love; it is in the movement toward the “Thou” that 
the “I” becomes aware of itself.'204  Simply because the child’s response comes before any conscious 
reflection and willing does not mean it is an irrational, forced, arbitrary or blind action of a sub-
conscious kind. Rather the response, as one of the heart, includes the child’s whole spiritual act of 
coming to self-consciousness underpinning all reflecting and willing. In the child’s ecstatic movement 
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into the ‘open world that offers its space,’ the child ‘experiences its freedom, its knowledge, its 
being as spirit.’205  
Balthasar calls this act of the heart ‘a perfect and immediate intuition’:  this is ‘not a discursive 
process of reasoning because the mother’s smile is not interpreted as love subsequently; it is 
intuition, too, because in the awakening spirit the understanding of being as such is always awaiting 
the moment of realization, and this precisely in the concrete event that is offered through ever-
open, ever-watchful senses.’206 This intertwines two senses of intuition, first, the child’s immediate 
encounter with and response of love as pertaining to the immediacy of esse; and, secondly, how this 
ontological reality is mediated by sense-based intuition. The intuitive act of the child’s heart, 
therefore, encompasses, in one complex and unified act, the child’s unity of apperception whereby it 
grasps the mother in her totality through her concrete appearance and effects its first act of 
synthetic judgement. These together amount to an act of the child’s whole person. It is an act of love 
responding to love. This allows us to specify how, through its heart's responsiveness, the child 
interprets esse in the mediated immediacy of its mother’s gesture in a way that also marks the 
beginning of language. The interpretation and language of the heart correspond not only to how 
being discloses itself in the concrete particular. It also reflects how this disclosure is the 
interpretation and language of being as love. 
5.4. The transcendentals and joy 
Framing this wholehearted encounter in terms of the co-extension between love and being has 
metaphysical significance not only for mother and child but for what it discloses about being. As 
Balthasar states, 
[l]ove is understood to be the most pristine source of all. This understanding opens up in the 
child the dormant bud of self-awareness. The love between a thou and an I inaugurates the 
reality of a world which is deeper than simple being because of its absolute boundlessness 
and plenitude. And, since this opening up occurs on the basis of love, unbounded being is 
seen to be the reality that makes sense, that is self-evidently right: in short, the truth which 
is identical with the good.207 
Balthasar here unequivocally rejects the Hegelian idea that the child’s awakening to itself through 
the love of another person is one of sheer empty existence. Rather, the child is welcomed into the 
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fullness of the act of esse which manifests itself positively in the child’s awakening according to 
being’s transcendental aspects. Balthasar mentions specifically the true and good, but these cannot 
be separated from the primacy he accords the beautiful.208 Moreover, echoing the earlier discussion 
of the heart, identifying the child’s awakening with the fullness of being according to its 
transcendental aspects chimes with how the child’s wholehearted response of love is characterised 
by an ecstatic sense of ontological joy – the very structure of consciousness in its openness to the joy 
of being as fully expressed in the loving encounter between persons. 
[This] belongs to the highest joy bestowed by love: since the summons by the mother is not 
addressed to something in the child but to the child itself beyond the sum of its qualities 
(which it can share with other children), precisely in the reality of the “I” of the child, it 
experiences at the same time that my “I” is loved, is lovable for my mother, and that my 
reply can lie only in the gift of this “I” – together with all that may belong to it….209 
For all the asymmetry of this encounter, it is not simply about the mother’s unilateral act towards 
the child. It is reciprocal. Hence, while the child’s love is carried and enabled on the strength of its 
mother’s love for the child in its own lovability; the mother is also lovable in her own right. The 
lovability and capacity for love of both mother and child are, therefore, simultaneously disclosed 
within the asymmetry between them where both participate in the single joy of being as love.   
6. Love Between Parents 
We have focused thus far on the mother. She is, however, not the only adult engaged with the child. 
How she relates to her child reflects a prior set of relationships, especially with the child’s father, 
most obviously in the conception of the child, but also regarding the child’s coming to self-
consciousness. This is important, especially, for guaranteeing the appropriately receptive nature of 
the mother’s engagement so as not to overwhelm the child but offer a welcoming space. To protect 
the difference of the child within the unity of their relationship, the child’s self-consciousness is, as 
Schindler says, not to be understood as ‘produced “immediately” by the mother’s love, but as both 
mediated and immediate in its emerging as the fruit of the parents’ mutual self-gift.’210 
If until now, therefore, I have principally considered the heart-to-heart encounter between mother 
and child, this clarifies that it cannot simply be about the mother’s isolated heart. Her heart is 
nourished, opened and made receptive to her child’s being because of the love she shares with adult 
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others, particularly, but not exclusively, the child’s father. This fills out how the birth of the child’s 
consciousness ‘turns on the gift character of the encounter, self-gift responding to self-gift. The 
mother’s own gift of self, which initiates this “exchange,” is possible only if she in turn has been 
freed for this gift in being loved by another.’211 The parents’ relationship, therefore, has a bearing on 
how the child’s self-consciousness is awoken and shaped.  
Again, this is to be seen metaphysically. The parents mediate to the child, via their mutual love, the 
immediacy of esse as a pure mediated letting be as it subsists within their shared spiritual and 
embodied existence. Each parent here helps to underwrite the responsiveness of the other’s heart 
whereby they offer a welcoming space wherein to encounter being's beauty and enact the fullness 
of esse in self-giving freedom and shared knowledge. This happens within the concrete gestures, 
images, language, memories, home and life of responsibility the parents share. Each parent thus 
frees and is freed by the other. Each is a stakeholder in the other’s attempts to act as a person who 
integrates their various acts with that of their heart and so their whole nature’s openness to being. 
Accordingly, the quality of the parents’ relationship safeguards the heart-centric nature of the 
relationship between each parent and the child that enables the child’s heart to enact its 
attunement to esse in the fledgling acts of its intellect and will.   
This expands upon how the child’s self-consciousness is born within the context of a pre-existing 
relationship of reciprocity between its parents. Schindler describes this with a neologism: to be 
'born(e).' As he expands, ‘[t]his child’s consciousness…springs organically from this communion of 
persons in love, just as his body springs from their bodily communion…. Consciousness is born(e), 
just like a child is born(e). And this is likewise why it is so original, so rooted in being.... The best 
name for consciousness, then,... is not merely gift but donum doni (the gift of a gift).’212 These two 
original metaphysical events of being born(e), and the self-giving relationships occasioning them, are 
not, however, exactly the same, but analogically related. There is a certain order of priority between 
them. Let me examine this further. 
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6.1. The archetypical identity-in-difference between parents and child 
For Balthasar, the relationship between a mother and the child in her womb represents an 
‘archetypical identity’ (urbildliche Identität).213 This is an identity, however, wherein they remain 
distinct. The child’s identity is not self-grounding, but rooted in two further differences. First, it 
depends on the father as a principle of difference. Balthasar states: ‘Between the mother and the 
child she bears in her womb there exists an “archetypical identity”, a unity which by no means is 
purely “natural”, “physiological” or “unconscious”: the child is already itself, is already something 
“other” than the mother because it derives from the man’s seed as much as from her.’214 Hence, 
mother and father are both distinct yet correlated principles of difference. The child is the fruit of 
their shared fruitfulness, yet irreducible to either. This opens onto a second archetypical identity-in-
difference, the relationship between the child and God.215 
The difference-in-identity between the mother and child, therefore, is not simply guaranteed by the 
sexual difference of the parents. Nor can the child’s distinct identity and existence be attributed 
simply to additional biological, psychological, cultural, or environmental causes and processes. 
‘Neither my parents nor the whole of the surrounding world are substantially that love to which on 
the grounds of my being and my consciousness I owe the fact of my being in the world, which is to 
say both myself and the world.’216 The child’s unique personal identity has its source in God. That 
said, this identity is guaranteed and mediated by the procreative act of the child’s parents and the 
child’s ongoing relationship to its parents. 
With this reliance on sexual reproduction, however, comes a heightened sense of the contingency of 
each person’s existence as embodied spirit – an existential realisation that surfaces for each person 
once they attain self-conscious maturity. Furthermore, such contingency is not removed by pointing 
to God. For, even if we understand our origin as directly created by God, this does not, for Balthasar, 
obviate a sense of dread about ‘the incomprehensible linking of God’s creative act to nature’s 
chance acts of generation...to such dark and blind cooperative causes.’217 Balthasar here gives 
qualified affirmation to Heideggerian angst as concerning a person’s ecstatic encounter with being 
beyond them, and provoking the fundamental questions, ‘Why do I exist?’, ‘Why anything?’.218 
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Balthasar notes, moreover, how this dreaded question is not sidestepped even if human generation 
were ‘to be performed in a way that is technically more closely guided and planned….’219 The latter 
leaves untouched the question of a person’s identity as spirit open to being as whole since the latter 
transcends any process. These processes too are contingent as to existence. Hence, even if sexual 
reproduction were overcome through, say, human cloning, this cannot remove the anxiety over 
being’s contingency. Indeed, dread intensifies since a more controlled disembodied way of 
generating humans obscures how a person’s existence can be received as a gift of love based on 
parents sharing their common spiritual embodied nature.  
This redounds on how those who bring a child into existence understand being. That a person’s 
existence can be experienced as a matter of gift rests on a vision of how esse as divine gift is 
mediated by the self-giving love of human parents. As Balthasar says, the parents ‘had to be “two in 
one flesh”, with mutual gratitude, in order to be able to procreate in love the new life that surpasses 
them both, the new life that will owe its existence to both of them together but for which they, 
together, will always have to be thankful in the sight of the absolute creative Power that transcends 
them….’220 The parents are not opaque biological causal agents, provoking dread in any child 
conceived by them, but cooperative causes who welcome the child in their common heartfelt 
wonder and thankfulness as a divine gift mediated through their mutual embodied self-giving love. 
This does not mean a child is born only when procreation is undertaken with love and gratitude. 
Nevertheless, Balthasar claims this is crucial for bearing the child into self-conscious existence. ‘The 
experience of the thou both among men and between God and man grows up out of the realm of 
the body and the senses into the sphere of the spirit; but in such a way that an original relationship 
of spirit (man-wife relationship in marriage...) is the prerequisite for this growth.’221  Despite the 
suggestion, this cannot mean a person is conceived only within marriage. Rather, we can distinguish 
between, first, the original relationship between a man and woman in the sexual act as the 
presupposition for the conception of a child; and, second, an original relationship of love as the 
presupposition for awakening the child to self-consciousness in its spiritual nature.  
Here we can consider more fully the relationship between a child being born(e) and consciousness 
being born(e). The absolute priority of the first birth depends on the relative and final priority of the 
second which brings esse’s excess to full subsistence in the child’s personal spiritual existence. The 
latter, however, cannot be uprooted from but displays within itself the paradigmatic significance of 
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the fruitful interdependence of the former. Thus, a child’s birth to and enactment of its self-
conscious freedom depends on its parent's shared love just as its existence depends on their sharing 
of the fruitfulness of their human sexual difference.  
As Balthasar states, freedom ‘only exists in the interrelationship of human beings, particularly since 
each new human being comes about through other human beings and only awakens to “being 
human” through the encounter with others, with their freedom and free response. The child arrives 
with its own freedom; and it is given (by its mother) this other freedom that comes from being in a 
society with others.’222 Thus, when the child awakens to its personal being and esse, through the 
self-giving freedom and mutual love of its parents (and not just its mother), it also awakens to the 
prior reality of its spiritual nature's participation in esse as already granted to it by others. This 
emphasises again the coincidence between ontological freedom and ontological dependence 
whereby in awakening ‘to selfhood, one is simultaneously admitted to one’s own being and obliged 
to respect being-in-its-totality, in which one has been allowed, intentionally, to participate; one must 
‘”let it be”….’223 The ontological indebtedness that underpins the child’s first and absolute 
ontological freedom, given its origin in human sexual difference, underwrites and directs how the 
child depends ontologically on others to awaken to self-conscious freedom and for its personal 
fulfilment. 
Indeed, Schindler also applies the analogy between a child’s birth and the birth of self-consciousness 
to how human self-consciousness is intrinsically fruitful. He states, ‘“fruitfulness” means not only 
openness to the other as other…but even more concretely as an “always already” being involved in 
the other, as the other is always already involved in me. The simultaneity of these two opens out 
further (ahead! Not behind!) to a new “third,” which then in principle means all possible others….’224 
The ontologically fruitful character of consciousness – as enacting the creative actuality of esse – not 
only reflects its having been born(e) and, therefore, its provenance as gift rooted in prior mutual 
self-giving. It also coincides with the abiding childlike nature of self-consciousness and, inversely, 
how being childlike is most fundamentally concerned with how fruitfully to enact one's self-
conscious freedom in dependence on others, namely, as a joint mediation of esse received and 
shared freely in childlike wonder as gift.  
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6.2. Passive and active expressions of the archetypical identity between parents and child 
This childlike core to self-conscious freedom and fruitfulness can be further considered according to 
a distinction Balthasar makes between a passive/receptive and active experience of the archetypical 
identity between child and parents.225 At first, this seems to apply respectively to child and parents. 
Thus, before the child awakens to self-consciousness, both at its conception and birth, it is receptive 
to this relationship of identity-in-difference that is actively bestowed upon it by its parents. This 
entails an absolute receptivity to the wholly original gift of esse actively mediated by the parents 
which brings the child into being with its human nature. 
Let us consider this further. First, from the child’s perspective, because its receptivity relates to 
esse's subsistence as the child, from conception the child enacts a receptivity wholly characterised 
by the actuality of esse. Furthermore, esse subsists as the child’s active human spiritual nature with 
its unique ontological, albeit not yet consciously appropriated, freedom. As Balthasar notes, this 
active freedom is inchoately present in ontological terms: ‘the “I” of the child is not created by the 
mother but only brought out of a latency, out of a state of being closed in on itself, into its true 
being and openness.’226  This suggests the seed of full conscious activity is present at the genesis of 
the child’s existence. As Walker says, ‘[n]ature is already the beginning of the free taking over of 
itself. Conscious love, then, can very well be present in us from the first moment of our 
existence…not in its final, developed form, but in an incipient form whose dynamism, already 
operating without our choice, is the shaping, ordering ground on which choice is…carried up into the 
daylight of self-consciousness.’227 This, however, must be understood against Balthasar’s insistence 
that this incipient freedom is always dependent on prior parental active receptivity.  
This reiterates how the child already in the womb moves itself, in its receptive activity, only in 
dependence on its mother’s actively receptive movement towards the child. Thus, the child’s 
embodied spiritual nature receptively enacts the taking over and handing on of esse as mediated by 
its mother's spiritual and embodied participation in esse. While not the exercise of the child’s fully 
self-conscious freedom, it is nonetheless the receptive activity of its spiritual nature. There is no 
contradiction in how the receptive activity of the child’s free, yet dormant, spiritual nature remains 
utterly dependent on the child receiving itself from its mother whereby it grows in a pre-self-
conscious way according to its human nature. This occurs in what Balthasar calls ‘the sheltering 
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place of common human nature;’ and ‘more intimately still, … the sphere of the common flesh of 
mother and child.’228  
This can be further correlated to the concrete act of the unborn child’s heart in its dependence on its 
mother’s heart in the womb.  For this common flesh is integral to the embodied and spiritual act of 
the child’s human heart and emphasises how the child’s first incipient acts are from the first always 
dependent on its mother. The child ‘enters into existence at a point (which he never leaves behind) 
where spirit always already – and still yet – slumbers in the flesh, where it “awakens” to itself 
through the call of the senses, and where it finds its center, not in the brain, but in the heart, in 
which spirit and body, inseparably intertwined, are “one flesh”.’229 Balthasar is keen to avoid 
speculation about the inner life of a child prior to birth.230 Nevertheless, ontologically, he stresses 
that ‘even the spiritual soul’s “presence-to-itself” (like the constant actuality of the sense functions, 
as described by Thomas) is something that has no conceivable beginning, a special form of waking, 
which, for lack of concepts and words, we cannot distinguish from our awakening to a self-
consciousness in a world of things and fellow human beings.’231 As he says elsewhere, ‘there is and 
remains something profoundly mysterious about the actual form of a consciousness that, humanly 
speaking, is still dormant; at all events, it cannot be defined simply by negatives.’232 As I explore 
more fully in chapter three, Balthasar correlates the child’s slumbering yet mysteriously active heart 
in the womb to its receptively active participation in its mother’s heart. After its birth, moreover, the 
child’s archetypical identity-in-difference with its parents is a receptively active one as it continues 
to depend on them. This applies also when it awakens fully to self-consciousness as the child can 
only actively give itself through being receptive to its parent's prior active self-giving. 
Secondly, from the parental standpoint, whereas the child first seemed to stand for a pure 
receptivity within the archetypical identity that turns out to be active from the first, the parents 
might be seen to have a wholly active experience of the identity-in-difference between them and 
their child. This arises from the child's utter dependence on their fully self-conscious activity for its 
survival. As explored earlier, however, the content of such parental activity is receptive and 
welcoming to the child. Such receptivity is multifaceted. It is rooted in the parents' heartfelt self-
 
228 MTG, 21-22. 
229 TL2, 232. 
230 TD3, 175-176n.21. 
231 TD3, 175-176n.21. Balthasar quotes Siewerth: ‘“Even the repose of the embryo in the uterus, in the psychic 
warmth of life’s womb, is not an unconscious, vegetative process but an experienced psychic process of 
profound depth…. Thus mother and child constitute not merely a physical unity but a community of life and 
love that involves all the sensitively rippling layers of the psyche.’ Siewerth, Metaphysik der Kindheit, 24.  
232 TD3, 228. 
116 
 
giving and receptive relationship to each other. It also reflects their abiding receptivity to the prior 
gifts of esse, their human nature and their awakening to self-consciousness. This emphasises that 
the parents cannot dispense with the reality that they too were once conceived and born; that their 
hearts also grew within the womb; that they were awoken to self-consciousness by others.  
In this light, the parents’ actively receptive experience of the archetypical identity with their child 
reveals itself to be a complex whole that encompasses both vertical and horizontal reciprocities. 
First, the vertical reciprocity concerns their relationship to their own parents and God, which looks 
backwards and upwards to their own origin. This verticality also looks forwards and downwards to 
their child who is also a gift of God. As Balthasar states, even though the parents ‘will have an active 
experience of “archetypical identity”, still they will not quite be able to dissociate it from the passive 
form of it they had once experienced.’233 Secondly, the parent’s active experience entails a 
horizontal reciprocity in their relationship to each other which, however, incorporates the vertical 
reciprocity whereby they open to the gift of divine esse vis-à-vis their being from their own parents, 
their child’s being child, and how they mediate being’s fullness to each other. This involves, 
therefore, a complex combination of active and passive/receptive experiences of archetypical 
identity.  
6.3. Non-biological parents 
At this point, we can consider an implication of the fact that Balthasar holds the two events of birth 
and their associated sets of fruitful relationship as not necessarily related. It is possible for people to 
love each other fully without having children. It is also possible for a child to have biological parents 
who are different from the adults who awaken it to self-consciousness and foster its developing 
freedom. Balthasar states, ‘[t]he mother who brought her child into the world can expose it or give it 
away, or she can simply die: in this case, the personal address does not take place, or at least it does 
not come from her.’234  It is possible, therefore, to speak of adults who, if not the child’s biological 
parents, are its spiritual and embodied parents. The key is a context of self-giving love shared 
between adults who acknowledge the child as God’s gift. 
To expand, we can recall how, given finite being’s ecstatic structure, those who awaken a child to 
self-consciousness are at first indistinguishable from God as the source of the child’s self-conscious 
existence and its intuition of being as whole: ‘[a]lthough it derives from a concrete encounter and 
thus does not at all communicate an abstract concept of being, this intuition is wholly unbounded 
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and reaches to the Ultimate, to the Divine.’235 This need not be limited to a child’s biological parents. 
Indeed, if we take the actual awakening of the child as confirmation of the presence of love, this 
suggests that love as ontological gift is forthcoming in every situation where a child awakens to self-
consciousness; as is the concomitant exposure to the risk of the absence of love. This places 
significant emphasis on whether the adults caring for the child mediate esse as a gift lovingly shared 
within the concrete archetypical identity-in-difference between a child, its parents, and God.  
This accords with the emphasis Balthasar places on the adults' role in helping the child to distinguish 
the difference between its relationship to those who raise it and to God as the source of the child’s 
existence and identity. With respect to non-biological parents, this means they cannot elide a child’s 
biological provenance in sexual difference and its archetypical identity-in-difference with its 
biological parents without diminishing how the child’s being is a matter of gift. In other words, not 
only is it important that non-biological parents affirm the child’s origin as God's gift, but also how the 
latter is concretely mediated by the fruitfulness of human sexual difference of the child’s biological 
father and mother. Indeed, for sexual fruitfulness to remain true to the gift-character of this fruitful 
act of mediation, it needs to be affirmed as an act shared between actual human beings in their 
openness to God's gift of being through their spiritual and biological nature. If a child is to be 
affirmed as gift, and it is to be awoken to being as a matter of gift, then its existence cannot be 
abstracted from the actual people who bring it into existence; nor can its origin simply be reduced to 
a matter of biological material. The key is whether non-biological parents, like biological parents, 
celebrate in their own lives and home the child’s provenance as a divine gift mediated by the 
fruitfulness of human sexual difference which is fully enacted in the wholehearted self-giving 
between concrete persons. Where the latter has not been manifested by a child’s biological parents 
it can be embraced and communicated in the love shared between its adoptive parents. This could, 
in principle, apply to a child raised by a single parent or parents of the same sex. What is important 
here is whether a parent is enabled or thwarted in this task by their own parents, wider family and 
by how any given domestic, cultural, societal and ecclesial context affirms or denies the crucial 
interrelationship between the fruitfulness of sexual difference and interpersonal love while 
recognising and safeguarding their equally pivotal difference. Love for a child cannot be reduced to 
biology, but neither can such love dispense with fully embodied human biology and sexual 
difference without undermining its own provenance as divine gift that is humanly-mediated. 
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7. Filial Character of the Heart  
The upshot of the above is that adults who raise a child have a metaphysical mission to inculcate in 
their child their own abiding childlike wonder. While awakening to self-consciousness in wonder may 
seem ubiquitous, Balthasar stresses it is not simply an automatic process.  ‘Before making any 
judgment or coming to any conclusion, we must marvel as at a miracle….’236 This is not self-evident. 
It depends on the adults being open to the wonder of being. This in turn impacts how the child 
encounters the world and being through its heart’s a priori consent. As Balthasar states: ‘the human 
child is dependent on free acts of giving by others... Because he is needy he is also thankful in his 
deepest being, before making any free, moral decisions to be so…. To be a child means to owe one’s 
existence to another, and even in our adult life we never quite reach the point where we no longer 
have to give thanks for being the persons we are.’237 This abiding childlike sense of obligation to give 
thanks for our being as gift redounds upon any adults raising a child. It attaches foremost to the 
responsibility that comes from fostering a child into existence, and so from an ontological sense of 
duty or indebtedness that is, however, freely affirmed and enacted.  
Parents are, therefore, called to rediscover their passive experience of the archetypical identity 
where they recall their own status as children. Here the parents’ active appropriation of this passive 
sense of archetypical identity is informed by whether they willingly affirm and recognise esse as a 
gift of divine love. Indeed, this is something they are beckoned to relearn with, and, indeed, from 
their child’s first response to the world;238 and, from their own parents, or the memory of them, 
each other, other adults, and the wider expectations and values of their community and culture. 
Hence, parents retain, within their self-conscious being, an element of their passive/receptive 
archetypical identity as children vis-à-vis their own parents precisely because they owe them their 
self-conscious existence – or, better, the shape of their hearts. The childlike dependency at the heart 
of self-consciousness always remains dependent on a prior set of parental-like mutual relationships. 
Thus, self-consciousness is at its core filial, not only regarding one's parents but regarding God and 
God’s gift of esse as mediated through families. 
Here Balthasar contrasts his view with Hegel who holds that the authority of parents over children 
should be superseded by the ‘definitive authority of the state or of society, whose element of 
fostering care replaces that of the family;’ indeed, this is necessary for the development of ‘an 
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autonomous, self-determined spirit.’239 Balthasar opposes this with Christ’s affirmation of the fourth 
commandment of the Decalogue to honour father and mother which ‘enjoins on adults, too, the 
respectful love of children for parents. Even when the educational element of the parents’ authority 
disappears as the children come of age, this does not abolish the original relationship of giving and 
responding personal love between children and parents.’240 Indeed, this original relationship 
imposes on grown-up children a responsibility to care for elderly parents. It remains ‘vivid…in the 
general memory of mankind that this duty out of gratitude on the part of children cannot simply 
vanish into thin air....’ Rather, ‘a fragment remains intact of the original “archetypical identity in the 
distinction between mother and child”, as an element of a love that transcends juridical 
considerations even as it contains them.’241 
This is a crucial element, therefore, of how grown-up children continue to receive and express their 
own childlike openness to being. It also underpins how parents relate to their children via an active 
experience of this archetypical identity. The latter is informed by the passive form of this identity 
which the adults who raise the children once experienced as children which is informed by their 
parents' experience, and so on. Indeed, Balthasar explicitly links the passive and active experience of 
the archetypical experience of grown-up children with an outlook that spans generations.     
The experience immerses them in the great stream of memory of generations whom they 
cannot cease to thank for their existence and whose past becomes for them the present, to 
the extent that, along with their progeny, they look out toward the future. The reciprocity 
with which both the past and the future point to the present is…a fragment of archetypical 
childhood, in which a confident and trusting expectation of the good has its basis in the 
experience of already having received it.242  
This has a dual significance insofar as the ‘fragment of archetypical childhood’ is applied to both a 
person’s existence and their self-conscious existence, and so their experience of the archetypical 
identity with those who have born(e) them into life and into self-conscious life in openness to esse 
as gift. The generational understanding of how a child’s self-conscious experience of esse is nurtured 
emphasises how esse is transmitted via concrete interpersonal relationships of letting be that 
welcome each child as a person open to the gift of being as a free conscious spirit. Across 
generations there is an intertwining mediation of esse as gift and self-conscious existence as yet 
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further gift, and so also an interweaving of different kinds of interpersonal fostering relationships 
that involve the fruitful exchanges of sexual difference, and the fruitfulness of interpersonal self-
giving. The important point is neither to separate them nor collapse them. Moreover, echoing the 
significance of the mother’s smile, and the parents' shared loving gestures, the generational 
provenance of self-consciousness is only mediated by concrete gestures, words, images, memories, 
and habits that open to and give concrete subsistence to esse. This fragment of childhood also points 
beyond the matrix of generational relationships to each person’s relationship with God as mediated 
through the immediacy of the gift of esse. 
8. Conclusion 
The event of the child’s awakening to self-consciousness marks a radical new beginning to the child’s 
relationship to being. It is this encounter and beginning that actualizes the objective structure of 
self-consciousness as receptively active and actively receptive in relation to others. It awakens the 
child’s heart to its joyful attunement to being. The birth of each child’s self-conscious existence 
establishes how the pattern of their freedom is one that is lived under the sign of being as a gift 
lovingly and concretely shared between persons in wonder. The way a child’s heart is first awoken to 
its a priori ontological attunement to being by its adult family, and how they mediate the gift of esse 
to the child, impacts how that person subsequently acts and experiences being.  
Maturity here is affected by whether a person freely affirms or denies the ontological indebtedness 
which is owed variously to their biological parents; the interpersonal adult community who nurture 
them into self-conscious existence and freedom; and God whose creative esse is mediated by these 
distinct yet inseparable sets of embodied human relationships. To affirm these is to reclaim the 
abiding childlike dependency and openness to gift that lies at the heart of each person’s self-
consciousness as a matter of ontological reality. 
This accords with Balthasar’s account of being's primal form in GL1. There he states  ‘[t]he primal 
form is not a form among others, but a form which is identical with existence, a form beyond “open” 
and “closed”, beyond “I” and “Thou” (since it, and it alone, encompasses both), a form which is even 
beyond autonomy and heteronomy since it unites God and man in an unimaginably intimacy.’243 The 
present chapter argues that this primal form, when fully reflected in human spiritual reality, has a 
paradigmatic concrete content, namely, the filial and childlike character of the human heart’s 
openness to being. This underscores how humans do not confer the primal form of their existence or 
self-conscious freedom upon themselves. We do not construct our own freedom but receive the 
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form of our freedom, as a participation in the form of being's character as loving gift, simply by being 
born and awoken to self-conscious freedom by others. Our 'being, even in its origin, is already form, 
form which does not curtail the spirit and its freedom but which is identical with them.’244  The 
freedom and self-possession of our nature as embodied spirit is simultaneous with the form which 
we  have appropriated and which enables the spirit's self-expression. ‘Such simultaneity is possible 
because it is the spirit’s native condition always to have gone outside itself in order to be with 
another.’245 Most fully, this communicative core of human nature matches how a child is not self-
originating, nor simply the fruit of its parent’s biology, choice or, even, self-giving love. Rather, it is a 
gift rooted in the shared fruitfulness of human sexual difference and interpersonal love yet 
exceeding them in their openness to the gift of divine esse. In the next chapter, I explore how the 
relationship between consciousness, being, birth, and self-giving love relates to Balthasar’s 
treatment of human sexual difference.  
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Chapter Three 
Critical Juncture of Sexual Difference and the Parent-Child Relationship 
In the previous chapter I demonstrated how Balthasar’s attribution of primordial and abiding 
metaphysical importance to the heart’s capacity for childlike wonder carries with it an equal, though 
distinct, significance for the parent-child relationship. The latter brings a child into existence and 
shapes the child’s heart and human self-consciousness. In this chapter, I explore how this unveils the 
singular significance of the fruitfulness of human sexual difference. I argue for the mutual 
illumination of sexual difference and the parent-child relationship as jointly constitutive of human 
existence and nature. Together they underpin how the transcendent unity of human nature in its 
participation of esse coincides with specific human relationships of correlated difference. This 
identifies them as constitutive relationships in a metaphysical sense. Beyond mere anthropology, 
they are metaphysical principles of difference considered, not abstractly, but concretely. Male-
female, father-mother, and parent-child are, therefore, not merely derivative or provisional aspects 
of human nature. They embody in a maximal way, in the freedom of spiritual nature, being’s 
analogical nature. A crucial corollary is that these constitutive human relationships are analogous to 
being a person as explored in the previous chapter. They act as the critical juncture between 
personhood and being.  
In defending this view, I take this also as a critical juncture from which to critique two alternative 
perspectives. First, I argue that Balthasar’s metaphysical vision issues a cogent challenge to the 
notion prevalent in Western culture that sex/gender is simply a construct.1 Balthasar re-visions the 
target of such constructivism, namely, essentialism which identifies sexual difference with fixed 
traits of human nature. Balthasar proposes a dramatic sense of essence which roots human sexual 
difference not simply at the level of essence, but also within esse as lived out in concrete 
interactions in the material realm where this cannot finally be separated from the child-parent 
relationship. 
Secondly, I am critical of Balthasar’s treatment of sexual difference; particularly, his identification of 
created being’s receptivity as feminine. Here I echo Balthasar’s feminist critics. I differ from them, 
however, in arguing he falls short of his own metaphysical vision as detailed in the previous 
chapters. In offering an apologia for the latter, I do not stop there, but give a speculative account of 
human sexual difference that, I maintain, accords with Balthasar’s understanding of being. This 
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aligns being with, first, the asymmetrical reciprocal receptivity and activity of male and female 
organic and personal fruitfulness; and, secondly, with the heart’s childlike receptivity. 
In what follows, I begin with Aristotle’s metaphysical legacy regarding sexual difference and 
contemporary debates concerning sex and gender. Secondly, I consider Balthasar’s dramatic 
approach to human nature and its implications for understanding sexual difference through the lens 
of its fruitfulness in the child-parent relationship. Thirdly, I show how these constitutive human 
relationships are the extreme limits of being the same living, spiritual embodied nature. This leads, 
fourthly, to how Balthasar treats the combined fruitfulness of human sexual difference and the 
parent-child relationship as paradigmatic for interpersonal spiritual fruitfulness. Fifthly, I critique, 
along with his feminist critics, Balthasar’s distinct treatment of male and female human fruitfulness. 
Finally, I employ Balthasar’s metaphysics to offer an alternative speculative view of the latter.  
1. Metaphysics of Sexual Difference  
In pursuing a metaphysical agenda, I ask how does human sexual difference and the child-parent 
relationship relate to being? This explores what assertions about sexual difference claim about being 
and if sexual difference reveals something about being. As David L. Schindler states, ‘a 
“foundational” treatment of gender distinction cannot finally – responsibly – be avoided. 
Foundational questions regarding the meaning of gender do not go away when they are not asked 
explicitly; in fact they only get begged….’2 Much contemporary feminist thought is wary of such 
foundationalism and rejects the metaphysical tradition. By contrast, I pursue a foundational 
treatment that rests, paradoxically, on being’s unfounded nature as divine gift. Such a metaphysical 
approach differs from an approach that, as it were, passes over being to apply directly a theological 
solution. The latter is problematic insofar as it ignores how the feminine is considered a 
metaphysical imperfection. Commenting on this as evident in Scholastic thought, Schindler notes 
how this is ‘offset...by its theological horizon of grace and salvation.’3 However, while this 
emphasises the positive role and mission of women in salvation history, it does so despite or even 
because of their metaphysical imperfection, further entrenching this view. In addressing this, l shall 
now examine the provenance of the female metaphysical imperfection in Aristotle and how 
contemporary debates about sex and gender fail to resolve it while losing what is of value in 
Aristotle.  
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1.1. Aristotle and sexual difference 
The knot of issues involved in unravelling the claim that the female is metaphysically imperfect 
traces back to Aristotle.4  Crucial is his distinction between substance and accident as primary and 
secondary categories of being, respectively.5 Substances exist in themselves. They are what a being 
is. If the substance changes, the thing ceases to be. Accidents exist in relation to substances, 
qualifying how substances exist, for instance, as small and red. Although certain accidents are 
essential to each substance, ontologically speaking they are derivative. They rely on substance. They 
do not concern what it means to be a thing of a certain kind. For Aristotle, substances evoke 
wonder, fuelling a desire to know a being’s cause.6 This concerns not only what brings it into 
existence but its intelligible unity and purpose. This is Aristotle’s fourfold model of material, formal, 
efficient and final causality.7 Here every substance is a composite of matter and substantial form or 
essence. Unlike aspects of Platonism, substantial forms for Aristotle do not exist in a separate ideal 
realm but inhere each being. It is form (properly speaking, final form) not matter, which determines 
the being’s whole existence.8 Also substantial form is not static but the primary ontological category 
of act – the act of being something. Form is act vis-à-vis matter which exists in potency as to 
substantial form which, in turn, is actively potent towards matter. Accordingly, substantial form is 
the act that constitutes the whole substantial composite. The efficient cause of a substance is a 
substance which moves matter by introducing a new substantial form bringing about a new 
substance. With animals, the act of generation is such that the male contributes active substantial 
form as efficient and formal cause; the female contributes passive matter (not pure matter but 
matter informed with a lesser substantial form subsumed into the male’s contribution of a higher 
form).9 The male principle is to be ‘maker and mover’; the female that ‘which is acted on and 
moved.’10 This aligns with Aristotle’s account of the male-female difference. A male offspring is 
produced where form is perfectly actualised within matter; a female where it is imperfectly 
 
4 Prudence Allen, The Concept of Woman: The Aristotelian Revolution 750BC-1250 (Cambridge: Eerdmans, 
1997), 119: Aristotle was the first ‘to provide a comprehensive framework of the sex-polarity position.’ This 
contrasts with Plato’s ‘sex-unity’ position where sexual difference is insignificant because the soul is sexless. 
Sex pertains to appearance. Ibid., 79-80. 
5 Metaphysics, IV.4.  
6 Metaphysics, I.2.983a.10-25 
7 Aristotle, Physics, Loeb Classical Library, trans. by P. H. Wicksteed and F. M. Cornford (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1957), II.3; Metaphysics, V.2. 
8 Metaphysics, VII.8.1032b1. 
9 Generation, I.2.716a5-10; 2.4.738b20-23. 
10 Generation, I.2.729b14–19. 
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actualised because of accidental conditions. The female is, for Aristotle, infamously, a ‘misbegotten’ 
or ‘deformed’ male.11  
With justification, many commentators see Aristotle’s female as simply a negative modification of an 
essentially male substantial form. This lies behind, for example, Thomas Laqueur’s distinction 
between a one-sex model and two-sex model.12 Whereas the latter recognises an irreducible 
difference between the sexes, the former makes one sex normative and the other its variation. 
Laqueur argues Aristotle makes the male normative.13 Feminists argue this reflects social norms that 
subjugate women and underpin later social history.14   
Aristotle’s position can be nuanced somewhat. Positively, sexual difference is linked to generative 
function. The male is ‘one which generates in another’; and, the female is ‘one which generates in 
itself.’15 Furthermore, male and female are not just causes of substantial existence (material, formal 
and efficient causes) but indispensable for final causality and the flourishing of the individual, society 
and species.16 This affirms a positive reciprocity between male and female necessary for generation. 
Accordingly, against the one-sex attribution, Sophia Connell argues that for Aristotle ‘there must be 
two sexes.’17 Nevertheless, the female remains ‘disabled and differently abled.’18 So, despite 
Connell's claim, Aristotle offers a two-sex model derived from a more basic one-sex perspective.  
This indicates a metaphysical ambiguity concerning whether the privation and resultant reciprocity 
that defines the female impacts human substance. Aristotle makes sexual difference more than 
merely accidental given its significance for generation. But this cannot entail a privation of 
substantial form which would yield a different being. Rather, using the notion of deficiency, Aristotle 
introduces a metaphysical vulnerability of substantial form to matter due to external, accidental 
forces. 
This has two implications. First, it establishes an ambiguity regarding the priority of substance to 
accident. Accidental changes impact substances (form and matter), even if this is not a substantial 
 
11 Generation, II.3.737a25-30. Cf., ST, Ia.92.1. 
12 Thomas Walter Laqueur, Making Sex: Body and Gender from the Greeks to Freud (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1990), 6-8.  
13 Ibid., 28-33.  
14 E.g. Simone de Beauvoir, The Second Sex, trans. Constance Borde and Sheila Malovany-Chevallier (New York: 
Alfred A. Knopf, 2010), 23-27. 
15 Generation, I.2.716a15 
16 Generation, II.3.731b16-732a12. Cf., ST, Ia.92.1 ad 1, where Aquinas follows Aristotle. For a defence of this, 
see Joseph Francis Hartel, Femina Ut Imago Dei: In the Integral Feminism of St. Thomas Aquinas (Rome: 
Editrice Pontificia Universita Gregoriana, 1993), 96-97. 
17 Sophia M. Connell, Aristotle on Female Animals (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 266. 
18 Connell, Female Animals, 291. 
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change. While this attributes to the female more metaphysical dignity than the accidental order, it 
remains less than that of substantial form. Secondly, it allows privation into the form-matter union 
which determines the female substance. This privation or deformity becomes the primary 
metaphysical measure of sexual difference.19 Though Aristotle affirms reciprocity between the sexes, 
it does not touch the core of being human.  
The ambiguity here becomes more apparent when Aristotle considers the nature of difference itself 
in his treatise on metaphysics. He first distinguishes ‘difference’ from ‘otherness’. The latter is purely 
extrinsic with little commonality between things other than existence (without Aquinas’ sense of 
esse, Aristotle has an empty notion of being beyond substance). Difference, however, concerns 
variations regarding something shared between things.20 The greater the unity they share the more 
intelligible their difference. Aristotle also employs the notion of contrariety to describe the greatest 
possible difference within the shared unity of a genus. It is complete-in-itself, marking the extreme 
end points of a series. Contrarieties are accidental modifications of substances.21 For each 
contrariety, one term is principle and the other its privation.22 Thus, for example, the hot-cold 
contrariety is more fully defined as hot-not(hot). Aristotle interprets this to mean the terms are not 
interdependent.23 Some contrarieties, moreover, are mutually exclusive, admitting of no 
intermediaries. This arises where the presence of one contrary is always necessary in a substance 
and so excludes the other, for example, health or disease in an animal. Other contrarieties, where 
neither term need be present, encompass a spectrum of intermediaries between two extremes, 
such as hot and cold.  
Although contrarieties apply to the accidental order, in his Metaphysics Aristotle extends it to the 
difference between species in the same genus. Thus, a horse and a human are contraries because 
different species of the genus animal.24 This is problematic. It is not the most complete difference 
within the genus animal. Furthermore, the difference between two animal species is not one of 
privation. This out-of-character definition of contrariety tellingly precedes Aristotle’s consideration 
of sexual difference which he affirms as a contrariety. He notes sexual difference accrues to animal 
 
19 Cf., Luce Irigaray, This Sex Which Is Not One, trans. C. Porter (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1985), 165: 
‘Woman…in her share of substance, …may as well not be as be.’ 
20 Metaphysics, X.3.1054b20-30. 
21 Metaphysics, XIV.1. 
22 Metaphysics, X.4.1055b15-20. Also X.4.1055a33-36.  
23 Aristotle, Categories, Loeb Classical Library, trans. H. P. Cooke and Hugh Tredennick (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1938), III.10. 
24 Metaphysics, X.8.1058a1-30. 
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nature essentially.25 Hence, it cannot simply be accidental. This echoes how Aristotle says elsewhere 
that ‘male and female differ in respect of their logos…because the male is that which has the power 
to generate in another…, while the female is that which can generate in itself.’26 Such a difference in 
function would suggest a difference in substantial form. Yet, this cannot be so for sexual difference. 
Accordingly, despite himself, Aristotle affirms the male-female difference as a contrariety at the 
level of accident.27 
Ultimately, this makes sexual difference metaphysically secondary. As Schindler observes, it ‘may 
affect the physical being of an animal, perhaps even radically, but it does not “enter into” its very 
essence....’28 This is compounded by identifying sexual difference as a contrariety between a positive 
principle (male) and privation (female) with no reciprocity between them. Notably Aristotle does not 
classify sexual difference as a correlative. This is a difference where terms are reciprocally 
dependent on each other where this too concern accidents not substance.29 This highlights how 
Aristotle’s metaphysics offers an insufficiently radical basis for difference. Differences are either 
extrinsic between substances of the same genus or between accidental variations of a substance. 
Aristotle offers ‘no possibility of having a truly profound difference that concerns the very being of 
things, but only the manner…in which a thing appears.’30 Aristotle is, therefore, unable to affirm the 
substantial reality of female humanity as equal to but different from that of male. I shall return later 
in this chapter to see how Aristotle’s metaphysics can, via Balthasar’s metaphysics, be adjusted for 
an analogical notion of being that allows for a unity-in-difference affecting the whole substantial 
form. 
1.2. Gender and sex in contemporary thought 
I turn now to contemporary Western thought and the distinction between sex and gender.31 As we 
shall see, while this often sits critically to the Aristotelian legacy around sexual difference, it is both 
 
25 Metaphysics, X.9.1058a31–33. 
26 Generation, I.2.716a.20-25.  
27 Metaphysics, X.9.1058b22–24.  
28 D.C. Schindler, “Perfect Difference: Gender and the Analogy of Being”, Communio: International Catholic 
Review 43, (2016): 204.  
29 Aristotle, Categories, II.7. 
30 Schindler, “Perfect Difference,” 202-203.  
31 The distinction is a matter of debate within feminist thought. Some see it as problematic, for example, Raia 
Prokhovnik, Rational Woman (London: Routledge, 1999); and, Judith Butler, Gender Trouble: Feminism and the 
Subversion of Identity, 2nd ed. (New York: Routledge, 1999). John Money coined the distinction in psychology 
regarding transsexuality. See John Money, Joan G. Hampson, John Hampson, "An Examination of Some Basic 
Sexual Concepts: The Evidence of Human Hermaphroditism," Bulletin of The Johns Hopkins Hospital 97, (1955): 
301–319.  
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unable to resolve the difficulties with the latter while also forfeiting the metaphysical weight 
Aristotle wants to attribute to the generative act rooted in sexual difference.  
Typically, sex concerns traits such as anatomical differences, and hormonal and chromosomal make-
up; and gender relates to individual psychology, sexuality, social roles, cultural norms, and 
behavioural patterns. This distinction was adopted by feminists to challenge the hegemony of 
defining sexual difference based on empirically-observed traits asserted to be immutable that are in 
fact shaped by social and cultural norms. It lies behind Simone de Beauvoir’s claim that ‘one is not 
born, but rather becomes, woman.’32 For Beauvoir, this can appear natural, fuelling her ideological 
critique of any perceived inequality between male and female.33 Alongside Beauvoir's view, the 
contemporary situation unveils a plurality of views. These can be considered broadly to be either 
essentialist or constructivist. 
Essentialism has several meanings. It can be used pejoratively as the target of feminist critiques, or it 
can form the basis of feminist standpoints. A thoroughgoing essentialist position applies 
comprehensively to an individual’s human nature, determining biology, psychology, behaviour, 
social role and so on. This leaves open which traits are normative. Thus, a biological essentialism is 
based on anatomy and/or genetic makeup. However, most feminist positions hold that while 
biological factors are determinative for sex, gender is the social interpretation of these biological 
traits. One such approach is gender essentialism or realism which identifies a particular trait that 
makes women (and men) members of a social kind (also known as kind essentialism).34 This assumes 
women ‘share some characteristic feature, experience, common condition or criterion that defines 
their gender and the possession of which makes some individuals women (as opposed to, say, 
men). All women are thought to differ from all men in this respect (or respects).’35 What constitutes 
the defining property varies between thinkers. It can relate, for example, to how social conditioning 
defines women as subordinate to men;36 psychological markers influenced by social stereotypes;37 
or, being sexually objectivised by men.38  Certain feminist voices are critical insofar as this approach 
 
32 Beauvoir, Second Sex, 293. Cf., John Stuart Mill, The Subjection of Women, (London: Longmans, Green, 
Reader and Dyer, 1896), 41-42. 
33 Beauvoir, Second Sex, 15. 
34 Cf., Charlotte Witt, “What is Gender Essentialism?”, in Feminist Metaphysics, ed. Charlotte Witt (Dordrecht: 
Springer, 2011), 13-14.  
35 Mari Mikkola, "Feminist Perspectives on Sex and Gender," The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 
2017 Edition), ed. Edward N. Zalta, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2017/entries/feminism-gender/.   
36 E.g., Sally Haslanger, “Ontology and Social Construction,” Philosophical Topics 23, (1995): 95-125. 
37 E.g., Nancy Chodorow, Reproducing Mothering (Berkeley: University of California Press: 1978).  
38  E.g., Catharine Mackinnon, Toward a Feminist Theory of State (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
1989) 
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claims to speak for all women yet represents the viewpoint of a certain class of people, for example, 
white Western middle-class women.39 This sense of essentialism does not seek after substantial 
form as a causal explanation, but what constitutes membership of a social kind. It concerns the 
accidental order of being. It does not, therefore, address, but begs, the question of being. It is often 
contrasted with gender nominalism.40 This denies we can access the essence of properties, but 
instead groups individuals together based on abstract ideas we label in language based on perceived 
commonalities, but without claiming these attach to a real essence or its accidental properties.41 
This brings us to constructivism. This challenges the notion that there are any essential attributes 
defining gender. Gender essentialism simply replaces previous biological reductionist views or social 
constructs of gender with new constructs of social kind.42 This critique is evidenced by Judith Butler 
who draws on, amongst other, Friedrich Nietzsche and Michel Foucault. Butler holds that gender is 
wholly performative and constructed through ‘stylized repetition of acts.’43 Gender is ‘a 
becoming...that cannot rightfully be said to originate or end…. [I]t is open to intervention and 
resignification.’44  This entails a deconstructive phase which rejects gender essentialism as one form 
of oppressive constructivism to replace it with an approach that admits its constructed nature. 
Butler also claims biological sex is a construct and ‘discursively produced’.45 This takes aim at 
Aristotle’s substantial form, judging that it imprisons the body from within via a constructed idea of 
the body imposed by external, albeit hidden, coercion.46 She seeks to liberate human causal agency 
over human nature by dissociating it from any a priori claims. She proposes instead a pure 
relationality where male and female are defined only in relation to each other in an endless play of 
creativity.47 Other feminists, however, question this approach, arguing that gender identity and 
sexual difference have an objective basis in the nature of things, even if this does not fully determine 
 
39 Elizabeth Spelman, Inessential Woman (Boston: Beacon Press, 1988). 
40 This has its roots in John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed. P. H. Nidditch (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1975), III.6.2. 
41 Cf., Natalie Stoljar, “Essence, Identity and the Concept of Woman,” in Philosophical Topics: Feminist 
Perspectives on Language, Knowledge and Reality 23.2, (1996): 278. 
42  Judith Butler, “Contingent Foundations: Feminism and the Question of ‘Postmodernism’,” Praxis 
International 11, (1991): 150–165. 
43 Butler, Gender Trouble, 179. 
44 Ibid., 43. 
45 Ibid., 139. 
46 Judith Butler, “Bodies That Matter,” in Engaging with Irigaray, ed. Carolyn Burke, Naomi Schor, and 
Margaret Whitford (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 141–73. 
47 Butler, Gender Trouble, 22-33. 
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how gender is enacted within social contexts. Particularly noteworthy are those who, like Balthasar, 
root these differences in reproductive roles.48  
These tensions play out over whether sexual difference is binary, that is, exclusively male and 
female, and whether these are fixed from conception. In contemporary Western cultural discourse, 
even to speak of sexual difference is considered to have begged the question. Against this is pitted a 
plethora of gender identities that reflect different ways individuals relate to their bodies. This affirms 
sex and gender to be inherently malleable.49 Yet, in a sign that this often masks an anti-essentialist 
essentialism, this is challenged by evidence ‘that sex goes far deeper than previously thought: 
biologically speaking, the brain “has sex” as do the kidneys.’50 
This concern about fixed binaries links to questions of transsexuality and intersex. Both are complex 
issues. Here, I take the former broadly to cover how individuals who experience their personal and 
cultural identity to be at variance with their bodily sex, and its associated behaviour and roles, have 
changed their sex by cultural, medical and/or technological means; a change, moreover, which is in 
several countries recognised and protected by law. By intersex, I understand individuals who are 
born with biological traits of both sexes. For example, there are individuals who display typically 
female anatomy yet who possess the male XY chromosomes; and, those who appear typically male 
who have XXY chromosomes. Furthermore, there are individuals who have exhibited ambiguous 
genitalia of both sexes at birth, and in some cases undergone surgical reassignment to one sex. 
Intersex has led some scientists to argue that biological sex exists along a spectrum and is ‘a cluster 
concept’ where a person’s sex is determined by exhibiting enough features deemed typically male or 
female.51 This implicitly affirms, however, two normative ends of the spectrum. How intersex and 
transsexuality are interpreted varies. To sketch the extremes, they can be taken as proof of how 
nature is inherently malleable and so support constructivism.52 Alternatively, where sexual 
difference is understood to be most perfectly manifest as either male or female, they are considered 
as a defect.53  
 
48 E.g., Linda Alcoff, Visible Identities (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 172; and, Charlotte Witt, The 
Metaphysics of Gender (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 40. 
49 Cf., Anthony Giddens, Modernity and Self-Identity (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1991), 217–18.   
50 Margaret H. McCarthy, “Gender Ideology And The Humanum,” Communio: International Catholic Review 43, 
(2016): 289 
51  For an overview, see Alison Stone, An Introduction to Feminist Philosophy (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2007), 
44-46. 
52 McCarthy, “Gender Ideology,” 287, refers to this as the ‘natural argument’. 
53 Ibid., 287. 
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These issues open a broader set of questions regarding human nature and reality itself.54 Thus, on 
modernity’s understanding, material reality follows certain immutable scientific laws accessible to 
human reason. Human nature is divided between matter and an individual self-consciousness 
construed as rational autonomous adult freedom which transcends material reality such that we can 
understand the laws of nature and shape it as rational individuals and as part of society and state. 
Based on so-called post-modernity, however, this view is challenged. In the place of reason and fixed 
laws, reality is characterised principally by a depth of feeling, volition, and creativity to shape 
material reality beyond the bounds of mere reason and natural laws. This combines a metaphysical 
materialism and nominalism which asserts that there is no underlying essential and meaning-
saturated reality. Meaning is a function of the human power to define things and manipulate 
material reality through cultural, social and technological means, including our bodies. However 
much they appear opposed, these perspectives affirm that the only abiding reality is the individual’s 
power to manipulate matter. What is essential about being human comes down to the will’s 
freedom to be unencumbered, other than by encumbrances freely chosen. This is, therefore, 
oriented against aspects of human reality prior to individual freedom. These are ‘factitious 
inequalities' to be overcome since they place unacceptable limits on the individual’s self-
constructing freedom.55 This fuels a cultural mission indiscriminately to flatten reality, raising the 
spectre of ‘one vast war of all against all’ to allow everyone to exercise ‘the (supposed) universal 
equal right to self-construction.’56 This regards all beings as ‘essentially undifferentiated monads.’57   
Margaret McCarthy elaborates regarding the constitutive human relationships. Against them is 
pitted the view ‘that there is a “more natural” state (the “state of nature”) according to which we 
are really at bottom nonspeaking, apolitical, not-born, and androgynous, individuals for whom “it is 
good to be alone.” This turns what really is a construct – the abstract “individual” – into a new 
natural, so as to turn what is really natural – constitutive relations – into a “construct,” beginning 
with the reconfiguration of these relations on consensual terms.’58 Here individuals are insulated 
from any relationships that lay a priori claims on them. Even when framed as ‘pure relations’, such 
 
54 For this characterisation of modernity and postmodernity, see Taylor, Secular Age, 550-574; and, John 
Milbank, “A Closer Walk on the Wild Side: Some Comments on Charles Taylor’s A Secular Age,” Studies in 
Christian Ethics 22.1, (2009): 89-104. 
55 Adrian J. Walker and Rachel M. Coleman, “The Saving Difference,” Communio: International Catholic Review 
42, (2015): 185 
56 Ibid., 185. 
57 Ibid., 18. 
58 McCarthy, “Gender Ideology,” 294. 
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relationships are unmoored from nature or being.59 Familial relationships are repurposed ‘along 
more democratic (consensual) terms….”’60 This is witnessed, for example, in the dissociation of 
sexual intercourse from commitments we owe others, reproduction, and the claims of children. 
Indeed, generation is placed on an egalitarian footing since ‘even unions incapable in principle of 
generating children will enact a new form of kinship by reintroducing children to sex through the 
“deliberate construction” of assisted reproductive technology.’61 This rejects the parent-child 
relationship as prior to choice. In a final twist, however, this turns children, understood as de facto 
adults, against parents (including adults who have obtained children through technological 
assistance) and, more radically, as explored in the previous chapter, against their own status as 
children. Thus the ‘child’s “war with all that gives him birth” will now be “won” (however 
counterintuitive this may).’62 The underlying risk of such unfettered constructivism is that it turns the 
individual against itself and children against themselves, heralding nihilism and anti-natalism.   
The above belies the radical nature of difference itself. This seems strange given the emphasis on 
diversity advocated by post-modern constructivism. Indeed, such a perspective echoes Jacques 
Derrida’s notion of différance.63 This affirms not only irreducible difference, but an endless deferral 
of meaning in language where words reference other words yet no foundational meaning is 
attained. Such deferral of meaning underpins a wider deconstruction in the name of affirming 
difference, informing Derrida’s critique of how traditional metaphysics is structured around binary 
oppositions such as perfect-imperfect, act-potency, form-matter, male-female.64 As Schindler 
argues, however, culturally this witnesses to ‘a confusion and an ambivalence toward difference’.65 
The ambivalence arises from how diversity is lauded only at the surface. No difference we have not 
chosen ourselves can be countenanced. To escape such demands, difference is trivialised into an 
endless possibility of equally valid fungible choices, motivating the rejection of so-called binary 
thinking. This dovetails with Schindler’s claim over cultural confusion, for to reject binary thinking 
entrenches a new binary, namely, that non-binary is good and binary is bad. The new binary is 
unacknowledged given the refusal to affirm any fundamental difference. This is done for the sake of 
promoting endless yet abstract and content-less difference at the expense of concrete differences. 
 
59 Cf., Anthony Giddens, The Transformation of Intimacy: Sexuality, Love, and Eroticism in Modern Societies 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992), 58.   
60 McCarthy, “Gender Ideology,” 294. 
61 Ibid., 295. 
62 Ibid., 295. 
63 Jacques Derrida, “Cogito et histoire de la folie,” Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 68, (1963): 460-494. 
64 Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology, trans. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1976). 
65 Schindler, “Perfect Difference, ”196.  
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Like Aristotle, the contemporary situation reflects an inability to affirm differences that pertain to 
what exists-in-itself. Unlike Aristotle, however, the contemporary regime of difference-at-any-price 
denies any underlying notion of substantial form which, for Aristotle, roots difference at the 
accidental level and makes difference intelligible. Instead, it lionizes Aristotle’s sense of mere 
otherness between things that have no other commonality than that they participate in process of 
becoming. Against this backdrop, I now examine how Balthasar’s metaphysics supports an 
alternative view, yet not without confronting Balthasar’s own problematic treatment of sexual 
difference. 
2. Balthasar’s Dramatic Approach to Human Nature 
To develop this, I turn to Balthasar’s dramatic anthropology in TD2 and TD3. This follows the 
discussion of finite freedom explored in the previous chapter and is contiguous with Balthasar’s 
account of how being appears according to a concrete primal Gestalt examined in chapter one. As 
we saw, each person is first welcomed into this Gestalt, and reflects it within their spiritual nature’s 
openness to being, when they awaken as a child to self-consciousness through its parents’ love. 
Human freedom is, at its origin, already concretely formed with the self-transcending capacity freely 
to receive and response to being as gift, not principally a matter of choice, but via concrete relations 
of interdependence whereby the spirit is ecstatically engaged by and with others.66 This establishes a 
positive tension between each person’s freedom and their dependence on others’ freedom. Here 
the a priori gifted capacity of the human heart's attunement to being's beauty ‘passes over into a 
dramatic interplay of dialogical freedom.’67 
Given this, questions about humanity’s essential nature are inseparable from our dramatic 
participation in esse: ‘we are caught up in the drama, we cannot remove ourselves from it or even 
conceive ourselves apart from it.’68 We can ask about human essence only in the midst of this 
‘dramatic performance of existence.’69 Balthasar here adapts a Scholastic axiom: ‘“Agere sequitur 
esse” also requires “esse sequitur agere".’70 Not only does human action follow and participate in 
esse, but esse only subsists in and manifests itself as the actions of beings. The truth about human 
essence, therefore, is not a determined fixed static reality accessed directly in a conceptually 
complete way.71 Rather, the dramatic discovery of human nature occurs within the Gestalt into 
 
66 Cf., GL1, 21. 
67 TD2, 25. 
68 TD2, 335. 
69 TD2, 335. 
70 TD2, 11. 
71 TD2, 12. 
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which we are born and which we share with others. It is presumed, yet not given comprehensively 
all at once.72 This participation within form's excess obviates the suggestion that Balthasar places 
human drama outside being's appearance as Gestalt.73 Rather, this primal Gestalt is the ontological 
medium that enables human freedom to be enacted according to its self-transcending spiritual 
openness to esse within its concrete material limits. 
The upshot is that human nature is open-endedly ‘undefinable.’74 This does not preclude saying 
anything about being human. Rather, affirming the medieval view of humanity as a microcosm of 
creation open to God, Balthasar follows both Aquinas and Nicholas of Cusa for whom such 
indefinability reflects humanity's commensurability with being's ever-greater reality which 
paradoxically mediates the immediate human relationship to God.75 Rooting human indefinability in 
being's excess underpins Balthasar’s dramatic anthropology. ‘Man…cannot be defined by anything 
outside of him; he can and must define himself.’76 This occurs, however, only within the dramatic 
Gestalt of human existence such that humans define themselves according to the limits of their 
nature’s freedom. Hence, Balthasar cautions against trying to escape concrete encounters in the 
world into an abstract transcendental self. He also challenges a dialectical view of such encounters 
that makes the self ‘the product of a prepersonal process.’77 Balthasar rejects, therefore, a 
Hegelianism that equates ‘the empirical I with the absolute I in some inconceivable point that would 
then be responsible for the whole upward movement of the process and…coincide with it.’78 For 
Balthasar, the paradox of created spirit is to be ‘simultaneously fully realized in itself and yet also 
characterised by a potentiality whereby it realizes itself by ongoing experiences of the other and of 
itself….’79 Even this must not be absolutized. Humans as persons are not identical with their 
paradoxical nature which, instead, points beyond itself to God. In the ‘dramatic dialogue with God,’ 
God causes humans to encounter God’s ultimate definition of being human.80 This defines humanity 
as a positive mystery that reflects and is oriented to the ever-greater mystery of God: ‘man is more 
 
72 Cf., TD2, 11. 
73 Milbank, The Suspended Middle, 77, claims Balthasar leaves the aesthetic form behind in his notion of 
drama. Schindler, “’A Very Critical Response’", 76-77n.9 notes that Milbank misquotes Balthasar’s text. 
Schindler responds ‘drama does not go beyond form…but only beyond passive, detached spectation of form, 
which is why drama “expands aesthetics into something new,”….“yet continuous with itself.”’  Cf., TD1, 17. 
Accepting this, I argue Balthasar steps outside the dramatic character of form vis-à-vis sexual difference. 
74 TD2, 335. 
75 TD2, 354-355. 
76 TD2, 341.  
77 ExT4, 21. 
78 ExT4, 21 
79 ExT4, 23 
80 TD2, 343. 
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than what can be included in a conceptually clear definition.’81 To be a creature that must freely 
define oneself against a backdrop of ever-greater divine mystery, therefore, becomes a matter of 
whether one freely receives oneself and one’s openness to esse as divine gift to be shared with 
others.  
3. Polarities of Human Nature 
In TD2, against the backdrop of this dramatic understanding of human essence, Balthasar identifies 
three polarities that underpin how humans are simultaneously indefinable, capable of defining 
themselves, and receive their true definition from God as a gift shared with others. These polarities 
are: body and spirit, male and female, and, the individual and community. Balthasar claims that 
humans exist according to this ‘threefold rhythm.’82 Though constants of human nature, they do not 
solve the human mystery. Rather, ‘they render it more profound and more pressing. In all three 
dimensions man seems to be built according to a polarity, obliged to engage in reciprocity, always 
seeking complementarity and peace in the other pole. And for that very reason he is pointed beyond 
his whole polar structure.’83 My focus here is on the male-female polarity. In TD2, Balthasar treats 
the polarity of sexual difference as a whole whereas in TD3 he considers the distinctiveness of male 
and female humanity, which I shall return to later. 
From the outset, we can query whether Balthasar actually offers a dramatic account of sexual 
difference. He engages, first, with the Genesis accounts of creation, judging them to contain ‘much 
legendary wisdom on the part of mankind, purified of mythical bias,’ and ‘a phenomenology of the 
sexual [realm].’84 Secondly, Balthasar considers how sexual difference has been interpreted within 
the history of Western thought as related to material or spiritual reality. Regarding the latter, 
Balthasar criticises the tendency of equating the male with the spiritual realm, and the female with 
material nature. He rejects the ‘misogynisitic utterance of the Fathers and Scholastics….’85 This 
approach, however, is removed from a dramatic account rooted in the encounter between actual 
humans. 
This provokes the criticism that Balthasar claims a priori comprehensive knowledge of what sexual 
difference is. Beattie, for example, contrasts Balthasar with Luce Irigaray’s claim that, because 
female subjectivity in the Western tradition is largely a male construct, ‘we have only the vaguest of 
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ideas’.86 This echoes a broader epistemic position held by some of Balthasar’s critics, namely, the 
unknowability of essences. This, in a broadly Kantian lineage, emphasises the a priori limits of human 
knowing whereby we gain at best a partial grasp of partial realities, but cannot grasp the whole of a 
reality or reality as a whole. It can be pitted against, for example, a Hegelian perspective which 
subsumes partial viewpoints into an overarching whole at the risk of an ultimately abstract and 
univocal view of reality. Indeed, Ben Quash argues this is what Balthasar does in his dramatic view of 
reality, applying a so-called overarching epic perspective towards reality that situates itself outside 
the drama.87 Kilby follows Quash in accusing Balthasar of adopting a ‘God’s eye view’ above human 
drama.88 These critiques, however, tacitly admit we can grasp a notion of sexual difference as a 
whole. Implicit in Beattie's words, for instance, is that she knows what the vaguest of ideas of sexual 
difference as whole refers to from the outset. It would be better to affirm, therefore, that it is 
possible to have a notion of sexual difference as whole which, nevertheless, is not comprehensively 
mapped out. Here Balthasar and his critics would find common ground by affirming together that 
sexual difference is a mystery before which we must exercise epistemic humility. Nonetheless, we 
can affirm that the exploration of sexual difference does include grasping it as a whole from the 
start, albeit as a whole that needs to be continually reencountered. Here the debate would focus on 
the nature of whole grasped from the first. In the present discussion, I use the prism of the 
fruitfulness of sexual difference to this end. To deny even an initial grasp of the whole, however, is 
to claim that partial knowledge of parts trumps an ability to engage with something as a whole even 
if it requires further discovery.89 Furthermore, such a wholesale denial begs the question that human 
reason operates according to a priori limits which prevent us from knowing something-in-itself as a 
whole. To assert such limits is already to claim more than those limits allow. 
For Balthasar, sexual difference, as a polarity of human nature, is not an abstract a priori limit but a 
concrete condition of human existence. As with the other polarities, they are presumed and 
encountered within every human life. They are no mere external objects to be investigated by the 
subject. They constitute the subject's capacity for perception, action and thought. We approach 
these polarities from within, even as they constitute us from without, and as we seek to articulate 
them more fully. This restates the previous chapter’s conclusion that the act of self-consciousness is 
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awoken from beyond itself, making it constitutionally open to discover more about the inexhaustible 
depths of the beings beyond it. Moreover, the self-conscious subject is transformed by what it 
discovers outside itself thereby fulfilling its ecstatic provenance. This dramatic process of ongoing 
discovery via participating in a concrete reality that is inexhaustibly more-than-can-be-grasped 
applies to sexual difference.  
That said, regarding sexual difference Balthasar problematically steps outside the dramatic concrete 
form of human existence. This is apparent in his assertion of an irreducible difference and mutuality 
between male and female. 
The male body is male throughout, right down to each cell of which it consists, and the 
female body is utterly female; and this is also true of their whole empirical experience and 
ego-consciousness. At the same time both share an identical human nature, but at no point 
does it protrude, neutrally, beyond the sexual difference, as if to provide neutral ground for 
mutual understanding.... The human, in the completed creation, is a “dual unity”, “two 
distinct but inseparable realities, each fulfilling the other and both ordained to an ultimate 
unity that we cannot as yet envisage”….90    
Positively, this passage articulates that sexual difference characterises human nature as a whole yet 
is only manifested concretely in given individuals. As Kilby notes, ostensibly this champions sexual 
difference’s embodied reality and eschews abstraction.91 It militates against identifying sexual 
difference with one aspect of human nature. ‘[T]he human person – who is concretely male and 
female – is (and remains) incarnate through and through. It is neither possible nor legitimate to split 
him schizophrenically into two halves, one biological and the other spiritual.’92 Balthasar insists no 
metaphysical polarity can define sexual difference.93 It encompasses humanity’s whole embodied 
spiritual existence in openness to divine reality.94 Negatively, Balthasar simply asserts a 
comprehensively biological and psychological essentialist distinction between the sexes without 
explaining how this avoids splitting human nature. This sits uneasily with Balthasar’s claim that we 
cannot give ‘a conclusive definition of the essence of the male and the female. We can only 
approach the male/female polarity that pervades the entire living creation by allowing each pole to 
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shed light on the other.’95 Balthasar hints at a tension by admitting the ‘extreme difficulty of giving a 
precise account of the significance and implications of the sexual difference.…’96 
More promisingly, farther on in TD2, Balthasar delineates the sexes based on their mutual 
illumination and interdependence as analogous to, and paradigmatic of, interpersonal relationships. 
Balthasar states: 
man is always in communion with his counterimage, woman, and yet never reaches her. The 
converse is true of woman. If we take this man/woman relationship as a paradigm, it also 
means that the human “I” is always searching for the “thou”, and actually finds it..., without 
ever being able to take possession of it in its otherness. Not only because the freedom of the 
“thou” cannot be mastered by the “I” using any superior transcendental grasp – since, in its 
proper context, all human freedom only opens up to absolute, divine freedom – but also 
because this impossibility is “enfleshed” in the diverse and complementary constitution of 
the sexes.97 
This affirms that the male-female difference is a reciprocity which safeguards their abiding mystery. 
Indeed, their reciprocity depends on their asymmetry. This represents an ‘integral sexual 
complementarity.’98 This differs from a ‘fractional sexual complementarity’ which treats male and 
female as two incomplete halves of a single whole.99 Balthasar explains this ontologically. Sexual 
difference denotes how human nature ‘”‘is dual, without multiplying the unity by two; it is simply 
two poles of a single reality, two diverse presences of a single being, two entia in a single esse, one 
existence in two lives; but by no means two different fragments of a whole, to be fitted together like 
a puzzle….”’100 Man and woman are fully human yet differently whereby they encompass human 
nature as single essential unity characterized by irreducible difference and interdependence that 
expresses humanity’s contingent nature and  opens to God.101 As it stands, however, the above 
merely asserts difference. For a fully dramatic account, Balthasar links this mutual illumination of 
sexes to their joint fruitfulness.  
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4. Knowing Sexual Difference by its Fruitfulness 
In TL2, Balthasar qualifies his earlier view of sexual difference in TD2. Rather than asserting ‘the 
original distance and relation between man and woman’ as ‘the primordial phenomenon’, we must 
attend also to their ‘organic and personal fruitfulness.’102 I will return to the distinction between 
organic and personal fruitfulness later. For now, the focus on fruitfulness emphasises the point 
mentioned above: that we grasp the polarities of human nature from within through dramatic 
enactment. Balthasar specifies this in TL1 via an analogy between the subject-object union in the act 
of knowledge and the union of masculine and feminine humanity. In each case, the two poles can be 
considered in relative isolation in their inclination to union. However, ‘[t]he union itself is a new, 
third thing in which the purpose of these inclinations is truly unveiled for the first time.’103 This 
transformative disclosure of the parts through union involves a reciprocal notion of causality. Thus, 
regarding sexual difference, the union of feminine and masculine is presupposed as that which 
orientates them to each other. Yet, this union and its fruit are only effected in their actual 
encounter. Here the effect (union and its fruit) is a cause (discloses and fulfils) of its cause (the 
constituent parts). Echoing final causality’s importance to Aristotle, the whole is inchoately 
anticipated as the condition of the integrity of the parts; and, yet this whole is only fully manifested 
in the parts, their transformative encounter, and its fruit. The analogy with the act of knowledge, 
however, must be qualified. The male-female union is not simply between subject and object, but 
between two subjects who are also distinctive objects to each other that represent different ways of 
being the same nature. Their union, moreover, brings a wholly new human into existence. While this 
may seem self-evident, it entails the wholly new event of the birth of a unique person who exceeds 
its parents as gift beyond their self-giving in its relationship to God.  
The fruitfulness of human sexual difference can be further specified. I consider three observations 
made by Balthasar. First, the relationship between the sexes is one ‘that has all fruitfulness within it, 
and not in addition to it.’104 There is a completeness and perfection to sexual difference’s 
fruitfulness. Yet it is not self-enclosed but intrinsically exceeds itself in its fruit, namely, a new living 
spiritual being. The birth of a child reveals that the relationship between the sexes encompasses all 
fruitfulness, therefore, only by exceeding itself into the relationship between parents and child. The 
parent-child relationship is both fruit and has ‘all fruitfulness' within it insofar as it brings and 
nurtures a child into existence and self-conscious freedom. The horizontal, asymmetrical and 
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reciprocal relationship between a child’s biological parents, which is rooted in their sexual 
difference, thus yields a vertical, asymmetrical and reciprocal relationship between the parents and 
child. The latter’s asymmetry is distinguished from the former because of the child’s utter 
dependence. Moreover, the parent-child relationship concerns not merely the conception, 
gestation, and birth of a child but also the child’s awakening to self-consciousness as an embodied 
spirit open to esse in fragile dependence on others’ love. 
In addition, therefore, to the three polarities mentioned above (body-soul, male-female, individual-
community), this denotes a fourth polarity, namely, child-parent. Balthasar implicitly treats this in 
the individual-community polarity. This, however, remains too abstract. The child-parent 
relationship, by contrast, is the concrete beginning of the drama of existence for each person. As 
Balthasar states, ‘the child is born, not into an abstraction called “humanity”, but into the supremely 
concrete reality of a maternal, paternal, and fraternal love…. Abstraction (in the usual sense) is even 
less appropriate here; the “essence” of man unfolds for the child only in a communion of love….’105 
The child-parent polarity concretely grounds and manifests the dramatic enactment of the other 
three polarities. That said, human sexual difference acts as a crucial hinge in the convergence of the 
body-soul and individual-community polarities in the child-parent relationship. As Balthasar says, 
‘the man/woman relationship can stand as a paradigm of that community dimension which 
characterizes man’s entire nature.’106 This paradigmatic community-character of sexual difference 
applies foremost to how its fruitfulness is manifested in bringing a child into fully self-conscious 
existence. 
Secondly, Balthasar observes that the perfect fruitfulness of human sexual difference is 
‘conditioned’.107 This is most apparent in its dependence on the body and sharing male and female 
fruitfulness. More fully, it refers the fruitfulness of sexual difference to the ontological difference 
discussed in chapter one. This stresses, first, how such fruitfulness is conditioned according to the 
essential form of human nature as embodied living spirit. Secondly, it emphasises how human sexual 
fruitfulness participates in esse as divine gift, thereby enacting the conditioned fruitfulness of the 
‘triadic character of worldly being.’108 This concerns how all beings are to some extent co-
constitutive because they share in esse. This affirms a closer level of intimacy and difference 
between all beings than both Aristotle and contemporary postmodernist constructivism envisage 
because each being's difference from others is rooted in the unity of esse's superabundant actuality. 
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Such co-constitutive intimacy still varies, however, according to how extrinsic or intrinsic the 
relationships between beings are and the degree to which they actively mediate esse to each other. 
The fruitfulness of sexual difference discloses that the greatest degree of such intrinsically fruitful 
mediation occurs not simply between beings who share the same nature, but who generatively 
share a single nature in different ways. I return to this in the next section. 
Thirdly, if the perfect and conditioned fruitfulness of sexual difference is to be fully human in 
communicating esse’s fruitfulness, it is both an organic/sexual and spiritual/personal fruitfulness. 
Organic/sexual fruitfulness coincides with how esse subsists in humans specifically as embodied, 
living, animal beings; and, spiritual/personal fruitfulness with how esse subsists in humans 
specifically as spiritual beings. Even if inseparable, these are nonetheless distinct. Before considering 
this, however, I examine first the metaphysical implications of identifying sexual difference, its 
fruitfulness, and the child-parent relationship with how esse subsists as human being. 
5. Metaphysical Perfection of Sexual Difference 
As considered above, Balthasar sees human sexual difference as two different ways of being the 
same kind of living spiritual embodied being. He does not consider this systematically. Accordingly, I 
engage with D.C Schindler’s treatment of this question as congruent with Balthasar’s thought. 
Schindler offers a phenomenological study of life, highlighting how the substantial form of a living 
being transcends its material being, enabling that organism to grow, reproduce, learn, etc. This 
greater transcendence of living form, however, is not separate from matter but manifested within 
matter as a greater unity-in-difference. Thus, the greater transcendence of form effects a greater 
integration between form and matter in living beings. This integrated view of form and matter 
echoes Balthasar’s sense of Gestalt as a concrete whole. Accordingly, an individual living organism, 
in its vitality, is always more than just a mere instance of a universal essence. Schindler calls this the 
‘supra-individuality of the living individual.’109 Echoing Balthasar’s focus on fruitfulness, Schindler 
associates the transcendence of organic animal form in and beyond matter decisively with 
reproduction and nurture. These display both a greater level of transcendence of form over matter 
and a greater integration in that parents actively mediate the living form to their offspring within 
material reality. The supra-individuality of reproduction and nurture is also disclosed in the need for 
more than one progenitor. Thus, ‘both means and ends are “supra-individual”; reproduction is the 
giving rise to super-individuality supra-individually….’110  
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This transforms mere reproduction, which, in principle, does not require sexually distinct individuals, 
as with many plants, into a single activity shared jointly by two co-agents that are different but 
correlated to each other. For animals (including humans), male and female in their co-dependence 
mediate the transcendence of living form within material being where form's vertical transcendence 
is manifested in their horizontal difference and relationship. Sexual difference is a ‘dual unity' that 
encompasses the transcendence of animal substantial form. Schindler calls this different way of 
being the whole a ‘mode’ or ‘modality’ of substantial form.111 Hence, sexual difference does not 
divide the species’ unity. This is no accidental modification but entirely coincides with the essential 
form that defines a substance. 
Schindler understands this modality of substantial living form as the most comprehensive of 
differences in a given unity and so, as explored earlier, a contrariety. Beyond Aristotle, however, 
Schindler argues this is no accident nor does it have a form-privation structure. Rather, the way the 
sexes mediate, in a single shared act, the transcendence of living form in generation and nurture 
entails a different relationship between contraries. Male and female are ‘asymmetrically related…, 
ordered to each other reciprocally and from their very core; they are not a positive agent and a 
negative patient, but two differently positive, correlated agents in a single activity… [T]he genders 
are “supra-individual” from the ground up, reciprocally for one another, both as an expression of the 
immanent transcendence of form in living being.’112 Although Schindler does not say so, this applies 
Aristotle’s notion of correlatives, again in non-Aristotelian fashion, to substantial form. This corrects 
contrariety’s form-privation model so that the extremes are reciprocally dependent. It also 
circumvents the idea that the female is the privative pole in the male-female relationship. Or, 
indeed, that there is a privative pole at all. This effects a metaphysical reversal. Rather than applying 
abstract notions of contrariety and correlative to sexual difference, it takes the concrete difference 
of sexual difference as disclosing something definitive about difference itself. This yields a reworked 
notion of difference that Schindler calls a ‘substantial contrariety’ meaning ‘two positive and 
correlative ways of being a (living) substance’ where they represent the greatest and most complete 
difference.113 Here the sexes do not divide human nature but encompass it wholly yet differently in 
interdependence. They are able to effect a union greater than the sum of its parts which thereby 
discloses more fully the difference between the sexes. 
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I raise two issues with Schindler’s presentation thus far. First, while sexual difference as a substantial 
contrariety is comprised of two extremes, this twoness is oriented to a third, namely, a new being 
who expresses the immanent transcendence of the same living form. This reveals a more complex 
pattern of relationship between a horizontal substantial contrariety (sexual difference) and a vertical 
substantial contrariety (parents and child). To be deemed a contrariety, and so encompass the 
extremes of a difference that applies to the transcendent unity of a substantial living form, this 
vertical contrariety needs to apply to the difference between two biological parents and their child. 
It does not encompass the extreme concrete limit simply to speak of adult and child; an adult who 
acts as a parent and a child they care for; one biological but absent parent and their child; or one 
biological parent who cares for their child. While these participate in the extreme difference-in-unity 
of a contrariety, they are intelligible based on a concrete form of that contrariety, namely, the unity-
in-difference of sexually correlated adult progenitors and their child. This echoes Balthasar’s sense of 
‘the supremely concrete reality of a maternal, paternal, and fraternal love.’114 That said, if everyone, 
for Balthasar, is fundamentally a child, and, indeed, should integrate such childlikeness into 
adulthood, then this vertical contrariety is not defined by mutually exclusive extremes. It is not the 
case that one is either a child or a parent. Rather, everyone, parents included, is a child whose origin 
is ultimately from God albeit mediated by human parents. Accepting, therefore, that no one can 
dispense with being a child opens the vertical parent-child contrariety to God, who as the source of 
everyone’s being is the extreme limit that transcends child and parent, without, however, 
undermining the concrete parent-child contrariety. Echoing the discussion about non-biological 
parents in chapter two, this suggests that the perfection of the parent-child contrariety can be 
emulated by any relationships of fostering care between adults and children so long as each child is 
acknowledged as divine gift mediated by sexual fruitfulness and welcomed in love.  
Secondly, because Schindler treats sexual/gender difference as a contrariety, he concludes there can 
be no third gender or infinite number of genders. He does, however, affirm the ‘empirical 
observation’ that individuals can exhibit ‘a coincidence of male and female traits, each of which 
logically make sense only as the contrary of the other.’115 That Schindler stresses its empirical nature 
suggests such intersex be restricted to the accidental order. But this contravenes his argument thus 
far. Rather, it is better to affirm any number of combinations of male and female at the level of an 
individual’s substantial form, yet always within the concrete limits set by the extreme boundaries of 
sexual difference. Sexual difference is, therefore, a type of contrariety admitting intermediaries. This 
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makes intersex as a modality of human substantial form. While accepting, therefore, Schindler’s 
statement that each person learns about ‘the other gender best by being true to one’s own 
gender…and each gender is most liberated in its own specificity in the presence of others who 
authentically live their own’; this can also occur within a single individual in whom a distinct 
coincidence of male and female modalities occur.116 This offers a different perspective on Schindler’s 
observation that we ‘become more universally human the more fully and completely we live our 
distinctive masculinity or femininity.’117 Any individual by acting out their masculine modality comes 
closer to the feminine modality as expressed both within and outside them in others. Conversely, by 
acting out their own femininity they come closer to the masculinity that is within them and outside 
them in others. In principle, this also provides a context to situate the different but related question 
of transsexuality. Schindler, however, does not hold this position. For him, like Balthasar, humans 
are either male or female. This risks, however, replacing Aristotle’s female as misbegotten with 
intersex. I reject this. The difficulty, however, is that, on a strict Aristotelian basis, contrarieties that 
admit intermediaries concern non-necessary properties. We could just assert that intersex simply 
requires we adjust the notion of substantial contrariety to fit the concrete reality. This, however, is 
insufficiently moored to being. Another way to address this is to affirm that substance has a non-
necessary core in its dependence on esse. Such non-necessity would then attach to any modality of 
substance, be it an extreme limit or an intermediary. 
This returns us to Schindler’s account. As a modality that applies to substances, sexual difference 
cannot be rooted in essence/substantial form. Rather, Schindler locates such modality of substance 
in esse.  As he explains, ‘esse concerns the particular form that every form in a thing takes, which is 
to say the modality or way of being of a substance and everything in it. Hence, we see why it is 
appropriate to associate gender metaphysically with esse: esse is a distinct mode of the essence that 
bears on everything in it....’118 Sexual difference, therefore, finds its metaphysical home in the quasi-
formal pattern of esse – the creative reciprocal letting be whose actuality is permeated by both 
activity and receptivity. This explains how sexual difference applies to the whole substance of human 
nature without altering or dividing it. Sexual difference is communicated to and manifested in every 
level of human existence: its living spiritual form and, then, through this form, in the accidental 
order and material reality. Hence, no human attribute can be exclusively attributed to a single sex. 
Rather, each sex exhibits such attributes in their distinctive way, something I examine in a later 
section. 
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Schindler’s association of sexual difference with the mode of esse as it subsists as the modality of 
living substantial form makes it analogous to personhood as we have explored it in Balthasar. Hence, 
‘personhood is…the perfection of the very thing that causes gender difference, namely, the 
transcendence of form.’119 Like personhood, sexual difference transcends nature from within nature. 
Also like personhood, sexual difference unveils the pattern of esse within a single nature as creative, 
self-transcending reciprocal letting be. Sexual difference is, therefore, like a ‘who’ that possesses and 
enacts the transcendence of its nature in relation to other sexed individuals of the same nature. As 
Schindler comments, with an eye to contemporary gender debates, the transcendence of human 
spiritual nature vis-à-vis the body does not divide gender as construct from sex as biological reality 
since this vertical transcendence constitutes sexual difference and discloses itself within embodied 
sex. The greater transcendence of human spiritual life means that gender is expressed not just 
biologically, but in the realm of personal freedom, and social and cultural interaction. 
Given this analogy, Schindler argues sexual difference is a metaphysical principle of perfect 
difference per se. This draws together the strands of his argument: he applies contrariety, as the 
most perfect of differences within a given unity, not just to the unity of substantial form but the 
highest and most transcendent form, namely, substantial spiritual living form. This unity-in-
difference is, moreover, located beyond substantial nature altogether in the perfect actuality of 
esse. Sexual difference applies, therefore, to esse’s unity which is prior to substance as the source of 
all being. Echoing Balthasar’s metaphysics, Schindler holds, moreover, that because sexual 
difference is that which gives esse subsistence in living animal beings it is not derivative, but jointly 
ultimate with substantial form.120  
Sexual difference is, therefore, a fundamental metaphysical principle of perfect difference because it 
fully reveals the analogy of being’s unity-in-difference as encapsulated in the relationship between 
esse and essence. To clarify, it is not merely an instance of how esse subsists in the substantial reality 
of actual beings. Nor is it simply a relationship between specific human individuals who share the 
same nature. This remains too extrinsic. Rather human sexual difference (together with the child-
parent relationship) represents different yet necessarily interdependent ways of constitutively being 
the same concretely subsisting (human) substantial form in its transcendence. It is this that makes 
human sexual difference a concrete rather than abstract principle of perfect difference. As Schindler 
explains, this denotes ‘a radically positive relationality: a being for, being from, and being with....’121 
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There is here a coincidence between unity and difference where difference generates unity and 
unity difference.  This represents ‘a generative enactment of the analogy of being.’122 Sexual 
difference thus unveils that being’s meaning is to affirm difference or, better, the unity-in-difference 
that corresponds to love.  
Returning to the analogy between sexual difference and personhood, we can more fully appreciate 
how these mutually inform each other. While personal and spiritual reality discloses to a maximal 
degree the nature of being, this disclosure cannot dispense with what sexual difference unveils 
about being in terms of correlated fruitful unity-in-difference. The gender-person analogy, therefore, 
not only reveals the person-like reality of human sexual difference, but personhood's gender-like 
structure. Instead of identifying personhood with the autonomous individual, sexual difference 
unveils that equally primordial is the correlated relationship to others who embody differently a way 
of being that same substance in its openness to esse. As Aristotle Papanikolaou notes, vis-à-vis 
Balthasar, this view shares an affinity with certain feminist view which reject the self’s reduction to 
mere individuality, autonomy and independence in favour of 'relational understandings of the 
self...constituted in and through community and communion.’123  
This needs to be extended to include the child-parent relationship. It is the constitutive relationships 
between mother, father and child that most comprehensively encompass within material reality the 
transcendent form of human nature and, within the unity of that single nature, manifest esse’s 
pattern of positive unity-in-difference. This does not crudely sex esse, nor make it banally filial or 
familial. Rather, it affirms that insofar as the fruitfulness of sexual difference and the progenitors-
offspring relationship are construed as different ways of constituting and actively handing on the 
same single living and spiritual form, and so as intersecting substantial contrarieties, they must be 
sourced in the quasi-formal pattern of esse as the highest level of metaphysical reality beyond 
substance, or, rather, together with substance.  
This applies also to personhood. Locating the unity-in-difference of sexual difference, the child-
parent relationship and personhood in esse gives metaphysical warrant for claiming that one cannot 
be a human person without being engendered, gendered, and engendering. The relationships of 
interdependence that constitute human nature both underpin personhood and are fulfilled when 
enacted in fully interpersonal and so spiritually fruitful ways – that is, when they communicate being 
as love. Thus, we can affirm Balthasar’s statement that ‘the highest instance of the analogia entis is 
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the analogia personalitatis....’124 Nevertheless, between them there is the mediating analogy of the 
constitutive human relations or, as Balthasar states elsewhere, the ‘father-mother-child analogy.’125 
This does not mean, however, that everyone is a biological parent, or, even, that everyone is either 
male or female as opposed to, say, intersex. As noted above, substantial contraries manifest 
differently in different individuals. And yet, every person is and always will be a child. This suggests 
the unity of which the contrary terms are the limit principles of difference is not only ultimately 
found in the unity-in-difference of esse and essence, nor even in esse, but, also, more concretely, in 
being a child who is not simply a product of sexual fruitfulness but divine gift. 
As Balthasar stresses, this distinguishes human procreation from other non-spiritual animals. It 
involves the birth of a spiritual creature whose freedom is irreducible to nature’s necessity.126 A child 
is not simply an extension of its mother and father. A ‘human child is not a mere gift of nature but a 
personal gift of God.’127 And yet precisely as divine gift the child is the fruit of its parent. This 
articulates the paradox of human reproduction which, though natural, opens to God who ‘hands 
over his creatorship, making it dependent on events initiated at the will of creatures. The real depth 
of this mystery only emerges when the child is seen no longer as “res partis” but as a personality in 
direct relationship with God….’128 Accordingly, in ‘every fruitful act of conception, God performs an 
act of quasi-creation (not an absolute act of creation, since it is not creation out of nothing)…. God 
operates “by implementing a system he has already established and instituted in the creature 
itself”.’129 A human child, therefore, comes into existence via a shared act of its parents who mediate 
God’s personal gift of divine being to bring about a new spirit. This emphasises the mediated 
immediacy of each person’s relationship to God from the start. It also coincides with how its parents' 
love awakens a child to full personal self-consciousness whereby it freely receives and enacts the gift 
of its personal reality as an embodied spirit open to esse in direct (that is, mediated immediate) 
relationship with God. 
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6.  Sexual and Interpersonal Fruitfulness 
The uniqueness of bringing a new child into being as self-conscious spirit emphasises the privileged 
nature of the fruitfulness of human sexual difference. It enacts the fruitfulness of esse's coming to 
subsistence as the transcendent form of living embodied spirit within the concrete interpersonal 
relationships. This privilege attaches to the jointly organic and spiritual nature of this fruitfulness. 
The relationship between these two types of fruitfulness can, however, be interpreted differently: as 
separate from each other; in opposition; identical; or, as inseparable yet irreducible in a mutually 
fulfilling manner. Let us consider these in dialogue with Balthasar. 
First, regarding the possible separation or opposition of sexual and personal fruitfulness, Balthasar 
notes, in Western history, this has been interpreted so as to divide 'on the one side, the fruitful 
encounter between man and woman in personal mutual self-giving – and, on the other side, their 
sexual union.’130 This pivots on how the sexual and spiritual span the realms of freedom and 
necessity. By necessity, the human species conjoins the animal and spiritual. Accordingly, Balthasar 
argues a ‘species oriented function’ such as reproduction should not be diverted from its intrinsic 
purpose to satisfy personal desire. Yet, a person, as spirit, is free to do so, thereby dividing their 
organic and spiritual unity.  The worry is that sexual fruitfulness is used simply to promote ‘the 
limitless, personal side', undermining ‘an act that is meant to be the symbolic expression of an 
unconditional love between man and woman.’131 Balthasar’s immediate focus here is the teaching 
against contraception in the encyclical Humanae Vitae. Supporting the latter, Balthasar’s fear is that, 
taken to its logical conclusion, placing organic and personal fruitfulness in opposition separates 
sexual difference, the sexual act, the biological material required to conceive a child, the act of 
conception, the time of pregnancy, the moment of birth, care for the child, the developing 
relationship between the adults as parents, sexual desire, and the adults’ self-giving love. The issue 
is not that these are distinct, but whether they are encompassed and fulfilled within a living concrete 
whole. Indeed, elsewhere Balthasar decries separating the organic and spiritual in the sexual act for 
fear of ‘splitting the human in the very act in which it manifests its deepest unity.’132 Without 
entering here into a discussion about contraception, Balthasar’s fear casts the exercise of freedom in 
the sexual act in an overly negative light as if avoiding conception is always about fulling selfish 
personal desire, rather than conducive to the fruits of mutual self-giving in love. 
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Secondly, this underscores Balthasar’s concern to safeguard the unity of the organic and personal 
fruitfulness of human sexual difference. He insists that the sexual-reproductive side of human sexual 
difference cannot be attributed simply to the material side of human nature, and the sexual-erotic 
or personal self-giving love to the spiritual to which priority is given.133 They belong together. In 
emphasising this, there are times when Balthasar univocally elides sexual and personal fruitfulness. 
As Kilby notes, this becomes reductionist: ‘it is not only that male/female relationships are all 
conceived as marital, and that marriage is considered entirely in terms of sex; sexuality itself, here, is 
reduced to a sort of biologically conceived act of reproduction.’134 Although, as I demonstrate below, 
Kilby’s statement overlooks counterexamples in Balthasar’s thought, she correctly identifies a 
recurring reductionist tendency. For example, he states, if ‘in imagination, we were to exclude from 
the act of love between man and woman the nine months’ pregnancy, that is, the temporal 
dimension, the child would be immediately present in their generative-receptive embrace; this 
would be simultaneously the expression of their reciprocal love and, going beyond it, its 
transcendent result.’135 Here ‘the human child is both the proof and the fruit of the reciprocal love of 
the parents…’136 This ignores that the child is primarily proof of sexual fruitfulness, not interpersonal 
love; and, that love can be fruitful without children (as Balthasar affirms).  
To address this, we must draw some distinctions. Though sexual and personal fruitfulness are not 
the same (there is no necessary relationship between having a child and fruitful love), we can unpack 
Balthasar’s insistence on their unity against the backdrop of his metaphysics. The identification of 
the self-giving between man and woman, and the fruit of a child, with love can be seen as shorthand 
for how the fruitfulness of human sexual difference manifests being’s fruitfulness. This echoes our 
discussion in the first chapter where the difference between esse and beings ‘forms the ontic first 
step of what love is among free entities.’137 Thus, on one level, Balthasar is right that, in the 
procreation of a child, man and woman mediate the fruitfulness of love understood ontologically. 
This applies even if they do not personally affirm this love or even reject it. Such ontological love, 
however, is only fully expressed in the parents’ loving interpersonal exchange and mutual 
commitment, and their openness to the child‘s existence and its awakening to self-consciousness. As 
Balthasar says, ‘the loving persons (in whom the all-encompassing Being of reality prevails) never 
close themselves off from one another…. [T]hey are open to the original mystery of Being in their 
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(always conditioned) fruitfulness. The fruitfulness they share, rooted in nature (as when a child is 
conceived)…remains an important but still limited parable of this fruitfulness of love….’138  
To avoid reducing everything to mere sexual fruitfulness, sexual and personal fruitfulness must be 
seen as mutually dependent yet irreducible to each other according to a certain order. Thus, sexual 
difference’s organic fruitfulness enacts an absolute ontological fruitfulness by bringing another 
human as spirit into existence. Such sexual fruitfulness, however, is no guarantee of personal love 
and its attendant spiritual fruitfulness. It must be fulfilled in the fruitfulness of spiritual and 
interpersonal love. This entails a loving self-giving between adults whose welcome awakens a child 
to self-conscious freedom in its spiritual openness to esse. It coincides with how the child’s existence 
as spirit is not simply of its parents, but a personal gift of God who shares the divine capacity to 
create and awaken new spirits with the parents. The corollary is that a human child is utterly 
dependent on the gift of love without which it could not live, let alone live as spirit. In discontinuity 
with other animals, this involves an exposure to the risk of a lack of love. The child's being calls to 
the hearts of adult world, demanding what can only be given freely – love. As Balthasar says, ‘[t]he 
child…not only originates from his parents’ mutual love but also depends on its continuation for his 
future existence and growth, an exigency that seals the permanence of his parents’ mutual 
commitment in turn….’139 
That said, to be a personal expression of sexual difference’s fruitfulness, this cannot simply be an act 
of will. It must engage the whole person and be rooted in the heart’s attunement to being. Indeed, 
even before the question of children, Balthasar finds the primal experience of a child awakening to 
self-consciousness reawakened in adults erotically attracted to each other: ‘the ability to marvel that 
was enjoyed at the dawn of life again awakens in the same primal sense.’140 This erotic awakening in 
wonder moves ‘from the surface of the senses into the depths of the heart: for here eros can keep 
alive an awed amazement at one’s partner’s self-surrender within all the routine of the common life, 
even after the first sensual stimulus has evaporated.’141 Moreover, Balthasar notes how the arrival of 
a new child evokes surprise in its parents: ‘a surprise which overtakes the phenomenon of growth 
and blossoming [of the parents’ love for each other].’142 Such surprise is not merely psychological, 
but metaphysical. The child’s existence as ‘a third, independent spirit-person’ is ‘an 
incomprehensible wonder’ and ‘unexpected delight’ for the parents ‘perhaps even and precisely in 
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those cases where they had attempted to prevent the child from being born.’143  This connects the 
birth and self-conscious awakening of a child with the reawakening of the parents’ child-like wonder. 
This is not, however, a foregone conclusion. Because the encounter with a newborn child takes place 
within the realm of freedom, the advent of a child and the demand it places on its parents, can be 
experienced as an invitation to freedom or a threat to it. Accordingly, the opposite response is also 
possible. The birth of a child may be a cause of anger, fear, despair or angst, and be rejected.   
The upshot of this intertwining of sexual and personal fruitfulness is that the most perfect fruitful 
self-giving – whose fruit is a child born, awoken and nurtured into self-conscious freedom – happens 
via the wholehearted commitments between two loving adults who are sexually different. This 
reflects how they willingly open their hearts both to each other and to the fruitful possibility of a 
new life as a gift of their personal sharing of their common nature based on their correlated 
difference.144 The fruitfulness of this exchange pertains to how sexually different adults can, in their 
concrete personal gestures, give and receive more than themselves in their living spiritual nature’s 
transcendent openness to esse as disclosed decisively in a child. Indeed, for Balthasar, this receives 
its fullest expression in the commitment made in marriage.145  
However, Balthasar also makes clear that this capacity concretely to give more is not limited to 
sexual difference and children or family life. It discloses a ‘law’ of the fruitfulness of living spiritual 
human nature where the latter reflects within its freedom and interdependence the fruitfulness of 
love as expressive of the fruitful gift of being. This law is operative ‘not only in “first love” or in the 
sexual act; it leaves its impress on the family and everything belonging to it; in short, it characterises 
all human life, which is a ‘play’ of ‘representations’ that are precisely more lively when, in the game 
of life, man assumes the most serious ethical responsibilities….’146 As Balthasar says elsewhere, 'the 
element of propagation' does not disappear; rather ‘this form of “excess” and “fruit” (which can be 
spiritual-intellectual) belongs to every love, including the higher forms.’147 The fruitfulness of human 
sexual difference, therefore, is not simply the condition for another person’s existence, but 
paradigmatic for personal fruitfulness between people who transcend themselves by freely sharing 
their concrete selves where this results in a fruit beyond them both. 
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The fruitfulness between persons is not limited to the relationships between the sexes or between 
parents and child, but goes beyond these relationships of fruitful self-transcendence into a plethora 
of relationships that underpin human community.148 As Balthasar comments, ‘since there are 
countless such incidences of transcendence in human society, they always burst the closed model 
(for example, marriage) and bring about many movements that cross and recross like waves.’149 
Thus, each person shows that they have ‘understood God’s gesture of gift-giving by taking it over 
and becoming a giver: not only in the generation of children, but in every kind of human 
communication and fruitfulness.’150 As Balthasar affirms, ‘fecundity is the law, not only of organisms 
but…also of the life of the spirit…. [E]very I-Thou relationship between spirits can be fulfilled only in 
an objective third (as Hegel never tires of stressing) or in the fact that genuine paideia (according to 
Plato) is a “begetting in the beautiful” and thus the generation of a fruit.’151 This echoes Balthasar’s 
point, noted above, that the fruitfulness shared between lovers ripples beyond them, and arrives 
from myriad sources, becoming more vital in exchanges that enact the good (and the true and 
beautiful) – something I consider in chapter four. 
7. Critiquing Balthasar’s Account of Male and Female 
I turn now to what distinguishes the male and female modes of being human. I focus specifically on 
how male and female fruitfulness, in their interdependent enactment of human organic and spiritual 
fruitfulness, distinctively mediate esse by handing on the immanent transcendence of human 
nature’s spiritual living form to the fruit that is a child. 
I approach this in two steps: first via a critical engagement with Balthasar’s thought; and, secondly, a 
speculative reworking of the latter. While Balthasar affirms the metaphysical provenance of the 
distinctiveness of male and female fruitfulness, I argue he loses sight of their reciprocity as rooted in 
being's analogical nature. Here I both echo and differ from Kilby’s critique of Balthasar. She 
acknowledges that at times Balthasar treats sexual difference ‘with a clear sense of symmetry….’152 
However, she judges that in the end he prioritises an asymmetrical unilateral priority of man over 
woman. I agree. However, I add that safeguarding the reciprocity between the sexes requires a 
certain kind of asymmetry. 
7.1. Created being as feminine vis-à-vis divine being 
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In distinguishing the sexes, Balthasar makes a fateful choice: to associate the feminine with the 
active receptivity of created being.153 This represents an important innovation regarding the 
Aristotelian metaphysics which associates the female with the receptive potency of matter and, 
therefore, with imperfection. As David L. Schindler comments, Balthasar transforms the association 
between the feminine and receptivity: ‘receptivity is now seen as an essential ingredient of what is 
meant primitively by act (esse), that is, as distinct from what is merely “potential,” and receptivity is 
thereby seen from the beginning as a perfection.’154 This aligns with what we examined in chapter 
one: the actuality of each being’s participation in esse is receptive to essence where this ontological 
receptivity is further expressed through action and letting be. 
For Balthasar, the alignment of created esse’s receptivity with the feminine makes all created being 
feminine.155 One implication of this seems to be that God is masculine. Balthasar, however, wants to 
avoid a one-to-one correspondence between male-female and God-creation. While the feminine 
aligns with created being because both are understood to be receptive and responsive, the 
masculine does not align with God because, unlike the human male whose esse is also secondary 
and receptive, God is not dependent on creation.156 Balthasar thus emphasises that any similarity 
between God’s act of creation and the male’s activity vis-à-vis the female’s receptivity requires a 
greater dissimilarity between them. It is this dissimilarity that most characterises the esse of male 
humanity. Nevertheless, Balthasar still affirms a male priority on this basis. As Gerard Loughlin 
argues, ‘Balthasar wants equality of male and female but the text displays the priority of the male; 
he wants the priority of the male but the text insinuates an equality with the female, so we have the 
“relative priority of the man,” which only whispers of the relative equality of the woman.’157 
Though beyond this thesis’ remit, Balthasar locates the ultimate metaphysical origin of sexual 
difference in the Trinity. Within the pure act of divine being, Balthasar attributes both an active 
sense of act (‘active actio’) and a receptive sense of act (‘passive actio’) to the different Triune 
Persons based on their relationships of origin.158 By associating the active with the masculine and the 
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receptive with the feminine, Balthasar analogically assigns both masculinity and femininity to the 
different Persons of the Trinity based on how they are active and receptive towards each other. 
Balthasar stresses the analogical nature of this by the terms ‘(supra-) feminine’ and ‘(supra-) 
masculine.’159 Thus, for example, both the Father and the Son are in different ways (supra-) feminine 
and (supra-) masculine in relation to each other and the Spirit. This account of something like sexual 
difference in the Trinity undermines any straightforward attribution of one sex to any divine Person. 
However, as several critics note, Balthasar simply transposes to divine being his identification of 
receptivity with the feminine and activity with the masculine.160 He does not always, however, 
maintain this fixed association.161 Indeed, Balthasar’s Trinitarian thought develops in the later TL3. 
This echoes Balthasar’s shift towards seeing sexual difference through the lens of fruitfulness, 
childlikeness and wonder. It also counterbalances Balthasar’s use of the receptive feminine and 
active masculine vis-à-vis the Trinity. Here Balthasar draws an analogy between the fruitfulness of 
the sexes as manifested in the wonder of a new self-conscious child and how the fruitful and 
wonder-filled relationship between the Father and Son manifests its intrinsic excess and objective 
fruit in the Person of the Holy Spirit who is also the bond of their love.162 Balthasar calls this the 
‘father-mother-child analogy’ while stressing its limits as a ‘remote metaphor for the mystery of the 
inner fullness of the absolute, divine Unity.’163 
7.2. The feminine as receptive in sexual intercourse 
Our concern here, however, is why Balthasar equates the feminine with receptivity and, therefore, 
with the receptivity of created being. This hinges on his understanding of female fruitfulness in 
reproduction. As David L. Schindler approvingly summarises Balthasar, 
[i]t is only through the woman’s (active) receptivity of the seed that new life can begin. 
Properly speaking, …that receptivity is spiritual before it is physical…. [I]t is precisely through 
the receptivity, the continuing “fiat,” of the mother that the child first experiences the truth 
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of (created) being as gift.… [It is] the feminine person – who first and best reveals the 
meaning of (created) being.164 
This rehearses central themes in this thesis. However, it also encapsulates problematic aspects of 
Balthasar’s view. It is unclear why spiritual receptivity is uniquely feminine. This identifies ontological 
and spiritual receptivity with a narrow biological understanding of female fruitfulness in sexual 
reproduction. As Beattie argues, this involves a ‘muddling of biological and spiritual categories.’165 It 
contravenes Balthasar’s insistence that sex is an integral act of the whole person that should involve 
a mutual exchange between man and woman where both are active and receptive on a physical and 
spiritual level, albeit differently. Balthasar articulates this, though infrequently.166  
More commonly, he asserts that in sex the woman is receptive, the male active. This holds despite 
Balthasar’s criticism of the ancient and medieval view ‘that in procreation only the man plays an 
active, effective role, while the woman is merely passive and receptive.’167 As he elaborates,  
in sexual intercourse it is the man who is the initiator, the leader, the shaper while the 
woman’s love – even if it is not passive, but just as active in its own way – is still essentially 
receptive. We could almost say (very naively) that, through the man, the woman is somehow 
awakened to herself, to the fullness of her feminine self-awareness. This initiative on the 
man’s part is something primary that sets in motion the whole process of feminine 
fruitfulness.168  
This is a problematic on several fronts. In sex, man is not always the initiator. Balthasar sidesteps the 
dramatic experience of actual humans and applies preconceptions of male and female roles in the 
sexual act. He also limits sex to the mechanics of male and female reproductive organs. Another 
omission is how the female fertility cycle is independent of male initiative, even if it is oriented to 
male fruitfulness vis-à-vis reproduction. It is false to state that the ‘fruitfulness of the woman is 
always dependent on an original fructification.’169 While this applies specifically to a new child, it is 
does not concern female fruitfulness per se. Moreover, the male contribution to conception, while 
necessary, is insufficient to awaken the woman’s fruitfulness. Science tells us that this requires 
implantation in the woman’s uterus and a hormone-mediated communication from the embryo to 
the mother. More problematic is how Balthasar applies this receptive dependence to define what it 
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means to be a woman: it is ‘woman’s essential vocation to receive man’s fruitfulness into her own 
fruitfulness, thus uniting in herself the fruitfulness of both.’170 This reduces woman to being a fruitful 
response to male initiative.171 Indeed, Balthasar seems tacitly to acknowledge the problematic 
nature of this view by parenthetically admitting his naivety regarding feminine fruitfulness. This is 
hardly a credible corrective.172  
The above gives warrant to Balthasar’s feminist critics. Kilby summarises the concern well. She 
acknowledges how Balthasar’s supporters stress that the female is not identified with mere passivity 
but an active receptivity where this is interpreted positively as characterising the deepest vocation 
of every human. Nonetheless, she asks ‘how plausible it is...to identify woman so fundamentally with 
receptivity.... The notion of women as receptive is derived from the (traditionally conceived) act of 
intercourse, and perhaps also a certain fit with traditional courting patterns, but can find little 
purchase in relation to the great majority of the roles women currently do play or have traditionally 
played.’173  
Balthasar also fails the male perspective. Beyond the episodic provision of sperm, there is a paucity 
in his consideration of male fruitfulness, whether spiritual or embodied, in the interaction between 
mother and father, and father and child. Moreover, unlike the awakening that affects the woman, 
the man is excluded from any awakening on his part. The sexual act and its fruit are of limited 
spiritual significance for him. 
Balthasar’s problematic understanding of the sexual act and the initial stages of reproduction have 
far-reaching implications for his interpretation of how esse subsists as distinctively male and female 
humanity. Kilby notes how, scattered throughout his work, Balthasar makes what are predominantly 
unargued statements about what it means to be a man or woman. She collates the results: 
to be male is to be strong, to take initiative, to be active and goal-orientated; to be a woman 
is to be open, receptive, surrendering, passive, to be characterized by weakness and 
dependence, to be contemplative. And within these clusters, perhaps the most insistent, 
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frequently mentioned, the defining contrast, is that man takes initiative and is active, while 
woman is receptive.174 
Kilby does not, however, consider how Balthasar’s comments about the sexes inform how they 
relate to each other. For this I turn to Balthasar’s sustained reflection on sexual difference in TD2 
and TD3. 
7.3. The primary nature of man and the secondary nature of woman 
As seen earlier, in TD2, Balthasar first interprets the male-female difference as a mutuality and 
difference rooted in esse that encompasses the twofold extreme ways of being human. He modifies 
this via an interpretation of the Genesis narrative regarding Adam and Eve. He assigns specific 
metaphysical markers that distinguish the sexes and reinforce the troubling implications of his 
account of sexual intercourse.  
First, based on Adam’s initial solitude in Eden, Balthasar accords primacy to the male. ‘[H]e is alone 
before God and with God; although potentially and unconsciously he bears the woman within him, 
he cannot give her to himself.’175 Secondly, this loneliness is ‘not good’. This challenges ‘the idea of a 
primal, androgynous human, supposedly originally at peace with himself and only subject to 
unsatisfied longing after being split into sexes. But it also refutes the notion that the lonely human 
(or man) can attain fulfilment by knowing and naming the world.’176 Thirdly, ‘the woman comes from 
the man. It is through being overpowered in a “deep sleep” and robbed of part of himself, near his 
heart, that man is given fulfilment.’177 Here, Balthasar insists the man ‘retains a primacy while at the 
same time, at God’s instigation, he steps down from it in a kenosis; this results in the God-given 
fulfilment whereby he recognizes himself in the gift of the “other”.’178 Balthasar concludes that in 
‘the relationship between the two, where each is created by God and dependent on the other, even 
though one is “taken” out of the other, the man’s (persisting) priority is located within an equality of 
man and woman.’179  
Before examining Balthasar’s elaboration of these points, a tension is apparent in Balthasar’s 
insistence upon the reciprocity between the sexes. We might have supposed, as Kilby states, ‘that 
when Balthasar describes woman as...fulfilling and completing man, this is really shorthand for 
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saying that each, in their difference, can be fulfilment…for the other....’; but there is ‘a genuine 
ambiguity...on this point.’180 Positively, Balthasar insists on the equal worth of male and female 
humanity. They are created by God. Their mutual dependency and difference encompass human 
nature's good. That the woman comes from near man’s heart for his fulfilment suggests this 
concerns not simply sexual fruitfulness, but spiritual. The latter is attained not through knowledge of 
things, but ecstatic interpersonal recognition. The language of the heart emphasises this is no mere 
intellectual or wilful activity but concerns the whole of human nature. None of these aspects need 
exclude male-female reciprocity. 
That said, for Balthasar, the mutuality depends on male priority over the female who is derived and 
proceeds from him. This is described violently: the male is robbed.181 Balthasar, in effect, asserts a 
fractal complementarity with the difference that, rather than male and female representing two 
halves of a single unity, the female is a missing part of the original male whole.182 Beattie rightly 
worries this undermines real difference – ‘if she is “taken” out of the male other, then she is not 
really other at all.’183 The male’s fulfilment comes by following this lack through self-emptying which 
is received by the woman as her mission solely for the male’s benefit. The female is reduced to being 
a gift that enables male fulfilment through his ecstatically recognizing himself. She is simply an 
empty limit. Female fulfilment is occluded. This rightly raises the concern that Balthasar’s views 
‘threaten violence in the reductive logic of a phenomenological account of sexual difference.’184  
7.4. Male as word and searching look; female as answer and returning look 
This ambiguity between an abiding reciprocity between the sexes, and male primacy and female 
subservience is intensified in TD3.185 Here Balthasar explores the man-woman difference via two 
pairings concerning the realms of speech and perception. The first pair correlates the male to word 
(Wort) and the female to response/answer (Ant-Wort). The second identifies the male with a 
countenance that looks (Litz) and female with the face that returns the look (Antlitz).  
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To expand, first, woman is essentially an answer (Antwort), and so responsive, receptive and 
secondary to man’s calling word (Wort) which is primary and initiating.186 Balthasar understands Ant 
to encompass opposition and dependency; ‘both “direction toward” and the counterpart to 
something.’187  As he explains: 
man is the word that calls out, woman is the answer that comes to him at last (in the end). 
The two are related and ordered to each other. Furthermore, ...the word that calls out only 
attains fulfilment when it is understood, accepted and given back as a word. This clearly 
shows us how man can be primary and woman secondary, where the primary remains 
unfulfilled without the secondary. The primary needs a partner of equal rank and dignity for 
its own fulfilment. Moreover, the man is incapable of providing this answering dimension; it 
is latent within him…but it has to be given to him as grace.188 
Secondly, whereas the Wort-Antwort distinction applies to the realm of speech, understanding, 
judgement and reason, the Litz-Antlitz applies to visual perception: ‘Man and woman are face to 
face. Here their equal rank is given even more emphasis: man looks around him and meets with an 
answering gaze that turns the one-who-sees into the one-who-is seen.’189 The greater equality 
coincides with how an encounter in the visual realm, unlike that of (coherent) speech, can be 
simultaneous in time. 
To consider these further, positively, Balthasar understands male and female in terms of a spiritual 
fulfilment that is the fruit of concrete interpersonal encounter. The latter entails a recognition based 
on a shared freedom rooted in a common nature and underpinned by the gift of divine esse. Hence, 
Balthasar affirms ‘the substantial unity and equality of Wort and Antwort (word and answer), Litz 
and Antlitz (the “look” and the “face” that returns it).’190 This spiritual encounter is enacted via 
sense-based perception, language and thought. Moreover, as the reference to the biblical ‘at last’ 
alludes to, the encounter is characterised by the man’s wonder at the woman. For the male, the 
female is a personal reality that exceeds him, yet calls to the depths of his being. She is a source of 
delight which neither he nor the rest of creation can provide. This reflects woman being the man’s 
correlated extreme opposite and co-agent in mediating the transcendent form of human nature she 
shares with him in their joint openness to esse. Balthasar says, 
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[h]ad God not formed Eve from Adam but (like him) from the dust of the earth, their unity 
would have been an external one, and Adam could not have recognized her as “flesh of my 
flesh”. And if the making of woman from man had not been an act of God but a natural 
process, the original meeting of these two freedom humans would not have had the 
miraculous character it does have and must have: it would be merely an instance of sexual 
correlation at the natural level. Both sides – the “from within” and the “from without”, 
“from above” – are equally essential. In other words, Eve is potentially in Adam, but he 
himself cannot produce her from within him.191 
This allots primordial significance to the mutuality of wonder shared between a man and woman 
who offer themselves freely to each other in openness to all fruitfulness, sharing immanently the 
same self-transcending nature in its participation in the gift of being. This suggests that what 
Balthasar says about the Wort-Antwort and Litz-Antlitz distinctions should not be reduced to sexual 
fruitfulness.192 Rather, the spiritual is accorded primacy over the organic in their inseparability.193 
This is corroborated by Balthasar’s view, stated elsewhere, that the meeting of Adam and Eve 
concerns the concrete condition of possibility of human encounter. ‘This man cannot know what a 
human encounter is, nor can he postulate it.... [T]he answer lies dormant within him, next to his 
heart; but first the rib must be removed from him and placed over against him as a living Thou by 
God’s creative act.’194 This interpretation is consistent with man and woman embodying the extreme 
contraries of being human. Only together do they manifest humanity’s intrinsic self-transcendence 
where their union intensifies their mystery to themselves and each other that exceeds their mutual 
commitment in love. Indeed, another’s love deepens the self's mysterious depths.195 This 
recapitulates in adulthood how each person attains self-consciousness as a child through another’s 
love and awakens to God’s ever-greater being.  
In this, however, Balthasar fails to maintain reciprocity between the sexes. The above is framed as 
man’s questioning, paradox and fulfilment beyond self. As Beattie says, ‘[i]f woman is the answer to 
man, she can exist only within the parameters of the man’s question. She must await his word and 
respond to his initiative, but how can she then reveal her difference and otherness? And if woman is 
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man’s answer, to whom does she address the question of her own being?’196 The male’s 
prioritization over the female becomes clearer as Balthasar’s account in TD3 proceeds.197 
Balthasar tries to insist on the abiding equality between man and woman given that Eve is not just 
derived from Adam’s side but fashioned directly by God. But unlike the man, woman is defined 
essentially by her dependence on him for her raison d’être as his fulfilment. For example, Balthasar 
states since woman ‘is both “answer” and “face” (Antwort and Antlitz), she is dependent on the 
man’s word (Wort), which calls to her, and his “look”…, which searches for her; but at the same 
time, she is independent of him in virtue of her free, equal rank.’198 Despite the insistence on 
freedom, the derivative and secondary nature of woman predominates. This denies female 
humanity proper freedom. She is ‘chronologically, temporally, historical, accidentally second.’199 
Only if she is free is she suitable for man’s fulfilment; yet this is construed as a predetermined 
essential servitude to man’s fulfilment.200  The woman is denied her own agency.201 Nowhere is 
‘”she” permitted a question, nor does “she” even speak, because “she” is essentially an answer (Ant-
Wort).’202 Thus, the female is defined as fulfilling what the male already potentially is.203 This remains 
true even where such fulfilment is understood as an intensification of humanity's mystery reflecting 
God's mystery. Woman is man's means to such mystery, not a subject in her own right.204 
This reduction of woman as means to male fulfilment becomes more apparent when Balthasar 
considers the encounter in terms of fruitfulness. While he is clear that woman is not simply ‘the 
vessel’ of male fruitfulness but possesses her own fruitfulness, nevertheless 
[hers] is not a primary fruitfulness: it is an answering fruitfulness, designed to receive man’s 
fruitfulness…and bring it to its “fullness”. In this way she is the “glory” of the man (1 Cor 
11:7). So we can speak of a kind of natural vocation on woman’s part much more explicitly 
than in man’s case…. To that extent, the woman’s mission vis-à-vis Adam can be described as 
the extrapolation and continuation of her processio from Adam. Of course, this aspect must 
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not obscure the other truth, namely, that both man and woman individually (and not only 
together) constitute an “image of God”; thus each has a guaranteed direct access to God.205 
Woman’s essential identity as proceeding from man is identified with her essential mission as man’s 
fulfilment. As Beattie rightly worries, ‘woman becomes a projection of man, and the particularity 
and revelatory potential of female sexual embodiment is denied.’206 As she notes elsewhere, ‘[a]n 
individual who exists as another’s fullness, as his glory, is not a genuine other. As Irigaray would 
argue, a woman who exists as man’s fullness is nothing but the mirror wherein man sees only the 
other of himself….’207 There is no mention of a genuine reciprocity of fulfilment and fruitfulness. 
Woman is associated with a natural vocation but man is removed from the latter, suggesting an 
orientation of ‘women’s subjectivity and existence to the realization of men’s and the reduction of 
women to their biological role in reproduction.’208   
In metaphysical terms, Balthasar essentialises the two constitutive ways of being human.209 The 
receptivity inherent to esse is identified with the presupposed secondary and derivative character of 
female fruitfulness. Woman serves the active actuality of esse associated with the primary and 
initiating form of male fruitfulness and its transcendence beyond itself. Transcendent male 
fruitfulness is immanently tended to by female fruitfulness. As Tonstad rightly argues, this 
undermines difference in that ‘cooperation or agreement always reduces to an initiator and a 
(spontaneous but always “second” in relation to a “first”) responder….’210 Rather than being a 
substantial contrariety established between two positive correlates, Balthasar offers a variation on 
the Aristotelian perspective that the woman is a deficient male. He also implicitly employs Aristotle’s 
understanding of correlatives wherein one term is derived from or the possession of the other. The 
difference is that Balthasar holds that the male is dependent on this deficient and derived male (i.e. 
female) to be what he fully already is. This ‘eventuates as masculinity’s full development inside and 
in relation to feminine self-evacuation. Such a relationship cannot engender real difference, and real 
difference is essential to Balthasar’s project.’211 This suggests a lingering Hegelianism that 
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undermines genuine male-female reciprocity, making their difference a dialectical relationship 
where woman is a moment in man's overall, albeit abstract, fulfilment. I concur, therefore, with 
Kilby’s assessment that ‘while Balthasar appears to…make much of sexual difference, it is not a real 
sexual difference that he envisages, but one which begins from man and then casts woman as 
whatever is needed to complement and fulfil him. He is trapped…in a “one-sex” anthropology, “in 
which the normative human is implicitly male and Woman’s definition is based around Man, 
particularly around what Man is seen to need Woman to be.”’212 
7.5. Man as monadic; woman dyadic 
This is reinforced by how Balthasar declares woman is not only secondary but essentially double. 
Woman is ‘not only “second” (“answer”) but “dual (dyad).213 There is an ‘oscillation within woman 
herself: she is oriented to the man yet has equal rank with him, sharing in the same free human 
nature. The man has no equivalent experience of this irreducible double focus.’214 Balthasar sees the 
male as a fixed single principle of fruitfulness, or monadic, and woman as a double fluctuating 
derivative principle. Where there is any male dependence on the woman is it limited to how she 
fulfils what the man already is, but cannot be without her.215 ‘[M]an represents a single principle 
(word, seed), the woman represents a double principle: she is the “answer” and the common “fruit” 
of both of them.’216 Woman is the common fruit because she fulfils in herself man’s fruitfulness. 
Again, woman is ultimately sublimated. 
Woman is double not only vis-à-vis man but also the child conceived within her. This expands the 
metaphysical marker of being woman to a double dual ordering. First, woman is, one, derived from 
and, two, relates to man; second, she, one, relates to the child that, two, is derived from her. 
Balthasar sees this double duality, moreover, through another duality, namely, that of personal and 
organic fruitfulness. In relation to man, she ‘gives a twofold answer: a “personal” answer and one 
that goes beyond the I-thou relationship (and which, in the absence of a more precise word, one 
may call “generic” or “of the species”). She responds through reproduction.’217 This rightly insists on 
the analogous unity-in-difference between personal and sexual fruitfulness where the personal 
transcends the sexual while depending on it. In this, ‘the dyad of the feminine principle 
is…irreducible…insofar as the woman’s relation to the man is different from her relation to the 
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child…in that the woman is essentially equal to the man but personally unlike him; she comes from 
him and is oriented to him.’218 Nevertheless, it is unclear why this is applied only to the woman and 
not also to the man who is excluded from any genuine personal reciprocity with the woman and 
from being a co-agent in reproduction and nurture. This echoes Balthasar’s understanding of male 
sexual fruitfulness. 'As a sexual being, the man is explicitly monadic, whereas woman is dyadic: the 
area of woman that interests the man sexually is not the same that the child desires for its 
sustenance.’219 This disassociates the male from reproduction and nurture. It also entirely omits 
woman’s sexual interest, reducing woman's sexuality to a mere part defined by male desire.  
Thus, while Balthasar insists sexual and personal fruitfulness are analogically interwoven in how they 
express the transcendence of form in the concrete unity of human nature, he forgets the female and 
male reciprocity that constitutes this transcendence. By treating male humanity as monadic, 
Balthasar leaves the male outside the contrarieties that hand on the form of human nature wherein 
esse subsists. Man stands outside the dramatic relationships of male-female and parent-child. He is 
left alone in human nature’s transcendent mystery that is reminiscent of the modern/post-modern 
independent rational self-conscious adult self. While this requires woman for its fulfilment, it is a 
male fruitfulness outsourced to woman. By contrast, woman is wholly identified with the 
interdependence of the constitutive contraries of human nature (male-female, parent-child) for the 
benefit of male fulfilment. She is the non-male who allows the man to be fully constituted in his 
sexually and personal monadic freedom in openness to the divine being. She is the parent who 
actively brings the child into existence and calls it to self-conscious freedom but again for male 
fulfilment. Woman’s self-conscious freedom and personal and sexual fruitfulness are elided. 
This picture of woman as encompassing within herself the whole reciprocity inherent to human 
nature is reinforced by how Balthasar identifies an ambiguity that is distinctively female. Compared 
to the indefinability that characterises humanity, and, implicitly, male humanity, woman ‘is even 
more elusive because of her twofold orientation toward the man and the child; this both constitutes 
her as a person through dialogue and makes her a principle of generation. In one relationship, she is 
the answer that is necessary if the word that calls to her is to attain its full meaning; in the other 
relationship, she herself is the source…, and hence she is the primary call addressed to the child.’220 
Again with abstractly dialectical undertones, Balthasar states that ‘[t]here is a twofold reason, 
therefore, why woman cannot be summed up in a neat definition. She is a process that oscillates 
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(…from the answering Person to the Source of the race); it is the theorizing of men that attempts to 
make this flux and flow into a rigid principle.’221 This reference to men theorizing is telling. It rightly 
challenges any positivistic attempt by men to define women as if men and women were not, in their 
irreducible asymmetry, dependent on each other, thereby situating men outside the dramatic 
enactment of humanity’s primal form. Yet Balthasar does precisely this by claiming that woman is 
defined by the horizontal and vertical contraries of human nature in a way that man is not. 
Moreover, Balthasar theorizes about this on the authority of his interpretation of the second 
Genesis story, sex and reproduction.  
By contrast, Balthasar offers no corresponding reflection on man’s dyadic nature as not only lover 
and spouse in relation to woman, but as father to the child. The only way Balthasar does attribute a 
dual character to man’s essentially fruitful nature is in the male’s (priestly) representation of God. 
This repeats his understanding of reproductive fruitfulness. Whereas the woman’s fruitfulness is 
characterised by the ‘inward’ and ‘more perduring’ role of ‘conception that actively bears to full 
term’, the man provides an ‘external, episodic function’ which means his role is such that he ‘merely 
represents a primal, creative principle which he himself can never be.’222 Balthasar claims as an 
‘irrefutable assertion’ in the sexual realm that 
woman is the full explication of the dignity bestowed on the creature of being a second 
causality alongside, in and through God. Because of this, furthermore, woman enjoys the 
role of being the world’s comprehensive answer to God. The role of the man consequently 
acquires a peculiarly open bipolarity where woman’s role exhibits a closure: as a 
representative of the Creator God, the man is more than himself, and yet, at the same time, 
as a mere transmitter who can as such only represent, he is also less than himself.223 
Balthasar sees the inability of the male to be either a suitable analogue for the active receptivity of 
created being or the activity of divine being as characterising male esse’s uniquely representative 
role vis-à-vis the divine. There is a ‘clear opposition’ between ‘(masculine) representation and 
(feminine) conception that actively bears to full term.’224 This claims too much of woman and too 
little of man, while using this imbalance as an arbitrary justification for excluding woman from 
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representing God.225 Woman is defined based on her immanent focus on the child and orientation 
towards fulfilling male sexual fruitfulness. By contrast, man is disengaged from the woman’s 
fulfilment and the new child. Indeed, this reads as a divine warrant for male failure to engage within 
the task of handing on the form of human nature in childcare. This splinters the reciprocity that 
underpins the unity of human nature. It leaves man in abstract isolation disengaged from the 
concrete interpersonal process of handing on esse which is left to women and children. Worse, their 
interaction is appropriated by the isolated and abstract male for his fulfilment. 
7.6. Balthasar’s misappropriation of the womb and denigration of the heart 
Balthasar implicitly acknowledges the paucity of the account as offered above by asserting that 
every human, whatever their sex, is, metaphysically-speaking, feminine. Thus,   
insofar as every creature – be it male or female in the natural order – is originally the fruit of 
the primary, absolute, self-giving divine love, there is a clear analogy to the female principle 
in the world…. [T]he analogy goes farther: if the creature is to be God’s “image”, it must be 
equipped with its own fruit-bearing principle, just like the woman (vis-à-vis the man).226 
Ostensibly, this mitigates how the male is solely active, monadic, primary, isolated and somehow 
outside the constitutive reciprocity of human sexual difference and the contrariety that obtains 
between parents and child. Male activity should enact the activity receptivity that characterises 
created being. The problem is that Balthasar identifies this univocally with feminine active 
receptivity in reproductive terms. In the relationship between God and the creature, even though 
the latter is ‘at an infinite remove from God’, it is ‘equipped with an organ of fruitful receptivity’ and 
so can respond to God ‘in a feminine mode.’227 It is difficult to see how this does not simply equate 
creation with the female and God with the male. Furthermore, this becomes the measure for human 
personal being: personhood becomes a receptive ‘space-making, turning the self into a place in 
which the other may become – just the vision of femininity that masculinism most hopes to 
enact.’228 The male must abstractly and wilfully appropriate the female way of being fruitful. This, 
however, deprives woman of her distinctive way of being. Furthermore, Balthasar precludes women 
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from appropriating male activity in any positive sense.229 As Beattie notes, men can be uniquely 
masculine and feminine, but women can only be feminine and, then, at the service of men.230 
Tonstad concurs, adding that men can ‘become feminine…without losing their primacy or their 
fullness. Their emptiness is only symbolic, because their fullness has feminine space, feminine 
wombs, and feminine bodies in which to realize itself…. Only the biological woman remains feminine 
throughout….’231 
Balthasar links the womb-like active receptivity of the human created spirit, moreover, to the act of 
philosophical contemplation. This involves an attitude receptive to the essence of things. Balthasar 
contrasts this to ‘the masculine element’ which enacts a calculating and utilitarian approach which 
involves pushing ‘forward into things in order to change them by implanting and imposing 
something of its own.’232 As Balthasar continues, 
the philosophical attitude of letting oneself be gifted and fructified by nature and being is 
not feminine in the mere sense of receptivity. A forward-moving way of thinking certainly 
reigns in the attitude: one which, like the fructified womb, is of course able to bear patiently 
the seeds received and give birth to them in images, myths and concepts. In the 
contemplating intellect, the active element of the feminine principle is wedded to the 
passive element of the masculine (which needs the self-bestowing power of the womb in 
order to be able to give) in the best possible way.233  
This repeats Balthasar’s problematic view that in sexual intercourse the woman is passive and active 
in her receptivity insofar as a child is conceived. Furthermore, the identification of contemplation 
with a receptively active womb raises an important question in light of the last chapter. What 
Balthasar says about the womb matches his account of the heart’s childlike wonder-filled 
attunement to being’s beauty. 
Granting that Balthasar is using the language of the heart and womb in metaphorical and 
metaphysical terms, and not merely biological, what is their relationship? And, which of these 
metaphysical organs should be given priority vis-à-vis fruitful human interaction with being? The 
force of this thesis’ argument is to allot priority to both yet differently. Thus, the womb has a priority 
insofar as it brings a newly conceived human into being and shapes their human existence. The 
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heart’s childlike wonder, by contrast, has priority because it applies without remainder to every 
human as self-conscious embodied spirit; whereas a fruitful womb concerns mature female 
reproductive fruitfulness. Nevertheless, as explored in the next section, there is an intrinsic, albeit 
asymmetrical, relationship between the fruitfulness of the heart and the womb, insofar as each 
person’s heart is first shaped within both the womb and their mother’ heart in her openness to 
being. 
8. Re-conceiving Male and Female Fruitfulness 
I offer now a speculative alternative rendition of male and female fruitfulness. While this sits 
critically to Balthasar’s account as examined above, I echo his concern to safeguard ‘the equal 
dignity of man and woman, so that the extreme oppositeness of their functions may guarantee the 
spiritual and physical fruitfulness of human nature.’234 I affirm how male and female humanity, as 
extreme substantial limits that constitute human nature, distinctively and together generatively 
enact the analogy of being in their shared organic and personal fruitfulness vis-à-vis the fruit of a 
new child. While keeping the whole reality of human sexual fruitfulness and the child-parent 
relationship in view, I consider, how male and female jointly enact the letting be of esse according to 
how they differently hand on the immanent transcendence and transcendent immanence of human 
nature's form. 
For this, I adapt Balthasar’s reference to how female fruitfulness is characterised by inward 
conception and actively bearing to term; and male fruitfulness by externality. This echoes Aristotle’s 
view of the male as one who generates in another and the female as one who generates within 
herself and out of whom a child comes to being. As Schindler identifies, there is a direct proportion 
between more intensive forms of reproduction and care for the young, and more extensive 
difference between the sexes.235 This proportion increases the higher the level of organisms 
involved. Thus, in humans the greater transcendence of living spiritual form and its immanence to 
matter means there is a greater extensive difference between the sexes which underscores a greater 
intensity of reciprocal sharing of that form. Greater intensive reproduction and nurture does not, 
therefore, just mean greater receptivity. It also indicates a greater shared activity between the sexes 
in handing on living form. Also, simply because the female bears a new child within her during 
pregnancy does not exclude male input into nurture’s intensive aspect. This would isolate the male 
from the living form he shares with the female and child. Indeed, the spiritual nature of human form 
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makes the intensive and extensive aspects greater still. The greater intensiveness relates to how the 
response of each person’s heart and freedom within material reality underpins the handing on of 
spiritual form from parents to child. Equally, this personal freedom underpins a greater 
extensiveness in the difference between persons. Human reproduction and nurture most fully 
involve handing on esse in the immanent transcendence of spiritual nature as loving interpersonal 
gift. The task now is to consider this with respect to human male and female fruitfulness.  
To clarify, in approaching the latter through the lens of reproduction and nurture of children, I am 
not suggesting that these activities offer a comprehensive essential definition of female and male 
humanity. Nevertheless, I am seeking to examine what can and must be said about female and male 
fruitfulness in light of the unique metaphysical fruit of a child. In other words, I claim the latter does 
indeed reveal something paradigmatic about male and female fruitfulness. What is thus manifested 
represents a metaphysical minimum. Yet, this does not mean that what is unveiled about the 
metaphysical reality of male and female fruitfulness is exclusively tied to having children. Rather, it 
will take on a rich diversity of analogous expressions inflected through dramatic encounters between 
actual persons and the creative use of their freedom in a variety of cultural contexts.236  
8.1. Female fruitfulness and the mother-child relationship 
The distinctive characteristic of a woman’s female fruitfulness vis-à-vis a newly conceived child is 
that it begins with an inward, tightly knit identity between the unborn child and mother. There is, 
moreover, an identity between the mother’s spiritual and organic fruitfulness. This reflects how a 
mother’s entire being is an active crucible for how esse attains subsistence as a child and mediates 
to the child the material immanence of transcendent living spiritual form. Such inwardness is, 
however, oriented towards the transcendence of form expressed extensively in the relationship 
between mother and child, and their relationships to the child’s father. Female fruitfulness follows, 
therefore, a distinctive order from inwardness and difference-in-identity to outward-ness and 
identity-in-difference; from the immanence of transcendent spiritual living form in the embodied 
identity of mother and child to this form’s transcendence beyond matter but where this 
transcendence is expressed immanently in the concrete relationship between mother, child, and 
father.  
This matches Balthasar’s emphasis on the actively receptive character of female fruitfulness. As 
argued earlier, Balthasar errs when he reduces woman to being receptive to the male and a means 
 
236 In chapter four, I explore the implications of this for how male and female differently manifest being’s 
beauty. 
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to fulfil his fruitfulness. But we can affirm with Balthasar that in ‘the conception of a child the 
woman’s organism is just as active as the man’s. Indeed, by reason of the long pregnancy, birth, the 
stages of feeding, and subsequent child care on the mother’s part, we could say that the woman 
exhibits an activity which is significantly superior to the man’s.’237 To reiterate the point made above, 
I disagree with this insofar as it univocally identifies the female with childbirth and nurture. But I 
concur to the extent it articulates the minimum of what is revealed about the distinctively female 
way of being fruitful as disclosed in relation to having children. Thus, I affirm how Balthasar implicitly 
links the superiority of female fruitfulness vis-à-vis a child with an organic fruitfulness that 
intrinsically mediates spiritual fruitfulness. Moreover, as the child grows and is born, the spiritual is 
increasingly distinguished from, yet increasingly informs and transforms the organic. Simultaneously, 
the inwardness and identity that marks the beginning of female fruitfulness develops into a growing 
sense of difference between the child and mother, where the difference works towards forming the 
bond of unity between them. Taken together, this growth in both the unity-in-difference between 
organic and spiritual fruitfulness and the identity-in-difference between mother and child coincides 
with the reciprocity of love proper to persons.  
This chimes with Balthasar’s claim that spiritual or personal fruitfulness comes more naturally to 
female fruitfulness. Balthasar’s identification of female fruitfulness with the fruitful active receptivity 
of created being is, therefore, no mere assertion. Rather, female fruitfulness is more predisposed to 
this than male fruitfulness because of how female organic fruitfulness already mediates the spiritual 
vis-à-vis a newly conceived child. Furthermore, Balthasar sees the interweaving of organic and 
spiritual female fruitfulness in dramatic and historical terms of becoming: ‘she requires a certain 
span of time in order to develop from a receptive bridge into a mother who gives birth to her child, 
nourishes it and brings it up.’238 Female fruitfulness is dramatically actualised and personally 
appropriated across time. This development is not simply effected by organic changes in the woman 
vis-à-vis her child and her response to this. It is impacted by her relationships to others including, 
especially the child’s father, immediate family and friends, the community, culture and society 
where she lives, and what meaning these various spheres of existence attribute to the menstrual 
cycle, pregnancy, motherhood, childcare and childhood – which touches upon the question of 
goodness and truth, matters I explore in the next chapter.  
There is some self-evident truth, therefore, to what Balthasar states about the superior nature of the 
receptive activity of female fruitfulness in bearing a child. The mother in her receptivity to the 
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unborn child actively gives both of her body and whole person. Though spiritual this is not initially a 
conscious decision but a response enabled by the child’s objective being. This coincides with 
Balthasar’s account of the asymmetrical reciprocity of the heart's a priori attunement to being as it 
appears in objects of perception. That it concerns first the heart, and not simply the intellect or will, 
accords with a spiritual fruitfulness mediated by organic fruitfulness. Yet even at an early stage this 
involves an increasingly willing receptivity, most obviously articulated in the mother’s willingness to 
bear the child to term. What is peculiar to the female heart is how a mother responds to being as 
encompassed within her as a new human life. Her heart’s attunement is not primarily mediated by 
sight or sound, but hidden feeling.239 Balthasar notes how this develops obliquely at first on the 
sensory level according to a certain order. ‘[It…] begins with a blind sense of touch, with the bodily 
sensing of a presence… – the sense of touch as the fundamental, unerring sense – and this 
experience intensifies first within its own particular kind before it extends to embrace also the 
experience of seeing and hearing which comes with the birth.’240 The mediation of the spiritual 
occurs, therefore, not only within the mother’s body but her heart’s receptively active attunement 
to the child’s being and being itself. 
This has implications for how the mother’s heart shapes her child’s heart. What Balthasar says about 
a child’s self-consciousness immediately after birth is illuminative: ‘the gradual separation into two 
of the one natural consciousness of the body at that stage when the mother’s consciousness still 
embraces both bodies…. The mother is still both herself and her child. And her feeling of the child 
still wholly encompasses within itself her being felt by the child….’241  The reference to the mother’s 
feeling-while-being-felt, and the intense blind touch mentioned above, coincides with Balthasar’s 
metaphysical understanding of the heart’s attunement. During pregnancy, the child’s slumbering 
heart is awake not in itself but within the maternal heart’s attunement to being. This encompasses, 
as mentioned in the previous chapter, how an unborn child’s nature is mysteriously active as spirit 
from the beginning and how the child awakens to itself as spirit in ‘the common flesh of mother and 
child.’242 The child’s heartfelt attunement to being is mediated by the mother’s heart in way 
analogous to how the child’s flesh is received from her where this actively mediates to the child its 
transcendent human form. That the mother’s active feeling of her child already shapes the child’s 
 
239 For a phenomenological engagement with maternal experiences of the hidden yet emerging presence of an 
unborn child based on Merleau-Ponty and Heidegger, see James Mumford, Ethics at the Beginning of Life: A 
Phenomenological Critique, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013). 
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receptive feeling of being anticipates and prepares for the post-birth encounter with the mother’s 
concrete love which awakens the child to self-consciousness. 
The above suggests the unborn child is impacted not just by the mother’s biological and 
psychological state during pregnancy, but also her spiritual and metaphysical state.243 Although 
shrouded in mystery, even in the womb love’s presence or absence is significant to the developing 
child’s heart as a matter of ontological reality. Concretely, it matters whether the mother considers 
the unborn child a divine gift or not. This hangs not simply on the woman’s choice but her heart’s 
exposure to the surrounding world and the prevailing metaphysical attitude to being. Moreover, the 
mother’s female fruitfulness, organic and personal, is informed by her interpersonal relationship 
with others, particularly the child’s father, wider family, culture, and community. A particularly 
significant influence is the legacy of how her childhood relationship to her parents shaped the 
responsiveness of her childlike heart to being as divine gift. 
The growth that is directed to an increase both in the identity-in-difference between mother and 
child, and the mother’s spiritual fruitfulness, reaches a culmination and crisis point, first, in the 
physical separation at birth; and, then, the interpersonal difference fully manifested in the child’s 
awakening to self-consciousness. After birth, and prior to the child’s awakening to self-
consciousness, the identity-in-difference between the child and mother continues to emerge within 
the realm of shared feeling where the mother can be actively receptive toward the child, while the 
child is receptive in its unselfconscious activity and dependency. Furthermore, while mother and 
child have grown together in a shared hidden feeling, at birth the mother encounters the child as 
external to her with sound, sight, taste and smell, and touch. Moreover, she gives of her body in new 
ways, particularly, through breastfeeding and nurturing touch. This is contiguous with how the 
mother’s organic fruitfulness mediates spiritual and personal fruitfulness. Balthasar speaks of a 
‘spiritual handing-on, which takes place simultaneously with the bodily gift of mother’s milk and 
motherly care…. For being-in-the-flesh always means receiving from others.’244 Amid the ongoing 
organic expression of fruitfulness, the mother can relate in a fully free way to the child as a distinct 
person, even as her self-consciousness continues to encompass them both.  
 
243 Cf., the notion of quickening where the ensoulment of an unborn child coincides with the mother’s first 
perception of movement in the womb. This is often wrongly attributed to Aristotle as adopted by Aquinas but 
has later origins. Aristotle holds ensoulment occurs at conception; Aquinas holds it occurs in a series of 
successive stages culminating in God infusing the spiritual soul. See Kathleen J. Austin, “Aristotle, Aquinas, And 
The History of Quickening,” (Masters’ Thesis, McGill University, 2003), 69-75.  
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After the child’s birth, not only is the difference between the mother and child intensified but so is 
the mother’s capacity consciously to experience the loving bond or identity-in-difference between 
them as one of freedom-in-dependency. This unity now coincides with the irreducible difference 
between mother and child where the child has its source in its parents’ sexual difference, and, 
beyond this, God. The identity-in-difference between mother and child shows itself, moreover, to be 
a bond capable of subsisting across distance. This provides the context for the child to be born as 
self-conscious spirit. ‘The child at its mother’s breast is…something of a repetition of their bond 
while in the womb. And yet this unity in love persists even when the mother’s face smiles at the 
child at a distance. Here is where the miracle occurs that one day the child will recognize in its 
mother’s face her protective love and will reciprocate this love with a first smile.’245 The intimacy 
between mother and child is not discarded after birth but encompassed within a loving union where 
the bodily context allows the spiritual to come into concrete subsistence. Only in the intimacy of 
their pre-existing union can the child’s difference be affirmed. Hence, the child ‘awakens at the love 
of the Thou, as it has always slept in the womb and on the bosom of the Thou.’246 It is in the intimate 
identity-in-difference between mother and child that Balthasar locates the event of the child’s 
awakening where it responds as an ‘I’ to a ‘Thou’. At birth, and even more at the birth of self-
consciousness, this surfaces in its full spiritual significance as an encounter of mutual love yet 
according to a pattern of subordination. The child, while awakened fully as embodied spirit, is utterly 
dependent on its mother and others’ love whereby it receives the capacity to response as a person.  
As examined in the previous chapter, although Balthasar affirms that an archetypical identity-in-
difference obtains between mother, father and child, he focuses mostly on the mother and child. 
This is also his preferred context for considering the child’s awakening to self-consciousness. We can 
now see this as relating to how the child comes concretely into being and has its heart attuned to 
being in the mother’s womb and in the child’s utter dependence on her after birth. Similarly, after 
birth the child’s heartfelt response to the mother’s smile is where the fruitfulness of the self-giving 
love between parents comes into embodied and spiritual subsistence. While in this instance, the 
mother’s concrete gesture is characterised more fully by her deliberate self-gift than during 
pregnancy; nevertheless, her smile too is rooted in her bodily reality and manifests the openness 
and response of the mother’s heart which calls to and moves the child’s heart.  
All this indicates how a child is fruit in several senses: first, the fruit of the sexual act of its parents; 
secondly, the fruit of its mother’s womb; thirdly, the fruit of the mother’s heart where the latter is 
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shaped by the relationship to others, not least the child’s father; fourthly, the child is also the fruit of 
the self-giving love between the parents, or in absence of one or other parents, other parent-like 
adults; and, finally, taken together, this encompasses how human parents mediate esse to their child 
as a matter of gift and how the child is, as embodied spirit, in both its ultimate origin and destiny, 
the fruit of divine love, a child of God entrusted to others and dependent on their love. This recalls 
the importance of father-mother and father-child relationship for ensuring the archetypical identity-
in-difference between the parents and the child is one that affirms the child’s difference as unique 
personal being where the parents do this by enacting their childlike dependence on God. 
8.2. Male fruitfulness and the father-child relationship 
In considering male fruitfulness, I take aim at Balthasar’s failure to recognise that male fruitfulness 
also develops in the father-child relationship.247 I contend that there is an analogy between female 
and male fruitfulness which resists Balthasar’s insistence that all humans should be receptive in a 
(abstract) feminine sense. Rather, at the outset, there exists a certain symmetry regarding male and 
female fruitfulness in the sexual act when it is enacted in a fully spiritual and embodied manner that 
Balthasar fails to recognise. Man and woman both exhibit an active receptivity that may lead to the 
conception of a child. After conception, Balthasar affirms, rightly, the superior activity of the 
mother’s female organic fruitfulness regarding the gestating child. Yet he also curiously stresses that 
the father’s organic fruitfulness retains primacy as having actualised the mother’s fruitfulness. ‘Such 
an order of things holds true even if we may smile at the incidental, marginal and transitory 
character of the male’s function in procreation…. But it still remains true that the absolute beginning 
lies in the progenitor – in the father – while the feminine principle, even as Magna Mater or as 
Mother Nature, can never be conceived simply as the beginning.’248 This is patently false as the 
beginning lies with both parents. That said, male fruitfulness does safeguard the child’s distinct 
identity vis-à-vis the mother. As Balthasar notes, if absolute significance is attributed to the mother-
child relationship, ‘it leads to the cults of the Magna Mater, the principle of reproductive fruitfulness 
– often depicted with an array of breasts – understood as the ultimate Source. But such a 
perspective…reduces the principle of male fruitfulness to insignificance and destroys the authentic 
polarity….’249 Tellingly, Balthasar makes no mention of phallic cults.250 To correct this, we need to 
 
247 I echo Kilby’s observation that, for Balthasar, ‘the bearing and raising of a child is…consistently construed 
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affirm that both male and female have a certain primacy and subordination in actualising each 
other’s fruitfulness vis-à-vis a child.  
Compared to the mother’s intensive fruitfulness, the father’s fruitfulness is characterised by 
outwardness and difference between the father and child even as they share the same form in its 
intrinsic relationship to matter. This reflects how a child is conceived outside the male body, is not 
dependent on the father’s organic fruitfulness, nor held hidden within the father’s consciousness. 
While there is nothing comparable to a woman’s act of bearing the child, this does not, however, 
justify Balthasar’s reduction of male fruitfulness to episodic and disengaged terms.251 Rather, the 
father's male separateness underpins how the transcendence of spiritual form is shared immanently 
in the common flesh of mother, father and child. The externality of male organic fruitfulness also 
underwrites the child’s difference from its mother and the direction of the growth of this personal 
difference between them, even as the mother actively shares with the child the intrinsic relationship 
between spiritual living form and matter in her womb and heart.  
To develop this further, at first, there is asymmetry between the mother and father’s experience of 
the archetypical identity-in-difference with their newly conceived child. The father’s relation to the 
child is inverse to the mother’s. He is physically separated from the child growing in the mother's 
womb. While the father can be actively and receptively engaged with the child's mother, he is 
restrained regarding the child in her womb. There is no equivalent for male fruitfulness to how the 
response of the woman’s body to the child within her shapes and is enveloped in her heartfelt 
response. Unlike the woman, there is no organic substrate that binds father and child wherein the 
spiritual fruitfulness is latently expressed and actualised over time.  
Hence, in addition to physical distance, there is a difference between the organic and the spiritual in 
the father’s male fruitfulness. The separation between father and newly conceived child, however, is 
no disconnection if seen through the lens of spiritual fruitfulness. Balthasar recognises this, but 
problematically: ‘the man...ought not only give something of what is his but must rather surrender 
his very self….’252 However, Balthasar makes this self-giving about an act of will. This divorces the 
male’s response from his heart’s openness to being as it appears in the mother and child. This is laid 
bare when Balthasar asserts male self-giving requires ‘a supernatural measure of selflessness’; 
indeed, ‘[m]an needs woman in order to release and satisfy himself, even though he may also feel 
the impulse of love…. In love, as in fidelity, the woman has an easier time of it.’253 Male spiritual 
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fruitfulness collapses into untethered sexual desire, negatively construed, and woman becomes 
merely the means to minimal sexual release whereas the child is not mentioned. Moreover, 
Balthasar links this spiritual helplessness with the uniquely male representative vis-à-vis God. He 
asserts ‘woman is not called upon to represent anything that she herself is not, while the man has to 
represent the very source of life, which he can never be.’254 This is misplaced. Man and woman 
together represent the source of life in the realm of secondary causality.  
This questionable perspective is not the only one Balthasar offers. As mentioned earlier, Balthasar 
stresses the metaphysical significance of parental wonder. If we consider the father’s relation to the 
new-born child in this light, there is a greater likeness to the mother’s experience albeit according to 
a different order. The father’s spiritual fruitfulness is not simply a matter of his wilful self-giving yet 
disengaged activity. It concerns the intensive receptivity of the father’s heart to the child and 
mother’s being. The man must willingly allow the spiritual fruitfulness of his heart’s openness to the 
gift of new being to mediate his organic fruitfulness understood not as direct nourishment but his 
embodied interactions with the mother, the child once it is born, and, more broadly, the home he 
shares with them. Rather than consigning male fruitfulness to the background, this accentuates the 
father’s response to the mother and their shared communication of esse according to their spiritual 
being’s transcendent form. Furthermore, the father's distinctive wholehearted acts are mediated to 
the child in the womb through the movement of the mother’s heart. As with female spiritual 
fruitfulness, male spiritual fruitfulness vis-à-vis the child and mother coincides with his interaction 
with the surrounding world. It is shaped by the values and expectations of the community, culture 
and society where mother, father and child live, and their understanding of God and being. It also 
depends on the parental and cross-generational relationships that have shaped the father’s heart as 
a child.  
In this, the direction and order of how male fruitfulness engages with the child is opposite to that of 
female fruitfulness. The original distance between father and child must grow into a greater sense of 
identity, or identity-in-difference, between them, as must the relationship between organic and 
spiritual fruitfulness. Only thus can the father actively mediate to the child the transcendence of 
living spiritual form where this relies on the spiritual fruitfulness the father actively shares with the 
mother and which allows both parents to actively tend to the growth of the child in organic and 
personal terms. The father must allow his heart to follow his organic fruitfulness to effect this 
mediation. This transpires first via the relationship between the child’s father and mother, and then 
is shared by them more concretely once the child is born. Here the child’s difference from both 
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mother and father is more pronounced while at the same time allowing a greater unity between the 
child and the parents.  
From birth onwards, the father can become more actively engaged based on his different bodily 
engagement with the child. Unlike the mother, the sensory encounter comes at once when the 
father encounters the child for the first time as a separate person. At that point, the father is set on 
a journey of discovering his bond with the child. This is a bond of the heart that abides beyond their 
difference, even as it has done obliquely during the separation that obtained while the child was in 
its mother’s womb. The father’s discovery of the identity-in-difference between him and the child 
reflects an awareness on his part of the distinct identity of the child, something which is rooted in 
the child’s existence as coming not just from the mother and father but, beyond them both, from 
God. 
8.3. Shared male and female fruitfulness 
In contrast to Balthasar, the above stresses that the distinctiveness of male and female fruitfulness 
should not be correlated univocally to an ontologically-conceived feminine receptivity and masculine 
activity. From the viewpoint of substantial form, male and female hand on in different but reciprocal 
ways the transcendence and immanence of the spiritual living form of their common human nature 
to their child. They do so, moreover, dramatically from within the transcendence of the same form 
whereby they confront each other across the full span of the different ways of being human. 
Conversely, from the perspective of esse, male and female together but differently give subsistence 
to esse’s pattern of activity and receptivity within the unity of human nature. This metaphysical 
reciprocity obtains not simply on the abstract level of substantial form and esse, therefore, but 
within the concrete Gestalt of how esse subsists according to the specific extreme limits of human 
nature as constituted by the relationships between male and female, and father, mother and child.  
This coordinated metaphysical enactment of their shared fruitfulness is played out maximally 
according to the distinctive ways male and female hearts are attuned to the gift of their child and 
shape the child’s heart within their relationship.255 What distinguishes them is the different way the 
active receptivity of the heart to esse is actualised according to the intensive (transcendent 
immanence) and extensive (immanent transcendence) nature of the parent’s relationship to their 
child based on the differing relationships between their organic and spiritual fruitfulness. This is 
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manifested in how the mother and fathers’ hearts respond to the child’s new being first on the level 
of senses and body, and how they differently encounter and mediate the identity-in-difference 
between them and the child.  
In contrast to Balthasar, this makes the period of pregnancy and childcare a significant time for both 
parents, not simply the mother. They can strengthen their mutual relationship in their love while 
they await and then encounter the wonder of the fruit of their self-giving love in the gift of a child. 
This places significance on the quality of the relationship between the parents and their familial and 
social milieu before, during and after the time of pregnancy; and how they respond to and share the 
differences in their enactment of their fruitfulness understood in both organic and personal terms. 
This impacts how mother and father respond in heartfelt love and support for each other, and the 
formation of the child’s heart in the womb, immediately postpartum, and as the child is awakened 
to self-consciousness. Even in the womb, the child’s heart stirs towards wakefulness as it 
participates in the attunement of its mother’s heart and in how such maternal attunement is 
affected by her relationship with the father and the wider community. 
Metaphysically-speaking, the time of waiting and welcoming a new child is one when the parents 
confront existence’s fundamental character – whether they affirm the child’s existence and being 
itself as a gift of fruitful self-giving love, and as a source of wholehearted wonder even in the face of 
a world characterised by anxiety and violence. This is not simply about intellectual reasoning and 
willed decision. Rather, paternal and maternal hearts undergo metaphysical tutelage as they attune 
to the ontological reality of their child’s existence and ontological reality per se; something which 
Balthasar, in a reduction of the whole to a part, affirms only in the mother’s historical development. 
This period of metaphysical learning brings into sharper relief the parents’ relationship to God as the 
giver of the gift of being. Moreover, it is a time when they discover the metaphysical perfection of 
their sexual difference in the distinctive ways they mediate esse as it subsists in the transcendent 
living and spiritual form of human nature they share with their child. What is important is whether 
the parents allow the wonder of their hearts to come to fruition in their willing commitment to each 
other and the child, and how they communicate this in their shared life. As Balthasar says, in UBC, 
the child’s  
parents are obeying a duty when they assume the responsibility of caring for it. Especially in 
the case of the mother, but also of the father, this duty is contained within the original 
sphere of the concrete good, in which they are bound up with the child. They live out an 
obedience to the laws of existence that is inextricably united with fatherhood and 
179 
 
motherhood. But there is also involved a part of free willingness that has to be achieved 
through personal decision.256 
It is notable that in this, his final work, Balthasar recognises more clearly the reciprocity between 
male and female fruitfulness. The reference to the concrete nature of the good shared between 
parents and child emphasises that the parents’ duty is not simply a matter of willing an abstract 
good but expressing their encounter with being as good, true and beautiful. I explore this in chapter 
four. 
9. Conclusion 
For all their differences, male and female fruitfulness converge in that their spiritual fruitfulness is 
rooted in their heart’s wonder-filled responsiveness to being, specifically as it greets them in the 
ontological singularity of their child. This heartfelt wonder is not principally feminine, nor simply 
masculine and feminine, but childlike. Mother and father are themselves always children, albeit 
grown-up, mature and responsible adult children. Their hearts, like that of their child’s, are the fruit 
of human sexual difference, knit together in their mother’s womb and shaped by her heart's 
attunement to the surrounding world, and awoken in wonder by their parents' love. This means that 
the metaphysical significance of human sexual difference and its organic and spiritual fruitfulness 
always remains, in a certain sense, subordinate to the objective reality of a new child and the 
subjective act of childlike wonder.  
On the objective side, the subordination of the fruitful union of sexual difference to the child is a 
function of the child being the fruit of this union. Each child is by nature a new embodied spirit in 
whom the unique and ever-fruitful divine gift of esse subsists. No child is ever merely the product of 
the human sexual reproductive process or the love between the parents. A child is more than a mere 
biological reality or what humans can construct or will into being. Rather each child as spirit is a 
uniquely personal gift of God’s loving being to which the a priori response of the heart is one of 
metaphysical wonder, even if this may be a wonder that is rejected, overlooked, or evokes despair. It 
is this response of the heart that places a demand on the adults who are charged with the care of 
the child to share being as loving gift. They must take responsibility for the child of their fruitfulness 
who is utterly dependent on them for its continued existence and its self-conscious freedom. In 
placing this ontological demand on them, the child calls forth from its parents their joint mediation 
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of the transcendence of the spiritual living form they share, and, therefore, the creative letting be of 
esse. 
Following on from this, on the subjective side, the call of the child demands that the parents give 
priority to their own abiding sense of filial obedience and childlike openness at the core of their self-
conscious being. It demands they prioritise the childlikeness that characterises their pre-volitional 
and pre-intellectual wonder at the gift of being – the wonder that quickens their hearts’ spiritual 
fruitfulness. The subordination of the parents’ sexual and spiritual fruitfulness to that of childlike 
wonder recalls the a priori nature of the childlike wonder that constitutes the self-consciousness of 
each person. Now as adults who have become parents this requires that the childlike wonder of 
their hearts be integrated with their mature acts of intellectual and volitional freedom. This will take 
a different but correlated expression of intensive-extensive shared fruitfulness based on how each 
sex differently encounters the child’s new being and plays its distinctive part in jointly handing on 
the transcendence and immanence of their shared spiritual living form. 
On this speculative reading, Balthasar’s metaphysics challenges both (his own) essentialist and 
constructivist positions based on their implicit or explicit rejection of the abiding value of childhood 
in favour of adult self-mastery and technological manipulation. Balthasar’s metaphysics stands in 
stark contrast to any view that sees not only sexual difference, but also the child-parent relationship, 
as in some sense preliminary, inessential, deficient, and dispensable differences. Such views judge 
these relationships as problematic because they are prior to our free choosing and ability to reason 
and so should be abandoned, or, more radically, eliminated to allow us to assert our freedom 
unencumbered by any relationships of dependency not of our making. By contrast, Balthasar’s 
understanding of the metaphysically-rooted convergence of the fruitfulness of sexual difference, the 
child-parent relationship and personhood, gives priority to the abiding value of the heart’s 
childlikeness, the freedom that comes from interdependence and the readiness for wonder at being 
itself. 
This reiterates the central claim in this thesis that childlikeness is not simply the primordial but also 
the abiding mode of fruitful personal existence which enacts the generative nature of the analogy of 
being in its character as divine gift. This would seem to suggest that being fruitful as a childlike adult 
person, in openness to being as divine gift, is more fundamental than the fruitfulness of human 
sexual difference. This in turn would open a way beyond the paradigmatic status of male and female 
fruitfulness. Just as each child is capable of being fruitful through sharing the personal gift of 
themselves, and so the gift of being, with others in heartfelt love; each adult too can be fruitful in a 
more than simply sexual way through sharing the personal gift of themselves with others in love 
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which is expressed in an adult commitment of the whole self in childlike openness. Whatever their 
sex, this affirms that each person can enact the interpersonal fruitfulness of being like a child as an 
adult. 
And yet, it is this priority of the child and childlikeness to the fruitfulness of each person that 
demands a jointly fundamental metaphysical significance for the fruitfulness of sexual difference 
understood as the female and male poles of a contrariety that constitutes human nature’s 
participation in esse. The priority of being a child cannot, therefore, be separated from being a child 
of sexual difference. Childlike fruitfulness is never something we simply possess independently, 
according to which we make ourselves. Rather, it is in its essence constituted and mediated by the 
fruitfulness of human sexual difference not just in conception but in how each person is shaped and 
formed by female and male organic and spiritual fruitfulness by being awoken to self-conscious 
freedom. This emphasises that the specific difference between male and female, as encompassing 
the perfect and complete difference of the analogy of being, and so the extremes of human 
existence and freedom, is crucial to safeguarding the reality each person’s uniqueness as being born 
and remaining a child. More specifically, it safeguards the heart’s capacity for childlike wonder in its 
openness to being's appearance in beings, and the spiritual fruitfulness that such heartfelt wonder 
underpins. 
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Chapter Four 
Transcendental Fruitfulness 
Balthasar's metaphysics supports the view that the child-parent relationship and human sexual 
difference are concrete principles of difference of created being itself. They are the correlated 
extreme modes of being fully human. Within the realm of secondary causality, they communicate 
the ‘primal Gestalt’ or ‘native condition’ of being an embodied spirit.1 They constitute a being-from, -
with, and -for others that enacts, within humanity spiritual embodied nature's self-transcending 
openness, being’s superabundance. In this chapter, I argue this makes them paradigmatic for being’s 
so-called transcendental aspects.  
I draw on five aspects of Balthasar’s metaphysical notion of the transcendentals. First, Balthasar 
structures his thought according to the ‘positive relational transcendentals’ of beauty, goodness and 
truth.2 These are intrinsically related as a single whole according to a certain order. Their relational 
nature arises from their source in the relationship between being and the spiritual soul in its capacity 
to reflect being as a whole. Especially significant is the primacy Balthasar’s gives beauty. Secondly, 
underlying this is the transcendental of unity understood as the real distinction between esse and 
ens, and so the unity-in-difference of the analogy of created being. Balthasar identifies this polar 
unity as marked by a vital tension that opens to the transcendent source of being in God. Unity is, 
for Balthasar, distinct from the relational transcendentals since it underpins and is articulated 
through them. This is no abstract unity-in-difference, therefore, but one manifested concretely in 
the encounter between subject and object via the positive relational transcendentals. Thirdly, 
Balthasar interprets this complex whole most fully as the reciprocity of love. Beauty, goodness, and 
truth are interrelated moments of love as the overarching transcendental of being and the fullest 
expression of being’s unity-in-difference unveiled in the freedom of spirit. Conversely, love is not 
separable from or positioned alongside the other relational transcendentals, nor identified with only 
one of them, but is fully expressed as beauty, goodness and truth in their unity. Moreover, 
associating the transcendentals with love locates their fullest articulation in interpersonal reality. 
Fourthly, these aspects converge on fruitfulness as a transcendental. Balthasar does not explicitly 
make this claim but implicit in his thought is that fruitfulness inheres the relational transcendentals. 
While this fruitful excess is what being already fully is, nonetheless it also reflects how being 
 
1 GL1, 25, 21. 
2 D.C. Schindler, “Love and Beauty, The ‘Forgotten Transcendental,’ in Thomas Aquinas,” Communio: 
International Catholic Review 44, (2017): 334. Cf., Jan Aertsen, Medieval Philosophy as Transcendental Thought 
(Leiden: Brill, 2012), 220. 
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incorporates a dependence on the fruitful encounter of actual beings according to the relational 
transcendentals. Finally, this co-inherence of the relational transcendentals, unity, love and 
fruitfulness is, in created terms, enacted primordially, paradigmatically, but not exclusively, in the 
relationships between mother, father, and child. This recalls from the previous chapter how the 
form of human love has its provenance in the love offered by parents to a child born of sexual 
difference. For Balthasar, a child’s awakening to self-consciousness through love is ‘decisive proof’ 
that the positive relational transcendentals are rooted in ‘groundless love’ as ‘the supreme act of 
being.’3  
Given the above, I argue being cannot be enacted as beautiful, good and true, and so as love, but for 
the child-parent relationship and human sexual difference. Specifically, I claim these relationships 
are co-principles of beauty itself. To this end, I consider, first, Balthasar’s interpretation of the 
transcendentals; secondly, how the transcendentals, particularly beauty, relate to the fruitfulness of 
the human constitutive relationships; and, finally, I revisit, from the previous chapter, my critique of 
Balthasar’s understanding of sexual difference and extend my speculative alternative in light of the 
transcendentals. 
1. Medieval and Modern Perspectives on the Transcendentals 
For Balthasar, the transcendentals ‘are all-pervasive and, therefore, mutually immanent qualities of 
being as such.’4 This is in continuity with the medieval scholastic view of the transcendentals as 
properties of being. As Jan Aertsen shows, a theory of the transcendentals is not fully articulated 
until thirteenth century.5 Before this, notions of transcendence operate in earlier classical and 
Christian thought, yet concern aspects of reality that wholly transcend being understood variously as 
material reality, the categorical divisions of Aristotelian substance and accident, or created being. 
Thus, Plato affirms the relationship between the Good, True, Beautiful and One.6 Yet, he holds the 
Good transcends being as the ultimate principle which confers being and intelligibility upon beings.7 
Neoplatonism applies this ‘beyond being’ to the One that transcends all being.8 Within Christianity, 
Augustine attributes the verb to transcend to both the ascent of the soul toward God and to God 
 
3 TL2, 177n.9. 
4 TL1, 15. 
5 Jan Aertsen, Medieval Philosophy, 28. 
6 Plato, “Philebus,” trans. Dorothea Frede, in Complete Works, 64a-65a. 
7 Plato, “Republic,” trans. G.M.A Grude and C.D.C Reeve, in Complete Works, 509b.  
8 Plotinus, The Ennead: Volume V, trans. A. H. Armstrong (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 1986), 5.6  
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whose essence transcends created being.9 Pseudo-Dionysius adapts Platonic notions such as the 
Good and Beautiful to express God’s transcendence who is ‘beyond all.’10 
The scholastic sense of the transcendentals, however, identifies a transcendence proper to created 
being. It has roots in different albeit not fully developed aspects of Aristotle’s metaphysics.11 The 
scholastic innovation marks the advent of a concept of being as transcending the substantial and 
accidental categories of being. This is the metaphysical outworking of creatio ex nihilo where created 
being is divine gift.12 While the scholastic period is marked by a diversity of interpretations of this 
sense of being, the upshot is that created being is understood to transcend all beings because it is 
universal and common to all, yet is not divine being. Rather, in this, its transcendental sense of 
transcendence, created being harkens towards but is distinct from the God’s transcendent being.13  
Being is the first transcendental because common to all beings.14 This transcendental sense of 
being’s transcendence applies also to the properties of being that transcend the categories of 
substance and accident which all beings possess through their share in being’s commonality. On the 
majority consensus these are unity, goodness and truth. While irreducible to the categories of finite 
beings, they apply to every being. They concern the basic way any being exists. As properties of 
being, moreover, they are convertible with each other. Here they are distinct not in reality 
(secundum re) but add a conceptual difference (secundum rationem) to being that is not merely 
superfluous.15 Across the diversity of medieval views, Aertsen distils the common scholastic 
perspective thus: ‘transcendentals are the “firsts”, since they are most common; and because of 
their commonness they transcend the categories [of substance and accident].’16 
Beyond the medieval period, later modern developments interpreted the transcendentals as 
structures of the human perception, mind or will in their cognitive encounter and practical 
engagement with objects of human perception. As Aertsen notes, it is regarding truth ‘that the 
complex process of the transformation of the medieval doctrine of the transcendentals to modern 
 
9 Augustine, “Of True Religion,” in Earlier Writings, trans. J.H.S. Burleigh (Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 
1953), 72. Cf., Aertsen, Medieval Philosophy, 21-22. 
10 Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite, “The Divine Names,” in The Complete Works trans. Colm Luibheid (New 
York: Paulist Press, 1987), 5.8. 
11 Cf., Aertsen, Medieval Philosophy, 60-64.  
12 Cf., Ibid., 672-680. Cf., Étienne Gilson, Being and Some Philosophers, 2nd ed. (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of 
Medieval Studies, 1952), 74-107.  
13 Aertsen, Medieval Philosophy, 20. 
14 Ibid., 4. 
15 E.g., ST, 1a.5.1; 2a.2ae.109.2 ad 1.  
16 Aertsen, Medieval Philosophy, 657. 
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transcendental philosophy becomes apparent.’17 Whereas truth had been seen as a relation 
between being and the intellect, it now becomes a product of the intellect.18 This reaches its zenith 
in the transcendentalism of Kant. Kant locates the transcendentals not as properties of being but of 
the possibility of knowing things and so within the a priori structures of the human mind and will.19 
The human subject constitutes the objects of experience and provides the condition of the 
possibility of empirical truth.20 This underpins transcendental Thomism and phenomenology.21  
This lays the ground for Nietzsche's denial of the transcendentals in favour of the human will’s 
power over the immanent order.22 As Balthasar notes, this flattens being, eviscerates its mystery, 
and hollows out the transcendentals based on the damage human freedom has inflicted on them: 
‘falsehood, malice, ugliness, and the elevation of a violent dualism to the level of a first principle 
seem to dominate man’s world so thoroughly that anyone who can look all of this in the face...must 
dismiss the idea that being is true, good, and beautiful as a hopeless illusion. Existence is governed 
by the will to power, which uses the transcendentals to its best advantage.’23 This echoes Heidegger 
sense of being as mere contingent existence (Dasein, being-in-the-world).24 The latter is framed 
ultimately as endless potential and possibility before the ever-present reality of death.25 Being (Sein) 
is identified with nonbeing (Nichtsein) which is the condition for the possibility of transcendence. 
Transcendence here, however, is contained solely within the immanent frame where being’s 
contingency is made into a transcendental of a thoroughly immanent sense of being-in-the-world 
which is ‘held out into the nothing.’26 
As Schindler notes, these differing perspectives on the transcendentals betoken an ambiguity. Do 
they concern properties of being or our experience of being?27 Given that Balthasar treats the 
transcendentals as properties of being, he sits within the medieval view. However, he also allots 
 
17 Aertsen, Medieval Philosophy, 692. 
18 Ibid. , 693. 
19 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, B114. Cf., ibid., A11/B25. 
20 Ibid., B185. 
21 DST, 352. Schindler examines how Balthasar challenges phenomenology’s suspicion of metaphysics in both a 
Heideggerian and Husserlian register in Schindler, “Problem of Onto-Theology,” 102-113; and, “Metaphysics 
within the Limits of Phenomenology: Balthasar and Husserl on the Nature of the Philosophical Act,” Teología y 
vida 50, (2009): 243-258.  
22 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Will to Power, trans. R. J. Hollingdale and Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage 
Books, 1968), 822. 
23 TL1, 16. 
24 Heidegger, Being and Time, 250. 
25 Carpenter, Theo-Poetics, 33, examines Balthasar’s critique of Heidegger. Cf., Aidan Nichols, Scattering the 
Seed: A Guide through Balthasar’s Early Writings on Philosophy and the Arts (New York: T&T Clark, 2006), 204-
205. 
26 Heidegger, “What is Metaphysics?,” 91.  
27 DST, 352. Cf., GL4, 411. 
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human freedom a pivotal role while avoiding a wholesale Kantian turn to the subject or Nietzschean 
will to power.28 This is ensured by Balthasar's affirmation of an analogous freedom of the object 
which moves the subject in its freedom. Indeed, it is the concrete event of encounter between 
subject and object that characterises the transcendentals. Thus understood they supply the antidote 
to the lionisation of human power above being. The transcendentals are ‘stronger than any human 
nihilism that would liquidate them and, with them, the being in which they inhere….'29 As I examine, 
however, the transcendentals' indefatigability is paradoxically precarious, not least because of the 
primacy Balthasar gives to beauty and the paradigmatic role he allots to sexual difference and the 
child-parent relationship in safeguarding being’s beautiful good truth. 
Let us, however, turn back to the medieval understanding of the transcendentals that underpins 
Balthasar’s approach. I focus on Aquinas’ account in De Veritate for several reasons. First, this is a 
central text in the scholastic exposition of a theory of the transcendentals.30 Secondly, Balthasar sits 
in continuity with Aquinas’ analogical understanding of being in terms of esse and ens as the basis of 
the transcendentals.31 Indeed, for Balthasar, Aquinas’ metaphysics underpins an approach to the 
transcendentals that accords primacy to beauty, even if Aquinas does not explicitly state this.32 
Thirdly, Balthasar builds on Aquinas’ innovative understanding of the transcendentals as the 
relationship between being and the spiritual soul.  That said, Balthasar goes beyond Aquinas most 
principally in treating the relational transcendentals as differences inherent to being, not just 
conceptual differences.  
Aquinas examines the very possibility of properties of being (ens) given that ‘nothing can be added 
to being as though it were something not included in being.’33 Aquinas argues there are non-
superfluous additions that articulate ‘a mode of being not expressed by the term being.’34 Being is 
more than mere being. Aquinas identifies two such additions. First, being is expressed as substance 
which specifies being as an actual being. The second way concerns the transcendentals.35 These ‘add 
 
28 John Dadsoky, “Philosophy for a Theology of Beauty,” Philosophy and Theology 19, (2007): 7, queries 
whether Balthasar affirms the subject sufficiently to ‘articulate the proper philosophical foundations for a 
modern recovery of beauty.’ Dadsoky argues this requires going beyond Aquinas. Carpenter, Theo-Poetics, 
48n.24, challenges this.  
29 TL1, 16-17. 
30 Aertsen, Medieval Philosophy, 211. 
31 Cf., Cornelio Fabro, “The Transcendentality of Ens-Esse and the Ground of Metaphysics,” International 
Philosophical Quarterly 6, (1966): 404-407.  
32 GL4, 407-41.  
33 De Veritate, 1.1. 
34 De Veritate, 1.1. 
35 Aquinas does not use the term transcendentia in De Veritate, 1.1. but in 21.3.  
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to being because the mode they express is one that is common, and consequent upon every 
being.’36  
Aquinas lists five transcendentals: res, unum, aliquid, bonum and verum. These divide into two 
groups. Firstly, res and unum concern how each being is in itself. Thus, positively, each being is a 
thing (res). It has an essential reality. Negatively, each being is undivided in itself and so is one 
(unum). Secondly, the remaining three transcendentals concern how every being is related to what is 
other.37 Negatively, each being is something (aliquid) in distinction to others. This expresses how 
unity (unum) entails multiplicity.38 As Aquinas says elsewhere: ’Multitude belongs to the 
transcendentals, insofar as being is divided by the one and the many.’39 Positively, therefore, each 
being has a positive relation to another. This concerns ‘the correspondence one being has with 
something other’. To clarify, this concerns not the relationship between any two beings, but the 
relationship of being, as it subsists in every being, to something other than itself. Aquinas, following 
Aristotle, identifies this as the spiritual/rational soul which alone agrees in some way with all things 
(quodammodo est omnia).  
In De Veritate, Aquinas identifies two such positive relational transcendentals: the true (verum) and 
the good (bonum). This reflects the two different spiritual powers of the soul which relates to being 
simply as intelligible and desirable. The true encompasses the relationship between being and the 
intellect; and, the good the relationship between being and the will or appetitive power. We can 
note that beauty is not on Aquinas’ list of transcendentals in De Veritate. Indeed, it is questioned 
whether beauty is recognised as a transcendental in medieval thought.40 There are similar queries 
about beauty in Aquinas’ thought.41 Whereas in De Veritate Aquinas lists five transcendentals in 
 
36 De Veritate, 1.1. 
37 De Veritate, 1.1. 
38 Aertsen, Medieval Philosophy, 682-683. 
39 ST, 1a.30.3. 
40 For an overview, see Schindler, “Beauty and the Analogy of Truth,” 298n.3. Étienne Gilson, Elements of 
Christian Philosophy, (New York: Doubleday, 1960) 159-163, calls beauty a ‘forgotten transcendental.’  Aertsen 
denies beauty’s status as a transcendental in medieval thought. See Aertsen, Medieval Philosophy, 175-176. 
Indeed, Aertsen criticises Balthasar for reading nineteenth century aesthetics into thirteenth century thought. 
Ibid., 168-169, 175. He challenges how these modern thinkers prioritize an isolated Franciscan text, Tractatus 
de transcendentalibus entis conditionibus, which some attribute to a young Bonaventure. Balthasar refers to 
this text in GL4, 373 though he does not unequivocally attribute it to Bonaventure. See GL2, 260n.1, 334, and 
GL4, 383.  Stephan van Erp, The Art of Theology: Hans Urs von Balthasar’s Theological Aesthetics and the 
Foundations of Faith (Leuven: Peters, 2004), 138, accuses Balthasar of merely asserting beauty’s importance. 
41For those in favour, see Francis Kovach, Die Ästethik des Thomas von Aquin: Eine genetische und 
systematische Analyse (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1961); Czapiewski, Das Schöne bei Thomas von Aquin; 
Günther Pöltner, Schönheit: Eine Untersuchung zum Ursprung des Denkens bei Thomas von Aquin (Freiburg: 
Herder, 1978); and, Jacques Maritain, Art et scholastique (Paris: Librairie de l’Art Catholique, 1947). Aertsen is 
against. See Aertsen, Medieval Philosophy, 172-174; and, Jan Aertsen, Medieval Philosophy and the 
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subsequent tradition the number reduces to three, unity, truth and goodness. This reflects how res 
is incorporated in to being, and aliquid into unum. As Aertsen charts, this represents being's 
univocalisation understood in increasingly abstract essential terms (albeit beyond categorical being) 
against Aquinas’ emphasis on esse's actuality.42 As we will see, Balthasar resists this in favour of an 
analogical view that affirms the abiding unity-in-difference between res and esse, and unum and 
aliquid.  
An important point to highlight is how the positive relational transcendentals, namely, the true and 
the good (and by implication the beautiful as Balthasar employs it), encompass, what Schindler calls, 
the ‘transcendental paradox.’43 This concerns how the positive relational transcendentals denote the  
way being inherently points beyond itself to what is other than being (the will and the intellect of 
the soul); yet, there is nothing other than being. Though paradoxical this is no irrational 
contradiction. It follows from the soul’s capacity to reflect the whole of being and so transcend being 
while depending on being.44 The spirit thus fully encompasses within itself being’s own excess. 
Although Aquinas does not develop this point, goodness and truth are, therefore, not simply 
conceptual differences, but relate to the otherness inherent to being (that is, aliquid and multitudo) 
as reflected in the spiritual soul’s own transcendent capacity to encompass being as whole.45 
Anticipating Balthasar, being thus paradoxically depends on the soul to manifest fully what it already 
is: a unity-in-difference that always already exceeds itself. The soul alone unveils the full meaning of 
being’s superabundance as truth and goodness. Schindler labels this ‘the anthropological deduction’ 
which he considers one of Aquinas’ ‘most innovative contributions’ to the question of the 
transcendentals. It introduces ‘anthropology into what was previously simply a metaphysical or 
theological issue.’ This entails 'a noble risk' insofar as it allows humanity to shape the basic meaning 
of being, carrying with it ‘the threat of the subordination of reality to human projects that arguably 
becomes real in the Enlightenment.’46 This innovation in metaphysics lies at the core of Balthasar’s 
notion of metaphysics as meta-anthropology. 
 
Transcendentals: The Case of Thomas Aquinas (Leiden: Brill, 1996), 335-359. At GL4, 393, Balthasar is 
circumspect about whether Aquinas recognises beauty as a transcendental. In GL4, 407-41, however, Balthasar 
argues Aquinas’ metaphysics underscores the emergence of a ‘transcendental aesthetics.’ 
42 Aertsen, Medieval Philosophy, 679-680, charts how Henry of Ghent, Duns Scotus and Francisco Suárez 
identify being (ens) principally with a quidditative notion of being. 
43 DST, 351. 
44 Schindler, “Beauty and the Analogy of Truth,” 303 
45 Aertsen, Medieval Philosophy, 683, rejects this interpretation arguing multitude concerns beings not being, 
and represents a different kind of transcendental. Pace Aertsen, multitudo is compatible with the relational 
transcendentals. They explicate an otherness intrinsic to esse as it subsists as ens and fully articulated in spirit. 
46 Schindler, “Beauty and the Analogy of Truth,” 302.  
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2. Balthasar’s Account of the Transcendentals 
The transcendentals are central to Balthasar’s metaphysical thought.47 He understands them as 
universal to every being: ‘The One, the Good, the True, and the Beautiful, these are what we call the 
transcendental attributes of Being, because they surpass all the limits of essences and are co-
extensive with Being.’48 Balthasar’s understanding of the relational transcendentals, moreover, 
follows Aquinas’ insight that being comes fully to light as the spiritual soul. ‘Though the 
transcendentals pervade all being, even subspiritual being, they first attain their fullness where 
being, lighting up within, becomes spirit.’49 In contrast to Aquinas, Balthasar approaches this 
relationship between being and spirit not so much from the perspective of the soul’s individual 
faculties and their relationship to being, but from within the encounter between the whole concrete 
human person and being as it appears concretely in beings.50 
For Balthasar, more explicitly than Aquinas, the transcendentals concern not only how being’s unity-
in-difference is encountered by the spiritual soul, but being's nature so unveiled. This is captured by 
Balthasar's notion that being is epiphanic or expressive, developing Heidegger and Bonaventure.51 
Beauty, goodness and truth denote being’s ‘epiphanic character, which permeates everything that 
exists….' This is a 'shining-out that recalls the illuminating action of the light. But this is only 
meaningful when we maintain the difference between appearance and that which appears, for 
appearance without something that appears empties its identity into mere seeming.’52 This rests on 
the affirmation that every ‘being is a manifestation of itself (the more intensively the higher it ranks): 
the representation of its own depths, the surface of its ground, the word from its essential core; and 
upon this essential movement of being (from its interior to the exterior) are founded the good, the 
 
47 This is explored in Saint-Pierre, Beauté, bonté, vérité. 
48 MW, 471. 
49 TL2, 176. 
50 Saint-Pierre, Beauté, bonté, vérité, 109, notes the significance to Balthasar of a concrete approach to the 
transcendentals.  Cf., GL4, 28-29. 
51 That being is epiphanic reflects Balthasar’s adaption of Heidegger’s notion of truth as unveiling or aletheia 
and is connected to Balthasar’s notion of expression. See, for example, TL1, 37-38 and GL1, 193. Cf., Martin 
Heidegger, “On the Origin of the Work of Art,” in Basic Writings 2nd ed, ed. David Farrell Krell (New York: 
HarperCollins, 1993), 178. Hence, Fergus Kerr labels Balthasar’s thought as a ‘Heideggerian Thomism.’ Kerr, 
“Balthasar and Metaphysics,” 237. For Bonaventure, see GL2, 260-362. Regarding the importance of expressio 
to the latter’s notion of beauty, see GL2, 271, 335-352 and TL2, 165-170. On Bonaventure’s importance to 
Balthasar, see Junius Johnson, Christ and Analogy: The Christocentic Metaphysics of Hans Urs von Balthasar 
(Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2013), 31-74. 
52 E, 83. 
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true, and the beautiful.’53 Balthasar thus re-envisions the relational transcendentals as follows: being 
is self-showing (beautiful); self-giving (good); and, self-expressing or self-saying (true).54  
That Balthasar associates the transcendentals with differences in being's epiphanic nature maintains 
the paradoxical relationship between being and spirit. The transcendentals express being’s already 
superabundant perfection within spirit’s intrinsic openness to being’s excess. This obviates any 
suggestion of a lack within being that is fulfilled by beings, particularly, by the development of spirit 
along Hegelian lines. As Balthasar says, ‘the self-showing, self-bestowal, and self-expressiveness of 
finite things are not aspects that arise out of their need but belong to their essential ontological 
perfection.’55 Accordingly, the dependence at the heart of the transcendentals and so every being 
belongs to being’s perfection. This is a perfection, moreover, that because it subsists as the 
perfection of particular beings cannot dispense with them in favour of Heideggerian nonbeing.56  
Before considering Balthasar’s understanding of the respective relational transcendentals, I shall 
explore how he affirms, first, their inseparability; secondly, their order; and, thirdly, the fruitfulness 
of being's polar unity which they articulate. 
2.1. Circumincession of the relational transcendentals 
Following the medieval tradition that the transcendentals are convertible with each other, Balthasar 
states, ‘all the transcendentals equally determine the whole of being’; this underpins ‘their 
inseparability, reciprocal interpenetration, and mutual implication.’57  They are ‘circumincessive.’58 
This is key to Balthasar’s metaphysics. He insists that only the relational transcendentals in their 
unity unveil the truth of being’s intrinsic richness.  
[O]nly a permanent, living unity of the theoretical, ethical, and aesthetic attitudes can 
convey a true knowledge of being.... [I]t is necessary to keep in mind their common root and 
constant interplay. This interplay is so intimate that one cannot speak concretely about one 
of the three without drawing the other two into the discussion.59 
Developing the traditional perspective, for Balthasar, the convertibility of the transcendentals does 
not arise simply because what is one in re, being, is conceptually differentiated by the spiritual 
 
53 GL1, 610-611. 
54 E, 59-86. 
55 E, 85. 
56 Cf., Balthasar, A Theological Anthropology, 84. 
57 TL1, 7. 
58 MW, 116. 
59 TL1, 29. Cf., ExT1, 107. 
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faculties of the soul in ratione. Rather, being is characterised by a multifaceted unity-in-difference 
manifested fully in spirit. Each of the transcendentals is a distinct yet interrelated aspect of being’s 
epiphany. They ‘must be interior to each other: that which is truly true is also truly good and 
beautiful and one. A being appears, it has an epiphany: in that it is beautiful and makes us marvel. In 
appearing it gives itself, it delivers itself to us: it is good. And in giving itself up, it speaks itself, it 
unveils itself: it is true (in itself, but in the other to which it reveals itself).’60  
2.2. The order of the transcendentals 
If the transcendentals concern how being reveals itself and is encountered, then Balthasar advocates 
an ‘unusual sequence’.61 This represents another innovative contribution to metaphysics.62 While 
they interpenetrate, the order of beauty, goodness and truth is not arbitrary.63 Balthasar sees this as 
an evolutionary hierarchy that reflects the scholastic gradation of being (being, living being, spiritual 
being). Here ‘”truth” forms the conclusion to “beauty” and “goodness”….’64 Hence, the beautiful, as 
being's self-appearing, applies to all inanimate beings; goodness, as being’s self-giving, occurs at the 
level of living, conscious being; and, truth, as being’s self-saying, obtains at the level of self-conscious 
spiritual reality.65 Truth emerges at the pinnacle of nature where being becomes self-conscious. 
Truth also depends on the preceding levels and fulfils them: ‘without self-consciousness, even terms 
like “beautiful” and “good” can only be imperfect, preliminary natural steps leading to what they 
become in their full unfolding in man.’66 That said, truth is not limited to the human. As Balthasar 
stresses, truth does not simply conclude the relational transcendentals but is their beginning. The 
beautiful and the good are truly aspects of being. As Balthasar affirms, ‘self-showing and self-giving 
must already be inchoate forms of self-saying even before man shows up on the scene.’67 
 
60 MW, 116. 
61 E, 46. Cf., Schindler, “Beauty and the Analogy of Truth,” 300, where he defends Balthasar’s ‘unconventional 
order’ of the transcendentals of beauty, goodness and truth. See also DST, 396-401.  
62 Schindler, “Beauty and the Analogy of Truth,” 300-301, notes that occasionally Balthasar states philosophy, 
rather than theology, cannot begin with beauty but starts with the barest concepts and, at best, only 
concludes with beauty. Cf., GL1, 17. This philosophical ordering is evidenced by Kant who orders his three 
Critiques first with truth (pure reason), then goodness (practical reason) and, finally, beauty (aesthetic 
judgement). The latter is seen in purely regulative terms. Balthasar thus seems to apply a theological order as 
he confirms at TD1, 15-23. Schindler, however, argues there must be a philosophical basis for beginning with 
beauty given the intrinsic relationship between philosophy and theology that Balthasar affirms. This is echoed 
in E, 45, 78; and, GL1, 34.  
63 This order is evidenced in how Balthasar structures his trilogy. 
64 E, 77. 
65 E, 83-84. 
66 E, 77. 
67 E, 77. 
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Saint-Pierre summarises the significance of Balthasar’s order thus: beauty is the primary 
transcendental corresponding to the basic way being appears as radiant Gestalt. Goodness is the 
central transcendental as the hinge within the realm of freedom and action. Truth is the ultimate 
transcendental where beauty and goodness are brought together in a fruitful manner that ensures a 
unity that expresses being’s ever-greater mystery.68 The importance of order reiterates the crucial 
relationship between the intellect and the will, and the true and the good. Whichever is prioritised 
impacts how being and spirit interact, and threatens to reduce being either to subject’s mind or 
desire. As I examine later, Balthasar prioritisation of beauty affirms a joint priority of both intellect 
and will, and of subject and object, that avoids any such reduction. Beauty is first as the concrete 
union of the true and the good; and, the heart, as the distinct faculty of beauty, encompasses as a 
whole the movements of the intellect and will vis-à-vis being.69 
Regarding Balthasar’s prioritisation of beauty, Schindler argues this is based on ‘“fittingness”’ not 
‘necessity (as if the order presented here is the only one possible).’70 This echoes the 
circumincession of the transcendentals. In the concrete order, such fittingness means this ordering 
cannot be insisted upon but allows each person’s free response to being. Paradoxically, however, 
implicit in Schindler’s observation is that such fittingness arises from beauty’s priority. The possibility 
of deciding for or against beauty is a function of beauty. This involves its own necessity insofar as it 
safeguards an openness to being as a gift of divine love.  
2.3. The fruitfulness of being’s polar unity  
Balthasar affirms unity as a transcendental property of being. He does not, however, dedicate as 
much focus to unity as the relational transcendentals. He states, ‘we can talk about unity as a 
transcendental only after having dealt thematically with the other transcendentals first.’71 This is to 
avoid abstracting being’s unity from the concrete encounter with being’s unity-in-difference in 
actual beings.72 This granted, in the Epilogue, Balthasar does begin his metaphysical treatment of the 
transcendentals with unity, calling it the first transcendental. Indeed, unity has always been present 
as the polarity or unity-in-difference of the analogical nature of created being understood according 
 
68 Saint-Pierre, Beauté, bonté, vérité, 349. Cf., DST, 369. 
69 Schindler argues against Aersten that the heart is the third distinct faculty of the spiritual soul that underpins 
beauty as a relational transcendental analogous to goodness and truth. DST, 400-405. 
70 Schindler, “Beauty and the Analogy of Truth,” 301. 
71 TL1, 7-8. 
72 Saint-Pierre, Beauté, bonté, vérité, 230-234, notes how the Epilogue takes up the transcendental of unity 
where it is examined in light of the relational transcendentals’ circumincession. Cf., Aidan Nichols, A Key to 
Balthasar: Hans Urs von Balthasar on Beauty, Goodness and Truth (London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 2011), 
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to the real distinction between esse and ens. In this scheme, each being’s unity (unum) is tied to its 
being something (aliquid) different from others and vice versa. Being's ‘not-one unity’ characterises 
the relational transcendentals.73 Just as the unity 'permeating everything cannot be subsumed under 
some univocal concept, then the same must necessarily also hold true for the subsequent 
“transcendentals”: the true, the good, and the beautiful – which can only have their place within the 
act of Being.’74 The association of being’s polar unity with the distinction between esse and ens 
means that unity is characterised by the dynamic way esse subsists as different beings and their 
interaction. Unity is thus associated with the polarity between a being’s ground, or essence, and its 
outward expression whereby it communicates itself to other beings. This occurs in each being's 
shared participation in esse’s letting be and is how every being ecstatically receives esse whereby it 
realises its essential being.75 
As noted in chapter one, Balthasar explicitly identifies this communicative core of being’s polar unity 
with a vital tension that makes being  ‘the object of an unquenchable interest, indeed, of a reverent, 
astonished wonderment.’76 The vitality coursing through being's unity-in-difference and expressed in 
the dynamic between ground and appearance is the superabundant spring of finite reality. And 
because it applies to being itself then this ‘immense wealth of vitality’ lies also in ‘the transcendental 
difference.’77 Balthasar links this to an ontological fruitfulness.78 Being’s epiphanic nature as 
manifested in beings according to the relational transcendentals entails a self-openness 'endowed 
with the miracle of fruitfulness, at least where we are speaking of living beings… [T]he 
transcendentals (taken as a unity) allow beings to strive beyond themselves: surrender creates new 
beings….'79 Each relational transcendentals enacts this fruitfulness in its own order in relationship to 
the others.  This is played out concretely in the subject-object encounter, reflecting how, for 
Balthasar, ‘we encounter all Being both objectively and subjectively….’80 Accordingly, I shall now 
examine each relational transcendental from an objective and subjective perspective while affirming 
their inseparability.81 
 
73 E, 85. 
74 E, 55. 
75 E, 51. 
76 TL1, 9. 
77 E, 85. 
78 E, 56-57; E, 85-86. 
79 E, 109. 
80 GL1, 119. 
81 This reflects Balthasar’s account of the positive relational transcendental in the Epilogue. As Schindler, DST, 
364n.51, notes it is important not to separate the subjective and objective aspects. He argues that Saint-Pierre, 
Beauté, bonté, vérité, 234-238, risks this. Schindler, by contrast, frames each transcendental as the relationship 
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3. Beauty 
3.1. Beauty’s objective perspective 
Beauty is, in Balthasar’s idiom, being’s self-showing. It is the basic event of being’s epiphany; the 
fundamental ontological phenomenon. This underpins how reality is not something we construct but 
which offers itself to us according to ‘the objective evidence that emerges and sheds its light from 
the phenomenon itself.’82 This involves the dual pattern mentioned above where each being appears 
outwardly and preserves what it is in itself, its essence. More fully, beauty encompasses how this 
dynamic manifests as a single concrete whole that opens beyond itself to esse’s superabundance 
while displaying this excess within each being’s determinate reality.83 Balthasar articulates this 
whole via two aesthetic notions: Gestalt and splendour.  
For Gestalt, Balthasar draws on how classical thought identifies beauty with forma or species, the 
‘perfection’ of the outward form which contain the depths of a thing’s reality.84 Splendour, which 
Balthasar associates with the medieval notions of lumen and splendor, concerns how any 
determinate Gestalt opens to an inexhaustible depth. He connects this with a Romantic emphasis on 
‘boundlessness’, the ‘infinite’ and ‘the form that transcends itself by pointing beyond to the 
depths’.85 Gestalt and splendour, though distinct, are inseparable and only in their unity is being fully 
disclosed. The light of splendour is not extraneous but ‘breaks forth from the form’s interior. Species 
and lumen in beauty are one…’86 This reflects beauty correspondence to how being’s polar unity is 
encountered not abstractly, but concretely as radiant Gestalt ‘where it is always the totality of being 
that presents itself.... This means a totality of parts and elements, grasped as such, existing and 
defined as such, which for its existence requires not only a “surrounding world” but ultimately being 
as a whole…’87 
Let us consider further Balthasar’s notion of Gestalt. It encompasses the relationship between the 
ground of a being – the thing-in-itself, its essence, in its participation of esse – and the appearance of 
this ground in its various manifestations. These two irreducible elements are in asymmetrical 
reciprocal relationship. First, a being’s appearance flows from its essence and participation in esse. 
 
between being-in-itself and being-for-another where the dynamic between them opens to a theological 
perspective.  I bring these perspectives together. 
82 GL1, 464. 
83 Cf., GL1, 234. 
84 GL1, 118-119. 
85 GL1, 118-119. 
86 GL1, 151. 
87 GL1, 28-29. 
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As Balthasar says, ‘[b]eauty...is the inexplicable active irradiation of the centre of being into the 
expressive surface of the image, an irradiation that reflects itself in the image and confers upon it a 
unity, fullness, and depth surpassing what the image as such contains.’88  Secondly, this appearance 
is no mere extrinsic expression of a fully formed essence, but constitutive of that essence’s 
realisation as it participates in esse. A being’s appearance is not simply derivative, but ‘an original 
expression. It is a creation, not an imitation.’89 A being does not first come into existence and then 
communicate itself via its appearance. A ‘being comes into existence only in communicating itself.’90 
Essence and appearance require each other to be themselves. Yet, for the tension between them to 
be maintained they must coincide within a whole that encompasses and exceeds them. They must 
be ‘integrated in a permanent tension.’91 This is the ‘illuminated space “between” the ground and its 
appearing….’92  A ‘Gestalt is the whole at once; it is the outward expression of the inward ground, 
taken all at once, as a single, luminous appearance of the whole object.’93  It is a transcendent third 
that is inseparable from, but more than, the tension between two causal principles, namely, the 
hidden ground of a being and the outward appearance of this mysterious ground, where this 
transcendence is thoroughly present to its parts. As Balthasar states, Gestalt has ‘an exterior which 
appears and an interior depth, both of which, however, are not separable in the form [Gestalt] itself. 
The content (Gehalt) does not lie behind the form (Gestalt), but within it.’94 
Accordingly, each Gestalt has a ‘triadic structure.’95 What is crucial for the present discussion is that 
this articulates the pattern of fruitfulness of being’s epiphany. A Gestalt is a concrete fruit that is the 
effect of the dynamic relationship between its constituent parts. Yet it is also the whole that 
incorporates its causal principles, undergirding their mutual dependence and distinctiveness. A 
Gestalt is, therefore, an effect that is the cause of its causes. Here the whole has ontological priority 
over the parts on which it depends. The whole is, moreover, characterised by the dynamic tension 
between the parts. As Balthasar states, this has ‘the precise form of a reciprocal surrender…. In this 
mutual surrender, the essence con-descends to enter into the appearance and to display itself 
publicly in the world of images, whereas the appearance wants to be nothing other than a function 
 
88 TL1, 142 
89 TL1, 140. 
90 DST, 185.  
91 DST, 168. 
92 GL1, 610-611. 
93 DST, 184.  
94 GL1, 151. 
95 DST, 241, where Schindler compares the concrete fruitfulness inherent to Balthasar’s triadic sense of Gestalt 
to Aristotle’s triadic logic which separates the ideal and the real, and Hegel’s which reduces the real to the 
conceptual/ideal.  
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of the essence’s revelation.’96 The creative event of any being’s appearance involves an act of mutual 
surrender that belongs properly to the realm of beauty. This is, moreover, analogous to love as fully 
unveiled in the spirit’s freedom. As Balthasar states, ‘[t]o beauty belong not only the “measure, 
number and weight” of organised material, but also the “energy” of the organising agent, which 
expresses itself in form without losing itself to the external, and the “glory” proper to being free, and 
still more deeply, proper to the ability to squander oneself in love.’97  
This mutual self-giving between ground and appearance is fruitful, moreover, because the whole it 
constitutes infinitely transcends its parts. As Balthasar explains, vis-à-vis artistic Gestalt, ‘it is as if, at 
the moment when the two finite magnitudes of meaning [or essence] and image [or appearance] 
coincide, the work became infinite – a symbol that from now on transcends the sum of its parts.’98 
Given this, Schindler comments, ‘Balthasar’s notion of Gestalt...differs in a profoundly significant 
sense from the Thomistic and Neoplatonic notion of form precisely by the fact that it is not simply 
finite, but is rather the mysterious “intersection” of finitude and infinity.’99 In the mutual self-
surrender wherein essence and appearance coincide, ‘[t]he meaning is so completely and perfectly 
expressed that the surfaces “brim over” with meaning; they become literally radiant with 
“overfullness”….’100 Here the fruitful dynamic which inheres a Gestalt opens up to infinite splendour. 
As Balthasar says, ‘[a] light irradiates the form [Gestalt] itself, and the same light points to the reality 
that is both appearing in that form [Gestalt] and simultaneously transcending it.’101 The splendour of 
this dynamic between appearance and essence, as manifested as a being’s Gestalt, opens to the 
splendour of esse which achieves subsistence as the being’s dynamic reality. Esse’s splendour is thus 
inseparable from that of the actual being’s Gestalt. ‘The light which shines forth from the 
form…is…inseparably the light of the form itself (Scholasticism speaks therefore of splendor formae) 
and light of being as a whole, in which the form is immersed, so that it may have a unitary form.’102  
Remaining with the dynamic between essence and appearance, Balthasar’s notion of Gestalt adapts 
different aspects of the notion of form as conceived in classical, scholastic and certain strands of 
modern thought.103 As Schindler notes, compared to Aquinas’ notion of form, Gestalt corresponds 
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‘not to form alone but to the whole composite essence taken concretely in its participation in esse. 
In fact, it might be most appropriate to see Gestalt as the Thomistic composite [ens], read along the 
lines of the Platonic eidos (as the transcending unity that gives a thing its physical “look”), and even 
more specifically of the Aristotelian morphe, as the living organic whole.’104 Balthasar thus holds that 
the transcendent unity of essential form only ever appears within the concrete whole of a being 
where it is this whole that corresponds to Gestalt.  
There is, therefore, both a transcendent and immanent notion of essential form operating within 
Gestalt. Each Gestalt has, what Balthasar calls, a ‘transcendent centre’ that ‘is the midpoint of the 
concept of form (Gestalt)’ which joins the different ways a being appears into a concrete whole 
which shines with the light of being.105  As Balthasar says, ‘individual beings, as required by the act of 
being, fulfil their respective self-illumination and self-manifestation (as it were, grateful that a primal 
ground of being “lets them be”) in a “form” whose moments are rightly and revealingly “formed” in 
an interrelationship with one another that takes place on the basis of a unity: that which converges 
towards a unity is the light as well as the form….’106 Michael Waldstein reads Balthasar such that this 
transcendent unity dominates the various parts. Furthermore, a form exercises a higher quality of 
unity due to the greater degree of dominance over its parts.107 As Balthasar says, ‘the “height of the 
form” is judged according to the greater power of the unity to gather together equal varieties.’108 
This suggests a hierarchy of Gestalten based on the degree to which the different ways a being 
manifests itself are integrated. As Waldstein sees it, the more comprehensive the principle of unity 
in a Gestalt, the greater the complexity of the form, and, therefore, the higher the quality of the 
Gestalt in question. That said, Schindler corrects Waldstein’s overemphasis on the dominance of the 
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unity of the transcendent centre of the Gestalt. It is crucial to affirm also the immanence of this 
centre to ‘its parts and, indeed, its reciprocal need for its parts….’109 As Balthasar confirms, 
‘[t]ranscendence increases along with the immanence.’110 The higher level of quality of a Gestalt is 
not simply about greater unity, but greater immanence of that unity to its diverse material parts. 
Unity and diversity are not opposed. There is a direct proportion between them. ‘The quality of a 
form...is manifested not only in the fact that none of its parts is left out of that unity, but also in the 
fact that the parts enjoy a certain freedom in their difference. The rose is a higher Gestalt than a 
heap of sand, not only because it has a greater unity but also because it has more difference than 
the sand heap....’111 This creative tension between unity and difference, and transcendence and 
immanence, within a Gestalt unveils further the character of its inherent fruitfulness. The greater 
transcendent unity of Gestalt is manifested as greater immanent difference that in turn manifests a 
greater transcendent unity within immanent material reality. Indeed, this sense of greater unity-in-
difference echoes the perfect difference encompassed by the unity-in-difference of the constitutive 
human relationships as explored in the previous chapter – a connection I shall return to later in this 
chapter. 
The above concerns the fruitfulness that inheres a Gestalt analysed according to its essential and 
material components. This remains incomplete. The fruitful transcendence of any Gestalt only 
reaches fruition beyond itself via the actuality of esse. This betokens a fruitful reversal. Not only is 
any Gestalt the infinitely fruitful whole greater than the sum of its constituent parts, but the internal 
tension that characterises the Gestalt points beyond itself to a greater whole of which it is a part, 
namely, the splendour of esse. Again, ‘[t]he higher and purer a form, the more will light shine forth 
from its depths and the more will it point to the mystery of the light of being as a whole.’112 The 
triadic structure of a Gestalt thus opens intrinsically to esse. Each being’s resplendent Gestalt is, 
therefore, both triadic and quadratic: 
it is triadic to the extent that it is a whole, and it is a whole to the extent that it is constituted 
as such in a fourth dimension, radically different from the other three …. We might say that 
this triadic-quadratic logic, the logic of Gestalt, is in fact the very logic of fruitfulness: a 
constant opening up to the genuine novelty of a radically discontinuous order, an openness 
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that does not imply the destruction of ideal forms but is in fact what first gives them their 
solidity, their wholeness, and, indeed, their fascination.113 
 
This encompasses the ‘principle of fruitfulness’ where ‘the “stability” of the “triad” is not closed in 
on itself, but that it is inwardly, of itself, in principle open to a “fourth,” and a “fifth”, and so on.’114 
This allows beings fruitfully to communicate in a mutually fulfilling way that is creative of new 
beings. This also enables beings to contribute to yet more comprehensive wholes or Gestalten of 
which they are irreducible parts yet in a way which allows them to be more fully themselves in their 
distinctiveness. Finally, not only does the fruitful splendour of esse shines in and beyond the fruitful 
splendour of the concrete Gestalt, but esse’s own Gestalt-like pattern is unveiled. This concerns the 
active and receptive letting be which subsists in each being’s act of appearing. The luminous pattern 
of esse is intertwined with the particular, concrete form through which it shines. Beauty appears as 
the radiant Gestalt that manifests the event of being’s fruitful excess, a letting be that subsists in the 
more than determinate reality of beings that open to a creative splendour shared with others in 
their participation in esse.115 Again, as I discuss later, this associates the paradigmatic fruitfulness of 
the constitutive human relationships with the fruitfulness of a radiant Gestalt that mediates esse’s 
excess fruitfulness.  
3.2. Beauty’s subjective perspective 
Being’s beauty concerns not only the appearing object's radiant Gestalt but the latter's interaction 
with the subject, hearkening to Gestalt’s roots in psychology. Although the object’s radiant Gestalt 
has a certain priority, this obtains within a subject-object reciprocity in their joint participation in 
esse. In their complex interaction, subject and object form a single concrete dramatic unity 
analogous to two people dancing.116 They are a living unity greater than the sum of its parts, where 
this unity precedes them, yet is dependent on and only manifest in their correlated difference.  
In this encounter, the polarity exhibited in a being’s resplendent Gestalt is echoed within the 
subject’s activity. This is the wonder at being’s beauty we examined in chapters one and two. In GL1, 
Balthasar offers a more precise account, identifying this act as encompassing two distinct yet 
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inseparable aspects: perception and rapture.117 The resplendent Gestalt of the appearing object is 
simultaneously perceived and appropriated by an act of awe-filled rapture on the subject’s part. 
‘[N]o one can really behold who has not already been enraptured, and no one can be enraptured 
who has not already perceived.’118 Just as a Gestalt is a dynamic whole whose depths open to infinite 
splendour, so the whole subject is transported beyond itself through the rapture of perception of 
this radiant Gestalt. ‘We are “enraptured” by our contemplation of these depths and are 
“transported” to them. But, so long as we are dealing with the beautiful, this never happens in such 
a way that we leave the (horizontal) form behind us in order to plunge (vertically) into the naked 
depths.’119 
To explore this further, by perception Balthasar means not simply how an object is perceived by the 
senses, although they are crucial to the perception of being.120 It encompasses a distinctive 
intellectual act, one that is, as we will see, inseparable from an act of will understood as rapture. 
Perception (Wahrnehmung) means ‘a “taking to oneself” (nehmen) of something true (Wahres) 
which is offering itself.’121 This includes the intellect's participation in esse’s light which makes seeing 
Gestalten possible, just as this light is seen together with them.122 Balthasar explicitly contrasts 
‘intelligence that perceptively reads the Gestalt of things’ (das verstehende, Gestaltenlsende Denken) 
with ‘conceptual thinking’ (das begriffliche Denken) which follows upon the latter.123 He calls this 
variously ‘perceiving reason', ‘apperception’, or the passible and agent intellect, all working in 
conjunction with the imagination.124  
The imagination here encompasses the active receptivity of sense-based perception of an object’s 
sensible appearance and the receptive activity of the intellect to its essence. These cohere as two 
dynamic aspects of the single concrete act that opens up to the light of the intellect able to grasp the 
whole Gestalt. As Balthasar says, ‘[t]he very act of abstraction in which the spontaneous power of 
the intellect (intellectus agens) turns to the sensory material in order to illuminate it with its light 
and to elevate it into its sphere is simultaneously the act in which the intellect inclines to the 
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sensible in order to fill, and to find filled, its own empty unity in the latter’s multiplicity.’125 Just as 
the object’s Gestalt radiates its own fruitful light that is also the light and fruitfulness of esse beyond 
it, so the images that inhere within the fruitful light of the subject’s imagination receives their full 
ontological measure of fruitfulness in the latter’s openness to the light of the intellect’s participation 
in esse.126 The intellect and imagination’s receptively active engagement with the object beyond the 
subject is mediated by the will’s ecstatic movement. This brings us to how perception is inseparable 
from rapture.  
Whereas perception of the radiant Gestalt jointly engages the intellect and senses within the 
imagination’s openness to the intellect, rapture concerns the subject’s intellectual appetite or will in 
relation to the same Gestalt. Here intellect and will are married together as distinct aspects of a 
single complex act of the imagination now understood most fully as the concrete act of the heart, 
the centre of a person, in the sense explored in chapter two. This underlines how any act of 
perception of a Gestalt as a concrete transcendent whole requires an act of the whole subject. Here 
‘the whole person…enters into a state of vibration and becomes responsive space, the “sounding 
box” of the event of beauty occurring within him.’127  
As primarily concerning the will, rapture is an act of freedom understood not principally as choice 
(voluntas elicita) but the fundamental openness of the subject's spiritual nature in its orientation 
beyond itself to being as a whole (voluntas ut natura).128 The latter is the rapturous ground of free 
choice. This places prior receptivity to the beautiful Gestalt at the core of the will's freedom. Again, 
this echoes what we examined in chapter two: the subject can freely move beyond itself towards the 
object because moved by the object. Between perception and rapture the latter has an absolute 
priority. The subject’s perception of a Gestalt is preceded by the rapturous openness of the subject 
to the appearance of a radiant Gestalt. That said, this cannot be separated from the appearance and 
perception of the object, and, therefore, from the deliberate act of the subject freely to assent to 
the claim the object makes upon it. 
The subject’s awe-filled perception of the object’s appearance is, therefore, characterised by a 
twofold distinction between claim and decision. This allots priority to the claim the radiant Gestalt 
makes on the subject’s heart yet also calls for and so enables the subject’s free decision. However, 
this depends on the subject’s free decision to allow the object to make such a claim. As Schindler 
 
125 TL1, 151-152. 
126 E, 62-63. 
127 GL1, 220 
128 TL1, 110-112. 
202 
 
states, ‘[i]nsofar as the subject is free, he cannot be moved against his will, because in that case only 
a part of him will be moved.’129 This identifies the fundamental form of the subject’s freedom as ‘the 
rapture, in which the object “claims” the subject for itself. In this respect, the subject’s freedom 
toward the object in its truth is experienced…as the urgent call to decision.’130 This urgency of 
decision applies to all acts of perception, even if it is hidden; yet, it ‘increases in proportion as the 
complexity, or the unity and the difference, of the Gestalt increases, and, moreover, it is even in the 
smaller acts not unrelated to the fundamental decision that the knowing subject will make over the 
course of his life.’131 Nor, indeed, is it separable from the primordial decision that is a child’s 
awakening to self-consciousness by another. Every encounter, however great or small, thus offers a 
potential experience of beauty and, therefore, the breaking in of a gratuitous wonder that beckons 
to the heart, awakens the subject’s attention to the promising depth of things-in-themselves and 
being’s radiance, and energizes the subject to respond to reality out of a receptive freedom. 
We can link the centrality of this decision to Balthasar’s notion of aesthetic judgement. Balthasar 
calls this an ‘intuitive judgement’ of the appearing whole.132 As Schindler explains, ‘[i]n the relation 
between perception and rapture, ...perception occurs only in an inspired and free movement toward 
what is apprehended. The act of judgement is the crystallization of this movement.’133 This intuitive 
judgement means the act whereby the subject assents to being claimed and transported by the 
object as a transcendent concrete whole is the same act whereby the subject freely grasps the 
radiant Gestalt of the object. ‘Judgement, thus understood, is simultaneously an act of appropriation 
and an act of expropriation.’134 It is, moreover, a free act of the whole person (and an act of the 
whole person because free) that alone is fitting for grasping the whole radiant Gestalt of the object. 
In short, the subject can only take in the transcendent and concrete nature of the Gestalt by freely 
committing their whole self.  
This understanding of the subject’s wholehearted response to beauty corresponds, in Balthasar’s 
thought, to love. Love is not simply a matter of blind desire or willed active self-giving, but primarily 
a receptive response of the whole subject to being's beauty.135 Love thus matches the subject’s 
rapture-filled perception of beauty as the appearing object’s radiant Gestalt. As Balthasar says, ‘eros 
is the chosen place of beauty: whatever we love…always appears radiant with glory; and whatever is 
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objectively perceived as glorious…does not penetrate into the onlooker except through the 
specificity of an eros.’136 Here, ‘[l]ove is not “act without image”; on the contrary, love is what 
creates image and bestows shape absolutely.’137 
As Schindler examines in a discussion of Aquinas, love as eros or amor entails ‘the recognition that 
something is good and the positive disposition towards it’ where this ‘precedes every act of will, just 
as it precedes every physical desire.’138 This matches Balthasar’s sense of joint intellectual 
perception and willing rapture that moves the whole person. Love as recognition is a receptive act of 
appetite which moves in the ‘opposite direction of all of the other movements of the appetite….‘ Our 
will acts ‘not exactly like appetite, but more like an intellect, or our intellect…acts, not like intellect, 
but more like an appetite.’139 Hence, love effects an ‘inward transformation of desire brought about 
by the desirable thing, a transformation that precedes, and indeed makes possible, every single act 
of desire without exception.’140 In Balthasar’s idiom, the subject receives an object’s concrete Gestalt 
which transforms the subject’s desire and transports the subject beyond itself. Through this 
receptivity, the will's desire is fitted to the object's Gestalt which thereby furnishes the concrete 
milieu wherein the will’s ecstatic acts occur. Indeed, corresponding to the transporting nature of the 
beautiful form is ‘a pliancy' of the whole person whereby ‘one’s entire existence’ is ‘malleable 
material to be shaped….’141  What Schindler finds in Aquinas applies to Balthasar: ‘love is a unity 
from which one acts…. [L]ove is not a transition from potency to act but a sharing of actuality, which 
precedes all such transitions and gives them order….142 For Balthasar, this involves  
the metamorphosis of the beholder into the image he beholds, …the “realisation” of what 
the image expresses…. The image unfolds into the one contemplating it, and it opens out its 
consequence in his life. It is not I who draw my consequences from what I have seen; if I 
have really seen it in itself, it is the object of my vision which draws out its implications in 
me…. The form which inscribes itself in the living centre of my being becomes…my 
judgement….143  
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The subject thereby judges after the fashion of the beauty of the radiant Gestalt it encounters which 
in-forms and trans-forms the subject.144 Indeed, subject and object are transformed within a larger 
shared reality. As Balthasar says, ‘there should be a correspondence between object and subject; the 
external harmony must correspond to a subjective need and both give rise to a new harmony of 
higher order; subjectivity, with its feeling and imagination, must free itself in an objective work, in 
which it rediscovers itself, in the course of which…there may be as much self-discovering as 
experience of another.’145 This reiterates how, in the beautiful, object and subject are active and 
receptive to each other. They communicate via their shared participation in esse.146 
4. The Good 
Balthasar’s understanding of goodness follows from his account of the beautiful. Thus, from an 
objective perspective, goodness denotes how being’s manifestation as beautiful, as a being’s radiant 
Gestalt, also involves a self-giving. As Balthasar says, ‘[w]hat is shown (beauty) imparts itself 
(goodness)….’147 Whereas beauty concerns being's appearance in the concrete, goodness 
foregrounds the gift aspect of this same appearance.  
This embeddedness in being’s beauty means that goodness exhibits the same polarity evidenced in 
the radiant Gestalt. This polarity translates into how each being is both a determinate good-for-
others and a good-in-itself. Hence, being gives itself in the self-giving of particular beings as a 
determinate object to be used and enjoyed by other beings for their good and fulfilment. Thus, any 
being’s self-giving goodness intrinsically references other beings. The object's self-giving 
incorporates thereby a receptivity whereby it is appropriated by other beings.  This allows these 
others to strive beyond themselves towards what is given for their fulfilment. Being’s self-giving ‘is 
why striving for something is universal.’148  
That said, being’s self-giving is not simply to be reduced to a determinate good for the sake of other 
beings’ fulfilment. A being does not give itself, and so is not good, simply because it fulfils other 
beings’ desire or enjoyment. A being gives itself as a manifestation of its goodness-in-itself which 
exceeds any particular usefulness. Its goodness transcends how it appears as a determinate good 
that matches a particular desire. Being's inherent goodness is, however, immanent to and 
dependent on how a being is a particular good-for-others. This emphasises how the good is 
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embedded in beauty’s radiant Gestalt pattern. As Balthasar emphasises, this recognition of and 
striving after the good-in-itself, that does not reduce to the desire of the one striving, only comes 
completely into view with the self-conscious subject.149  
Viewed from the perspective of the subject-object encounter, goodness entails a reciprocity of self-
giving activity and receptivity on part of object and subject. Thus, the self-giving of any particular 
being via its concrete appearance as Gestalt also requires that it be receptive to the subject’s active 
and ecstatic striving towards it as a determine good. As Balthasar says, this indicates a dependence 
of the object’s good, that is, its capacity to give itself and be receptive to the subject’s striving, on 
the subject giving itself in a way that is receptive to the object's self-gift.150  
This underscores the central position Balthasar allots to the subject’s freedom of will in receiving the 
object’s self-giving. Although a being may give itself as good, it cannot impose itself on the subject’s 
freedom without threatening the subject’s good. Indeed, the subject can resist the good for this 
reason.151 As Schindler summarises Balthasar, ‘the object must in some sense await the free 
reception by the subject, and in that respect in its freedom in giving it has a certain dependence on 
the freedom that receives. The good can therefore be good, not through force but through 
persuasion and vulnerability to rejection.’152 This is clearest in the encounter between subjects 
where it entails a renunciation of efforts to coerce another subject’s freedom but requires a shared 
openness to being's transcendent ground wherein each thing participates, including another's 
freedom.153 This involves an active sense of welcome and vulnerability to the other's freedom that 
requires ‘neither compulsion nor allurement from the outside; rather, it is the exposure of the 
heart’s innermost freedom….’154 This becomes especially apparent with the paradoxical nature of 
love.  Love is both the fulfilment of humanity’s free spiritual nature, and so a determinate good 
accruing to that nature, yet as love, cannot be something forced but only given in ‘free self-
surrender’ as a good-in-itself.155 It is this freedom that underpins the dramatic nature of the self-
giving of goodness. The ‘human person will always be trying to compel something that essentially 
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cannot be compelled: love. Furthermore, each person can be denied what he demands from the 
other…and his demands can be refused for reasons that are or are not good.’156  
As with the polarity exhibited in the object’s good as a determinate good relative to others and a 
good-in-itself, the subject’s response exhibits its own polarity. This involves two moments in the 
subject’s enactment of the good: a receptive act of will which is one of appropriative choice and an 
ecstatic act of will enacted as abiding fidelity.157 Choice here flows from the response the subject has 
already made to the beautiful whereby the subject is claimed by the object's radiant Gestalt and 
transported beyond itself. This movement enables and invites the subject to respond fully with its 
deliberately willed act of free choice. As Schindler state, ‘this choice has the basic structure of a yes, 
of an assent to the good that has…presented itself in the beautiful.’158 In this receptive act of 
appropriation, the subject also goes out to the object. Yet, echoing the polarity exhibited in the 
beautiful, the good that gives itself exceeds any such appropriation by the subject. As with the 
radiance of the Gestalt, the excessive character of the good-in-itself wells up within the determinate 
good that is given and appropriated. In correspondence with this excess, the first moment of choice 
needs to be deepened in a second moment of fidelity on the part of the subject. Schindler defines 
this fidelity as ‘an abiding with what was chosen wherever it may lead, and perhaps significantly 
beyond what one initially expected.’159 The self-giving that lies at the core of any determinate good 
exceeds our initial appropriation of it and instead expropriates us and, if we remain committed to 
this expropriation, transforms us. Such transformation follows from the subject’s fidelity to the 
object in its abiding difference.  
5. Truth 
Truth represents how being’s self-showing (beauty) and self-giving (goodness) are inseparable from 
and culminate in being’s self-expression. In line with his hierarchical and evolutionary account of the 
transcendentals, Balthasar associates truth-as-self-expression particularly with self-conscious 
freedom. As noted above, however, even beings lacking self-consciousness express themselves in an 
analogous fashion.  
To expand, from an objective perspective, being expresses itself according to the self-expression of 
each being in the polarity between being grounded-in-itself and going out of itself to realise its 
innermost reality. In the realm of truth, this involves a tension between a being’s determinate 
 
156 E, 70. 
157 Schindler, “Beauty and the Analogy of Truth,” 314-315. 
158 Ibid., 314. 
159 Ibid., 315. 
207 
 
outward expression of its unified essential and existential being-in-itself, and its abiding mystery and 
transcendent depth that opens to being's excess. For Balthasar, truth is characterised by an abiding 
mystery where the object is more-than-what-is-determinately-disclosed yet where this mystery is 
expressed in a determinate or, better, super-determinate fashion as a radiant Gestalt.160 This 
associates being’s mystery, not with negative inaccessibility, but an inexhaustible, ever-greater 
luminosity shining in each being’s super-determinate reality. Such mystery is not opposed to 
determinate clarity rather it shines within the object’s more-than-determinate Gestalt. Such 
ontological mystery ‘results from the expressiveness of reality rather than from being’s relentless 
withdrawal.’161  
The unveiling of a being’s ever-greater luminous mystery in its super-determinate self-expression, 
however, is not achieved alone. It requires coming to realisation beyond itself in others, most fully in 
self-conscious spirit. Beings express their truth through communication. As Balthasar says, ‘[e]very 
being has the gift of being able to “express” itself to another, which capacity presupposes an 
“innerness”, an ability to communicate, that is, to impart itself. This “im-parting” implies a 
mysterious “partition” “in” another, in which the one imparting himself both gives himself away and 
at the same time...preserves himself.’162 A being’s dependence on others to unveil its truth and 
express itself deepens, therefore, what is first shown, perceived and wondered at as radiant Gestalt 
in beauty; and what is imparted, received, sought and enjoyed as a determinate good that opens to 
the being’s inexhaustible goodness-in-itself. As Balthasar says: 
[t]he entity in its essence [Wesen] is represented in its appearance. This re-presentation 
gives it its form [Gestalt] in the world. In this form [Gestalt] it pre-sents its sense-ful, logos-
based content as something entirely intuitable. It thus also gives itself from within the 
context of the whole world so that it can be used (uti) as gift but also enjoyed (frui) and in 
which, finally, even its truth is proven.163  
Truth thus involves a disclosure wherein what is shown as beautiful and bestowed as good is indeed 
unveiled as the reality of the being-in-itself and its abiding mystery in its openness to esse.  
Let us consider this vis-à-vis the subject-object encounter. To reiterate, a being’s self-expression in 
truth is not achieved unilaterally. It is an event of reciprocal encounter, the more so the higher the 
level of beings involved. This means that a being’s truth depends on being offered space to express 
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itself, ultimately in the freedom of self-consciousness wherein the object achieves greater 
realisation. This cannot mean, however, the assimilation of a being’s conceptual reality to the 
subject’s mind. Rather, a being’s self-expression attains completion when the subject recognises the 
object’s appearance as ‘the self-perfecting of what is self-expressive and not as something belonging 
to it….’ The object’s manifold appearances are taken as a single unified Gestalt to refer 
‘immediately…to the other self-expressing being – the “thing in itself”.’ The subject ‘takes the other 
as something other, …and understands the other’s acts of expression as those of the other’s 
interiority or subsistence.’164  The subject’s recognition of the object’s self-expressing reality requires 
that the subject goes out to the object. The event of truth thus begins ecstatically outside the 
subject. This stresses how truth is rooted in the good whereby the subject not only goes out to 
appropriate the object’s good for itself but remains outside itself in fidelity to the object’s goodness-
in-itself. In the order of truth, this fidelity becomes self-giving trust.165 Through the subject's ecstatic 
trust in the object’s irreducible otherness, the object discloses its reality to the subject’s 
receptivity.166 
This dynamic of trust in the object and disclosure to the subject pivots on the subject’s act of 
judgement coming to fruition in truth. This is the culmination of the subject’s act of intuitive 
judgement enacted first in beauty where the object’s Gestalt is grasped by the subject being 
transported beyond itself. As noted above, this involves a receptive movement of the will which is 
freely appropriated through the subject’s assent and fidelity in the good. In the realm of truth, the 
subject completes this scheme by judging the object’s appearance to be an expression of the object 
itself.167 The subject can do this because its own self-conscious freedom is constituted by and open 
to being as whole. As Balthasar expands, ‘[t]he subject “discovers” Being only when the subject is 
discovered by Being. The cogito ergo sum in which the subject discovers the entire openness of the 
real in reflexive and free self-possession happens only when the subject is addressed by a reality that 
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manifests itself through phenomenal images.’168 Balthasar thus understands the subject’s act of 
judgment as contributing to truth insofar as it ‘concedes’ to the appearing phenomenon the reality 
of the being-in-itself. This concession occurs within the subject and object’s joint participation in 
esse. Echoing the metaphysics explored in chapter one, the subject lets the other be ‘in the unity 
appropriate to that other in the mystery of that other’s “being-there”…. The other…is thus revealed 
to me as a mystery lying well beyond all grasping concepts precisely when it reveals itself to me 
without any desire to hold back….’169 This ‘ensues only if, while being addressed by this real thing, I 
gain the intuition in myself…of “reality”, in whose light true judgement occurs....’170 Because the light 
of being is reflected in spirit as a gift bestowed from beyond itself whereby the spirit recognizes its 
own existence, the spirit can freely contribute to the expression of other beings who participate in 
the light of being. The subject’s act of judgement does not constitute truth; rather, the subject’s 
judgement is judged against the ever-greater divine gift of being bestowed to subject and object. 
This reiterates that truth is not simply a function of the object being taken into the subject’s 
intellect. The object discloses its truth because the subject has willingly gone out of itself in its 
openness to esse which it shares with the object. This echoes how, for Balthasar, it is not simply the 
will that is ecstatic, but so too in the intellect – it must go beyond itself to understand. The subject 
arrives at this point of truthful disclosure together with the object via their mutual encounter in the 
beautiful and good.  
This recasts the evolutionary relationship of the transcendentals as, what Schindler calls, ‘the 
narrative structure of the soul’s encounter with reality.’171 The transcendentals chart a dramatic 
course where truth is the final outcome: ‘the truth of being reveals itself “explicitly” only through the 
mediation of the ex-propriative moment of goodness, and this moment, in turn, does not make its 
demands except within the “rapture” in which the soul already receives a “foretaste,” we might say, 
of being’s good truth.’172 This begins with being’s epiphany in beauty where the subject responds 
with ‘vision and rapture’; then, in goodness with ‘choice and fidelity’; and culminates in truth, with 
‘trust and disclosure.’ These moments are successive yet overlapping.173 They do not, moreover, 
terminate with a being’s disclosure to the subject’s understanding. Disclosure ‘reveals truth to be 
diaphanous, to be the communication of a reality that retains its integrity as an objective Gestalt 
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abidingly distinct from the soul and so abidingly mysterious….’174 Truth's disclosure is, therefore, a 
moment of epiphany in a new radiant Gestalt wherein being’s ever-greater transcendence shines 
out.175  
Such transcendence is, therefore, no formless excess into which subject and object are subsumed. It 
concerns the new Gestalten that are the concrete fruit of the subject-object encounter.176 These 
Gestalten encompass this union in a way that transcends subject and object yet affirms their 
diversity and communicates being afresh.177 This is why Balthasar associates truth with 
fruitfulness.178 Indeed, these new Gestalten are the fruition of beauty’s incipient fruitfulness. They 
incorporate in a transformative union the radiant Gestalt of the object’s first appearance and the 
subject’s wholehearted self-giving free response to the latter where this exceeds their individual 
contributions in their shared participation in esse. Thus, the Gestalten of truth are partly the fruit of 
the subject’s own perceptive, intellectual and willed activity. This undergirds how the intelligibility of 
an object’s Gestalt exceeds the being itself. And yet, the truth of the Gestalten resides also beyond 
the subject insofar as the Gestalten possess an independent concrete existence distinct from the 
subject. ‘To say that the Gestalt is thus irreducibly distinct from the soul means that the soul can 
“appropriate” it only by going beyond itself….’179 That said, the Gestalt also remains distinct from the 
being that is known since the Gestalt is the only ever the concrete appearance of an ever-greater 
reality beyond what appears. It ‘is an intelligibility that the soul can comprehend, and thus include 
within itself, but which represents more than the soul can articulate….and at the same time, while it 
lies beyond the mere material existence of thing, it remains a relative partial expression of that 
reality: the reality could have appeared differently, and it does not simply exhaust all that it is in the 
particular appearance.’180 
This notion of truth-as-fruit manifested in new radiant Gestalten is, for Balthasar, paradigmatically 
expressed in language. Language is ‘no mere ens rationis and ens diminutum but rather ontological 
reality.’181 Accordingly, Balthasar stresses language’s role in enabling being’s self-expression in the 
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self-expressing activity of beings.182 Here beings both depend on being illuminated in human free 
expression to express themselves fully, yet also enable such free expression in humans who thereby 
recognise their own capacity as creators of meaning that expresses being’s reality in the communal 
medium of language.  
This ontological significance of language to truth is, for Balthasar, inseparable from beauty and 
goodness. Each being’s epiphany in beauty and self-giving in goodness are ‘indispensable moments 
in their emergence into speech.’183 Indeed, human language ‘has always implied the (subhuman) 
organic structure of self-showing and self-giving, drawing this structure into the sphere of the 
spiritual.’184 That said, self-expression in language ‘is more than simply externalizing oneself in 
manifestation or action: it presupposes the strongest tension between perfect interiority in the 
freedom of self-consciousness and perfect externalizing in a more than natural mimesis and 
gesture….’185 Hence, language is a function of the human capacity freely to express the self-
expressing excess of esse as it subsists in beings yet also transcends them. As Balthasar states, 
language is only possible when ‘Being in its entirety...is fundamentally open to spiritual self-
consciousness…which grasps itself reflexively as Being…which is always more than the sum of the 
finite beings that partake in it.’186 The self-conscious spirit, moreover, only attains to this insight into 
being as whole and, therefore, the freedom to express itself and to judge the reality of other beings’ 
self-expression, because it is addressed by the light of being in other beings. As we saw in chapter 
two, this occurs primordially for each child through the address of the light of its parents' love which 
mediates the light of the gift of divine being. 
Language is here indispensable to the act of judgement whereby the self-conscious spirit enables 
other beings to express themselves and expresses its own self-conscious freedom through the light 
received from them. This occurs when ‘the mind…conscious of its own “to be”, can grasp these 
existing things in the light of Being by means of images and can address those images because they 
are illumined by this light.’187 This requires that human subjects ‘re-spond [ant-worten] with a word 
[Wort] that is spirit [the verbum intellectus or cordis], but with a word that has always had its 
sensible correspondence, even if the vision of insight into reality as such precedes this answer….’188 
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Balthasar here follows Aquinas in affirming ‘the medium of our human thinking and judging is 
therefore speech….’189 Truth's disclosure via the union of subject and object in the concrete fruit of 
new Gestalten thus finds its correspondence in the meanings of human language. This is greater 
than any one individual yet funds each person’s freedom: 'self-expression is a free imaging, in which 
the spiritual subject can make known its reflexivity, relying both on language’s prior social 
conventions as well as on the personal inventions of new sentences.’190 
Language is, therefore, ‘the sphere in which human beings understand one another and 
themselves…which is why knowledge always presupposes community…’191 This presupposition of 
community and interdependence enables self-expression and freedom. Furthermore, language and 
any meaning-imbued activity are the means whereby humans know each other in love.192 Here 
‘[s]ouls can truly encounter one another and changes places through the narrow passageway of 
image-bound words.’193 The fruitful exchanges of language are the medium for the love rooted in 
beauty, given freely in goodness and expressed in truth which shines anew with being's radiant 
beauty.194 Hence, human language encompasses being’s self-expressing reality which always exceeds 
simply what humans express. This emphasises how ‘truth and language are not the same even as 
language conditions and makes possible the expression of truth. The expression is always 
outstripped by that which it expresses, and this is because what is expressed drives us to ask more 
deeply about what we have received.’195 As I examine later, Balthasar’s understanding of the 
metaphysical significance of language vis-à-vis truth, and its dependence on beauty and goodness, 
and importance to love, finds its measure in the fruitfulness of the constitutive human relationships. 
6. Beauty’s Primacy 
Having considered beauty, goodness, and truth as distinct yet interdependent aspects of being’s 
epiphanic character in the subject-object encounter, I now consider more fully their circumincessive 
relationship. I examine this principally from the perspective of the primacy Balthasar allots to 
beauty. Beauty’s primacy rests on how it is the concrete unity of the true and good. It is a third 
positive relational transcendental yet it is not any of the following: situated alongside them; their 
nominal aggregate; a transcendent unity that negates them; nor, are the good and true derived from 
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beauty. Rather, beauty incorporates the opposing movements of the intellect’s receptivity to being 
in truth and the will’s ecstatic relationship to being in the good. Beauty encompasses them in its own 
order that has a relative completeness-in-itself. It transcends the good and the true as their concrete 
unity yet is immanently dependent on and permeates them. Regarding goodness and truth, 
therefore, beauty has the structure of a radiant Gestalt. This means beauty can be analysed 
according to how it relies on and transforms its component parts. 
[T]here is a “truth-like” movement of the object’s being taken spiritually into the 
subject…though this is not truth per se; it is truth trans-formed by goodness, which means 
the grasp is not an explicit comprehension.... At the same time, there is a rapture, a 
movement of the subject toward the object that imitates the good, but is not the good per 
se; it is goodness trans-formed by truth so as to be, not a real possession or enjoyment, but 
specifically a disinterested pleasure….. [B]eauty is not merely conceptual and not merely 
enjoyable because it is both simultaneously.’196  
In beauty, the intellect and will are set into action in unison by being’s epiphany, not in their own 
right, but, to recall the discussion of chapter two, in the heart's active receptivity to the object’s 
receptive activity. The intellect and will do not reach completion in beauty but await fulfilment in 
their own orders. That said, not only does the mutual inherence and transformation of the good and 
true characterise beauty, but, given their shared genesis in beauty, beauty mediates the true and 
good to each other making them what they are in themselves. Thus, to reiterate, the receptivity of 
the intellect to being in truth incorporates the ecstasy of the subject’s will towards the object – 
truth’s relationship to goodness – to be truth at all. This is the spontaneous activity of the agent 
intellect. Likewise, the ecstatic activity of the will towards being in the good incorporates the 
receptivity of subject’s intellect to the object – goodness’ relationship to truth – to be the good. This 
is the voluntas ut natura. 
The good and truth remain true to their interdependence insofar as they remain rooted in beauty. 
Accordingly, beauty is ‘more foundational than goodness and truth, since it establishes the context 
within which all of our acts of understanding and desire take place…. Every action is ultimately a 
response at some level to beauty.’197 That said, truth and goodness do not simply depend on beauty, 
beauty depends on them. As Balthasar says, ‘[t]he form as it appears to us is beautiful only because 
the delight that it arouses in us is founded upon the fact that, in it, the truth and goodness of the 
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depths of reality itself are manifested and bestowed, and this manifestation and bestowal reveal 
themselves to us as being something infinitely and inexhaustibly valuable and fascinating.’198   
This brings us to consider how beauty’s primacy safeguards the ontological fruitfulness of the 
transcendentals as properties of being’s own transcendent superabundant actuality. Where either 
truth or goodness are prioritised over the other, being risks losing its transcendence by being 
reduced to the subject. This is clearest when truth is prioritised since being becomes a function of 
the mind’s receptive grasp of the object with no relation to object’s goodness-in-itself.199 This 
precludes any fruitfulness beyond the mind’s abstractions and ideas. Moreover, goodness, because 
made secondary to truth, risks becoming a function of and mere agent of an abstract rationalism 
that undermines any genuine sense of freedom based on the fruitful encounter with others. 
By comparison, a loss of fruitful transcendence is less obvious if the good is prioritised since this 
concerns the subject’s movement beyond itself towards the object through a free act of will. Indeed, 
Balthasar affirms how transcendence is associated particularly with the good. He disagrees, 
however, with, for instance, Jean-Luc Marion, that this makes the good more transcendent than 
being and truth, or, indeed, beauty.200 Such an approach threatens the concrete reality of beings 
since it precludes from the good any receptivity to the object's being-in-itself. This makes the good 
an arbitrary function of the subject’s will which acts against a purely negative backdrop. The will is 
here blindly irrational. Moreover, transcendence and fruitfulness are subject to the ‘the sovereign 
act of the sheer origin’ of the subject’s ‘self-positing.’201 This undermines a transcendent source of 
being’s fruitfulness beyond the subject. Furthermore, truth, as secondary to the good, risks 
becoming a function of the will’s arbitrary choice.202 Additionally, as Schindler notes, even where an 
initial grasp of the object is granted, a fruitful encounter with being's transcendence is undermined 
insofar as the good is made more ultimate than truth. Receptivity to the object becomes merely 
instrumental for the subject’s self-positing journey in a futile attempt to go beyond itself. The object 
becomes the expendable means to ‘the infinity of striving or the infinity of kenotic self-gift.’203 This 
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jeopardizes transcendence and being’s fruitfulness because final emphasis is placed on the subject – 
‘if the last word is the gift of self, the final accent falls on the self.’204  
By contrast, Balthasar’s ordering of the transcendentals safeguards the transcendent source of 
being’s fruitfulness. This is because, first, the beautiful is an event of mutual transcending enacted 
jointly by object and subject. The subject’s will and intellect are actively engaged at the outset from 
beyond the subject by an object whose ground remains irreducibly different to the subject. This 
prevents the intellect or the will collapsing into each other. Secondly, Balthasar's ordering means 
that the transcendence associated with the good is not inimical to truth’s disclosure of an object’s 
essence as a clear determinate concept because goodness has its own provenance in a truth-like 
receptivity to the object’s radiant Gestalt in beauty. Thirdly, the transcendent source of the 
fruitfulness of the transcendentals is safeguarded not only through the primacy of beauty but the 
ultimacy of truth. Since truth is reached via the beautiful and the good, it does not correspond to a 
mere abstract grasp of the object. Truth is the communion of subject and object in their mutual 
ecstatic encounter beyond each other in the fruit of their union which is an objective new Gestalt.205 
This emphasises how ‘the transcendence of the transcendental relation – its being in every moment 
an event that is “more than self” – requires that the gift of self in the end be subordinated to the 
objective fruit of that gift.’206 Here truth is a fruitful new event of beauty. As Balthasar says: ‘the 
name of this radiant property of truth, which overwhelms by its splendor, its indivisible integrity, and 
its perfect expressive power, is, in fact, none other than beauty. Beauty is the aspect of truth that 
cannot be fitted into any definition but can be apprehended only in direct intercourse with it; thanks 
to beauty, every encounter with truth is a new event.’207 
We can enumerate several implications of this understanding of beauty. First, as noted above, 
beauty displays a Gestalt-like structure vis-à-vis goodness and truth. This means that beauty is a 
third characterised not only by the horizontal polarity between its constituent terms, but also a 
transcendent vertical polarity that opens within this horizontal tension. This transcendent-immanent 
dynamic reflects how the primacy of beauty aligns not only with how beauty is the concrete unity of 
the good and the true, but how this concrete unity of two-in-a-third is the manifestation of being's 
transcendent unity. As Schindler clarifies, ‘[i]f beauty is the unity of truth and goodness within the 
order of the true and good, unity itself is the transcendental that comprehends the whole.’ Thus, 
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beauty parallels how the immanent transcendent unity of a Gestalt points beyond itself to the 
wholly other order of the unity of esse. This pattern is echoed in the relational transcendentals. As 
Schindler continues, ‘[t]he organic whole that corresponds to the circumincession of the beautiful, 
the good, and the true, and the irreducible tension that results from it ‘is “crystallized” in the 
surpassing of that whole into a “radically other” order.208 This also explains why beauty has ‘a 
general primacy’ over the good and true, while underscoring the primacy of the good and true in 
their own orders. While beauty is the concrete appearance of the comprehensive unity of the whole, 
it ‘is not so to speak responsible for the unity of the whole alone, but is itself a manifestation of a 
unity that transcends the whole, [hence] its general primacy…is not something that it has to insist on 
at every turn in relation to the others, but rather, the transcendence of unity itself “frees” it to be 
subordinate to the other orders in a way that enriches both the true and the good…..209 It is only via 
goodness and truth, and their relationship in beauty, that being’s transcendent unity is fully 
expressed.  
Here the wholly other order of unity, as articulated in polarity between esse and ens, ‘undergirds’ 
beauty, goodness and truth and so ‘precedes’ them; and yet is what ‘their complex circumincession 
in fact explicates (and thus comes after them)….’210 This reflects how, in Balthasar’s concrete 
approach to metaphysics, being's polar unity is only encountered through the concrete dynamic of 
the relational transcendentals as ‘the self-surpassing of the three transcendentals into the wholly 
other order….’211 As Balthasar says, ‘in the cleavage that traverses their worldly form, the 
transcendentals necessarily pervade one another, yet, in virtue of this same cleavage, hence, of their 
“finitude”, they point together beyond themselves. In other words, as the nature unfolds of “ens 
[sic] completum et simplex sed non subsistens,” they all together contain a super-finite, super-
essential aspect by which they point to their origin, their conservation, and their end in God.’212 In 
this concrete way, according to the order of the relational transcendentals that Balthasar proposes, 
the not-one unity of the analogical nature of created being opens to the ever-greater reality of 
divine being.213 
Secondly, that beauty concretely manifests the ever-greater excess of being’s transcendent unity 
reflects Balthasar’s association of beauty with groundlessness.214 Beauty is not simply concerned 
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with the dynamic of the outward appearance of a being’s inward ground as a concrete whole, but 
with the ground of this dynamic. Beauty is the manifestation of the ‘ground of the ground’ or 
‘groundless ground.’215 As Balthasar says, ‘[a] moment of grace lies in all beauty, it shows itself to me 
far beyond that I have a right to expect, which is why we feel astonishment and admiration.’216 
Beauty’s groundlessness concerns the ‘being-in-itself’ quality of being as divine gift.217 If the 
beautiful makes any demands it is ‘to be allowed to be what it is beyond our attempts to control and 
manipulate it, in order truly to be able to be happy by enjoying it….’218 Any reductive account based 
on the ‘necessity of being must always be transcended by the eternal wonder of being allowed to 
be.’219 Beauty is the ‘“just-is-ness” of things. When we look up at a starry sky…we are not instructed 
or fed, …we are simply moved in a deep way…’220  Indeed, Balthasar associates this gratuitous aspect 
of beauty with a freedom that has its own quality of necessity: ‘it possesses its intelligibility precisely 
as a miracle; it is something that binds and frees at the same time, since it gives itself unambiguously 
as the “self-manifesting freedom” (Schiller) of inner, undemonstrable necessity….’221 This necessarily 
groundless quality of beauty reflects paradoxically how it is more foundational than the good and 
true as their groundless ground. 
Thirdly, insofar as goodness and truth remain rooted in beauty they manifest within their own 
orders beauty’s groundlessness. This transforms their character into a communication of something 
endlessly fascinating which cannot be exhausted by what the subject makes of them. Balthasar 
enumerates this from both a negative and positive perspective. Negatively, without beauty truth 
‘remains both pragmatic and formalistic;’ and, ‘the good remains both utilitarian and 
hedonistic….’222 Positively, the ‘depth-dimension’ between a being’s ground and its manifestation as 
disclosed in a radiant Gestalt ‘opens up the ontological locus of the truth of being, and frees the 
striver, allowing him to achieve the spiritual distance that makes a beauty rich in form desirable in its 
being-in-itself (and not only in its being-for-me), and only thus worth striving after.’223 Beauty's 
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groundlessness thus transforms thought and action.224 It introduces ‘contemplative wonder more 
fundamentally at the origin of all our knowing – an origin that constantly abides as a life-giving 
principle – and...a disposition of gratitude more fundamentally at the origin of our action.’225 
Fourthly, beauty’s groundlessness, and so that of goodness and truth, embodies a particular notion 
of reciprocal causality. Each of the relational transcendentals betokens a single act shared jointly 
between two agents in the concrete event of encounter between subject and object. As Schindler 
explains:  
[i]f beauty “contains” the movements of the true and the good, then, because these 
movements are “opposed,” its own movement is a paradoxical one…: it is a single 
movement that ends in two places at once, in both the subject and the object.… The only 
way of conceiving it is as one act with two principles, which are…not unrelated to each other 
but have a mutual interdependence. It is one act with two sources. Thus, another way of 
expressing beauty as a relation with two termini is to say that beauty is reciprocal causality 
itself.’226 
We can add that this dramatic reciprocal causality is asymmetrical. This asymmetry concerns how, 
although beauty is a single act with two sources and two end points, relative priority is given to the 
object or the subject, respectively. Thus, as regards beauty’s two sources, the appearance of the 
object’s radiant Gestalt has relative priority. Nevertheless, the object’s appearance as beautiful 
simultaneously depends on the subject’s openness to the object. Conversely, this encounter ends 
with a relative finality in the subject’s disinterest enjoyment of the object, and yet this is inseparable 
from the subject’s being transport towards the object which retains its ever-greater difference from 
the subject. This asymmetry of the reciprocal causality underpins the self-transcending dramatic 
tension that characterises the encounter between the object and subject in the event of beauty and 
opens fruitfully beyond itself to manifest being’s infinite depth and gratuity. 
Understanding beauty as asymmetrical reciprocal causality sheds light on the character of beauty’s 
groundlessness. The latter is no purely unmediated groundlessness. Instead, beauty’s 
groundlessness is, in fact, the mutual grounded-ness that obtains between subject and object in 
their mutually interdependent and self-transcending movement that opens to being’s ever-greater 
excess. This is groundless insofar as neither subject or object alone, nor in relation, are the causes of 
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being’s manifestation as beautiful. Beauty is an event jointly caused by, but also exceeding the 
subject-object encounter. This connection between beauty as asymmetrical reciprocal causality and 
being’s grace-like groundlessness as gift, together with the wonder beauty evokes, further explains 
why Balthasar associates beauty with joy – where wonder arises from mutuality and difference.227  
Fifthly, and finally, given that beauty is the union of the good and the true, they too exhibit the same 
asymmetrical reciprocal causality and mutual grounded-ness that is the mediation of being’s 
gratuitous excess. We saw earlier how the good cannot simply be a matter of the will’s ecstatic 
movement towards the object without the will incorporating something like the intellect’s 
receptivity; nor can truth simply be a matter of the intellect’s receptivity to the subject without a 
will-like activity. United in beauty, both the good and the true are ‘dramatically complexified by a 
countermovement within itself, which is to say that there is a resistance in each case to a tension-
less collapse into a single direction.’228 The asymmetrical reciprocal causality manifested in beauty 
applies, therefore, to each of the transcendentals.  As Schindler explains, 
once we have secured the “mediated immediacy” of the two in a third in principle, we are 
freed to see it everywhere. There is therefore an importance sense in which…goodness 
contains both beauty and truth, and truth contains goodness and beauty – precisely because 
beauty contains goodness and truth…. In other words, each of the transcendentals is in some 
respect a relationship with two termini…. [T]hey must both end in difference ways in the 
subject and object, and in this way form the reciprocal movement of circumincessive, 
dramatic encounter.229   
We have seen this played out in the polarities that characterise the narrative structure of the soul’s 
encounter with being according to each transcendental. Each is a single, complex and paradoxical 
movement that has simultaneously two points of origin and two end points in the subject and 
object. That this asymmetrical reciprocal causality characterises each of the relational 
transcendentals accounts for how goodness and true share in beauty's openness to being’s excessive 
superabundance, and therefore, the latter’s groundlessness, wonder, joy and grace-like quality.230 
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7. Love as the ‘Transcendental Par Excellence’231 
The asymmetrical reciprocal causality and mutual grounded-ness that characterises the relational 
transcendentals explains why, for Balthasar, love is ‘the hidden ground underlying the 
transcendentals and their circumincessive relation.’232 To associate love with the transcendentals as 
a whole and so a comprehensive sense of being's actuality reflects Balthasar’s ontological notion of 
love examined in chapter one where being is divine gift characterised by a receptive and self-giving 
act of letting be. This reiterates that love here is not simply an act of feeling or will but has its 
beginning in beauty, its central pivot in the realm of action and freedom, and culmination in truth 
and so engages, heart, will and mind.233 This comprehensive transcendental perspective explains 
how  Balthasar’s ultimate prioritisation of love cannot dispense with truth even as it exceeds 
truth.234 As Schindler states, this means that the generosity associated with a selfless love cannot 
simply about moral action and the good; love also 'has an aesthetic, i.e., is a matter essentially of 
beauty… and… a logic, i.e., is a matter essentially of truth….235 Love thoroughly permeates being and 
so pervades how a subject perceives, acts, and knows.  
As explored earlier, Balthasar roots love's beginning in a person’s awe-filled perception of being in 
beauty’s concrete radiant appearance as Gestalt. Here love denotes the actively receptive 
movement of the human heart in wonder at being’s gift-like appearance in concrete beings. This 
makes love not merely about the subject’s possession of an object to fulfil its desire, but the 
enjoyment of the object in its abiding difference. Beauty’s grace-likeness underpins love's ‘non-
possessiveness.’236 Due to the ecstatic openness effected in the subject by beauty, the subject's 
whole being is transformed, including, therefore, its desire and intellect. ‘We not only feel differently 
after a deep experience of beauty, we not only have the direction of our lives altered, but we also 
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see differently….’237 This affirms the importance not just of the will but the intellect to love. Beauty 
calls to and moves the whole subject whose response in love necessarily includes yet transcends the 
intellectual freedom of the subject. 
Following from this, the fruitfulness of love’s response to beauty anticipates, initiates, and awaits 
the full appropriation by the subject in the order of the good. Love’s response to beauty must be 
deepened and, indeed, tested, through the subject’s freedom and self-giving commitment while 
being open to the goodness of the object-in-itself. This culminates in truth where love entails both a 
fundamental trust of the object and the disclosure of the object as an intelligible, meaningful, 
determinate thing-in-itself that shimmers with ever-greater mystery that is a new event of beauty. 
Love as the overarching transcendental thus fully discloses how truth entails a transformation of 
both subject and object beyond themselves in a greater shared communion which more fully affirms 
their essential meaning and distinctiveness. Therefore against claims that elevating love foments 
irrationalism, ‘the superiority of love, far from compromising the integrity of truth, is in fact the very 
thing that safeguards it...in itself and...within its essential relationship with all the other 
transcendentals.’238 Seen according to the circumincession of the transcendentals, goodness and 
truth are key moments of love as the overarching transcendental of being, but only insofar as they 
remain rooted in the gratuity and freedom of beauty.239  
This develops Balthasar's claim that love is inchoately present in any concrete manifestation of being 
because being's polar unity between esse and ens is ‘the ontic first step of what love is among free 
entities.’240 Balthasar holds that the real distinction underpins the connectedness, communication, 
exchange and ‘mutual inhabitation' between self-conscious beings.241 This is fully unfolded as love 
within spiritual nature and its interaction with the beautiful Gestalten of the objects it encounters 
which then reaches fruition in the good and true. Indeed, there is here an interdependence and 
analogy between a subject's encounter with being’s beauty and interpersonal love. As Balthasar 
says,  
[j]ust as in mutual human love, where the other as other is encountered in a freedom that 
will never be brought under my control, so too in aesthetic perception it is impossible to 
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reduce the appearing form [Gestalt] to my own power of imagination. In both cases, “to 
understand” what reveals itself does not mean to subsume it under master categories; 
neither love in the freedom of its grace nor the beautiful in its gratuitousness are things “to 
be produced” (Rilke), least of all on the basis of a “need” on the part of the subject.242 
While the aesthetic and the personal aspects of love analogously echo each other, it is the personal 
that ultimately expresses the core of love. ‘Love does not come to man “from outside” because the 
human spirit is tied to the senses, but because love exists only between persons, a fact that every 
philosophy tends to forget.’243 The love that fully articulates the relational transcendentals and 
being's actuality as reciprocal causality thus has its fullest expression in the love between persons, 
even as this interpersonal love is always born of beauty, freely enacted in goodness and 
communicated in truth wherein its beauty shines further. As Balthasar states, paraphrasing Dante, 
‘personal love and the shaping of the universe are mutually conditioned.’244  
8. Transcendentals and the Constitutive Human Relationships 
With this, I consider how the transcendentals relate to the metaphysical significance of the 
constitutive human relationships, drawing on the previous chapter's conclusion that love between 
persons is shaped by its primordial beginnings in the relationships between child and parents, and 
the sexes. I show that the constitutive human relationships are not mere instances, but 
paradigmatic, of the asymmetrical reciprocal causality between subject and object that characterises 
the transcendentals as love.  
This rests on Balthasar’s alignment of the relationship between being and spirit at the core of the 
transcendentals with the constitutive human relationships. Balthasar thus develops Aquinas’ 
understanding that the transcendental relationship depends the spiritual soul being quodammodo 
omnia;245 and, aliquid quod natum sit convenire cum omni ente.246 While the latter is normally 
translated ‘something which is such that it agrees with all being,’ in Balthasar’s thought natum is 
better rendered as ‘born.’ Thus, the spiritual soul is ‘something which is born to fit with all things.’ 
For Balthasar, being born as a child of sexual difference and awoken by love to self-consciousness 
are crucial to fitting with all being. We can note here Balthasar’s indebtedness to Paul Claudel's 
correlation between connaitre (as ‘a coming to an inner awareness of’) and co-naitre (‘coming into 
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being with’ or ‘being born with’) that applies to the relationship between all beings as co-
determinative.247 As Balthasar summarises Claudel: ‘In man, this becomes the knowledge of 
universal being…in the sense, not of abstraction, but of a being together of all things separated out 
into singularity.’248 Balthasar's contribution to this vision is to originate this awareness of the co-
determinacy of all beings in beauty and how each person’s heart is shaped by its origin in sexual 
difference and the child-parent relationship.  
That Balthasar frames the encounter between the child and its parents according to the 
transcendentals has been alluded to throughout this thesis. To reiterate, Balthasar’s primal Gestalt 
here is that of a mother’s smile calling forth a smile from her child. 
She has awakened love in the heart of her child, and as the child awakens to love, it also 
awakens to knowledge: the initially empty-sense impressions gather meaningfully around 
the core of the Thou. Knowledge (with its whole complex of intuition and concept) comes 
into play, because the play of love has already begun beforehand, initiated by the mother, 
the transcendent…. [N]o child can be awakened to love without being loved.249  
This beginning aligns with beauty’s primacy, being's concrete epiphany in a radiant Gestalt, and the 
soul’s loving response to it. As Balthasar insists, if humans are to live within ‘an original form, that 
form has first to be sighted. One must possess a spiritual eye capable of perceiving (wahrnehmen 
[the seeing of what is true]) the forms of existence with awe.’250 This begins with the child’s 
wholehearted loving perception of the form of its own self-conscious existence through the 
bestowal of that same form by adults who lovingly communicate that form. It is a beginning both 
precariously unique and universal. This adds a gloss to Balthasar’s assertion that ‘only the few 
who…bear the weight of the whole on their shoulders, will receive eyes to behold the primal form of 
man-in-existence, and…their courage to embrace this primal form will raise everything else into the 
light along with itself: the true, the good, and the beautiful.’251 While the few ostensibly refers to 
adults, this exceptional vision is, paradoxically, universally granted to each child who affirms being as 
beautiful, good and true simply by awakening to themselves. As a person matures, they embrace the 
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primal form not by sheer will or rational deduction but via a commitment to a life of responsibility, 
goodness, truth and love while remaining rooted in the wonder-filled childlike perception of beauty. 
In the final retrospective examination of his work, Balthasar explicitly identifies this event of the 
child’s awakening with the relational transcendentals, their underpinning in being’s unity, and their 
interdependence in love. He states: 
[t]he infant is brought to consciousness of himself only by love, by the smile of his mother. In 
that encounter, the horizon of all unlimited being opens itself for him, revealing four things 
to him (1): that he is one in love with the mother, even in being other than his mother, 
therefore all Being is one; (2) that that love is good, therefore all Being is good; (3) that that 
love is true, therefore all Being is true; and (4) that that love evokes joy, therefore all Being is 
beautiful. We add here that the epiphany of Being has sense only if in the appearance 
[Erscheinung] we grasp the essence that manifests itself [Ding an sich]. The infant comes to 
the knowledge, not of a pure appearance, but of his mother in herself.252 
The significance of this cannot be overstated. It contains in nuce the transcendental relationship 
between being and spirit. Here spirit, understood not abstractly but according to its concrete 
constitutive extremes (parent-child, male-female), fully manifests the fruitful excess of being’s unity-
in-difference in the interpersonal reciprocity of love according to being’s beauty, goodness and 
truth.253 In short, the concrete encounter between child and mother (and, implicitly, father) 
manifests primordially and paradigmatically the transcendentals’ fruitfulness. Balthasar makes this 
explicit elsewhere by identifying the child’s awakening to self-consciousness as ‘decisive proof’ of 
how the relational transcendentals of beauty, goodness, and truth are rooted in the self-giving love 
shared between parents.254 This event unveils fully what is always already there from the beginning: 
the concrete nature of the fruitfulness of being’s superabundant excess as it subsists as, and so 
depends on, spirit’s own fruitful excess. 
Not only is it crucial to see that the child awakens to self-consciousness through a love that is 
concretely perceived in awe according to a radiant Gestalt. It depends on the child encountering the 
Gestalt of its parents’ love which mediates human nature in its transparency to being’s 
transcendental aspects. A child does not, therefore, awaken to itself simply through the encounter 
with any beautiful Gestalten of nature, art or technology. Nor does this happen through engagement 
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with just any human(s). Rather, to repeat the conclusions of the previous chapters, the content of 
this primal Gestalt embodies the love of an adult parent – a love already lived out between adult 
parents as shared with the child. Such parental love must remain rooted in the relational 
transcendentals to communicate the metaphysically fruitful nature of the relationship between 
being and spirit. This raises the question of how this paradigmatic enactment of the transcendental 
is related to the parent-child relationship and the sexual difference between the parents.  
Let me consider these in turn. Regarding the child, when it awakens to itself through the love of 
others, and responds with the gift of itself, the circumincession of the relational transcendentals and 
their orientation to the wholly other order of being’s unity as divine gift come to light all at once. 
Goodness and truth are wholly aligned within beauty. This is, for Balthasar, characteristic of youth 
which is marked by the ‘sunrise of the spirit’s splendour in the beauty of form…in which the spirit 
plays in the body unselfconsciously.’255 The child, however, must grow up and engage with the 
beautiful with greater freedom and responsibility. This heralds the ‘age of dignity’: out of a youth 
‘fully governed by the aesthetic principle there breaks forth the ethical on account of the spirit’s 
stronger radiance. But the ethical does not then question the legitimacy of beauty, rather does it 
reveal itself as beauty’s inner coordinate axis, which enables beauty to unfold to its full 
dimensionality as a transcendental attribute of Being.’ The beautiful now carries a sense of urgency 
and decision. While this applies, to a greater or lesser degree, to every encounter with beauty, 
fundamentally it concerns the decision of what to freely commit one’s life to as an adult. Balthasar is 
clear about the stakes involved. The spirit is ‘forever confronted by a decision between the abyss of 
heaven and of hell,’ and so ‘the beauty of any form must remain in the twilight of the question as to 
which of the two masters’ glory such form radiates.’256 Even more fundamentally, this concerns a 
decision about whether truthfully to enact the comprehensive primal form of human nature so as to 
integrate the childlike wonder at its core. This commitment is something that is expressed fully only 
in the shared context of truth and so the meaningful and fruitful exchanges based around language 
where language itself is the concrete medium of being’s fruitful communication. 
This brings us to the parents. Because the awe-filled vision of the primal form of human nature is 
bestowed first to a person as a child who is utterly dependent on others, this places a burden of 
metaphysical responsibility on those who raise the young. They must freely embrace and remain 
faithful to the primal form of human existence as it expresses being’s transcendental aspects. 
Indeed, when Balthasar states the child’s awakening to self-consciousness through its parents’ love 
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is decisive proof of the reciprocal causality of the transcendentals, he states that the good is more 
transcendent than the other transcendentals.257 This rightly emphasises how the love parents share 
for each other, and with their child, is a free self-giving commitment of their whole selves beyond 
themselves in openness to being's goodness as shared between them and their child.  
As noted earlier, however, the greater transcendence of the good cannot leave the other 
transcendentals behind. Thus, Balthasar qualifies the good's greater transcendence. It ‘does not 
oblige us to sacrifice the priority of truth and its ontological transcendence.’258 Indeed, after 
speaking of how love is linked to the greater transcendence of the good, Balthasar affirms that 
‘[g]roundless love is not prior to being but is the supreme act of being, the reef that shatters every 
attempt at conceptual capture.’259 Hence, ‘[l]ove can…be considered the supreme mode, and therein 
the “truth”, of being, without, for all that, having to be transported beyond truth and being.’260 More 
fully, given the circumincession of the transcendentals, the parents' free self-giving in the good, to 
be an expression of love, must arise from, be rooted in, and constitute a deepening of beauty, and 
culminate in the objective fruitfulness of truth in its openness to beauty. This is not achieved solely 
through the parents’ will or intellect. The transformation of their vision and desire is initiated by 
their encounter with being’s beauty in the Gestalt of their child, each other and their shared life. 
Indeed, before the vulnerability of a child, adults face the same demand Balthasar identifies with any 
moment of beauty: ‘that man pursue the good by compelling him to be true to the living content 
whose external forms he represents.’261 
Hence, the parents' sharing of being’s beauty must carry over into the good and true. They cannot 
remain simply in beauty without falsifying it. Beauty achieves full expression in the freedom and 
dramatic action of the good, and in the shared communication of the true which, in hospitality to 
being’s ever-greater mystery, shines anew with the beautiful splendour of being's inexhaustible 
vitality. It is, indeed, only in this culmination in truth’s concrete Gestalten that adults express 
faithfully their own childlike wonder at being’s beauty in the fullness of love as the overarching 
transcendental. This translates into the truthfulness of the activities that fruitfully shape the life and 
home the parents share. It also stresses, regarding their child and each other, the ontological 
significance of the act of judgement, language and any shared meaningful activity wherein truth 
shines out with being’s superabundant radiant revitalising beauty. Indeed, these find their 
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metaphysical measure in the human constitutive relationships, particularly, in how parents shape 
the heart, memory, language and freedom of their child. 
This accords with the insistence that the parents’ enactment of the good and the true remain rooted 
in the beautiful, even as these fulfil the beautiful. The primacy of beauty calls the parents to abide in 
what is first freely given as groundless gift from beyond themselves and is manifested in the 
fruitfulness of their shared interaction. Here the primacy of beauty aligns with the freely-bestowed, 
intrinsically complete, and conditioned fruitfulness of sexual difference and the parent-child 
relationship. 
9. Beauty and the Constitutive Human Relationships 
This claim underpins this thesis. To state it fully, and drawing on the previous chapters’ insights, this 
associates the distinctiveness of beauty, as the primary relational transcendental, with the love 
between persons who embody the polar extremes of the different yet correlated ways of being the 
same single spiritual embodied nature. In making this connection, we must recall that beauty’s 
primacy is a matter not of necessity but fittingness, albeit a fittingness paradoxically needed to 
safeguard the gratuity at the core of the transcendentals. My claim is that this applies also to the 
metaphysical significance of the child-parent relationship and sexual difference. Any necessity that 
attaches to these ways of constituting human nature is best understood as that of ungrounded 
fittingness rather than sheer objective necessity. The fittingness of beauty's primacy aligns with the 
gratuitous character of a child’s being born and awoken to self-consciousness through the 
fruitfulness of, the equally gratuitous, reality of sexual difference and an interpersonal love freely-
bestowed that analogously takes its fruitful character from, yet transcends, the gift-like fruitfulness 
of sexual difference. 
Beauty is, therefore, the fabric of these relationships. This can be interpreted in light of how 
beauty’s groundlessness is, in fact, a mutual grounded-ness between irreducible but correlated poles 
that mediate the ever-greater gift of being. Sexual difference and the parent-child relationship are 
groundless because mutually grounded in each other. In drawing this parallel, I am arguing these 
reciprocal relationships are not just instances of beauty but express the fitting good truth that 
beauty is the primary transcendental. They are the paradigmatic instance of being's mutual 
grounded-ness as beauty. Moreover, they are paradigmatic for how beauty is mediated via goodness 
and truth, and, conversely, for how the good and true remain embedded in beauty’s grace-like 
quality. This is reflected particularly in truth's status as the ultimate relational transcendental where 
truth’s fruitfulness echoes that of the constitutive human relationships. Being’s truth is the objective 
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fruit of the self-giving union between subject and object in the good expressed in new Gestalten that 
manifest afresh the concrete radiance of beauty. 
This can be analysed according to the asymmetrical reciprocal causality of beauty's mutual 
grounded-ness wherein object and subject are co-agents. Male and female are not simply subjects 
understood according to a single abstract notion of human nature. They are subjects in a distinct yet 
correlated way. Put differently, they are subjects and objects to each other where their encounter 
unveils the infinite fruitfulness of their spiritual nature’s capacity to reflect being as a whole. Both 
manifest being’s beauty to the other with the priority that attends the object's radiant appearance; 
and, both respond to the other as a subject in the freedom of their awe-filled perception. They do so 
as the extreme limits of being fully human. Hence, they communicate the abiding priority of the 
object's ever-greater excess to each other within the freedom of their shared spiritual nature. They 
display, therefore, to a maximal degree the fruitfulness of beauty's mutual grounded-ness. Hence, 
male and female are concrete principles of beauty. The truth of this is confirmed by how their 
fruitfulness intrinsically opens to and constitutes the overarching Gestalt of human nature in the 
parent-child relationship which is, therefore, also a concrete co-principle of beauty. Here too parents 
and child are objects and subjects to each other yet in this case each parent has a responsibility to 
the child in communicating the Gestalt of their shared nature in its openness to being according to 
the transcendentals.   
This echoes how Balthasar affirms Aquinas’ reading of the causal significance of beauty in his 
commentary on Pseudo-Dionysius’ Divine Names.262 Aquinas holds that God creates not out of need 
but by ‘the love he has for his own beauty, for whoever has beauty of his own wants to multiply it as 
much as possible, that is, through the communication of his likeness…. Thus everything is created in 
order as far as possible to imitate the divine beauty.’263 As Balthasar emphasises, ‘this is true as 
much of the particular forms, by which things are distinguished from one another, as for the 
common possession of being, in which they communicate.’264 As Aquinas states, ‘out of the 
beautiful, esse comes to everything that exists,’ and this occurs insofar ‘as every form, through 
which a thing has esse, is a certain participation of the divine claritas ’265 My contention is that within 
the realm of secondary causality, the fruitful creativity of beauty, understood in terms of mutual 
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grounded-ness, receives its paradigmatic expression in the constitutive human relationships. That 
said, beauty’s creativity is enacted differently with respect to each constitutive relationship. I 
examine this now according to how beauty is, first, the concrete unity of the good and the true; and, 
second, opens to being's ever-greater transcendent unity as divine gift.  
Thus, to consider first a child’s birth and awakening as new spirit. While these events, as fruit and 
proof of the reciprocal causality of the relational transcendentals enacted by the parents, are 
associated with truth as the fruitful culmination of beauty and goodness; nonetheless, the concrete 
new Gestalt of this truth exceeds the parents. It is the wholly gratuitous gift of a new self-conscious 
being who shines with the radiance of being’s superabundance. The child’s beauty brings out, 
therefore, the gratuitous and wholly other order of being’s transcendent unity as esse that is 
immanent to the relational transcendentals, a beauty which is the mark of their source in and 
orientation to God. Furthermore, this identification of the child with beauty’s transcendent 
openness to esse informs, as noted above, how the child’s personal enactment of the 
transcendentals encompasses them all at once in its wholehearted response to its parents’ love. 
By contrast, the parents’ sexual difference, and its organic and personal fruitfulness, are especially 
associated with beauty as the concrete union of good and true, and so with the dynamic of beauty’s 
transcendent immanence to these orders. The union in truth that comes from the sharing of male 
and female humanity in their mutual freedom in the order of the good is a new radiant Gestalt that 
discloses their distinctive way of being human together, whether or not a child is conceived. 
Nevertheless, while this new Gestalt is the fruit and so the truth of the goodness of their union and 
the beauty of their mutual grounded-ness, it does not of itself communicate the full extent of their 
fruitful enactment of being's unity-in-difference as spirits. Their union points beyond itself to the 
decisive proof of a new child awoken to self-consciousness. This stresses that while neither female 
nor male constitute each other per se, each is dependent on the other to be what it already is in 
relation to the greater whole. Their union expresses this greater whole most comprehensively 
insofar as it steps beyond to a fourth, which is the wholly different order of being’s creative actuality 
as is manifested in the gift of a child awoken as spirit. Furthermore, the way the parents' sexual 
difference and its fruitfulness encompass beauty’s union of the good and true informs how they 
enact their interpersonal fruitfulness. Indeed, their organic fruitfulness only attains full expression as 
personal with the free self-giving in the order of goodness and the life-giving exchange and creative 
judgment and disclosure of the true.  
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10. Male and Female as Principles of Beauty 
We can now ask how this paradigmatic association of beauty with sexual difference plays out as 
distinctively female and male. As I indicated in the previous chapter’s account of male and female, 
any response to this within the present discussion needs to follow certain restraints. I examine this 
from the perspective of human nature considered as a concrete whole in light of the primordial and 
paradigmatic status of the constitutive human relationships of which male and female are 
constituent parts. As with any Gestalt, the whole casts a clearer light on the distinctiveness of its 
parts. This does not deny that humans can, in fact, choose to act differently from what is disclosed 
about sexual difference in light of the whole. Nothing said here is necessitated but concerns what 
each person is beckoned to respond to in beauty as befitting the free enactment of being's 
fruitfulness according to the relational transcendentals. Any such enactment is judged, not according 
to its fidelity to a fixed abstract nature, but on whether it discloses the grace-like beauty of the truth 
of the primal Gestalt of human nature in its openness to being’s ever-greater mystery as divine gift.  
How then do male and female differently enact beauty? To answer this, I draw on the previous 
chapter's discussion regarding their different roles in the act of generation and bringing a child to 
self-consciousness. I consider this from both an objective and subjective perspective. 
Seen objectively, that is, as female and male unveil in themselves being’s beauty with respect to a 
newly conceived child, the mother’s relationship to her child manifests the transcendent immanence 
of being’s unity within the Gestalt of human nature. In the act of generation, the female actively 
receives from the male so that she generates a new human inside her and she nourishes the child 
with milk from her body and encompasses it in her consciousness and embrace. The mother receives 
the child’s being while also handing on immanently to the child the transcendent unity of human 
nature she shares with the father. This is oriented outward towards forming a relationship of 
difference between her and the child that is nonetheless held in a unity of nature. This reflects how 
greater transcendence and unity is expressed as greater immanence and difference within the 
dynamic of a radiant Gestalt. Here the characteristically female relationship to the child embodies 
the immanent radiance and fruitfulness of the self-transcending Gestalt that encompasses mother, 
child and father. 
The male, by contrast, manifests the immanent transcendence of the unity of the same radiant 
Gestalt. This reflects how he generates outside his body, in the woman’s body, handing on to the 
child the transcendent unity of human nature he shares with the mother. This manifests the 
transcendent radiant unity intrinsic to the radiant Gestalt. Put differently, the characteristically male 
relationship to the child immanently embodies the transcendent fruitfulness and radiance of the 
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same Gestalt that encompasses father, mother and child. That said, neither the aspect of beauty 
expressed in the immanent transcendence of the father-child relationship, nor the transcendent 
immanence of the mother-child relationship manifest the fullness of the radiant Gestalt of human 
nature. It is only in the shared unity and tension between them that their mediation of this Gestalt 
opens intrinsically to the transcendent source of unity that is the wholly other order of esse, most 
decisively disclosed in a child’s birth and awakening. Mother, father and child together receive, hand 
on and unveil esse's quasi-formal pattern of fruitful letting be.  
From a subject-oriented perspective, these differences between the sexes play out in their awe-filled 
response to the beauty of the same Gestalt. Thus, regarding the female response, her whole being is 
active and receptive towards the child in a way that does not arises from her choice, but rather 
enables her freely to appropriate and express this active receptivity for herself. This is a function of 
how, in the woman’s relationship to the newly conceived child, the organic and personal are closely 
entwined and mediate each to the other. This underpins what is distinctive about the female 
response to being’s beauty as it appears in the child first in the hiddenness of her womb. It enacts 
the rapturous response of her heart to beauty. This includes both her heart's a priori openness to 
being and its transportation beyond itself by the radiance of beauty into the realm of the good and 
true. The emphasis on rapture is not isolated from perception. Perception during pregnancy is at 
first hidden, but not blind or absent. Indeed, it a perception wholly characterised by heartfelt 
rapture. Perception is thus reworked from within by rapture through the gradual felt encounter with 
the radiant Gestalt of the child’s being. This entails a hidden vision effecting a hidden rapture which, 
as it becomes more obvious, informs and transforms perception. 
This does not happen immediately, but takes time, during which the rapture of the woman’s heart 
towards her child is something she assents to and shares with those around her and which she 
articulates through her free response to, judgement of, and communication about what is unveiled 
to her as true about being.  Indeed, the mother’s concrete perception of the child’s difference, even 
as it is encompassed within the unity of her being, is underwritten by the father’s difference from 
the mother. This unity-in-difference is enacted by them together through their mutual self-giving in 
the good and their shared communication in the true whereby they disclose their different ways of 
responding to being’s beauty. 
In this distinctively female emphasis on rapture, the circumincession between the relational 
transcendentals is particularly evident. This reflects the jointly receptive and self-giving response of 
the mother’s heart to the child’s concrete being in her womb, and the self-giving of her body 
whereby she enters in the self-giving of the good and discloses in her being the radiant truth of the 
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intelligible form of human nature. If we recall how the subjective response for each of the relational 
transcendentals entails a polarity, then in being predisposed to rapture, the distinctively female 
response to beauty carries with it, first, a predilection to the self-giving fidelity of goodness; 
secondly, the trust that lies at the beginning of truth; and, finally, how the determinate disclosure of 
truth opens up to being’s ever-greater mysterious depths. The corollary of this, however, is a risk 
that the female enactment of the transcendentals is simply identified with rapture, self-giving 
fidelity, trust and mysterious depths – something which, as we have seen, problematically colours 
Balthasar’s account of the feminine. This can, however, be interpreted positively as identifying a 
uniquely female metaphysical task to articulate this rapture, and how it changes perception, via the 
exercise of a free choice in how she fully receives and appropriates as her own the self-giving 
response of her heart and body. Furthermore, this carries over and finds completion in the 
determinate expression of the true whereby through her self-expression and language she discloses 
more fully the intelligible form of the reality of human nature. To use a more obvious theological 
image, this insists on the metaphysical significance of woman’s freely-appropriated, fully articulated 
fiat to the rapture she experiences. 
Turning to the male response to beauty, his organic engagement with the child is at a remove, and 
so distance and difference is emphasised. This is echoed by how, in the male's relationship to the 
child, the organic and personal are not intrinsically connected. What is emphasised, therefore, is 
how he engages personally with the mother and child in a way that affirms or denies the union of all 
three of them. More specifically, it is a question of whether the man’s heart is open to and so goes 
out to the woman and child to be actively receptive to them and so enact the self-giving of goodness 
in truth. If this is not simply a blind act of will it must be based on the heart’s rapture that 
accompanies the perception of a concrete Gestalt. This highlights what is distinctive in the male 
response to beauty. It is a rapture following from sense-based perception of the concrete Gestalt of 
mother and child. In contrast to the female, perception is accentuated, and rapture and transport, 
and the change they effect, more hidden. In all this, the father’s concrete perception of the child and 
their shared unity within their difference is safeguarded by the mother’s unity with him. As with the 
mother, this takes time to encounter and adjust to, and depends on their mutual self-giving in the 
good and their shared communication in the true which incorporates their different responses to 
beauty. 
Regarding the male enactment of the circumincession of the transcendentals, the focus on 
perception emphasises in the order of the good a determinative choice towards self-giving fidelity to 
the mother and child. It also reflects how truth is disclosed to male understanding in its determinate 
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concepts even as this opens to mystery. The potential risk here is that the male's response to beauty 
is simply identified with a sense-based perception such that it cuts out the a priori rapture of the 
heart. This in turn risks prioritising choice in the order of the good, including a wholly arbitrary 
choice of self-giving, and, in the order of the true, emphasising determinate concepts, including the 
abstract concept of indeterminate mystery beyond truth, rather than an ongoing encounter with 
mystery in more-than-simply-determinate Gestalten. As we have seen, this is something Balthasar 
tends towards. Framed positively, however, this means the male metaphysical task is to ensure that 
his determinate perception and choice is rooted in the gratuitous rapture of the beautiful that 
underpins the self-giving fidelity of the good, and  expressed in the element of trust in the true and 
in how the determinate clarity of the true opens to the ever-greater radiance of beauty. This 
identifies a distinctively male fiat with a willingly open heart that abides more deeply and faithfully 
in the determinate perception of beauty and the choice this elicits. 
The upshot of this double perspective is that the personal metaphysical tasks of each sex with 
respect to the transcendentals reflects what comes more naturally to the other in their response to 
and articulation of beauty as manifested paradigmatically in their child’s birth and awakening. In the 
female, what arises more naturally is a rapture that informs and transforms perception; whereas in 
the male it is a perception that opens to and is transformed by rapture. Furthermore, this mirrors 
how the female with child objectively manifests beauty’s transcendent immanence and the male 
manifests vis-à-vis the same child beauty’s immanent transcendence. This develops the observation, 
articulated in the previous chapter, that by remaining true to one’s own sex one comes closest to 
the other. It also lends support to, yet reinterprets, Balthasar’s view that the male must somehow be 
female. This is achieved by remaining true to the distinctively male response to beauty, not by 
appropriating what is properly female as Balthasar is prone to do. Conversely, this requires that the 
female, in being true to her femaleness, is more male-like in her response to beauty. Taken together, 
the sexes in their distinct yet correlated way concretely enact the self-transcending orientation of 
human nature in its openness to the gift of being’s beauty. Finally, in enacting their shared capacity 
as adult parents according to the correlation between male and female responses to beauty, they 
paradoxically give expression to the wholly other way of being human, their common childlikeness. 
They enable each other to be childlike in their fundamental openness to the wonder of being. 
11. Conclusion 
The observations made above are not meant to be an exhaustive statement of the difference 
between the sexes, nor exclusively apply to all humans as the only way to be fruitful. They do, 
however, attempt to articulate the minimum required to safeguard the whole. This claims, 
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therefore, that the unity-in-difference which constitutes human nature and is disclosed in the 
uniqueness of each person is dependent on the shared enactment of the analogy of being by male 
and female humanity, and child and parent. This gives metaphysical priority and ultimacy to how we 
are each constituted within and shaped by the polarity of sexual difference that stretches between 
the extremes of male and female, and that of parent and child. Although paradigmatic, however, 
these constitutive extreme instances of being human cannot be separated from the dramatic 
enactment between actual persons and the ever-greater disclosure of the Gestalt of human nature 
that occurs in the order of the true through freely shared communication and meaningful activity. 
This involves always discovering more about the mysterious truth of human nature in its openness 
to the gift-like event of beauty. It is this path of discovery that is safeguarded by these extremes 
ways of being human in their responses to beauty and enactment of the transcendentals. 
In this light, I revisit Balthasar’s statements about sexual difference. Despite the problems with 
Balthasar’s interpretation, as examined in chapter three, I contend some of his insights about the 
tension between the fruitfulness of sexual difference and the productivity of an increasingly 
technological age remain valuable when adjusted for this chapter’s findings.  
Balthasar identifies the dominance of a 'positivistic, technology-oriented thinking' with two factors.  
First, the preponderance of a masculine perspective linked to a ‘technologized way of life’ and ‘the 
prevalence of a rationalism to which natural things and conditions mean above all material for 
manufacturables.’266 He couples this to an approach that lauds what humans wilfully make of 
themselves and the world.267 Here nature becomes ‘mere material; even the spirit itself is in danger 
of becoming material for self-manipulation, and being as a whole, as unreifiable, is overlooked.’268 
This threatens a reduction to a ‘pure positivism of “making”– and in the end of self-making' which is 
‘without norms and thus without direction.’269 Balthasar diagnoses thereby a dominant technological 
worldview with a masculinism rooted in a rationalism and voluntarism predicated on an epoch-
defining forgetfulness of being.  Secondly, in this situation the female is forgotten. Balthasar insists 
this forgetfulness cannot be addressed by mere reasoning or by women pursuing ‘an unnatural 
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mascuilinzation...or a levelling of the difference between the sexes.’270 This ‘would totally destroy 
the [already] disturbed balance, level the all-fructifying difference between the sexes in favour of an 
asexuality (with male indications, however) and consume humanity’s last ideological reserves.’271 
While Balthasar affirms the importance of culture for creativity, he insists culture be rooted in an 
attitude that contemplates nature receptively. It is this element of culture that is threatened by the 
above. Balthasar proposes that women here play a decisive role as the ‘counterpoise to and 
spearhead against man’s increasingly history-less world.…'272 This involves ‘creating a vital force 
against history-less, technologized existence, in abstaining from the artificial superabundance being 
offered with a view to noticing anew the real “superabundance of life”….'.273 Thus far, Balthasar 
rightly defends a reciprocity between the sexes in their difference.  
However, as he progresses Balthasar exhibits, by now familiar, difficulties. He argues for a feminine 
‘contemplative-receptive glance’ rather than a masculine calculating and functional one; a feminine 
element ‘that makes a person secure in nature and in being’ rather than a ‘masculine element’ which 
penetrates and changes things by ‘implanting’ something of its own.274 This rehearses Balthasar’s 
deficient view of sexual intercourse. Equally unsatisfactorily, he defines woman by her significance 
for man. She should be geared 'to being, to the background that gives meaning to things, to security, 
to making a home for man who is always on the run, exposed to the world'275 To paraphrase the last 
chapter’s critique, this expects too little from men, and too much from women.  
We can extend this critique via the transcendentals. Rather than linking the sexes to distinctions of 
emphasis in beauty, its circumincession with goodness and truth, and their transcendence into 
being’s ever-greater unity, Balthasar assigns to each sex isolated moments of the good and true. 
Thus, he associates the male with wilful choice and so a goodness and will separated from the active 
receptivity of the beautiful and the ecstatic receptivity of the true. Most basically, Balthasar excludes 
a distinctive experience of wonder, and so beauty, from the male heart, emphasising the male 
inability to be self-giving in receptivity to what is beyond himself. To remedy this, Balthasar 
problematically suggests the male appropriate the female womb’s active receptivity which he 
associates with a contemplative receptivity and the self-giving fidelity of goodness.  
 
270 NE, 188. 
271 NE, 190. 
272 NE, 191. 
273 NE, 191. 
274 NE, 189. 
275 NE, 190. 
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By contrast, Balthasar identifies the female, firstly, with a pure receptivity and so a sense of the 
intellect and truth dissociated from the receptive activity of the beautiful and the active free choice 
of the good. Secondly, he identifies the female with a pure selfless self-giving and so a goodness 
disconnected from beauty’s active receptivity. Again, primordially, this excludes a uniquely female 
experience of wonder at beauty, specifically, the active element of the heart's response, and 
undercuts the freedom this engenders. This denies woman the capacity to choose to appropriate 
fully the movement of her heart. Furthermore, Balthasar offers no corrective by allowing the female 
to enact a male-like activity. 
In both cases, Balthasar disassociates the sexes from beauty, aligning them univocally with isolated 
moments of goodness and truth. The latter are made extrinsic to beauty and, therefore, each other, 
and are uprooted from the asymmetrical reciprocal exchange that marks the transcendentals. 
Indeed, regarding both sexes, he forgets the childlike wonder of the adult heart in response to 
beauty. The consequence is the dissolution of the transcendentals’ circumincession.  Thus, I agree 
with Kilby that, regarding male and female humanity, Balthasar makes no ‘consistent mention of 
beauty, or allure, or desire…. It is sexual reproduction, rather than sexual love, that seems to govern 
Balthasar’s “nuptial” thought.’276 Though Schindler rightly offers a corrective in highlighting the 
centrality of desire to Balthasar, his criticism of Kilby falls short by not engaging with her concern 
that Balthasar does not fully consider how male and female experience beauty.277 Balthasar 
jeopardises the significance of the joint male-female enactment of beauty which, I have argued, 
underpins his view of the transcendentals.  
By the logic of Balthasar’s metaphysics, however, equal significance should be given to the female 
predisposition to rapture at the hidden radiance of beauty and the male propensity for the 
perception of the determinate Gestalt. This requires not, as Balthasar asserts, simply a feminine 
response to a world forgetful of being’s beauty, but a response which spans and fruitfully exceeds 
the extremes of male and female humanity, including how each sex exercises a response to beauty 
analogous to what is pronounced in the other. This corrects the imbalance where Balthasar allows 
the male to enact a feminine active receptivity but denies anything analogous to the female 
appropriating the male's activity. Furthermore, the fruitfulness of the sexes' shared enterprise rests 
on their mutual grounded-ness, their joint custodianship of beauty’s groundlessness, which points 
beyond them to the divine source of being’s unity as a gift to be shared. 
 
276 Kilby, Balthasar, 138-139. Cf., Ibid., 139n.36. Kilby’s concern needs to be tempered by, for example, 
Balthasar’s treatment of Dante in GL3. 
277 Schindler, “’A Very Critical Response’," 73. 
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We might ask whether Kilby’s concern about Balthasar’s predominant focus on sexual reproduction 
applies to the above. In response, first, I reiterate that Balthasar is not only concerned with sexual 
fruitfulness but more fundamentally with the fruitfulness of interpersonal love and its importance to 
the meta-anthropological service of the whole. While the latter has its paradigmatic expression in 
the fruit of a child born of sexual difference and awakened to self-conscious freedom by the love of 
its parents, it cannot be limited to this but finds fulfilment in the myriad ways people express 
interpersonal fruitfulness. Secondly, while agreeing that Balthasar does often reduce fruitfulness to 
sexual reproduction, I have argued this does not undermine the integrity of his metaphysics. This is 
because fruitfulness is an overarching transcendental rooted in the beautiful and its circumincession 
with the good and true. It need not be interpreted in exclusively reductionist terms to say this 
fruitfulness is paradigmatically expressed in the reciprocity of love shared between male and female 
persons who constitute correlated ways of being the same spiritual nature that transcends itself. 
Nonetheless, it does maintain that being born of sexual difference and awoken to self-consciousness 
as a child by parental love is of abiding significance to enacting the transcendentals aright as love. 
This affirms that these constitutive relationships underpin the human capacity to perceive with 
childlike wonder the primal form of human existence, and so being’s primal form, and, therefore, 
ensure that this form is communicated anew as loving gift. 
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Conclusion 
The wolf shall live with the lamb, the leopard shall lie down with the kid, the calf and the lion 
and the fatling together, and a little child shall lead them.1 
What should we hand on to our children? Balthasar’s metaphysics answers this question by 
recasting it as the most basic philosophical question: why anything, instead of nothing? He thus 
subverts the expectation of a precise, predetermined answer. His response to both is the same: 
childlike wonder. This is meant, objectively, as the miraculous wonder of the child’s existence and, 
more fully, being itself; and, subjectively, as the wondering of a child’s heart. The legacy we 
bequeath our children, therefore, is one we paradoxically receive from them and alongside them in 
wholehearted adult remembrance of, and responsibility for, the value of their and our childlikeness. 
We are to bestow upon our little ones what we receive freely as children: the heart's attunement to 
being’s beauty and joy as loving gift; how this gratuitous joyful beauty of love is encountered, denied 
and reclaimed anew in our lives; and how it transforms us in openness to the ever-greater divine 
source of being’s creativity. In short, we are to communicate to our children what we too depend 
upon – love’s own fruitfulness as the meaning of being.  
Balthasar sees this as a task that belongs to every human by virtue of having been born to and 
nurtured by sexually differentiated parents and awoken to self-consciousness by them or other 
parental figures. Balthasar thus makes metaphysics a truly concrete and catholic vocation. This is a 
calling that belongs to all who have ever been, are and will be children. Yet, each child is brought to 
this only by others. And so, because of their heart’s openness to being's beauty and joy, each child is 
exposed to the risk of love’s absence. This means the capacity of each person to engage with being 
itself as a child hinges on how we are each welcomed by our parents and adult guardians. Theirs is 
an intimately personal summons expressed either as open-hearted receptive welcome to the child 
as gift in its difference from and dependence on them; or, as hard-hearted denial. Either response 
coalesces around and shapes our heart’s consent to being even as it is knit together in the 
hiddenness of our mother’s womb and heart, and then nurtured or neglected in family and home. At 
the centre of Balthasar’s vision, therefore, lies the claim that metaphysics stands or falls on whether 
it serves the inviolable wonder of childhood. This is entrusted to a humanity whose capacity for 
childlike wonder and for living out freely being’s gift-character is not simply down to individual 
choice but underpinned by two extreme different ways of being fully human that embody being’s 
orientation to birth and wonder: male and female.  
 
1 Isaiah, 11:6-9. 
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I have offered a critical apologia for this vision in three interlocking ways. I have, first, analysed and 
clarified Balthasar’s understanding of being, self-conscious spirit, being’s transcendental aspects, 
and how these relate to the relationships between a child and its parents, and the fruitfulness of 
human sexual difference. I have argued that Balthasar’s metaphysics identifies the child-parent and 
male-female relationships as primordial and paradigmatic ways of being fully human that safeguard 
the wonder of being as manifested in the unity-in-difference between beings, and, particularly, 
persons. Balthasar’s view supports the notion that, though primordial and paradigmatic, these 
relationships are not exclusive. Though they underpin how humans enact being as gift, they do not 
exclude but liberate the endless creativity of interpersonal activity. This comes down to whether 
each person lives as an adult who rejects childhood and so their being’s dependency on gift; or, 
grows ever-more deeply into the reality of being a child in thanksgiving for the gift of being. 
Secondly, I have criticised how Balthasar falls short of this vision in his essentialist account of the 
difference between male and female humanity. However, I have also argued that Balthasar’s 
metaphysics supports an alternative view of sexual difference which affirms an asymmetrical 
reciprocity between male and female as differently active and receptive in their shared enactment of 
the transcendence of humanity's spiritual openness to esse. Thirdly, this apologia is also a critically 
vital one that has sought to defend a vision of the human as created with the capacity to wonder at 
the beauty of the gift of being and to communicate that wonder amid the different ways humans 
undermine it. 
To this end, in chapter one, I expounded how, for Balthasar, metaphysics begins in the wonder at 
being itself and, specifically, the wonder of a child’s first self-conscious encounter with esse as 
mediated through its mother’s concrete love. In this wonder, the whole of created being is 
manifested in its concrete, dramatic and self-exceeding primal Gestalt. The latter represents 
Balthasar’s concrete rendering of being’s analogical nature. It encompasses in a single complex 
whole the asymmetrical reciprocal relationship between esse and essence that characterises every 
being. The mutual dependency between these principles points beyond the whole to its dependency 
on and manifestation of God’s gift of esse which brings each being into existence. The divine 
provenance of esse and each being’s essential reality is, moreover, manifested concretely within 
created being as a reciprocal letting be shared between beings. This is the pattern of love. Central is 
Balthasar’s adaption of esse as non-subsistent: the pure actuality of esse, which brings all things into 
being and is God’s divine esse truly given away, is dependent on the essential reality of beings to 
subsist concretely. Each being is true to the gift-character of their origin insofar as they enact, 
according to their nature, their participation in the superabundant letting be of esse by sharing esse 
with others. This loving pattern of being receives its fullest expression in interpersonal relationships 
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of love. Indeed, it begins in how each person encounters being first in specific anthropological and 
interpersonal relationships which are, therefore, privileged sites of metaphysical disclosure. 
In chapter two, I examined the implications of Balthasar’s understanding that each person awakens 
to self-conscious participation in the gift of being as a child through the concrete love of its parents. 
In a challenge to ideals of the modern rational independent mature adult and the post-modern self-
creating individual, this beginning means each person’s self-conscious freedom coincides with 
childlike dependence on others. This reflects how Balthasar attributes a primordial and abiding 
significance to being childlike where a person’s freedom is received from others as gift and most 
fully theirs when shared as gift in being for and with others. This receives its concrete and lasting 
measure in how each person responds to their parents and to God as the source of their freedom 
and existence. I argued that Balthasar understands this most fundamentally as the childlike and filial 
character of the human heart in its attunement to being's beauty and joy. This makes childlike 
openness to the gift of being paradigmatic for fully personal acts as enacted by the intellect and will 
in the encounters between subjects and objects.  
In the third chapter, I employed Balthasar’s account of the event of a child’s birth and awakening to 
self-consciousness to explore what this unveils about the metaphysical significance of human sexual 
difference. I contrasted this both to Aristotelian metaphysical views of sexual difference and 
contemporary essentialist and constructivist positions. Balthasar’s dramatic approach to human 
fruitfulness articulates how the male-female and parent-child relationships constitute extreme 
different ways of being fully human in openness to the gift of esse as it subsists within the 
transcendence of humanity’s living spiritual form in the material realm. The force of Balthasar’s 
metaphysics means that the transcendent freedom of being a person cannot be separated from how 
esse comes concretely to subsistence within the relationships between mother, father and child. 
Here I articulated a relationship of mutual subordination such that the relationship between the 
sexes exceeds itself into the parent-child relationship which nonetheless depends on human sexual 
difference. What we discovered is that each human person is always a child whose personal freedom 
depends on, is shaped by, yet exceeds their origin in sexual difference.  
A key aspect of this third chapter was to critique how Balthasar’s understanding of sexual difference 
fails to be faithful to this metaphysical vision which requires a reciprocity between the sexes that, 
while asymmetrical, does not support Balthasar’s identification of the female with receptivity and 
the male with activity where the latter has primacy. Balthasar reduces adult childlike wonder at 
being to an abstract notion of feminine receptivity that is appropriated for the purposes of male 
fulfilment understood as either sexual fruitfulness or representing the divine. Despite his intentions, 
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Balthasar places the male outside the drama of human encounter, leaving the latter to female 
humanity while also devaluing the uniquely female way of being human. As an alternative to this, I 
focused on how differences in male and female fruitfulness are unveiled in relation to the being and 
awakening of a child to self-consciousness as gift. Here male and female are both actively receptive 
in their capacity for wonder where this is expressed differently according to their hearts' response to 
the objective reality of a child’s new being. The pattern of correlated metaphysical fruitfulness that 
this encapsulates extends beyond the realm of the sexual and familial to all interpersonal 
interaction. 
Finally, in chapter four, I explored how the metaphysical significance of these constitutive human 
relationships underpins Balthasar’s understanding of being’s transcendental aspects of beauty, 
goodness and truth wherein being’s fruitfulness is enacted. I connected this to the primacy Balthasar 
allots to beauty as the transcendental that ensures goodness and truth remain open to the vital 
groundless mystery of being’s unity-in-difference as the site of God's ever-greater gift of love to be 
shared. I argued that the male-female and parents-child relationships together constitute concrete 
co-principles of being’s beauty. Each pole enacts and mediates to the other, in a correlated way, 
how being discloses itself as radiant Gestalt whose beauty calls to the human person to respond 
wholeheartedly with childlike wonder. This informs each person’s enactment of the good and 
expression of truth. For Balthasar, if love is being’s meaning then it is a love that finds is fullest 
expression in interpersonal relationships that live out being’s beautiful good truth in its fruitful 
superabundance. This finds its measure in the fruit of a child who awakens to wonder through the 
love of its parents whose fruitfulness is shaped by how their human nature is opened to the gift of 
life which God has entrusted to the joint custodianship of male and female hearts. 
The above offers a more comprehensive and concrete account of Balthasar’s notion of meta-
anthropology. The latter requires communicating being's beauty, goodness and truth; enacting the 
fruitful reciprocity of love that permeates these transcendentals; and, thereby, concretely expressing 
the superabundance of created being’s analogical nature. This celebrates the unity that comes 
through affirming difference and the difference that is affirmed through ever-greater fruitful loving 
union. To this end, the constitutive relationships are of paradigmatic significance to how each person 
concretely lives out their meta-anthropological service to the whole in the particular. This rests 
especially on how these relationships are embedded within being's beauty. 
The association of the constitutive relationships with beauty means their significance takes on the 
urgency Balthasar attributes to the latter: 
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[without beauty] the good...loses its attractiveness, the self-evidence of what must be 
carried out. Man stands before the good and asks himself why it must be done and not 
rather its alternative, evil. For this, too, is a possibility, and even the more exciting one: Why 
not investigate Satan’s depths? In a world that no longer has enough confidence in itself to 
affirm the beautiful, the proofs of the truth have lost their cogency.... [T]he logic of these 
answers is itself a mechanism which no longer captivates anyone. The very conclusions are 
no longer conclusive. And if this is how the transcendentals fare because one of them has 
been banished, what will happen with Being itself? Thomas described Being (das Sein) as a 
‘sure light’ for that which exists (das Seiende). Will this light not necessarily die out where 
the very language of light has been forgotten and the mystery of Being is no longer allowed 
to express itself? What remains is then a mere lump of existence which, even if it claims for 
itself the freedom proper to spirits, nevertheless remains totally dark and incomprehensible 
even to itself. The witness borne by Being becomes untrustworthy for the person who can 
no longer read the language of beauty.2 
Beauty’s importance attaches particularly to how beauty is anchored concretely to sexual difference 
and the parent-child relationship. These relationships set the parameters that safeguard the human 
capacity to ‘read’ beauty. It is particularly regarding them that the significance of beauty is played 
out to profound effect. Given their paradigmatic status, they represent a singularly formative 
interpersonal context wherein the service of being is pitted against all that would threaten the 
grace-like quality of being’s beauty.  
As the passage above indicates, such threats include a deadening moralism, alluring evil, arid 
rationalism, a cold technological outlook, a forgetfulness of being's superabundance, and an inability 
to perceive beauty’s radiant Gestalten. This includes how the beautiful can be misconstrued either 
as mere superficial and escapist fantasy; or abyssal depths inimical to concrete forms. All these have 
a keen effect on the relationship between the sexes, and adults and children, and, therefore, the 
human capacity to enact what is real. As hinted in the above passage, this is expressed, in theological 
terms, in the struggle with Satan’s false depths. Echoing the book of Revelation, this can be 
construed as a battle over communicating being’s primal form that rages with regard to children; the 
childlike response of the heart to beauty; and, the male and female communication of being’s 
beautiful good truth as divine gift.3 As Balthasar says elsewhere: ‘no transcendentale is more 
 
2 GL1, 19.  
3 See TD4, 21. Balthasar refers to the heightened resistance to the victory of the Lamb that is attendant upon 
the deep things of Satan (Cf., Revelation, 2:24; 13:11). At TD4, 34, 468, Balthasar references the dragon’s 
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demonic than the kalon….. [T]he beautiful is only an appearance breathed out over what passes 
away: who knows whether it is an appearing of God or the seeming appearance of nothing.’ As with 
a diminished sense of being, beauty tends to nothingness ‘whenever man thinks he can master it in 
his transcendental reason: then the heavens praise the glory of man and the glory which they 
seemed to praise is quenched.’4  
Furthermore, by recognising a certain spiritual freedom attends being considered simply as a ‘mere 
lump of existence', Balthasar implicitly draws a distinction between, first, a fully interpersonal 
integrated spiritual existence and, secondly, a non-integrated spiritual one. The first, integrated 
perspective matches the focus of this thesis. It encompasses the whole of human nature's 
participation in being, the circumincessive relationship of the transcendentals, the reciprocity of love 
between persons, and the asymmetrical reciprocal relationship between male and female adults vis-
à-vis the birth of a child and its awakening to self-consciousness.  
The second, non-integrated perspective, while spiritual is not a response of the whole human being. 
It abstractly privileges one aspect of humanity's spiritual nature over others. Thus, fruitfulness might 
be expressed predominantly in terms of the intellect, the will, or the imagination – that is, according 
to the true, the good or the beautiful where these are isolated from each other and dissociated from 
being itself. This may be done in the name of personhood, yet a personhood abstractly detached 
from concrete human nature and the constitutive relationships. It risks elevating one sex over the 
other or an adult perspective against that of a child. Conversely, it may misappropriate the child’s 
viewpoint by fomenting an idealistic childishness which refuses an adult maturity that maintains a 
childlike openness to being’s beauty amid the trails and joys of daily existence. Such abstractions 
reduce human spiritual nature to less than it is, flattening the differences at the heart of being, 
especially differences deemed deficient, transitional, weak or superficial. Moreover, these 
perspectives may siphon off areas of fruitfulness that lose their rootedness in being’s fruitfulness, 
and so encourage a false fecundity that undermines the ontological depth of personal reality 
wherein fruitfulness finds its true ontological expression as love. For Balthasar, this tendency 
towards favouring the impersonal, abstract and all-too-adult perspective reflects the (ultimately 
futile) attempts of the demonic to undermine the personal as divine gift.5 
 
persecution of the woman, the war he wages on her offspring, and the decisive victory in the ‘birth of the 
Child.’ The latter concludes the proto-evangelion of Genesis 3:15 where God puts enmity between the 
offspring of the woman and serpent. Cf., TD4, 47. 
4 GL4, 38. 
5 Cf., TD3, 497.   
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As suggested at various points in this discussion, the possibilities and risks of this second approach 
have become pressing within a cultural context which elevates certain models of scientific 
knowledge and technological intervention.6 This extends to constructing non-living, material and 
spiritual-like technological beings that move and exhibit a certain intelligence, but are lifeless and 
impersonal. Even before the developments of recent decades, Balthasar feared that technology 
collaborates negatively with being’s diminution, and being’s wonder and fruitfulness. He worried 
that ‘[h]uman hearts have been…crushed and trampled on in this age of the robot.’7 The human 
risked becoming anima techna vacua.8 As Balthasar observed in 1987,  
[t]he age of science has replaced the era of philosophy. The “exactness” of the physical 
sciences is held up as the model for the life sciences and the humanities. At the same time, 
the aim of science is seen, with fewer and fewer exceptions, to lie in controlling or 
“changing” whatever comes within its grasp. Science subordinates itself to technology and 
productivity. The consequences of this restriction are tragic: we get precisely the opposite of 
what we bargained for: slavery, not freedom. For technology does not liberate but actually 
enslaves man on every level. But these tragic consequences can occasionally, at least by 
implication, afford us a glimpse of the unrestricted philosophical question.9 
This is the question of why anything at all and so concerns the human capacity for wonder at being 
and ultimately the person’s capacity for love. To lose a sense of how the human is proportionate to 
being’s splendour, forecloses on the dignity of the essential reality of each being, especially the 
human person and, even more so, the different sexes and the child as ways of being human that 
come not by our own making but by gift. Furthermore, such forgetfulness of being and spirit risks 
shutting out the possibility of encountering theological reality which, while entirely God’s free gift, is 
always, for Balthasar and Catholic tradition alike, mediated by the gift of being; the same being 
whose gift-like character shines out with declarative force in the demands and vulnerabilities of a 
child.   
Balthasar puts it in stark terms when he fears that human culture,  
 
6 For explorations echoing Balthasar, see David L. Schindler, “The Meaning of the Human in a Technological 
Age: Homo faber, Homo sapiens, Homo amans,” Communio: International Catholic Review 26, (1999): 80-103. 
Cf., Albert Borgmann, Technology and the Character of Contemporary Life: A Philosophical Inquiry (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1984); and, Martin Heidegger, “The Question Concerning Technology,” in Basic 
Writings, 307-341. 
7 P, 100. 
8 E, 11. 
9 E, 23. 
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will necessarily fall under the sign of the constant dominion of “knowledge,” and… science, 
technology, and cybernetics will overpower and suffocate the forces of love within the 
world. The result will be a world without women, without children, without reverence for 
the form of love in poverty and humility, a world in which everything is viewed solely in 
terms of power or profit-margin, in which everything that is disinterested and gratuitous and 
useless is despised, persecuted, and wiped out, and even art is forced to wear the mask and 
the features of technique.10 
This needs to be extended. Such a wholesale forgetfulness would also result in a world without men, 
and, ultimately, without human persons whose hearts are fashioned, in the intimacy of concrete 
loving human relationships, for the joy of childlike wonder at being’s radiant beauty as gift. As 
Balthasar says ‘[h]owever perfect things may be, man will never improve his heart through them; 
the world will only be filled with love by making ultimate decisions for love, and never through the 
ameliorations of technology.’11 Balthasar is not seeking to demonise science and technology. Indeed, 
his metaphysics underpins the integrity of the search for knowledge embodied within the sciences.12 
Rather he seeks to champion a metaphysics that abides in the wonder of being as divine gift; 
including, the questions it asks and knowledge and activity it promotes. The key is not that 
technological developments are intrinsically problematic but whether they affirm the primacy of 
beauty as the union of good and truth, and the paradigmatic importance to beauty of human sexual 
difference and the parent-child relationship. 
Balthasar’s insistence on the metaphysical significance of beauty and the constitutive human 
relationships has far-reaching implications across society and culture, raising several ethical 
questions, for example, concerning the impact of child abuse; the meaning and make-up of the 
family; children’s education; the effects of social media; ubiquitous access to pornography; ongoing 
debates about gender identity; and bio-ethical issues focussed on reproduction and genetics. To take 
one illustrative example: the possibility of artificial wombs (ectogenesis). Confronted with the non-
viability of a woman’s womb, the following represents a real possibility: 
An artificial womb could present a better alternative to commercial surrogacy, which many 
denounce as exploitative. It might also mean that the divide between mother and father can 
be dispensed with: a womb outside a woman’s body would serve women, transwomen and 
male same-sex couples equally without prejudice. If an artificial womb is created, it will 
 
10 LAC, 142. 
11 GL5, 654. 
12 Cf., Hanby, “Aesthetic Analogy,” 351-363. 
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mean that women will be freed from the dangers of pregnancy, and create a more equal 
distribution of “labour”, with women able to work throughout gestation. It will also give men 
an essential tool to have a child entirely without a woman, should they choose. It will ask us 
to question concepts of gender and parenthood.13 
Based on Balthasar’s metaphysics it would be wrong simply to dismiss this. What is required instead 
is careful discernment to test whether new procedures around the beginning of life serves the joy 
and beauty of the gift of being. Specifically, does our use of technology serve the wonder of a child 
whose uniqueness as spirit open to the gift of being and wholehearted attunement to the latter 
depends on adults who are themselves capable of affirming, through their heart’s wonder, being’s 
giftedness as personally mediated via the reciprocity of sexual difference? Alternatively, does it 
advance a view that ultimately places the desires and choices of adults against those of the child and 
any differences that are not self-chosen? 
From the former perspective, we could affirm the use of artificial wombs, say, for a premature baby 
in safeguarding the wonder of a child as gift. The conclusions of the passage above, however, despite 
ostensibly valid ethical reasons, support the latter perspective.  Absent is any consideration of a child 
as gift, as spirit whose existence and freedom is shaped for gift by concrete relationships of self-
giving love that are irreducible to mere choice because rooted in the heart’s openness to being's 
beauty as concretely manifested in sexual difference which opens to being as divine gift not human 
commodity. It also introduces the prospect of a child owing their self-conscious existence to a 
technological surrogate parent, and, behind this, various commercial and political interests. As 
Antonio López says, ‘[n]ot being the natural fruit of their parents’ love, children conceived by 
recourse to a third party perceive their belonging to their purported parents as a violation of their 
identity; they cannot be received as a gift because they were instead procured as a commodity put 
at service of fulfilling their parents’ cravings for fruitfulness.’14 This extends to the cravings of 
commercial and state enterprise. 
More broadly, the urgent metaphysical question is whether the secondary forms of human 
existence, activity and production serve and retain their vital connection to being’s primal form; or, 
whether the latter is obscured by them; or, indeed, an attempt is made to dissolve form altogether 
which, however, simply asserts a more all-encompassing yet hidden and unaccountable secondary 
 
13 Aarathi Prasad, “How artificial wombs will change our ideas of gender, family and equality,” The Guardian, 
May 1, 2017,  https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/may/01/artificial-womb-gender-family-
equality-lamb. 
14 Antonio López, “Affirming Childhood: The Form of Familial Relations,“ Communio: International Catholic 
Review 44, (2017): 626. 
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form, namely, that of pure human construction and consumption. In this twilight of ossified 
secondary forms, Balthasar notes it is more difficult and easier to reclaim being’s primal form. ‘[O]ur 
eyes lose their acumen for form and we become accustomed to read things by starting from the 
bottom and working our way up, rather than by working from the whole to the parts…. But in this 
valueless openness, the way back to primal form has perhaps been cleared….’15 The dissolution of 
secondary forms may further entrench the hegemony of the individual or collective will to destroy 
and create its own forms. Or, it may herald the advent of beauty's fruitfulness. The primal form’s 
beauty can dawn anew, unconstrainedly, wherever there is being. This, however, cannot be 
enforced. It appeals to the freedom of the heart's attunement to being. As Balthasar says, ‘the 
Beautiful never overwhelms those who resist it but, by its grace, makes prisoners of those who are 
freely convinced.’16 More concretely, beauty's capacity for renewal wherever secondary forms of 
existence have stagnated or atrophied attaches paradigmatically to the mutual grounded-ness and 
fruitfulness of human sexual difference and the parent-child relationship. They not only provide a 
metaphysical standard for judging whether secondary forms are true to being’s primal form. They 
also inscribe into human nature a responsiveness to being as beautiful gift that cannot entirely be 
suppressed but offers the hope of wonder that arrives anew with each person’s birth and coming to 
self-consciousness. 
As Gardner and Moss say, with Balthasar, this insists on ‘the cleaving of Being to birth' where ‘sexual 
difference is the chiasm of creation. Which is to say...the world as threshold. Creation is the site for 
the gift of life which knows itself only in its differencing to and from God.'17 I add this is true insofar 
as sexual difference is seen in the light of its metaphysical fruit, namely, the gift of a child's heart 
stirred into wonder at the gift of love. Balthasar says, ‘the power of Being…resides in the conferring 
of form…[where] the spirit which is immanent in form manifests itself radiantly through it.’18 If so, 
then the reclamation of the primal form’s beauty rests primordially and paradigmatic in the ever-
present possibility of the wonder of a child which is the preserve of the fruitfulness of male and 
female humanity, understood not only as sexual but as interpersonal love whose pattern of 
fruitfulness is undergirded by yet transcends the sexes’ correlated responses to being’s beauty. In 
their mutual grounded-ness, the sexes are the concrete wellspring of the groundlessness of being's 
beauty as manifested decisively in the radiant Gestalt of a human child awoken to self-
consciousness. 
 
15 GL1, 25. 
16 TD2, 35. 
17 Gardner and Moss, “Something like the Sexes,” 73.  
18 GL1, 22. 
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This estimation of the metaphysical mission of human sexual difference and the wonder of a child is, 
for Balthasar, presupposed yet exceeded by Jesus’ admonishment to his followers to value children 
and reclaim childlikeness in the image of Jesus’ divine childhood. This comes as gift. Jesus ‘can give 
them childhood – which is ultimately his own mode of existence – as a model by which to live. 
Indeed, he can communicate to them his own Spirit, that is, the gift of his own youthfulness in 
person.’19 This indicates a Christological and Trinitarian basis for affirming how adults abide in 
childlikeness. For Balthasar, ‘[t]his mystery places us beyond the opposition between seriousness 
and play. There is no more serious responsibility for God than the creation of the world, yet the 
Wisdom that stands at his side treats the whole business as a form of play…’20 This applies especially 
to adults responsible for fostering children. They participate in the serious responsibility of bringing 
into existence a new spirit as a unique divine gift. Yet, this is not simply their doing but must be 
received by them with the wonder that characterises their own status as children born of others and 
welcomed into being’s playfulness. While Balthasar acknowledges the seriousness involved, 
ultimately it is the playful openness to being as gift that marks human life.  
There is a close connection between childhood and death: the essential secret of both 
consists, quite simply, in the act of handing over the gift. It is in physical nakedness that the 
child enters the world, and it is in spiritual nakedness that he must entrust himself, stripped 
of all power, to the mystery of the Father. Everything between birth and death is a 
parenthesis. The seriousness of this parenthesis is part of God’s game, but at either end it is 
the aspect of play that stands out most prominently. The Father’s Child who proceeds from 
him eternally also returns to him eternally and in every moment of time. And this is the 
game that we, God’s other children, are invited to play….21 
Read one way this gives an impression of a child left to itself who is forced at death to abandon itself 
to God. Yet this interpretation belongs to the individual autonomous adult self. If interpreted with 
Balthasar’s metaphysical vision, the childlike handing over of the gift of being is something each 
person is constitutionally predisposed to do because they are the fruit of human sexual difference 
and their heart is awoken to self-conscious freedom by others. Handing over the gift of being is a 
function of having already received oneself from beyond oneself. Just as a child’s physical nakedness 
denotes not aloneness but dependence on the nurturing love of others; similarly, spiritual nakedness 
indicates the human spirit’s fundamental dependence on others to be freely itself. That we are born, 
 
19 ExT5, 222. 
20 ExT5, 216. 
21 ExT5, 217. 
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not made, children of sexual difference constitutes us as the gift of others' capacity for gift. Even 
where such openness to gift is not forthcoming or rejected, nonetheless because they came into the 
wonder of being as children of others, metaphysically speaking, each person's heart is always ready 
to be transformed by wonder into childlike openness to God's creative play of love, whether at their 
beginning, middle or end. 
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